
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LIVES

OF

THE MOST EMINENT

BRITISH MILITARY COMMANDERS.

BY

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LIVES

OF

EMINENT BRITISH

MILITARY COMMANDERS.

ROBERT LORD CLIVE.

1725—1776.

Robert Clive was born at Styche, in the parish of Moreton Say, in Shropshire, on the 29th of September, 1725. He derived his descent from an ancient and respectable family, which had held the estate of Stych during many generations, but which never aspired to a station in society more elevated than that of the class of middling gentry; a rank now unhappily extinct. His father, who was originally a second son, and, as such, bred to the law, continued, after he succeeded to the property, to practise as an attorney at Market Drayton. His mother was Rebecca Gaskell, the daughter of Mr. Gaskell, of Manchester; of whom we know nothing further, than that he acquired a moderate competency by fair dealing in trade.

Many tales are current respecting the youthful extravagances of Clive, of which we cannot pretend, in a sketch like the present, to offer so much as an outline. It is said, indeed, that, from the first dawning of his faculties, he exhibited a reckless and wayward temper, as well as an impatience of control, and a determination of purpose, rarely witnessed in a child; and the frequency with which he changed his places of abode, between his eleventh and eighteenth years, gives to

the rumour at least an air of strong probability. We find him, for example, first settled in Cheshire, under the private tuition of Dr. Eaton, of Lostock; who, though himself incapable of managing the caprices of his pupil, foretold that "few names would be greater than his." From Lostock he was removed to Market Drayton, where he was placed under a Mr. Burslem, the master of the grammar school, and a man of considerable attainments*: but he soon made himself so conspicuous there, by acts of daring irregularity, that his father was again compelled to seek out for him a new asylum. Merchant-Tailors was accordingly tried, though with as little effect as its predecessors; and, finally, he was given over to the guidance of Mr. Stirling, of Hemel Hempstead, in Hertfordshire. By this gentleman his irregularities seem to have been more leniently treated than by any of the others, though he not less than they spoke of Clive "as the most unlucky boy that ever entered his school."

We are not prepared to say that the juvenile reputation of Clive did positively determine his peculiar field of exertion in after-life; though it is at least possible that the circumstance may have had its weight in contributing to that end. We know, however, that his father, whose original intention it was to educate the lad to his own profession, reluctantly abandoned the design, and was content at last to avail himself of an offered appointment in India, at that time the grand arena of enterprise to the most aspiring and restless

* It is but just to state, that Clive's irregularities were almost always those of a high-spirited, not a malicious, boy. Though possessing talents of a superior order, he would never apply them except at his own pleasure; and any attempt to obtain by force what had been refused to persuasion drove him into rebellion. Of his recklessness of danger, the following anecdote will suffice to convey some idea: —

When attending the school at Market Drayton, he chanced on one occasion to be at play with his companions under the tower of an old church which stands upon the side of a hill in the town. On looking up, the urchins saw a flat stone lying on the ledge of a water-spout, which, carved into the form of a dragon's head, projected from the side of the tower more than three feet below the parapet-wall. "I wish I had that stone, to make ducks and drakes on the water," said one. "I *will* have it!" cried Clive; and, as the church chanced to be open, he immediately entered. In a few minutes he was seen sitting astride upon the dragon's head, and actually brought down in his hand the object of his wishes.

spirits of the age. This occurred in 1743, the subject of our memoir having barely completed his eighteenth year; nor was any time lost in equipping and preparing him for his voyage. He embarked almost immediately in one of the Company's ships; and, arriving at Madras in the summer of 1744, entered at once upon the duties of his office.

It were not in accordance with the plan of this work, were we to give a detailed account of the private habits of Mr. Clive during the brief period of his career as a civilian. Enough is done when we state, that for him the desk and the counting-house presented as few attractions as the school-room; and that the impatience of control which he had exhibited while a pupil, again displayed itself in his deportment as a "writer." The consequence was, that he very soon involved himself in disputes with his superiors, towards one of whom, indeed, — the secretary under whom he immediately acted, — his behaviour assumed, in the end, an air of positive mutiny. An appeal was made to the governor, who commanded Clive to ask pardon; an order which the young man could not but obey, though he did so in no very conciliatory manner; while a subsequent invitation to dinner, by means of which the triumphant functionary had hoped to smooth away all differences between them, was refused with scorn. "No sir," replied Clive; "the governor commanded me to apologise, and I have done so; but he did not command me to dine with you." Nevertheless, this same Clive, who exhibited so much impatience under the restraints of office, became, from the hour of his landing in India, a severe private student. Besides devoting his attention to the acquisition of the native languages, — an accomplishment then too much neglected among the Company's servants, — he gave up a certain portion of his time to the classics, of which, contrary to the general order of things, he acquired a fair knowledge only after he had begun to play a part on the great stage of public life.

Two years had passed in this manner, when the com-

mencement of hostilities between England and France opened out a new and more congenial field for the display of Clive's abilities. For some time the share which he took in the contest was too insignificant to demand notice. He was present, indeed, but merely as a civilian, during the bombardment of Madras, in the month of September, 1746; and became, like the rest of the European inhabitants, a prisoner on parole to M. Labourdonnais. In like manner, when Dupleix so far forgot his own honour, and that of his country, as to violate the terms of capitulation, Clive was one of those who looked upon themselves as absolved from the pledge which they had given; and he escaped, disguised as a Moor, to Fort St. David, then the chief settlement belonging to the English on the Coromandel coast. Here, again, still acting as a volunteer, he lent his aid in repelling the attempt which the enemy, flushed by recent successes, made upon the place; and here, in one of those private quarrels which too much disfigured the characters both of the man and of the age, he gave proof of that stubborn and indomitable courage which belonged to him.* But it was not till the year following, namely, 1747, that he formally accepted military service as an officer. He then solicited, and obtained, the appointment of ensign; though, by some arrangement rendered necessary, perhaps, on account of the

* The affair alluded to in the text was this: — Clive formed one of a party at play, whom two officers, by the grossest cheating, contrived to fleece. The winners being noted duellists, the others paid the money, and said nothing; but Clive at once refused to follow the example, and taxed the parties with knavery. He was challenged, went out, and gave his fire; upon which his adversary quitting his ground, put his pistol to Clive's head, and desired him to ask his life. Clive did so, but the bravo, not satisfied with this, required that he should pay the sum which he had lost, and retract what he had said. "And what if I refuse?" demanded Clive. "Then I fire," replied the other. "Fire and be d—d!" said Clive coolly: "I said you cheated, I say so still, nor will I ever pay you." The gamester, struck with the bold bearing of his antagonist, called him a madman, and threw away his pistol. We must not finish this note without recording Clive's highly honourable conduct in the sequel. When his friends were complimenting him on his behaviour, and condemning the conduct of his adversary, Clive interrupted them by observing, "The man has given me my life, and I have no right in future to mention his behaviour at the card-table; though I shall certainly never pay him, nor associate with him again."

paucity of Europeans in the country, he was still permitted to retain his situation in the civil service.

Every reader of history is aware that the years 1747 and 1748 were distinguished by the prosecution of a contest in the Carnatic, conducted, at least on the part of the English, with little vigour, and still less of skill. In the month of January of the latter year, Major Lawrence arrived from England, with authority to command the whole of the Company's troops in India. For a time he acted only on the defensive, repelling an attempt to surprise Cuddalore, and organising such resources as he could draw together, so as to be in readiness for more active operations; but the arrival, in August, of a long-expected reinforcement, under the convoy of Admiral Boscawen, at length enabled him to take the field. A march upon Pondicherry was immediately begun, the fleet steering along the coast, so as to blockade the place from the sea; and the expectations of all men, which had been excited to the highest, seemed on the eve of receiving their accomplishment. Unfortunately, however, it was judged imprudent to mask Ariancopang, a small fort distant about two miles south-west from Pondicherry. An assault was hazarded, and failed; the whole army halted, and trenches were formally opened, in one of which the commander-in-chief was made prisoner during an unexpected sortie. Still the siege went on; and the fort, after an obstinate defence, was reduced. Even now, however, the English army delayed to push forward, till it had repaired the works, which the garrison, previous to its escape, blew up; thus affording to the enemy every imaginable facility for meeting the danger by which they were threatened. It is not necessary to trench farther upon the province of the historian. Pondicherry was at length invested, and the first parallel drawn at the distance of 1500 yards from the glacis, while the nearest batteries were erected along the edge of a morass, which divided them from the object of their attack by a space of 800 yards. From such a commencement but one

result could by possibility be anticipated: the enemy's fire proved greatly superior to that of the besiegers; the cannonade from the fleet produced no effect whatever; the rains set in; sickness began to spread, and all hope of ultimate success was abandoned. Finally, after thirty-one days of open trenches had been wasted, the guns were withdrawn, and the army, having destroyed its magazines, and damaged its stores, retreated to Fort St. David.

The part taken by Mr. Clive throughout this wretched campaign was necessarily very subordinate; but it is represented on all hands to have been highly to his honour. He was ever the foremost to offer his services where danger appeared to threaten. In the assault of Ariancopang he displayed an extraordinary degree of hardihood and coolness; and the advanced trench at Pondicherry he defended against a party by whom it was assailed, with singular obstinacy. Yet, even here, he escaped not the calumnious attacks of one who, as the event proved, though bold to commit a moral offence, was wanting even in the animal courage necessary to maintain it. It chanced, on one occasion, when his piquet was warmly engaged, that the ammunition of the men began to run short. Eager to avoid the hazard of failure, Clive, instead of trusting to a non-commissioned officer, hastened himself to a depôt in the rear, and brought up a fresh supply, ere his absence from the line was observed. Of this circumstance a brother officer took advantage, to cast a slur upon his character as a soldier; but the base attempt entirely failed. Clive called his slanderer to account; and the latter was fain, in the end, to resign his commission, in order to avoid a more conspicuous expulsion from a service which he had disgraced.

The army returned from Pondicherry in October; and, in November following, intelligence arrived from Europe that a cessation of hostilities between the belligerent powers had been proclaimed in the preceding April. During some months, therefore, the military

career of Clive was suspended. But the position of the English in India, as well as that of their rivals, was now widely different from what it had originally been; and hence, though there might occur from time to time a truce, more or less extended, according as the resources at the disposal of each party should render such an arrangement desirable, no human being pretended to doubt that, eventually, a struggle must commence, to be ended only by the subjugation of one or other of the incipient empires. Nor did any great while elapse ere these anticipations gave place to reality.

Up to a recent date, not the English alone, but all the European powers by whom settlements had been formed along the coasts of India, were content to maintain the character of mere traders; and to hold, by humility and submission, a footing in the country, under the protection and subject to the caprices of the native rulers. To M. Dupleix belongs the merit, if such it can be called, of having first looked beyond the interests of mere commerce, and of aspiring at the establishment of a separate empire, which should rely for support upon its own exertions, and owe allegiance only to the crown of France. With this view, he began early to engage in the intrigues of the country powers, not, as had hitherto been the case, by supplying this or that nabob with troops and money, in the character of a vassal and tributary, but by throwing the weight of his influence into one or other of the scales, on the balance of which the Carnatic itself depended. It so happened, however, that while the French were arranging plans, gigantic doubtless in themselves, and tending to a gigantic issue, circumstances led the English into an active commencement of that system by means of which their colossal sovereignty in the East has been established. Of these it will be necessary to give some account; partly because upon them the whole tale of Indian warfare may be said to turn, partly because, in the contest which ensued, Clive took that decided lead in military reputation which he ever after-

wards maintained, as much to his country's glory as to his own.

That great and fertile portion of the globe, of which Europeans are accustomed to speak under the general appellation of India, is divided, as it were, by nature, into three parts. One of these, called Hindoostan, includes all the provinces north of the Nerbudda, from the Indus, on the east, to the borders of Chittagong; another, recognised as the Deccan, embraces the whole extent of territory between the Nerbudda and the Kistna; while all to the south of the latter stream passed, of old, under the common designation of the Carnatic. When the empire of the Moguls existed in its integrity, these several portions of the continent, though each possessed in part by many independent tribes, submitted, nominally at least, to the rule of an equal number of soubahdars, or viceroys. Like other representatives of majesty, each soubahdar was supposed to be removable at the will of the emperor; while the succession to the dignity, though permitted to pass from father to son, was understood always to depend on the decree of the supreme ruler, from whom a robe of office was solicited, and usually obtained. In proportion, however, as the Mogul empire fell into confusion, the soubahdars, like their inferiors, the nabobs of lesser provinces, began to exercise an authority virtually independent, and to transmit their sceptres, not to their children only, but to their nephews, or others nearest of kin. By degrees the custom obtained so much of force, that it came to be regarded, by all classes of men, as an established right.

As time rolled on, and the empire became more and more unsettled, the soubahdar of the Deccan so far extended his sway over the Carnatic, as to establish there a species of feudal superiority, reducing him of the Carnatic to the rank of a nabob. Still the nabob of the Carnatic continued a very powerful chief; and, though accepting from the soubahdar the ensigns of office, he made no scruple, in imitation of his superior, to transmit his doubly borrowed dignity to his children and nearest

relatives. It chanced that, in the year 1732, a person named Sadahillah, who, for some years, had held the office of nabob of the Carnatic, under Nizam al Mulk, soubahdar of the Deccan, died, leaving behind him no male issue. That the dignity might not, however, pass from his family, he had adopted the two sons of his brother; to one of whom, named Bakir Ali, he bequeathed the government of Velore; while the other, Doost Ali, he appointed to succeed himself in the nabobship. The latter, again, had two sons, and four daughters, one of whom was married to Mortiz Ali, the son of his brother, Bakir Ali, governor of Velore; while another gave her hand to a more distant relative, Chunda Sahib, who became dewan, or prime minister, to his father-in-law.

Of these various appointments, Nizam al Mulk, whose hands were fully occupied nearer Delhi, took for a while no notice: he even shut his eyes to the movements of Chunda Sahib, who, in open violation of established usages, made himself master of Trichinopoly, the capital of an ancient Hindoo principality, which had, during many generations, paid tribute to the nabob of the Carnatic, though governed immediately by its native princes. But the other rajahs, of whom there were many in southern India, became alarmed: they invited the Mahrattas to their aid, who invaded the Carnatic with an overwhelming force; slew Doost Ali in battle, and laid siege to Velore; after which they turned upon Trichinopoly, of which, as well as of the person of Chunda Sahib, they obtained possession. Meanwhile, the customary practices of oriental chieftains were industriously pursued among the relatives of the deceased Doost Ali: his sons were murdered by their cousins, who, in their turn, perished, or became fugitives; till, at last, Chunda Sahib, now a captive among the Mahrattas, alone remained to lay claim to the inheritance.* But before any final arrangements could be made, fresh actors ap-

* There were other and nearer relatives of Doost Ali alive, but none possessed of sufficient talent or energy to undertake the management of affairs so complicated.

peared upon the stage, and other and more rapid changes occurred, both there and elsewhere.

Relieved from the pressure of those affairs which had so long kept him at a distance from his own province, Nizam al Mulk, regardless of the burden of more than a hundred years, put himself at the head of a numerous army, and marched into the Carnatic. Without much difficulty he expelled the Mahrattas; and, though he treated with respect a grandson of Doost Ali, who took refuge in his camp, he nevertheless nominated one of his own officers, by name Anwar ad Dien, to the government of the province. Ostensibly, indeed, this man acted as guardian to the young Subder Ali, on whom it was the design of Nizam to confer the nabobship; but the boy died suddenly, as might have been anticipated; and when the soubahdar expired, in 1748, Anwar ad Dien became, to all intents and purposes, nabob.

There were now two candidates for the throne of the Carnatic; namely, the occupant, Anwar ad Dien, and Chunda Sahib, still a captive at Satarah. The government of the former being extremely unpopular, while that of Doost Ali and his race was remembered with gratitude, it occurred to Dupleix, that, provided the representative of Doost Ali, Chunda Sahib, could be restored, through French agency, to the musnud, the whole power of the Carnatic would, in point of fact, pass into the hands of his benefactors. Negotiations were, in consequence, opened with the captive chief, and sums of money advanced in order to procure his liberation; while the latter pledged himself to the adoption of any terms that his European friends might demand, so soon as he should recover his freedom and his authority. Even this, however, though a more extensive field of intrigue than had ever yet been entered upon by any European functionary, sufficed not to give full occupation to the active mind of Dupleix. The death of Nizam al Mulk paved the way to a disputed succession in the Deccan; Nazir Jung, the son of the deceased, being opposed there by his nephew, Mirzapha Jung;

and as Anwar ad Dien made common cause with the former, both Chunda Sahib and his French allies stood ready to support the claims of the latter.

Of the political movements of these rivals the English were far from being ignorant; though they possessed neither talent nor moral courage enough to thwart them. More than one letter was, indeed, written both to Nizam al Mulk and Anwar ad Dien, warning them of the treacherous designs of the French, and filled with protestations of British loyalty; but the idea of espousing openly the cause of the princes whom they professed to serve, seems not to have entered, for a moment, into the minds of the writers. Nevertheless, the English, equally with the French, were become ambitious of territorial possession; and fortune so ordered it, that they, in defiance of many solemn protestations to the contrary, were the first to draw the sword, for the purpose of securing it.

The rajahship of Tanjore, comprising an extent of seventy or eighty miles in length, and lying within, or immediately adjoining to, the several mouths of the river Cavery, formed one of those Hindoo principalities which the Mohammedans had all along been content to govern through the agency of their native sovereigns. It had submitted, during the reign of Arungzebe, to the father of the illustrious Sivaji, in whose family the sceptre had continued down to the period of which we write. In Tanjore, however, as in other eastern states, the seeds of usurpation were very early sown, and to bring them to perfection no more was required than a minority under the guardianship of a woman. Nana, the fifth in descent from the founder of his race, dying before his father Tuckojee, left an infant prince to the care of his widow, who, on the decease of the reigning sovereign, became first the tool, and eventually the victim, of a powerful servant. This man, by name Seid, after casting the widow into prison, slew the child to whom he had sworn obedience, and proclaimed as rajah, Sahujee, a younger brother of Nana, and, of course, a

younger son of Tuckojee. But the reign of Sahujee was equally short with that of his nephew, when Pritaupa Sing, the son of Tuckojee, though by a concubine, was, by the same agency, elevated to the throne. Pritaupa Sing, however, requited the traitor as he deserved, by causing his immediate assassination, though he did not consider himself bound to undo the work which treason had accomplished; on the contrary, he retained his power, which he appears to have exercised, as well to the satisfaction of the people as in accordance with the views of the English, who entered with him into a friendly correspondence, and treated him throughout as lawful sovereign of Tanjore.

This state of things had continued some years, when Sahujee, the exiled rajah, arrived at Fort St. David, and implored the aid of an English force in restoring him to his throne. How far the bare merits of his case would, or would not, have had weight with the English authorities, we are not prepared to say; but the assurance, on his part, that the country was ripe for revolt, and that the fort of Davicottah, with the territory attached, should reward the exertions of his friends, overcame any scruples which might have possibly existed touching the justice of the proposed undertaking. An army was immediately drawn together, of which captain Cope was placed at the head; and while the guns and heavy baggage were conveyed by sea to the mouth of that branch of the river on which Davicottah stands, the infantry, consisting of 430 Europeans and 1000 sepoys, began its march towards the point of attack.

As one of the latter force, Mr. Clive, now promoted to the rank of lieutenant, quitted Fort St. David in the beginning of April, 1749. But the expedition led to no fortunate results. A hurricane overtaking the fleet soon after it quitted its anchorage, caused the total loss of many of the vessels, and severely injured the remainder. The same tempest spread confusion through the camp which captain Cope had established along the margin of the river Valaru; and, rendering the stores

useless, besides destroying the tents, and killing many of the bullocks, compelled the column to fall back upon Porto Novo. Nor were Cope's future movements productive of more fortunate results. Having recruited his supplies, he again advanced, and, crossing the Coleroon, took post under the walls of Davicottah; against which, his heavy cannon having failed to come up, he contented himself with throwing away the few cohorn-shells which he had found it practicable to carry along with him. It was to no purpose that Clive urged him to attempt an assault, after having blown open the gate with his field-pieces. That was a mode of attack totally unauthorised by rule; and hence, after wasting eight and forty hours,—during a considerable portion of which his troops were without food,—the captain struck his tents, and retreated. The enemy followed the retiring force, which they harassed with constant skirmishes, driving not fewer than 400 coolies into the river; but the troops suffered comparatively little, except from fatigue and the privations to which the inexperience of their leader had exposed them.

Great was the mortification experienced at Madras when intelligence of this disaster came in. The possibility of defeat seems never to have been contemplated, and its actual occurrence excited at least as much of indignation as of dismay. A new expedition was immediately fitted out, at the head of which Major Lawrence placed himself; and the whole, comprising 800 Europeans, 1500 sepoys, and a formidable train of artillery, embarked without delay. The fleet, consisting partly of ships of war, partly of native traders, on board the latter of which the sepoys were placed, performed its voyage without disaster, and brought up at the mouth of the river, across which a bar, or bank of sand, is drawn. There both troops and stores were transferred to the boats; and the whole, ascending the stream, took up a position within excellent range of the fort, though the waters of the Coleroon divided them from the enemy's outposts.

The fire of a few 24-pounders, kept up without intermission during three days, sufficiently ruined the defences of Davicottah, and opened out a practicable breach. Still there was one serious obstacle to be overcome, — for the Coleroon rolled a deep and rapid volume of water in the teeth of the assailants, and its opposite bank was lined with troops securely posted among the underwood. To John Moor, a common ship-carpenter, the honour attaches of at once devising the means of crossing the stream, and bringing his own machinery into play. That individual constructed a raft capable of containing 400 men, which might be moved, as the ferry-boats on many rivers are guided, by means of a rope; and, taking advantage of a dark and stormy night, he swam the river alone, and made fast the end of a line to a tree within a few yards of one of the enemy's sentinels. Not a moment was wasted in considering how it behoved them next to act. The raft was loaded, at early dawn, with men and guns: it performed its voyage, in spite of a ceaseless fire of matchlocks and wall-pieces; and, in the course of three ours, Major Lawrence found himself, with his whole force, under the walls of Davicottah. He made instant preparations to storm; and, to Clive, whose ability and daring were well known to him, and who earnestly solicited the honour, the duty of leading on the forlorn hope was intrusted.

From the moment that the dispositions of the English became apparent, the enemy had busied themselves in cutting trenches, and throwing up breastworks, so as to intercept and enfilade the approaches to the breach. These, though as yet incomplete, were not wholly contemptible; while a muddy rivulet, that flowed in their front, added not a little to their strength. Regardless of the obstacles thus opposed to him, Clive formed his corps, consisting of 34 Europeans and 700 sepoys, into two bodies; and, putting himself at the head of the former, pushed on, after giving strict orders that the latter should follow at a very moderate interval. Not

without some loss, and considerable difficulty, the Europeans passed the stream; for its channel was stony, and its banks steep; but they no sooner gained a footing on firmer ground, than they sprang forward. It was the design of their gallant leader to take the epaulement in flank; while the sepoys, advancing to the front, should hold the garrison in check: but, unfortunately, the latter, overcome by a sudden panic, hung back. The consequences were very disastrous. A body of Tanjore horse, which stood concealed behind a projecting tower, rushed suddenly from their place of ambuscade, and, falling upon the party in the rear, cut down the whole, with the exception of Clive and three others. These, by retreating rapidly, escaped to the sepoy corps, which, though it failed to advance, stood in good order behind the stream; and the Tanjoreans, overawed by the countenance which they presented, abstained from any attempt to molest them.

Nothing daunted by this check, Major Lawrence ordered the whole of the Europeans to the front, and placed them, as before, under the immediate command of lieutenant Clive. On this occasson, every thing went on as the most sanguine could have desired. The Tanjore horse, again attempting to charge, were met by a volley which utterly destroyed them; while the men, animated by the example of their leader, rushed up the breach, and made the place their own. Nor were the future operations of the expedition less fortunate. A detachment of 100 Europeans and 200 sepoys, which took possession of the pagoda of Acheveran, a strong square building, situated about five miles to the south-west of Davicottah, repulsed a furious attempt made that night to recover it. Nevertheless, it was easy to perceive that, in the expectations which they had been led to form of co-operation from the people, the English were deceived. Not a single Tanjorean joined them; and the chiefs were, in consequence, well pleased to come to an accommodation, which, while it secured to their own government possession of Davicottah and its depend-

encies, obtained for the fugitive rajah a small pension, on which he might subsist as a private person.

While this campaign (neither very profitable nor very creditable) was in progress, the French were consolidating their power from day to day, and making rapid strides towards the acquisition of that empire on which Mons. Dupleix had set his heart. Chunda Sahib, ransomed at their expense, and placed at the head of 3000 men, soon made himself known throughout southern India as a successful warrior; and gradually added to his little army, till he had swelled its numbers to the amount of 6000. His next business was to make a tender of his services to Mirzapha Jung, already in the field; and, as these were joyfully accepted on his own terms, the allies prepared, with 40,000 men, to invade the Carnatic. As they approached the frontier, they were joined by a French force, consisting of 400 Europeans, 100 caffres, and 1800 sepoys, with which they continued their march until they arrived in the presence of Anwar ad Dien, who occupied an entrenched position under the guns of Amboor. A fierce conflict ensued, in which the French performed prodigies of valour, and which ended in the total defeat of Anwar ad Dien. He himself was slain, and his eldest son taken prisoner; while his second, by name Mahomed Ali, escaped, by the fleetness of his horse, to Trichinopoly.

Had the victorious adventurers followed up this success, by laying siege at once to Trichinopoly, there is every reason to believe that the most extravagant day-dreams in which Dupleix ever indulged might have been realised. Instead, however, of adopting this wise line of conduct, they marched first to Arcot, and afterwards to Pondicherry; where a great deal of precious time was wasted in those displays of magnificence in which oriental princes take so much delight. Nor did their errors end here. Pressed for money, of which they expected to find a supply in Tanjore, they moved against that city, only that they might be foiled and baffled under its walls by the superior cunning of the

Rajah. Meanwhile, Nazir Jung, alarmed at the progress which his rival was making, put himself at the head of a numerous army, and hastened to the relief of the Tanjoreans — already pushed to the greatest extremity. Mirzapha Jung and Chunda Sahib felt that they were not in a condition to hazard a battle. They broke up with the utmost precipitation, and sought shelter at Pondicherry.

It is not a little surprising, that the English, though fully aware of the designs of their rivals, and impressed with due alarm lest they might be realised, should have abstained, all this while, from placing themselves, where common prudence required, — in opposition to the French. They not only made no tender of their services to Anwar ad Dien, but even, after his defeat and death, permitted admiral Boscawen to depart with the fleet to Europe: nay, so decidedly pacific was the whole tenour of their bearing, that Clive withdrew from the army, and returned to his civil occupations. As his merits were universally recognised, no opposition was offered to this, certainly unusual, proceeding: indeed, he was placed at once in the same position, as to rank and emolument, which he would have occupied, had he never exchanged the pen for the sword; while his friend, major Lawrence, procured for him, over and above, the appointment of commissary to the British troops. But though thus favoured, in a worldly point of view, his situation proved to be the reverse of agreeable. He was seized with a violent nervous fever, which affected him so severely, as to render a voyage to the milder climate of Bengal necessary: yet neither that, nor the other remedies applied, sufficed to restore him to his former health. On the contrary, many weeks elapsed ere the constant depression of his spirits permitted a personal attendant to be withdrawn from him even for a moment; nor, to the last hour of his life, did he succeed in shaking off, entirely, that most distressing accompaniment of the complaint to which he had been a martyr.

It belongs not to the biographer of Clive to narrate, in detail, the progress of those remarkable events which had well-nigh given to France an absolute, though a borrowed authority over the whole of southern India. We must content ourselves, therefore, with stating, that Nazir Jung, supported by a battalion of English, took post in front of Pondicherry; and that, for a time, the fortunes of Dupleix appeared to have fallen to the lowest ebb. His officers mutinied, his troops deserted their colours; and his allies, Mirzapha Jung and Chunda Sahib, gave up all for lost. The latter, indeed, took refuge in the French presidency, where an asylum was still afforded him; while the former threw himself upon the mercy of his uncle, by whom he was immediately cast into chains. But that which open violence had failed to effect, intrigue and boundless duplicity, for a time, at last secured. Dupleix opened a negotiation with Nazir Jung, ostensibly with the view of bringing their differences to a settlement; in reality, that he might blow up into a flame the sparks of disaffection which he knew to smoulder in the camp; and the scheme, despite its unjustifiable character, went on to the most fortunate result. The English, disgusted and offended by Nazir Jung's folly, withdrew. Certain native chiefs, whose pay was far in arrear, rebelled; and, during a tumult occasioned by an attack from the French forces, Nazir Jung was slain. In a moment Mirzapha was restored to freedom, and elevated, amid the acclamations of the army, to the vacant dignity.

The first use which the new soubahdar made of power, was to appoint Dupleix governor of all the Mogul dominions on the Coromandel coast, from the river Kistna to Cape Comorin; Chunda Sahib being nominated his deputy, as well as nabob of Arcot. No umbrage was taken at this; but the earnestness with which he strove to cut down the claims of those chiefs to whom, directly at least, he stood indebted for his elevation, produced serious discontent. From the effects of this, not even M. Bussy's French brigade, which attended his march

homewards, sufficed to shield him. A new revolt took place; and though it ended, unlike the former, in the total defeat of the conspirators, it proved fatal to Mirzapha himself: he was slain by a thrust from the spear of one of the native chiefs, while engaging him in single combat.

The death of their minion would have proved fatal to the interests of the French, had not Bussy acted on the occasion with a degree of promptitude and forethought deserving of the highest praise. Passing by the children of Mirzapha Jung, all of whom were infants, he persuaded the principal men in the camp to proclaim, as soubahdar, Salabut Jung, the eldest surviving son of Nizam al Mulk. That prince was accordingly raised to the viceregal throne; and, as he undertook to fulfil all the engagements into which his predecessor had entered, neither Chunda Sahib nor Dupleix experienced the slightest reluctance to acknowledge his authority.

While these revolutions were occurring elsewhere, Chunda Sahib, in possession of the city of Arcot, assumed all the state, and began to exercise the authority, of nabob. So completely, indeed, did his power appear to be established, that Mahomed Ali had begun to negotiate with him as to terms of submission, when an act of outrageous vanity on the part of the French authorities roused the English into a bolder and wiser policy than they had yet adopted. The sight of numerous white flags waving around their settlements, operated with irresistible effect on the indignation of the authorities at Fort St. David's, and induced them to espouse openly, and without disguise, the cause of Mahomed Ali. Finding that both Chunda Sahib and Dupleix could yield nothing, and that even the possession of Trichinopoly, for which Mahomed had alone stipulated, was refused, they withdrew the qualified acknowledgment which they had given of Chunda's title, and made ready, by force of arms, to place Mahomed in his chair.

The prospect of active employment in that profession which engaged all his affections, soon drew Mr. Clive

from the more lucrative business of the counting-house. He claimed and received his rank as lieutenant; and a force being mustered in the beginning of April, 1750, with which it was proposed to march to the assistance of Mahomed Ali, then threatened with invasion, Clive immediately attached himself to it. But this renewal of Clive's military career was not attended by any very flattering augury. Captain Gingen, who commanded, after carrying the fortified pagoda of Verdachelum, sat down before Volcondah, a strong hill fort on the banks of the river Valaru; which, though summoned in the name of Mahomed Ali, refused to open its gates. The pettah, or town, was accordingly stormed; but the fort resisted all attempts at escalade: while the approach of Chunda Sahib, at the head of a formidable army, rendered it impracticable to open batteries, or attack it by regular process of siege. Nor did the disappointment of the English end here. Chunda Sahib advancing to give them battle, a panic, the consequence of too much hesitation among the officers, caused the men to waver; and the European battalion fled shamefully, in spite of the utmost efforts of Clive to rally them. Captain Gingen was, therefore, compelled to retreat with all precipitation; and leaving Volcondah to be secured by the enemy, to seek shelter under the walls of Trichinopoly.

In this discreditable retrogression Clive took no part, for he quitted the camp immediately after the disastrous affair of Volcondah. Whether he was induced to do so by a feeling of disgust, or acted in the strict line of his duty, we cannot pretend to say; but we find him, while Gingen and his comrades were sustaining an arduous siege in Trichinopoly, urging upon the authorities of Fort St. David both the wisdom and the necessity of more vigorous measures. The advice thus given according with their own views, a body of 80 Europeans and 300 sepoys were assembled, at the head of which Mr. Sanders, a member of council, placed himself, supported by lieutenant Clive. They marched first to Verdachelum, into which they threw supplies, though compelled to cut

their way through a strong force by which it was invested, and then pushed forward to Trichinopoly, where their arrival had been for some time ardently desired. Nevertheless Clive proceeded no farther than Verdachelum. He found there ample employment in animating the courage of the garrison, and teaching them how most effectually to maintain themselves; while his views extended farther than the bare reinforcement of Gingen, of whose fate, if not effectually relieved, he could not entertain a doubt. As soon, therefore, as he had placed matters on a sure footing within the pagoda, he sallied forth, attended by a slender escort; and fighting his way, sword in hand, through the enemy's patrols, succeeded, though not without extreme difficulty, in reaching Fort St. David.

This exploit had been performed but a few days, when the misconduct of certain officers rendering it necessary to remove them from the service, Clive secured the reward of his acknowledged exertions by promotion to the rank of captain. In that capacity he again took the field as second in command under captain Clarke, who was appointed to conduct a fresh reinforcement to the garrison at Trichinopoly. The little corps consisted only of 100 Europeans and 50 sepoys; yet such was the judgment with which its movements were directed, that it not only performed its long and arduous march uninjured, but encountered and overthrew a body of 30 French and 700 natives, by whom an effort was made to intercept it at the village of Condore. Still Clive was as far as ever indisposed to shut himself up within the walls of a beleaguered town: he therefore gave up his command, quitted the place almost alone, and returned to infuse fresh spirit into the councils of the authorities at the colonial capital.

We stated some time ago that Arcot, the chief city of the province, had been occupied by Chunda Sahib; and that he established there, as nabob, the seat of his power. It was suggested by captain Clive, that an attack hazarded upon that place would tend more to the

relief of Trichinopoly than any movement made directly in support of its defenders; inasmuch as Chunda Sahib would not, in all probability, permit his capital to be seized without making an effort to save it. The plan appeared feasible in all its bearings, and Clive himself was appointed to carry it into execution; though the whole force which it was found practicable to muster, amounted to no more than 200 Europeans and 300 sepoys, under the guidance of eight officers, six of whom had never seen other service than that of the parade.

On the 26th of August this handful of men, attended by a train of three field-pieces, set out from Madras, and on the 29th arrived at Congeveram, a town of considerable extent, and commanded in some degree by a large pagoda. There Clive received intelligence that Arcot was occupied by a garrison of 1100 men, and that the citadel was amply supplied both with artillery and ammunition. Nothing daunted by this information, he wrote to Madras, requiring that two 18-pounders should be sent after him without delay, while he himself suspended not his forward movement for one hour. So bold yet so prudent a procedure failed not of leading to the happiest result. It chanced that a violent thunderstorm came on when the column was now within ten miles of Arcot; and so astonished were the enemy's troops at the hardihood of Clive and his companions, whom the fury of the elements neither checked nor discommoded, that they evacuated the fort without waiting for a summons. Clive marched through the open town amid a concourse of 100,000 spectators; and entering the abandoned citadel, caused the British flag to be hoisted upon its ramparts.

Neither disheartened under difficulties, nor lulled into mistaken confidence by success, Clive immediately employed himself in preparing his newly-acquired conquest to resist the storm with which he doubted not that it would be speedily assailed. He ordered a stock of provisions to be laid in, and, while his instructions were receiving

their fulfilment, he himself led out a portion of his little army in pursuit of the fugitive garrison, which was understood to be hovering near. He came up with them, in number 900, including a body of 600 horse, near the castle of Timery, distant about six miles south-west of the city. It cannot be said that any action ensued; for the enemy, though they fired a few shots at long range from a single piece of cannon, would not abide the approach of the English. Scarce a musket was discharged, ere they fled in confusion, and found safety among the hills in their rear.

As it formed no part of Clive's plan to risk his handful of brave men too far in the open country, he contented himself with this success, and returned to Arcot; but hearing, on the 6th of September, that the enemy had again collected in his neighbourhood, to the amount of 2000 men, he determined once more to attack them. On this occasion a more serious affair occurred; for the enemy had a couple of guns which fired with some effect, while their position, partly in a grove, partly under cover of an old tank, enabled them to sustain for a few moments a tolerably warm fusillade. But Clive saw the advantage which their position gave them, and soon made his dispositions to deprive them of it. Having drawn his people behind the cover of certain buildings, he detached an officer with 40 men to take the tank in reverse; while he himself, with the remainder, prepared to rush upon it from the front. The movements were well executed, and produced all the effect that had been anticipated from them. The enemy, driven from their strong ground, took shelter within the walls of Timery, which Clive, being destitute of battering cannon, found it impracticable to reduce; and hence, after throwing a few shells into it, he fell back upon Arcot, observed, rather than harassed, all the way by the enemy's cavalry.

Well calculated as these movements were to impress the adherents of Chunda Sahib with respect for English valour, they did not prevent the gradual assembling of a

force, by which Arcot was, in some degree, invested. It is true that the besiegers, if so they may be termed, kept aloof for a time with extreme caution, — a sentiment which was certainly not diminished by the result of a sortie which Clive made during the night of September the 14th: nevertheless, as the force by which he was threatened became more and more numerous, his anxiety to receive the 18-pounders for which he had written gained strength. In due time he ascertained that they were in full march towards him; but as the messenger who brought this intelligence communicated also that the enemy were making dispositions to cut them off, Clive felt that the greatest risks must be run, otherwise the most serious consequences might follow. With characteristic hardihood, he ordered every man under arms, except 30 Europeans and 50 sepoy soldiers, with whom he himself proposed to defend the citadel against any attempt at surprise; after which instructing them to storm the pagoda of Congeveram, of which he learned that the enemy had taken possession, he taught them where to receive the convoy, and how to conduct it in safety to the place of destination. Again the most perfect success rewarded his courage and foresight. The enemy did endeavour, during the absence of the covering party, to seize the citadel, and were repulsed in a night attack, with heavy loss; while the convoy, taken up by those sent out to meet it, marched through the city, and entered the fort in triumph.

In the meanwhile Chunda Sahib, alarmed by the loss of his capital, took the step which Clive's sagacity enabled him to anticipate, by detaching 4000 men from Trichinopoly, under his son Rajah Sahib, whom he commanded, at all hazards, to recover the place. This corps, being reinforced on in its route by 150 French soldiers from Pondicherry, entered Arcot on the 23d of September, and proceeded, in conjunction with the army already assembled there, to tighten the chain of investment. But Rajah Sahib soon found that he had no common adversary with whom to deal. At daybreak

on the morning of the 24th, Clive directed a sortie to be made, with a view rather to impress the besiegers with a thorough conviction of their own inferiority as soldiers, than for the purpose of driving them from a large open town. It was conducted with great gallantry, in two columns, at the head of one of which Clive himself went on; and it so far produced the desired effect, that Rajah Sahib appears to have been struck with amazement; but it cost the garrison dear. Upwards of 30 Europeans, including 2 officers, one of artillery, the only scientific soldier in the place, fell, or were disabled in the conflict, while not a single trophy, not even a gun, though several were at one moment in their possession, was carried back by the daring assailants.

Though astonished at the temerity of the English, Rajah Sahib was far from abandoning his enterprise,—which, on the contrary, a further reinforcement of 2000 men, received on the day following, enabled him to prosecute with increased vigour. It had been a principal object with the garrison to ruin all the houses which in any degree commanded or interfered with the fire from the ramparts. This they had very imperfectly accomplished; and Rajah Sahib, as prudence required, caused the whole to be occupied in force, so as to sweep the parapet with a murderous discharge of musketry. Clive made a desperate effort to relieve himself from this annoyance. He sent out at midnight an ensign and 10 men, whom he let down by ropes from the walls; and, giving to them four or five barrels of gunpowder, he directed them, let it cost what it would, to blow down the troublesome buildings. The gallant little party penetrated into the range unobserved; they laid their mine, too, as judiciously as darkness and the necessity of concealment would allow; but, unfortunately, it was not placed aright, and, when exploded, did little damage. Nor was this all: the rope, by which the officer endeavoured to regain his place in the fort, broke; and Clive was in consequence deprived of another coadjutor,

at a season when the services of all were becoming hourly more and more valuable.

There were now left only four officers, including Clive, 150 Europeans, and 200 sepoy soldiers, to maintain a fort, which, besides, that it was of extremely irregular formation, and in many parts positively ruinous, measured a full mile in circumference. Its defences consisted of a wet ditch, almost every where fordable; a rampart too narrow for the action of artillery; a parapet low, slight, and dilapidated; with several towers, of which some were in ruins, while each was incapable of containing more than a single gun. Two gateways gave admission to this place of strength; both of them galleries, which, projecting forty feet beyond the line of the works, were approached, not by drawbridges, but by narrow causeways, run across the moat. But the matter in which, above all others, Clive found himself wanting, was in cannon. The 18-pounders brought up from Madras composed the whole of his heavy train; and even of light guns, varying from 4 to 9-pounders, he possessed only eleven. Still, where a governor is resolute, and a garrison faithful, means, slender according to ordinary calculation, are found to avail even in moments of emergency. Neither Clive nor his brave followers looked at their scanty resources, except with a view to make the most of them; and their zeal and intrepidity led to the result, which intrepidity and zeal may almost always ensure.

During the first fourteen days after the investment was completed, the enemy, not yet furnished with battering cannon, carried on the siege by means of a bombardment, and an incessant fire of musketry. From the former the garrison suffered little; but the latter was so close and so well directed, that not a man could show himself on the walls, the very sentinels being posted under embankments hastily thrown up during the night. On the 24th of October, however, two 18-pounders, with seven lighter pieces, arrived from Pondicherry, and Rajah Sahib began — the French serving

his guns, — to batter in breach. The first discharge, striking one of Clive's heavy guns, dismounted it; the second rendered it utterly useless. A similar fate befell the remaining 18-pounder, which being seriously injured was withdrawn; after which the enemy compelled the besieged to hide the remainder of their artillery, so superior was the practice of the French gunners. This done, they threw such a weight of unopposed fire upon the crazy towers and ramparts, that in six days they had beaten down not less than fifty feet of wall. But Clive, nothing daunted by the failure of his outward line, exerted himself to render the breach defensible. He caused retrenchments to be thrown up; cut a deep ditch behind the ruins; scattered crowsfeet and other impediments along the slope, and placing three of his field-pieces so as to enfilade the approach, waited resolutely to receive the assault. Of all this the enemy received immediate intelligence, for there were spies on both sides, between whom a constant communication was kept up: they, therefore, abstained from bringing matters to the issue of a storm, till a second breach should have been effected.

While Rajah Sahib was erecting a new battery, and preparing to batter the south-western face of the fort, the garrison employed themselves in erecting a lofty tower, from the summit of which they were enabled to overlook the whole of the besiegers' movements. With extreme labour they mounted here an enormous iron gun, honeycombed by age, for it belonged originally to Arungzebe, and cumbersome to the last degree. From this huge engine they ventured to throw, once a day, a ball weighing 72 pounds; though to effect this they were compelled to load it with 30 pounds of gunpowder, and discharge it by means of a train laid along the ground. Nothing, of course, could resist such a shot: it went sheer and direct through the palace where Rajah Sahib had established himself; but though it excited great alarm among the courtiers, it produced no other result, for on the fourth discharge the gun burst.

In this manner the siege went on, the army throwing up mounds, which were beaten down by the garrison, and firing with prodigious effect upon the new breach. This became, ere long, equally practicable with the other; and, notwithstanding the incessant volleys with which the garrison swept its face, it was manifest to all that the hour of final trial could not be much longer deferred. Meanwhile, however, an attempt was made from Madras to throw in succours; and a party of 100 Europeans, with 200 sepoys, set out for the purpose. But, being attacked during their march by overwhelming numbers, and suffering severely from a cannonade, they were compelled to fall back upon Ponamalee. Nor was the approach of 6000 Mahrattas, under their chief Moravi-Row, more beneficial to Clive and his companions. Though hired by the king of Mysore to support Mahomed Ali, and pledged to effect a diversion in Clive's favour, these fickle marauders stood aloof, as if waiting the result of the struggle; of which Rajah Sahib was now so little confident, that he sent in to offer honourable terms to the garrison; and a large sum of money to its commander, as the price of surrender. Both propositions were, however, rejected; and the Rajah, at once exasperated and alarmed, (for the Mahrattas began, at last, to move, and a fresh column was approaching from Madras,) determined to try the hazard of a general assault.

The 14th of November, the anniversary of the murder of the brothers, Nassein and Jassein, is observed as a high festival among the Mohammedan inhabitants of India. They celebrate the event amid the wildest excesses, and are taught to believe that all who fall in battle on that day, while fighting against unbelievers, are translated at once to the highest paradise. Of the enthusiasm produced by the return of that sacred season, Rajah Sahib took advantage; and, after plentifully supplying his people with intoxicating drugs, issued orders that the fort should be stormed at break of day. But the source of information which had so frequently

enabled Clive to anticipate the designs of the enemy, failed him not on the present occasion. He made himself fully master of their plan of operations; and, having with characteristic coolness, completed the arrangements necessary to thwart them, he lay down in his clothes, and slept soundly.

The first dawn of the morning displayed to the eyes of the watchful garrison a magnificent, though a very formidable, military spectacle. Excited to the highest pitch of enthusiasm, the besiegers came on in four columns; one against each of the gates, the others in the direction of the breaches, while a swarm of independent companies rushed with ladders in their hands, to scale the walls in every interval. At the head of each of the corps destined to assault the gateways moved several large elephants, partially defended by iron plates upon their foreheads, from which long iron spikes projected; while a huge raft was already launched in that part of the ditch, which, without some instrument of passage, would have held the assailants at bay. Clive and his gallant followers beheld these judicious preparations without dismay. Though reduced, by recent losses, to barely 200 men, of whom 80 only were Europeans, they stood to their posts like persons prepared for the last extremity; the front ranks alone handling their weapons, while those in rear found more useful occupation in enabling them, by a constant succession of loaded muskets, to sustain an uninterrupted fire.

Nothing could exceed the fury of the assault. The ditch in front of the north-western breach being fordable, the enemy rushed through with the recklessness of wild beasts, and gained not only the summit, but the nearest of the retrenchments, ere so much as a check occurred. In like manner, the raft was crowded in a moment, by men who seemed to value life as nothing; while, elsewhere, ladders were applied with the most daring intrepidity, in the face of a murderous discharge of every species of missile. But if the assailants were fierce, those who defended the ruins were cool, resolute,

and collected. They had pointed their slender artillery with measured exactness; piles of grenades lay every where ready for use, and a hedge of bayonets presented itself to receive the daring men who struggled up the broken steep, or hung madly on the ladders. The most dreadful slaughter ensued. Mowed down by shot, or transfixed by pikes, or lacerated by the fragments of shells which every where burst around them, the enemy vainly sought to move the stubborn garrison from their posts, and died by hundreds, rather than relinquish an attempt too gigantic for human accomplishment.

For a full hour the combat raged with all the fury which gives its character to a struggle on "the deadly imminent breach." Not at a single point, however, had a lodgement been effected, for the old breach was covered only with dead carcasses, and the raft which sustained the assailants of the new breach fell to pieces under the well-directed fire of a gun served by Clive himself. To have persevered any longer would have been to throw away the lives of his troops for no purpose: so Chunda Sahib caused the signal of retreat to sound; and his broken and dispirited columns gladly obeyed it. They fled in absolute confusion; and though they rallied under cover of the houses, whence they sent to solicit a truce for the purpose of burying their dead, they showed no disposition to try the fortune of a renewed attack. It is true that, at four in the afternoon, as soon as the truce expired, their guns opened again with great alacrity, and that the fire thus resumed was kept up, with considerable spirit, till two on the following morning. But at that hour it wholly ceased; and when daylight came, Clive's patroles discovered, that Rajah Sahib had retreated, leaving several pieces of cannon, and a large quantity of baggage, behind. Thus, after a close siege of fifty days' duration, the garrison was relieved from the presence of a fierce and exasperated enemy; while its commander enjoyed the lofty satisfaction of finding, that his perseverance and indomitable courage had not been exercised in vain.

On the evening of that day which witnessed the repulse of Rajah Sahib, the long looked for succours from Madras arrived; while a considerable body of deserters presenting themselves, Clive found that, after sufficiently providing for the continued maintenance of the place, he would be able to take the field at the head of 900 men. With these, of whom 200 were Europeans, he marched out immediately in pursuit of the flying enemy, whom he expected to find in their former position under the guns of Timery. But not considering themselves safe so near their enterprising opponent, they had fallen back towards Velore; upon which, Timery, abandoned to the defence of its ordinary garrison, surrendered on the first summons. Clive threw a few men into the place, and returned to the vicinity of Arcot.

Had it been possible to bring the Mahrattas, of whom not fewer than 6000 were in the province, to act either vigorously or systematically in co-operation with himself, Clive would have advanced at once upon Velore, where, notwithstanding the industry with which they had fortified their position, he would have engaged, doubtless with success, the combined French and Indian armies. The Mahrattas, however, at all times more inclined to plunder than to fight, kept entirely aloof, till a night attack successfully executed upon their own camp, induced a portion of them to attach their fortunes to those of the English. This had not long occurred, when intelligence of the movement towards Arni of a corps from Pondicherry came in: — Clive instantly got his people under arms, and though again deserted by the Mahrattas, made a movement to cut off the convoy; but the enemy, informed of his approach, retreated to Chittapet, from whence, in a few days afterwards, they again moved to Arni, and formed a junction with Chunda Sahib. Meanwhile Clive, who had returned to Arcot, was exerting his best endeavours to concentrate a respectable force, and having prevailed upon Basin-Row, with 600 Mahrattas, to join him, he

determined, if possible, to bring on a battle. With this view he pushed towards Arni, accomplishing a march of twenty miles in a single afternoon; and arrived in presence of the enemy just as they were preparing to cross the river. Chunda Sahib's forces amounted to little short of 5000 men, of whom 300 were Europeans, and 2000 cavalry. He believed himself more than a match for the handful of troops that now threatened his rear; so, directing a counter-march to be executed, he began to retrace his steps, for the purpose of giving rather than receiving the attack.

This movement was no sooner discovered, than Clive ordered a halt; and taking advantage of a village that covered one flank, and, a grove of palm-trees which protected the other, he drew up, with the Mahrattas on the right, the sepoys on the left, and the Europeans, with all the artillery, in the centre. In his front, again, was a paddy field, swampy and impassable to cannon through which, however, a causeway ran, leading circuitously towards the village; while behind him was a plain, offering slender chances of escape, should his line give way in the presence of a cavalry so superior. The enemy, on the other hand, made ready to attempt the position in two columns. Of these, one consisting of all the French infantry, 1500 sepoys, and four pieces of cannon, bore down along the causeway in the direction of the village; while the other, made up chiefly of horse, among whom were interlaced about 1000 sepoys, threatened the palm grove.

We have spoken of the Mahrattas as being, of late years at least, more conversant with the art of plundering than with that of fighting. On the present occasion, however, they ably sustained the reputation which their forefathers had earned under Sivaji; for they not only sustained, with great gallantry, the onset of the attacking body, but made repeated charges in the face of a heavy musketry fire. Meanwhile the enemy's left column suffered so much from the cannon which enfiladed the causeway, that it fairly recoiled. Indeed,

the sepoys rushed into the field, where they drew up in line, leaving the guns but feebly supported by a few platoons of Europeans. Clive saw, and lost not a moment in making use of, that fatal error. Sending a couple of pieces round to sustain the Mahrattas, and holding the main body of his English infantry in hand, he directed a rush to be made by three or four companies from the village upon the enemy's guns; and his orders were obeyed with so much steadiness, that the people left to guard the battery fell back with precipitation. Clive instantly followed up the advantage thus gained. He led out a strong support, pressed the retreating force along the causeway, drove it from two choultries, where an attempt was made to rally, and turned the enemy's line. Immediately the sepoys in the rice field broke and fled; while the cavalry, following their example, hurried from the palm grove, and left the Mahrattas masters of the field. In this action, which lasted in all considerably less than an hour, there fell of the enemy fifty French, and 150 natives; the English lost only two Europeans and eight sepoys; the Mahrattas about fifty in killed and wounded.

The tide of fortune was now completely turned, and Clive was not the man to make the least of its change. He pursued Rajah Sahib through Arni, of which the governor, though he refused to open his gates, took the oath of allegiance to Mahomed Ali. He then, after separating from his Mahrattas, who proceeded to join their chief in the neighbourhood of Trichinopoly, marched upon Congeveram, into which, during the late siege of Arcot, the French had thrown a garrison. After a sharp action, sustained on the part of the enemy with musketry alone, he took the pagoda by assault, the French evacuating the place as his troops began to enter, and narrowly escaping with their lives. Finally, he beat down the fortifications, which, with his present means, it would have been inconvenient as well to repair as to defend; and after securing Arcot, by posting there a body of 200 Europeans and 500 sepoy

infantry, he brought the campaign to a close in the middle of December, by retiring with the rest of his corps to Madras.

The withdrawal of Clive's force from the field served as a signal of reunion to the scattered and dispirited bands of Rajah Sahib; who no sooner found that his indefatigable enemy had retired into quarters, than he began again to act on the offensive. The works at Congeveram were repaired, and a fresh garrison thrown into the pagoda; after which numerous marauding parties were sent out, which carried devastation up to the foot of St. Thomas's Mount. Throughout the whole of January, indeed, the rajah continued master of almost all the open country; and, by the havoc which he spread around, caused serious injury to the revenues both of the nabob and the English. To put a stop to this destructive species of warfare, Clive was again called upon to take the field, at the head of 380 Europeans, 1300 sepoys, and six pieces of cannon; an army, if such it may be termed, which the English government succeeded in drawing together only by making large draughts from all the garrisons, not excepting that of Arcot itself.

Clive's first object naturally was to overtake the enemy, and to force them, if possible, to a general action. For this purpose, he marched upon Vendalore, a town near which, and at the distance of twenty-five miles from Madras, they were understood to have formed an entrenched camp. He found, however, as he proceeded, that they had suddenly broken up and departed, no one knew whither, with every mark of haste; and the conclusion to which he came was, that intelligence of some disaster at Trichinopoly had reached them, and that they were marching to support their chief in that quarter. Notwithstanding all this, Clive pursued his journey till he reached the site of the enemy's encampment; whence, being better instructed as to their movements, he pushed upon Congeveram, near which he learned that they were concentrating.

Again he reached his point of destination only in sufficient time to be made aware that the enemy were still in advance of him. They had heard of the enfeebled state of the garrison at Arcot, and they were now hastening to that place, in the hope of being able to surprise it ere supplies could be sent from any other quarter.

Clive summoned the pagoda, which opened its gates, without offering any resistance. He then gave his troops four and twenty hours to repose; after which he resumed the line of march, and pressed towards Arcot. This was the more necessary, as advices had come in of a discovered correspondence between Rajah Sahib and two sepoy officers in garrison there; while the enemy were ascertained to be in possession of the town, between which and the citadel skirmishes had already taken place. But Clive was destined to attain the object of his wishes sooner than he had anticipated. His advanced guard was already within sight of Coveripawk, towards which its steps were somewhat carelessly turned, when, just after sunset, there opened upon it a heavy fire of grape from nine guns stationed in a grove, at 250 yards distance. These were French pieces, which, supported by 100 Europeans, Rajah Sahib had so placed as to enfilade the road; while, with the remainder of his army, amounting in all to 5000 men, of whom 300 were Europeans, he prepared to attack the English both in front and on the flank.

So little was this affair anticipated, that the line wavered, and became confused, recovering its steadiness only after the men were removed from the high road, and placed under the shelter of an empty watercourse. They had not, however, occupied this position many minutes, when the enemy, advancing in column with 300 French grenadiers at their head, made a furious effort to dislodge them. A warm musketry fire ensued, which was sustained by both parties during two hours, the moon shedding her light upon the scene, even before the last rays of the sun were hidden; while a cloud of cavalry,

rushing past, hung upon the right of the English, and made more than one attempt to cut off the baggage. But it was by the fire of the guns, to which his inferior train could offer no effectual opposition, that Clive suffered most severely. These sweeping the road, and commanding the whole compass of the plain, rendered any formation of the line next to impossible; indeed, it was manifest that, unless means were devised to silence the cannonade, the most disastrous consequences must ensue.

There was attached to Clive's corps a serjeant, by name Schawlum, who spoke the country languages with great fluency. This man, attended by a few sepoys, Clive sent out with orders to reconnoitre the grove closely, and to collect all possible information touching the position of the artillery, and the amount of infantry by which it was covered. Schawlum executed his commission with admirable address, and brought back a report so faithful, that an officer was immediately detached, at the head of 200 Europeans and 400 natives, for the purpose of storming the battery. Lieutenant Keene, the name of the individual thus employed, performed his part with equal gallantry and caution. Though challenged by a large body of the enemy, who sat in a hollow road in rear of the guns, he contrived, by answering in French, to deceive them, after which he led his party by a detour to the right, within the cordon, and came, with all the effect of a surprise, upon the gunners. One volley, delivered at the distance of thirty yards, sufficed utterly to disperse them; and in five minutes afterwards every gun was silent. Nor was this all; Keene, following up his first impression, pursued the fugitives to a choultry, into which they rushed in such numbers, as to become perfectly immoveable; and, compelling them to lay down their arms, made sixty out of the hundred Frenchmen prisoners.

While this was going on, the troops left in the watercourse, intimidated by the departure of Keene's detach-

ment, began to waver; nor was it without great exertions that Clive succeeded in keeping them in their ranks. By and by, however, the cessation of the cannonade from the grove taught both them and their opponents how affairs were speeding. There was no more need of entreaties or remonstrances to hold them to their front. The men raised a shout, and sprang forward to charge; upon which the enemy broke and fled in the utmost confusion. Clive instantly reunited his scattered divisions, and, without hazarding a pursuit, which, in his case, would have been folly, passed the night under arms on the field of battle.

The loss sustained by the enemy in this affair amounted, independently of prisoners, to 50 Europeans and 300 sepoys; that of the English to 40 Europeans and 30 sepoys killed. There were a good many wounded on both sides; but it is not by the mere amount of slain that the consequences of a victory are to be estimated. Inconsiderable as the scale may seem of the actions which we have heretofore recorded, they led, one and all, to very important results; and the present proved to be, perhaps, the most important of all which had yet been fought in the Carnatic. Rajah Sahib's adherents melted from him like snow under sunshine. His horse deserted, and took service elsewhere; the whole of the open country, to the extent of sixty miles in length and thirty in breadth, submitted to Mahomed Ali; while still farther advantages would have doubtless accrued, had not the march which Clive had begun to direct upon Velore been suspended. The situation of the belligerents in and around Trichinopoly had, however, become such, as to draw to that point the undivided attention both of the English and French governments; and Clive was, in consequence, directed to return to Fort St. David, where a powerful armament for the relief of the besieged was in process of organisation.

We have not considered it necessary, while recording the exploits of captain Clive, to describe at length every

transaction in the war of which he proved so distinguished a leader; neither is it our intention to deviate, on the present occasion, from the rule which we have laid down for ourselves. It would, indeed, occupy much more of space than our limits afford, did we attempt to act otherwise. Nevertheless, that the operations in which he was now about to engage may be rendered in any degree intelligible, it becomes necessary that we should offer a brief and general outline of the state of affairs, as these existed at Trichinopoly during the close of 1751 and the earlier months of the year 1752.

The city of Trichinopoly stands at the distance of thirty leagues from the sea, about half a mile from the southern bank of the Cavery; and, for an Indian place of strength, is fortified with great care and science. About five or six miles above the town, the Cavery divides itself into two branches, which, after separating for the space of two miles, again approach, and are prevented from uniting, about fifteen miles below, by a narrow mound, artificially formed. The space contained within the branching river and this mound is spoken of as the island of Seringham, and is celebrated as containing one of the most venerated of all the pagodas scattered throughout Southern India. All around the town is one wide plain, diversified here and there by the occurrence of a few solitary rocks, and intersected, as the plains of India usually are, with tanks, watercourses, and other artificial channels of irrigation.

While Clive was carrying every thing before him in Arcot, captain Gingen found himself shut up here by a French battalion, under the orders of M. Law, and by the army of Chunda Sahib, increased, by recent reinforcements, to the amount of 20,000 foot and 15,000 horse. The siege, however, was conducted with so little skill or vigour, that even the investment cannot be said to have been completed; for while both French and Indians pitched their camp opposite the eastern and northern faces, the west and the south were ob-

served by patrols alone. As to batteries, again, that which M. Law accounted his principal, contained only three 18-pounders, which, from a distance of 1200 yards, battered the north-eastern angle of the town; while two others, one of two 18-pounders, erected on the summit of the French work, fired at 2000 yards, somewhat to the east of the former; and a second, from the island of Seringham, commanded the road from the northern gate to the Cavery. From such attacks as these Gingen had little to apprehend, though the paucity of his numbers compelled him to act with caution; and hence, he contented himself for a while with throwing up a few outworks, which either covered the ramparts from the enemy's shot, or enabled him to watch with better effect their movements against his foraging parties.

The pecuniary resources of Mahomed Ali, not at any period extensive, soon began to fail; and his troops became clamorous for pay. In this emergency, besides drawing largely upon the treasury at Fort St. David, he opened negotiations both with the Mahrattas and the king of Mysore; from whom, after endless delays, and the customary process of chicanery, he secured both supplies of money and an accession to his forces, which raised the native army to full 40,000 men of all arms. Still, though by the Mahrattas several brilliant services were performed, the war continued exceedingly to languish. Gingen, aware how little could be effected by natives against disciplined troops in possession of fortified posts, refused to commit himself and his handful of Europeans in any attack upon the enemy's batteries; while the enemy, overawed by the bold front which the Mahrattas presented, held back as much as possible from encountering them upon the plain.

Such was the condition of both sides at Trichinopoly, between whom, however, the Mahrattas, disgusted at what they beheld, had begun to waver; when, early in March, 1752, there assembled, at Fort St. David, a body of 400 Europeans and 1100 sepoys, with eight

pieces of cannon. To the command of this force, of which it was the business to conduct to the beleagured town a valuable supply of military stores, major Lawrence, who had just returned from England, placed himself; and Clive, acting as second in command, the whole, on the morning of the 15th, set forward. On the 26th, the convoy halted for the night, within twenty miles of Trichinopoly, and deposited in a fort belonging to the king of Tanjore such of their stores as would most seriously retard their march. Next day they were again in motion, along a road which passes within point-blank range of Coiladdy; and, as major Lawrence had ascertained that the place was in possession of the enemy, he directed his guides to conduct him by a different route. Unfortunately, however, in seeking to avoid one danger, the guides carried the convoy into another. They led the column so close to the banks of the Cavery, that the enemy's guns from Seringham got the range; and though Clive, with the four pieces attached to the rear-guard, did his best to keep the fire under, some loss was sustained. The consequence was, that, after traversing barely ten miles, the convoy was compelled again to halt, at a place where it received, by the arrival of 100 infantry and 50 dragoons from the town, full assurance that as yet the communications were open.

Having passed the night in bivouac, the troops were roused and under arms long before day, and, on the first blush of dawn, resumed their movement. A short march carried them within view of the rock of Elimiserum, — a steep and craggy eminence, surmounted by a pagoda, which the French had early occupied as an advantageous post, and now held, supported by cannon. About three miles to the north-west of this stood the French-rock, also in possession of the enemy; while at an obtuse angle from the latter lay the village of Chucklypollam, the original situation, as has been already shown, of M. Law's battalion. As his columns proceeded, major Lawrence failed not to observe, that

if he kept to the main road, he must be led to the north of Elimiserum, — a circumstance on which the enemy appeared to have fully counted, and to take advantage of which ample dispositions were made. He beheld them formed, as it were, on two sides of a square; one of which stretched from Elimiserum to the French-rock, while the other extended from the French-rock to Chucklypollam, — and he became at once aware of their intention to surround him, so soon as he should fairly have committed himself in the attempt to force a passage. Lawrence was too much a master of his art to be caught in a snare so palpable. He passed Elimiserum to the north, and halted only when joined, halfway between that and another height, called the Sugar-loaf, by a party of 600 men and four field-pieces, under the orders of captain Dalton, from the town.

Baffled by this simple and obvious evolution, M. Law hastened to repair his error, by moving forward his whole army, as it were in pursuit of the convoy. This was not at first observed by the English, who, overcome with the excessive heat of the day, sat down to rest; but a body of Mahrattas, whom Lawrence had left in his rear to skirmish, soon came in at speed, and the necessity of preparing for an encounter was made apparent. While Lawrence took upon himself the charge of arranging his troops in order, Clive volunteered to reconnoitre, and went on till he had left the nearest of the videttes considerably behind. He then discovered that the enemy had been guilty of a gross error; that M. Law was too much occupied in dressing his line, to think of seizing a range of stone buildings which stood but a little way in his front; and hence, that an opening was presented, of which, could the English avail themselves of it in time, the most important advantage might be made. He galloped back, explained himself to Lawrence, and in five minutes more was in rapid march towards the buildings, at the head of a division of artillery, and all the grenadiers in the army. His promptitude and decision received their merited reward. By something short

of 800 yards he anticipated the French battalion which endeavoured to check his approach by a heavy cannonade; and then, opening upon them with his guns, he held them completely at bay, till Lawrence, with the rest of the regular troops, came up.

The action which followed, though far from bloodless, was one of artillery alone. Twenty-two pieces thundered upon the buildings, to which the English replied with nine only; yet such was the advantage gained to the latter by the shelter of the walls, that the enemy were forced in the end to withdraw. They were followed with great spirit by Clive and Dalton, at the head of the first division, which pressed forward in spite of the bold front presented by Chunda Sahib's cavalry; till the latter taking to flight, on the death of their gallant leader, the French threw themselves pell-mell into an empty watercourse. There, nothing but the disinclination of Lawrence that his men should remain longer subject to the action of a vertical sun, under which several had already died, saved them from utter annihilation; for Clive gained a position from which he could have enfiladed them with terrible effect, and was fully prepared to take advantage of it. Nevertheless, he obeyed, without a murmur, the signal of recall, and that night the convoy took up its quarters in Trichinopoly.

A variety of movements now took place, of which, as Clive acted throughout in a very secondary capacity, it is not necessary to give any detailed description. We content ourselves, therefore, with stating, that the enemy's posts on the south of the Cavery were one after another attacked; and that the loss of some, with the daring attempts made to obtain possession of the remainder, struck dismay into the councils of M. Law. In spite of the remonstrances of Chunda Sahib, that officer determined on withdrawing entirely beyond the river; and the retreat was conducted with a degree of haste and confusion for which it is quite impossible to account. Magazines, which it had cost both hazard

and labour to collect, were destroyed; and all the rocks and pagodas, which they had hitherto found so useful, being abandoned or blown up, the Gallo-Indian army sought shelter within the island, or rather peninsula of Seringham.

It is not easy to conceive how an officer possessed of common experience, could, with an open and friendly country in his rear, commit the grievous error of placing himself in a situation where the means of egress were hazardous, and the opportunities of receiving supplies extremely difficult. Such, however, was the error which M. Law committed; nor did the consequences likely to arise out of it, provided a bold policy were pursued, escape for one moment the penetrating eye of Clive. He hastened to explain himself to Lawrence; his views were admitted to be just; and the brave and high minded veteran, holding in contempt the paltry feelings to which men, circumstanced as he was, are apt sometimes to give way, adopted without scruple the suggestions of his inferior. Nay, more; while he entered cordially into the plans of Clive, and acknowledged that to him would belong the principal merit of success, he determined to place his adviser in such a situation as that, even in the eyes of the unobservant, his genius might become as conspicuous as it already was to all who saw behind the curtain. In plain language, he resolved, provided no violent opposition was offered elsewhere, to place Clive in command of that portion of the army which, at the conclusion of the conference, it was judged expedient to detach for the purpose of cutting off all communication between Seringham and Pondicherry.

The plan which Clive proposed, and Lawrence with so much honourable frankness adopted, was attended, beyond doubt, with considerable peril; for it implied the necessity (not under any circumstances to be hastily incurred) of throwing the army in the face of an enemy scarce inferior to itself, astride upon two rivers. By pursuing that bold course, and occupying every

outlet from the island, one or other of two results must inevitably follow. If the dispositions of the confederates should prove such as to render them capable of maintaining the investment at all points, both Law and Chunda Sahib must eventually surrender; should any one of the detachments permit itself to be attacked at a disadvantage and defeated, the destruction of the whole was inevitable. On calculating the chances, however, it appeared, both to Lawrence and to Clive, that they were decidedly in favour of the attempt; and hence, with the perfect knowledge on their minds that all must depend on the vigilance and activity of those in power, they resolved that it ought to be hazarded.

Of the anxiety which he had experienced touching the disinclination of Clive's superiors to yield in his favour the honour of a separate command, Lawrence was at once, and in the most satisfactory manner, relieved. The confederates, more especially Morari Row, the Mahratta chief, refused to detach a man, unless to Clive were committed the guidance of the expedition; and hence, as much for the purpose of satisfying them, as in obedience to his own wishes, Clive was elevated to the important trust. On the 6th of April, therefore, a little before midnight, he began his march at the head of 400 Europeans, 700 sepoys, 3000 Mahrattas, 1000 Tanjorean horse, and 8 pieces of cannon, of which six were field-pieces. He led his column into the island, about three miles to the eastward of Jumbakistnah, whence, after a trifling skirmish with one of the enemy's foraging parties, he proceeded to the Coleroon, of which also he made good the passage before break of day; thus escaping all danger of molestation while entangled by the river. Then, pushing forward about seven miles on the road to Utatoor, he seized the village of Saniavaram, which, with its two pagodas, he converted, in an incredibly short space of time, into a fortified camp, containing a square redoubt on which he mounted his cannon.

While this was going on, M. Law, alarmed at the

aspect which affairs had assumed, sent out a strong party, which seized a pagoda not far from Clive's encampment, and began immediately to entrench. Clive was not blind to the advantages which either party must obtain by securing that building, the lofty situation of which enabled it to overlook the whole of the surrounding plain; and he resolved, let the measure cost what it might, to take possession of it. He gave orders to that effect; but the detachment employed, though gallantly led to the assault, was repulsed with loss. The enemy, however, fearful lest the attempt should be renewed, evacuated the place that night; and Clive, establishing an outpost there, devoted his whole attention to intercept any supplies that might be forwarded to the island.

It was well that the charge of guarding against this accident had devolved upon an officer of Clive's singular vigilance and activity. No sooner was the situation of M. Law known at Pondicherry, than Dupleix devoted all his energies to relieve it; his indignation at the folly of the commander in no way interfering to blunt the edge of his anxiety for the deliverance of the troops. A body of 620 infantry, of whom 120 were Europeans, with four field-pieces, were got together, and the whole received instructions, under the command of M. d'Auteuil, to convoy a stock of ammunition and necessaries to Seringham. On the 14th of April the convoy reached Utatoor, whence they intended, by making a detour round Saniavaram, to gain the Coleroon the same night; but Clive, whose information was at all times excellent, made his dispositions to intercept them. Leaving a slender guard in the camp, he moved out soon after dusk, and proceeded along the route by which he was aware that they must needs advance. Nevertheless, when informed that his approach had been discovered, and that the enemy were fallen back again upon Utatoor, he too retraced his steps, and returned to his old position.

Never were the effects of forethought and decision

more fully illustrated than on the present occasion. There were spies in Clive's camp not less than in that of the enemy, by whom the movement of the English to intercept M. d'Auteuil and his corps had been communicated to M. Law; and the latter eager to avail himself of every advantage which fortune might throw in his way, made his dispositions accordingly. A body of 780 men, of whom 80 were Europeans, chiefly deserters from the English army, and, therefore, the better fitted for their present purpose, were ordered to march from the island immediately after dark, and to attack the guards which had been left for the protection of the camp, whom there was every reason to believe they would find unprepared. The column reached the outer trench without interruption, soon after midnight, when its leader was informed by one of the spies that Clive had returned about an hour before. No credit was, however, given to the statement which, on the contrary, was attributed to the cowardice of the speaker; and the assailants, headed by the deserters, who replied, when challenged, that they came as a reinforcement from Major Lawrence, penetrated unopposed within the lines. They passed in perfect order through the bivouac of the Mahrattas, who lay encamped round the pagodas and redoubt, and had gained the entrances to the latter, in one of which Clive lay asleep, ere a shot was fired. But being again challenged here, and both officers and men becoming nervous, the leading files discharged their pieces, and attempted to carry the gateway at a rush. Clive, awakened by the report, sprang to his feet. He ran to the upper pagoda, where his Europeans lay; and, getting about 200 of them together, proceeded in all haste to the spot whence the firing proceeded, utterly at a loss to conceive in what so strange a tumult should have originated, and willing to attribute it to almost any other than the true cause.

Arrived in the vicinity of the redoubt, he beheld, to his amazement, a battalion of sepoys firing, as he be-

lieved at random, in the direction of the enemy's position. Convinced that they were his own troops, and that some strange infatuation had come upon them, he ordered his Europeans to stand fast, while he himself proceeded alone to allay the panic under which the sepoys manifestly laboured. His astonishment, however, increased fourfold, when the first man whom he addressed, instead of recognising or obeying, rushed furiously upon him with his sword, and wounded him in two places. Clive's anger rose. He returned his adversary's thrusts, who fled after a brief struggle, and was followed towards the lower pagoda, where, however, the whole matter was rendered clear by a challenge fiercely given, not in the English, but in the French language. Clive, indeed, found himself in the midst of six French soldiers, ere he could well make up his mind what to think; and the problem came immediately to be solved, by which party should the tone of a conqueror be assumed.

Perhaps no man ever possessed in a more perfect degree than Clive the quality of presence of mind; without which a soldier, of all men living, is the most helpless. In an instant he felt the full force of his situation; and, obeying the impulse of a ready judgment, he told the men coolly, that he came to offer them terms, on the rejection of which they should be put to the sword without mercy. The better to enforce this address, he requested them to look around, that they might convince themselves of the presence of his whole army, and the utter hopelessness of resistance. The Frenchmen became alarmed. Three of them laid down their arms and submitted on the spot, with whom he immediately returned to his Europeans; while the other three fled into the pagoda, of which their countrymen and the English deserters had made themselves masters.

It was Clive's design, on regaining his European battalion, to order an immediate charge on the sepoys; but he found, to his chagrin, that they had marched

quietly away, having been permitted to pass, under the idea that Clive himself had ordered the movement. He could, therefore, attempt against them nothing farther than to send intelligence of the whole affair to the Mahrattas; but to the assault of the pagoda he promptly led up every disposable man, and a heavy fire of musketry and field-pieces commenced. Clive naturally concluded that an attempt so bold would be supported, sooner or later, by a general attack along his whole line; and he was therefore anxious to repossess himself of this place of arms, ere the enemy should be able to succour it. Not all his efforts, however, availed. The deserters, fighting not for liberty but for life, repulsed every attempt to gain admission; and the return of day found them in full occupation of the pagoda, and resolute, as it appeared, to hold it to the last.

By this time the real state of the case had become known; and Clive, aware that these desperate men must submit or perish, yet willing to save the lives at least of his own people, approached, under a flag of truce, to summon them again. He leaned on this occasion, being faint from loss of blood, upon the shoulders of two serjeants, both of whom were of shorter stature than himself, and from the nature of his position advanced somewhat beyond the line of his person. It was fortunate for him that the case chanced to be so; for the leader of the deserters, desperate as he might well be, fired upon his old commander, and shot both his supporters dead. That act, however, of which it was the design to render all accommodation impracticable, led only to the opposite result. The French, disgusted at the traitor's perfidy, and fearful of being involved in its consequences, immediately laid down their arms; and the pagoda, with its now diminished but still formidable garrison, passed into the hands of the English. Nor were the sepoys who had accompanied this forlorn hope of Europeans more fortunate than their comrades. The Mahrattas no sooner became acquainted with the true state of the case, than

they sprang into their saddles, and, overtaking the fugitive battalion just as they gained the bank of the Coleroon, rushed sword in hand upon them. Not a man escaped, to tell how that ferocious charge was conducted.

From this time forth there occurred no event of which the consequences were not equally advantageous to the English and fatal to their adversaries. The fortress of Coiladdy, which commanded the eastern extremity of the island, was taken, and the last magazine of provisions which M. Law had established fell into the hands of the victors. M. D'Auteuil was again anticipated and driven back by a detachment under Captain Dalton, who pursued them as far as Volcondah, and himself took possession of Utatoor. The mound also, which holds the two branches of the river apart, was seized; and, post after post being carried, the investment of the island became all but complete. Next the strong redoubt of Pitchandah was breached and stormed by a detachment from Clive's corps; while, to sum up all, his chiefs began to shrink from the falling fortunes of Chunda Sahib, and deserted him with their followers by thousands. Still, however, both Chunda Sahib and Law showed a bold front to their enemies. They shut themselves up in the two great pagodas, which they resolved to maintain to extremity, because they had not yet relinquished the hope that effectual succours might arrive, or at all events that D'Auteuil's corps would certainly join them.

While major Lawrence delayed to act against the pagodas till a battering train, for which he had sent to Davicottah, should arrive, Clive put himself at the head of 100 Europeans, 1000 sepoys, 2000 Mahratta horse, and six field-pieces, with which he marched once more in quest of D'Auteuil. The latter, giving out that he would recover Utatoor at all hazards, had advanced from Volcondah; the governor, of which, with true Indian faith, was already in communication with Mahomed Ali; and now Clive, going forward to meet him, lay

concealed during an entire day and night within the streets of the threatened town. D'Auteuil, however, had either not intended to fulfil his boast, or, informed of the dispositions made to receive him, prudently abandoned the enterprise; nevertheless, he escaped not the fate which it was Clive's object to inflict. He was followed in the retreat, which he commenced after advancing within seven miles of Utatoor, and, being deceived into a halt, while yet a league from Volcondah, was threatened on all sides by clouds of Mahrattas. Still he continued his march, and gained the town, behind the mud walls of which he drew up; but, being furiously assailed here, all his exertions proved useless, and the place was carried by assault. Finally, the governor refusing to admit him into the upper fort, and threatening to turn his guns upon the lower redoubt, to which the French had retreated, the latter were compelled to capitulate, and the whole laid down their arms, the officers engaging not to serve again against the nabob, the privates becoming prisoners of war, and the deserters receiving a free pardon.

With the destruction of M. D'Auteuil's corps ended the last hope both of M. Law and Chunda Sahib. The former, indeed, had now but one end in view, namely, to secure the personal safety of his abused and unfortunate ally; with which design, after many a painful debate, it was determined to try how far one or other of the confederate chiefs might be prevailed upon to favour his escape. A dire extremity it doubtless was, which impelled a man in Chunda Sahib's situation to intrust his personal safety to the care of those who thirsted for his blood; nevertheless, a negotiation was at length opened with the general of the Tanjore contingent, who, in consideration of a liberal reward, took an oath on his sword and dagger to see the unhappy prince escorted to the nearest French settlement. To contract engagements only that they may be violated, is but too much in accordance with Asiatic notions of policy; and, on the present occasion, the ordinary course of

things was not avoided. Chunda Sahib put himself under the protection of the Tanjorean, was loaded with chains, became a fruitful subject of wrangling among the confederate chiefs, and at length died by the poniard of an assassin. The final catastrophe, however, did not occur till after M. Law and his troops had surrendered; an event which befell almost immediately on the arrival of the battering guns, and after a solemn declaration had been made by major Lawrence, that a protracted struggle would lead only to an indiscriminate slaughter.

Signal as the successes of Mahomed Ali and the English were, it soon became apparent that the former, by entering rashly into engagements which it would have been utter ruin to fulfil, had, while prosecuting one contest, laid the foundation of another and still more arduous struggle. The remains of M. Law's army were scarcely disposed of, when the Mysoreans demanded the surrender of Trichinopoly and its dependencies, the price which Mahomed Ali had agreed to pay for their services. As a matter of course, the nabob rejected the requisition, even though by doing so he rendered himself powerless to follow the victory just won; and hence major Lawrence, instead of proceeding with the whole of the allied army, to complete the conquest of Arcot, saw himself involved in a labyrinth of intrigues and negotiations, with which we have, in this place, very little concern. The result of the whole proved, however, to be in the highest degree unfavourable to the English interests. Both the Mysoreans and the Mahrattas withdrew from the confederacy, and entered into alliance with Dupleix, whose spirits were supported under his reverses in one quarter by the brilliant aspect of his affairs in another. Bussy was by this time all-powerful at the court of Sulabut Jung. He had obtained from that soubahdar a deed which conferred upon Dupleix the dignity of nabob of the Carnatic; and now Dupleix, by virtue of the powers thus obtained, conferred upon Rajah Sahib, the son of Chunda Sahib, the rank of his deputy. He next entered into the schemes both of the

Mysoreans and Mahrattas; engaged to give up to them, not Trichinopoly alone, but various places besides; and then assembling all the force which he found it practicable to embody, sent out a fresh army to support his novel pretensions.

In the campaign which ensued, Clive took for a while no part, for his health had given way under the privations and fatigues of active service, and he withdrew to recruit it into Madras. When, however, Mahomed Ali sent to implore the assistance of the English government in recovering the forts of Chinglaput and Cobeling, then occupied by the French garrisons, Clive, though ill able to undertake the duties required of him, could not resist the demand made upon his services. He consented to place himself at the head of 200 English recruits just arrived from Europe, with whom, supported by 500 newly raised sepoys, he committed himself in an enterprise from which almost every other officer in the country would have turned away.

With this totally undisciplined corps, of which the European portion was made up of the very offscouring of London, Clive marched, on the 10th of September, to Cobeling. He carried with him four 24-pounders, of which scarce a man in his little army understood the use; and, in truth, his progress, for a time after he sat down before the place, was not very different from what might have been anticipated. The men, terrified at every shot which took effect, either fled from their posts or lay down; indeed, the panic was on one occasion such as to defy, for a few moments, all Clive's exertions to allay or even to appease it. By dint, however, of remonstrances and exhortations, and still more by a reckless exposure of his own person, he gradually inspired his followers with better feelings; and these miserable recruits became, ere many days elapsed, bold at least, if not very skilful soldiers. The consequence was, that, after a good deal of firing on both sides, and a feeble attempt to obtain relief from Chinglaput, the place surrendered at discretion, the commandant stipu-

lating merely for protection to his own private property, which consisted chiefly of turkeys and snuff. Nor was this all that Clive accomplished, with means apparently so inadequate. Besides anticipating a second corps while on its march to interrupt the siege, and defeating it with the loss of 100 men, he pushed upon Chinglaput, against which also he threw up batteries. It does not appear that the governors of either of these forts, of which the latter was considered, and not without justice, to be a place of considerable strength, entertained very lofty notions of the degree of daring imposed upon them by their respective situations. Chinglaput, on the contrary, held out only till a breach was effected; after which, without waiting till the ditch should be drained, it too surrendered at discretion. This was the last exploit which Clive was enabled to perform, for a time at least, in the presence of an enemy. His constitution failed him altogether; and hence, after vainly lingering at Madras till the return of spring, he took shipping, amid the profound regrets and admiration of his countrymen, for England.

The reception which awaited him at home was in no degree at variance with his eminent services and high renown abroad. From the East India Company, in particular, he received every mark of attention, and, among others, a diamond-hilted sword, of the value of 700*l.*, which he consented to accept only after he had been assured that a similar mark of respect would be paid to his friend and old commander, major Lawrence. Nor were the directors content to limit their proofs of esteem and confidence to the mere presentation of honorary gifts: his health was scarcely restored, when they conferred upon him the appointment of deputy-governor of Fort St. David, with the right of succession to the chair as governor at Madras; while, in order to render his talents the more available in the field, they obtained for him the rank of lieutenant-colonel in the king's service. Finally, when, in the spring of 1755, he avowed his intention of returning to India, they placed under

his orders three companies of artillery, with three or four hundred recruits of the line ; which, together with such troops as he might be able to assemble at Bombay, he was instructed to lead on a special expedition against the Mahrattas.

Clive performed his voyage without the occurrence of any accident, and reached the place of his destination in the beginning of November. Instead, however, of a wide field on which to display his enterprise, he found southern India enjoying a sort of relaxation from open war ; for Mr. Sanders and M. Godhen had, but a few months previously, concluded that negotiation which suspended, for a brief space, the hostile movements of their respective countrymen. Nevertheless, Clive was not disposed to waste in idleness even the narrowest interval in his public life. As there was no other enemy to subdue, he suggested the propriety of an attack by sea and land upon the strong-hold of a pirate chief, who with his predecessors had, for the space of eighty years, kept the trade of western India in perpetual alarm ; and his views corresponding with the wishes of the civil authorities, troops were embarked, and the fleet set sail.

The pirate against whom this expedition was directed derived his descent from that Angria who, during the period of the great contest between the Mahratta nation and the Mogul, had first conducted the fleet of the former successfully against the Siddees; and then seizing the castle of Severndroog, set up for an independent prince. His successors, who, in honour of the founder of their race, bore, like him, the name of Angria, improved upon this first conquest, and spread their arms over the whole extent of coast, which, stretching at the breadth of twenty miles from the mountains to the sea, not less than 120 miles in length, embraces all the country between Tamanah and Bancoote. It is not easy to imagine a tract of country better adapted to the purposes of a piratical tribe. Intersected by numerous rivers, and indented with bays and promontories, its

harbours were numerous, safe, and convenient; while a multitude of rocky fortresses at once served to secure the plunder, and afforded an asylum to the rovers when overmatched and in danger.

We have said that colonel Clive suggested to the functionaries at Bombay the propriety of employing, in conjunction with a Mahratta army, the force assembled there in the extirpation of this nest of pirates. It is, however, but just to mention, that full proof had been exhibited, during the preceding summer, of the superiority of British courage and discipline over barbarian hardihood; and that two of the strongest of Angria's castles were already reduced by the fire of a small squadron, under the command of commodore James. Still there existed in Bombay so much of groundless caution, that even James's successes would, probably, have gone unimproved, had not Clive been on the spot, to urge the adoption of worthier counsels. Be this, however, as it may, a fleet, consisting of fourteen armed vessels, including three ships of the line, and five bomb-ketches, quitted the roadstead of Salsette Bay on the 11th of February, 1756; on board of which were embarked 800 Europeans and 1000 native infantry, under the immediate orders of colonel Clive. Never was undertaking attended with more complete success. Gheriah, the chief station of Angria's banditti, and a place of extraordinary strength both by nature and art, surrendered after a furious attack of two days' duration, when the whole of the rover's fleet was burned, and a valuable booty, both in money and stores, rewarded the exertions of the combatants. Then followed attacks on other posts, which, one after another, submitted;—so that in the beginning of April, when the squadron returned to Bombay, the Mahrattas were once more in peaceable possession of the whole line of coast.

Having accomplished this enterprise, colonel Clive continued his voyage, and arrived, in the beginning of May, at his government of Fort St. David. He remained here in a state of comparative quiet till the

month of August following, when intelligence of the ruined state of the Company's affairs at Calcutta coming in, he hastened to Madras, in order to lend to the authorities there the aid of his counsels. Whence the necessity of this anxious deliberation originated it is necessary, for the elucidation of matters yet to be narrated, that some account should be given.

With the eventful career of Alverdy Khan, an usurper, doubtless, but, at the same time, one of the most distinguished whom India has produced, no reader of history can be absolutely unacquainted. After maintaining a long and arduous struggle, sometimes with the Mahrattas, sometimes with the Pitans, and, on more than one occasion, with the representative of the Mogul, Alverdy established himself as soubahdar of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa, and swayed the sceptre with a degree of authority not often enjoyed by an oriental viceroy. Firm, yet humane in his general government, he at once held the people in due subjection, and protected them from wrongs, insomuch that men forgot the deeds of atrocity by the perpetration of which his power had been consolidated, and he became to the full as much an object of their love as of their respect. Under him the several European colonies were permitted to carry on their trade in safety, though he peremptorily prohibited them from deciding, within the limits of his dominions, quarrels in which he had no concern; and if he did from time to time exact sums of money, as the price of his favour, the English at least had no right to complain that his demands were exorbitant.

Alverdy Khan being without male issue, adopted as his successor Zamdee Hamed, the second son of his brother Hodgee. Zamdee Hamed was a man of talent and virtue, but unfortunately died before his uncle, who, led away by the partiality which he had entertained for the father, transferred the adoption to his son, in violation of the rights of an elder nephew originally passed by. The youth thus chosen to inherit a crown, and who became afterwards notorious under the

appellation of Surajah Dowlah, appears to have been one of the most depraved and vicious monsters that ever disgraced the human form. Delighting from his childhood in the infliction of pain, he began by exercising his depraved taste upon birds and domestic animals, and ended, as such a commencement led all men to expect, by giving vent to his humours in acts of the most brutal tyranny. Finding that his uncles,— one of whom, Nowagis, was married to the daughter of Alverdy Khan; while the other, Sid Hamed, had adopted his younger brother,— both looked with disapprobation on the position which he filled, he caused the most influential of their adherents to be assassinated; and abstained from dipping his hands in their blood also, rather because he judged it prudent to avoid the scandal, than because his conscience revolted at the crime.

It so happened that both Nowagis and Sid Hamed died natural deaths before Alverdy Khan was gathered to his fathers; and, as a necessary consequence, the union which had heretofore subsisted between their houses was dissolved. Surajah Dowlah's younger brother was dead also, and an infant son, about three years of age, alone survived him; nevertheless, neither the widow of Nowagis, nor the son of Sid Hamed, then governor of Purneah and its dependencies, felt at all disposed to submit quietly to the accession of the heir presumptive. The widow, however, who possessed large treasures, entertained so much doubt respecting the issue of a contest, that she instructed her dewan, or prime minister, by name Hossein Kooli Khan, to find shelter for them elsewhere; and Hossein sent his son Kessindas, after obtaining the sanction of Mr. Watts, the chief of the English factory of Cossimbuzar, with several boat-loads of valuable effects to Calcutta. A knowledge of this arrangement no sooner reached Surajah Dowlah, than it excited his bitter indignation against the English. He represented them in the most unfavourable light to Alverdy Khan, and accused them of strengthening their fortifications with

a view to the conquest of the soubahdary; nor was it till after he had held a long and confidential communication with Mr. Ford, the English surgeon, who attended him in his last illness, that Alverdy's mind became disabused of its suspicions. But the storm which continued only to lower while Alverdy swayed the sceptre, soon burst after the government passed into Surajah's hands. The former died on the 9th of April, 1756, and the latter lost but little time in wreaking his vengeance upon the infidels, whom he abhorred with no ordinary hatred.

Events so ordered it, that just about this time intelligence of an approaching rupture with France reached the government of Calcutta. The better to protect themselves against the chances of surprise, the English began immediately to repair their batteries along the river, and to mark out one or two additional works, some of them looking towards the land. Surajah Dowlah gladly seized the opportunity to interfere. He turned an army of 50,000 men, which he had raised for the purpose of reducing the son of Sid Hamed, against the factory of Cossimbuzar, of which, as well as of the persons of Mr. Watts and his coadjutors, he, partly by fraud, partly by violence, obtained possession. He then marched upon Calcutta, where the hope had been too long encouraged, that, by submission and offers of money, his anger might be appeased, and, assailing it with prodigious fury, entered the fort by storm, in spite of a gallant but unsuccessful resistance. Of the cruelties which were perpetrated upon the garrison, if not by his orders, at least under his sanction, it is not our business to tell the tale. We state sufficient when we inform the reader that the settlement was entirely ruined, and that the whole of its European inhabitants were either murdered or expelled.

On the 15th of July letters reached Madras, containing the most urgent entreaties for support from the authorities at Calcutta. It was then, however, too late; and the armament which set sail, in consequence of that

requisition, arrived only to behold how effectually the work of destruction had been accomplished. Nevertheless, the indignation of the English was at least as great as their terror. Clive was hastily summoned from Fort St. David; a council of all the leading men in the colony was held, and, during several weeks it was debated whether an effort should be made to avenge the wrong received, and to re-establish the colony. At last, after a great deal of hesitation, for which, to say the truth, there was some ground, it was resolved to suspend for the present certain designs, which had latterly been entertained, of superseding, by the presence of a British force at Golcondah, the influence of M. Bussy, and to employ every disposable man and vessel in one great effort to recover Calcutta, and to chastise Surajah Dowlah. Still, however, there remained some points to be settled. A difficulty arose as to the fitness of several candidates to undertake the perilous and important enterprise; but, in the end, the general choice fell upon colonel Clive, who, with his usual promptitude, accepted without a scruple the commission thus honourably pressed upon him.

The force composing the present armament consisted of five vessels of war, besides numerous storeships and transports, on board of which were embarked 900 European and 1500 excellent sepoy troops. The whole set sail from Madras roads on the 16th of October; and after suffering various disasters, including the loss of a fireship, came to anchor, on the 15th of November, at Fulta. It was here that the miserable remains of the colony from Calcutta had established themselves, and here also the corps first sent out was found; so that the total number of fighting men could not be estimated at less than 3000 of all arms.

Having delayed some time, to refresh the men, and despatched threatening letters to the Mohammedan governor of Calcutta, the leaders of the expedition brought their preparations to a close; and, on the 28th of April, the fleet came to anchor at Mayapore, about

ten miles below Buz-buzia, a fort which had been recently thrown up for the purpose of impeding the navigation of the river. As the works were yet imperfect, and no great resistance was anticipated, Clive determined to land, in order that he might cut off the garrison when driven by the fire of the shipping from the fort. For a time all things went on as he could have wished. The disembarkation took place; the infantry, dragging two field-pieces, were conducted by Indian guides, along a circuitous and swampy plain, to the rear of the redoubt, where they lay down, some in a deep hollow, others apart in a grove, and the artillery-men beside their guns, which were pointed to command the road. It is difficult to account for the absence of common vigilance which both Clive and his brother officers displayed on this occasion. Not a picket nor a sentry appears to have been planted; while the men, weary with their march, were permitted to go to sleep, without orders, and at a distance from their arms.

Moneck Chund (the name of Surajah Dowlah's governor), if not a man of courage, was at all events wary and cautious. His spies tracked Clive throughout the whole of his movement, and made themselves acquainted with the singularly unsoldierlike manner in which he concluded it; after which they informed their chief, who had come the day before, with 2000 foot and 1500 horse, to Buz-buzia. His plans were speedily arranged; he marched out on the instant; and the slumbering assailants were speedily roused by a heavy discharge of small arms on all sides of them.

If Clive committed an error in exposing himself to the risk of a surprise, he amply redeemed it by the coolness and decision with which he met and repelled the danger. Not a man was allowed to quit his ground, and though the line was formed without much regard to order, it stood firm under a fusillade which it was not permitted to return. Two parties, however, detached from the flanks, were pushed forward at double

quick time, to take the assailants, now crowded into a village, in reverse; while a body of seventy volunteers, the wreck of the original settlers in the province, poured in a steady fire on their rear. The enemy soon relaxed the exertions with which they began the combat. They did not venture to await the shock with which they were threatened; but, dispersing into small bands, endeavoured to harass the English by a desultory and, by degrees, a useless skirmish. But the guns, which at the first panic the English had deserted, began now to play, causing terrible havoc among the masses more remote; till, in the end, the whole fell back in confusion, nor halted till they reached Calcutta. That day Buzbuzia sustained a warm cannonade from the nearest of the ships of war; and the same night, the enemy's garrison having evacuated it, the pickets took quiet possession.

Irregular and imperfect as the operations before Buzbuzia had been, they gave to Moneck Chund and his people a much more exalted opinion than they had previously entertained of the valour of English troops, and, as a necessary consequence, paved the way for other and more important successes. Calcutta, for example, was abandoned by the main body of Moneck Chund's army, and left to the protection of 500 men; while even at Hoogly, whither the general retreated, a feeling of alarm and distrust was excited. Little opposition, therefore, was offered to the fleet, which, after reducing the castles of Tannah and Aligur, cast anchor in front of Calcutta, where a few broadsides, thrown in with effect, sufficed to drive the enemy from their guns. Both the town and citadel were abandoned, and a party of seamen and marines took quiet possession.

Having reinstated Mr. Drake in his office as governor, and restored as much of order to the dismantled colony as circumstances would allow, the leaders of the expedition despatched a force of 350 men to make a descent upon Hoogly, and to destroy, if possible, the enemy's depôts in its vicinity. The former having been breached by the fire from the shipping, was carried by assault;

while the latter, feebly defended, suffered total annihilation; nevertheless, the result of these successes, however gratifying in themselves, threatened, at one moment, to prove the reverse of advantageous. The nabob, exasperated by the fall of Hoogly, not only treated with scorn such proposals of accommodation as it was judged prudent to make, but, reassembling his army at Mexadabad, began a movement *en masse* towards Calcutta. Nor was this all: there arrived at the same time official intelligence that war between England and France had begun; and, as there chanced to be in the French settlement at Chandernagore a battalion of 300 regular European troops, Clive could scarcely flatter himself with being able to make head against the combined exertions of two such powerful enemies. Nevertheless, though, through the agency of Ormichund, a native merchant of great wealth and influence, he continued still to aim at an accommodation, he took care that the measures necessary to retard the nabob's progress should not be entirely neglected.

At the distance of a mile and a half from the outskirts of the town there was an unfinished ditch, to which, because it had been undertaken for the purpose of sheltering the native inhabitants from the incursions of the Mahrattas, the name of the Mahratta ditch was given. It began at the Hoogly to the north, was carried round in a semicircle towards the east, and would have ended, if complete, on the Hoogly again, to the southward of Calcutta. As it was, the trench covered only the northern and eastern faces of the Company's territory, by a line greatly too extended for any purposes of defence. About two miles to the eastward of this trench there is a lake abutting upon a wide and impassable swamp, which stretches to the sea, and forms, as it were, a natural barrier against all hostile approaches in that direction. Clive saw, and estimated at its true value, the advantages which the occurrence of these impediments offered. He directed an entrenched camp to be formed about a mile to the northward of the town, and at the distance of half a mile from the river;

thus effectually providing that no enemy from the northward should be able to violate the company's territory, without at least developing his designs. This done, and a garrison being thrown into a redoubt, or castle, at Perring's Point, Clive established his outposts, and waited with all patience the turn which events might take.

In the apprehensions which they entertained of an alliance between the nabob and the French, the English chiefs were happily deceived; for the French, with unaccountable short-sightedness, rejected the overtures of the nabob, and proposed that between them and their European rivals a local truce should be maintained. Though it is an error to assert that any formal treaty to that effect was ever signed, at least by Clive, no doubt can exist that he obeyed the dictates of prudence by amusing the Frenchman with expectations which were destined not to be realised; but he was far from feeling at his ease, even when opposed to the nabob alone. On the contrary, his hopes of victory became so slender, that he intermitted not, even after the advance began, his deprecatory correspondence through Ormichund, and when that channel failed, others were with anxious avidity sought out. Neither offers of accommodation, however, nor the demonstrations which he judiciously made, arrested the enemy's progress for a moment. On the 30th of January, the nabob crossed the river, about ten miles above Hoogly, and, while the smoke of burning villages marked his route, arrived on the 2d of February in the vicinity of the camp.

Exceedingly reluctant to take any step which might render the pacification to which he still looked impracticable, Clive beheld, without opposing them, this swarm of barbarians gain possession of a great road, which, stretching north and south, conducts to a stone bridge, by means of which the head of the lake is crossed. Here the road turning, runs almost in a straight line east and west, till it touches upon the Mahratta ditch; and here, had he been resolved on risking a battle for the preservation of the territory, it

was Clive's business to have thrown up entrenchments. But, swayed in part by the motives to which we have already alluded, and in part indisposed to divide his already feeble army, Clive abstained from doing so; and Surajah Dowlah, as a matter of course, gained the pass without firing a shot. Immediately his hordes spread themselves over the whole of the space between the Mahratta ditch and the lake, from which they swept off almost every article of value ere their excesses could be checked by a sortie from Perring's redoubt.

While executing the movements preparatory to this irruption, Surajah Dowlah had kept up the delusion on his opponent's mind, by requiring that accredited agents from the English chief should come to the presence. He adhered to this system of deceit, notwithstanding a reconnoissance executed by Clive, and a cannonade attending it; nor did he cease to hold out hopes of a reconciliation even after the mass of his army were in position, and busily engaged in entrenching themselves a mile or a mile and a half to the south-east of the English camp. Two gentlemen were accordingly sent, whose reception left them no room to doubt that the nabob's fury towards the English nation burned with unabated vigour; nay, it was only by a hasty flight that they themselves escaped detention as prisoners, — a fate which they were given to understand by Ormichund had been decreed for them. Now, then, Clive felt that to hesitate any longer as to the measures which it behoved him to pursue would but increase the enemy's audacity and his own weakness. Having ascertained that the greater part of the nabob's artillery was still in the rear, he determined to bring on a battle without delay; and, strengthening himself by the addition of 600 seamen from the fleet, he issued orders for a forward movement on the morrow.

About an hour before dawn, the English army, consisting of 650 Europeans of the line, 100 artillerymen, 800 sepoys, and 600 seamen, formed in a single column of threes in front, facing towards the south. The English battalion took post immediately behind one wing

of the sepoys, the other wing succeeding them: in continuation of these moved the artillery, six field-pieces, drawn partly by lascars, partly by seamen; while, in rear of all, came that portion of the sailors to whom muskets had been intrusted, guarding a second body of lascars who were loaded with spare ammunition. Clive himself took post beside the English battalion, where, like the rest of the officers, he marched on foot; and, at a given signal, the whole pressed forward, covered by a few patrols.

It was yet dark when the head of the column fell upon the enemy's outposts, which were stationed in a trench beside the road that leads from the bridge to the Mahratta ditch: these, after discharging a few match-locks and rockets, retreated, though not till, by the accidental explosion of a sepoy's cartouch-box, on which one of their missiles fell, they had caused considerable disorder in the English ranks. By great exertions, however, order was restored, and the column again pressed on; a fog overspreading them like a canopy as the day dawned, and rendering objects absolutely invisible at a hand's length from each individual. By and by they came opposite to Ormichund's garden, where, on the interior of the Mahratta ditch, the nabob had fixed his head-quarters; and here, for the first time since the advance began, were they aware of a threatened attack. The sound of horses' hoofs was heard: it approached rapidly from the direction of the ditch; and the fog opening, as it were, for an instant, a well-mounted line of Persian cavalry was seen within twenty yards of their flank. The column halted, gave its fire with terrible effect, and swept its enemies away as dust is swept aside by the breath of a whirlwind. Once more the men resumed their march, advancing slowly, and firing at random by platoons; while the artillery, from time to time discharged single balls obliquely, so as to clear the direction of the column, yet protect its progress.

They had now reached a causeway raised several feet above the level of the surrounding country, which con-

ducts through a plain of swampy rice-fields, across the Mahratta ditch, into the company's territory: it was understood to be entrenched; and it formed part of Clive's plan to carry the barricade by assault, and then countermarching in the inner side of the Mahratta ditch, to double back upon Ormichund's garden, and storm it from the rear. The leading sections accordingly clambered up the ascent, and, wheeling to the right, made ready to give the rush. Unfortunately, however, the artillerymen in the rear, uninformed of the change of direction, continued still to fire; and the balls falling among their own people, drove them to seek shelter by leaping down into a ditch on the opposite side of the causeway. A scene of irretrievable confusion followed; each company, as it came up, following the example of that which preceded, crossed instead of marching down the causeway, till at last the whole became one dense and shapeless mass, equally inapplicable to purpose of attack or of defence. Nor did the mischief end here. While Clive was using his best exertions to reform the column, and explaining to those around him the purpose of his intended movement, a couple of heavy guns opened with canister shot from a small bastion on the Mahratta ditch, and, at the first discharge, killed and disabled twenty-two Europeans. It was no longer possible to hold his men in hand, whom the enemy, having thus got the range, continued to gall with their fire; so Clive, abandoning his original intention, gave the word to push on, and made for another road, or causeway, still farther to the south by a full mile and a quarter.

The execution of this movement was grievously retarded by the deep and muddy nature of the fields, over which, intersected by numerous ditches and drains, it was necessary to drag the guns. By nine o'clock, moreover, the fog having dispersed, the awkward situation of the English became visible, and the enemy's cavalry made repeated attempts to charge both in front and rear. It is true that they were repulsed on each occasion, and that the steady and well-directed fire of this handful of

brave men caused terrible havoc in the nabob's lines. Yet were they outnumbered beyond all calculation; while another battery of two guns, in addition to that beside the causeway, bore upon them with murderous effect: many men, therefore, dropped ere the road was gained; and two out of the six guns having stuck fast in the mud, were abandoned. Nevertheless, the dogged obstinacy which, more than any other quality, characterises the British veteran, remained, in spite both of fatigues and losses, unsubdued. The column again wheeled to its right, and, bearing down all opposition, passed the Mahratta ditch in triumph.

There was now a choice of two courses open to Clive: either he might follow up his original plan, and march upon Ormichund's garden; or, taking advantage of the shorter communication with Calcutta, which he had just opened out, lead his troops into the town. He preferred the latter alternative; to which, indeed, the excessive weariness of the gallant band strongly urged him: so he held on without a check, and gained the town a little after noon.

If we have hitherto abstained from offering any criticisms upon the military operations of colonel Clive, our silence has been occasioned rather by a consideration of the petty scale on which his warfare was conducted, than from a disposition to slur over the errors into which he may have fallen. On the present occasion, however, so many and such striking mistakes occurred, that we should ill discharge the duty of an impartial biographer, were we to omit all mention of them. In the first place, Clive did wrong in leaving the bridge at the head of the lake unguarded. To have broken down the bridge, and covered its ruins by a single company thrown into a small redoubt, would not have materially weakened his main army; while the circumstance, if it failed entirely to check the advance in that direction, would at least have had a due effect upon the morale of an undisciplined and semi-barbarous host. In the next place, having made up his mind to force Surajah Dowlah to a

battle, his obvious course would have been to demonstrate merely in the direction which he actually took, while he pushed his real attack from Perring's Point through the Company's territory. By this means he would have gained his end by a route at once shorter and more practicable; for, of the nabob's troops, by far the larger portion were without the Mahratta ditch, and, of course, separated from head-quarters. Nor can we speak in terms of high commendation of that system of manœuvre, which permits a column of infantry to fire at random while in movement, and sanctions even the oblique discharge of artillery in the rear of that column. To these errors, indeed, the derangement of the whole plan may be attributed; for the troops never recovered their order after they suffered, in the first causeway, from the unfortunate mistake of their own gunners. Nevertheless, while thus condemning the absence of science that marked the arrangement of this affair, let us do full justice to the courage and constancy both of men and officers when engaged in it. Never were these qualities more perfectly displayed; and seldom have troops been thrown into a situation where to display them required more of coolness and native presence of mind.

There died in this affair, on the part of the English, 27 Europeans of the line, 12 seamen, and 18 sepoys; in all 57: while the wounded came up to 70 Europeans, 12 seamen, and 35 sepoys; total, 117. Of the enemy, again, the loss amounted to 22 officers of distinction, 600 men, 500 horses, 4 elephants, several camels, and a great many bullocks. Nor was it the least striking feature in the case, that both parties retired from the struggle dejected and disheartened: the English blamed their leader, and complained that they had been exposed rashly to utter destruction, without an object worthy of the hazard; the nabob denounced his officers as cowards, because a handful of infidels had dared to attack his camp, and had traversed it with comparative impunity. But the impression of dismay remained, as might have been expected, more permanently on the mind of the

nabob than of his adversaries; indeed, he caused his tents to be struck in the morning, and, after communicating to Clive his desire to put an end to the quarrel, withdrew to the distance of three miles north-east of the lake. Thus, even by an abortive manœuvre, Clive obtained his end; for a peace was soon afterwards concluded; and the English, reinstated in all the immunities which they had previously enjoyed, and having their forts and territories restored, Surajah Dowlah marched back, crest-fallen and dispirited, to Moorshedabad.

The tone assumed by the nabob, throughout this negotiation, having been more humble than the apparent condition of his affairs taught Clive to expect, the latter scrupled not to push the advantage already obtained, by demanding from his highness permission to undertake an expedition against the French settlement at Chandernagore. For a time the request was resisted with great bitterness; indeed, a part of the nabob's army, under his commander-in-chief Meer Jaffier, was marched into the French territories, for the purpose of supporting its possessors, should they be invaded by the English. By and by, however, a rumour reached Surajah Dowlah, that his province was about to be invaded by a horde of Pitans; and his anxiety to secure the co-operation of Clive in resisting that attack, led him to dissemble his wishes relative to the protection of Chandernagore. Availing himself of this lucky accident, as well as assured of the neutrality of Meer Jaffier, whom Ormichund had bribed to hold aloof by a present of 12,000 rupees, Clive overcame the scruples of admiral Watson, on whose strictly honourable mind the recent treaty of neutrality dwelt with great effect; and, leaving the ships of war to ascend the river as wind and tide might serve, advanced, partly in light vessels, partly by land, towards the settlement. He arrived before the place about noon on the 14th of March; and, the same day, drove in the outposts, and completed its investment.

It is not necessary to give any minute account of the

operations which followed; for they were precisely in accordance with those which occur in the attack of all irregularly fortified places by an army slenderly provided with the munitions necessary to a siege. Batteries were thrown up, the fire from which proved totally inadequate to resist that of the besieged: indeed, it is doubtful whether the place would have been reduced at all, but for the hearty and devoted co-operation of the squadron. But a couple of line-of-battle ships, in which the flags of admirals Watson and Pocock were hoisted, laying themselves alongside the principal bastion, at a range of fifty yards, threw in such a weight of fire that the enemy were driven from their guns. The consequence was, that at three o'clock in the afternoon of the 22d, the fort surrendered; when about eighty only of the garrison, including several officers, avoided the fate of their comrades by escaping from the place while the negotiation pended.

Surajah Dowlah, who had repeatedly protested against this enterprise, and was deterred from interrupting it only by renewed reports of a Pitan invasion, expressed the utmost indignation when informed of the fate of Chandernagore. He took M. Law and the fugitives immediately under his protection; and trusting to the assurances of that gentleman, that a powerful armament from France might daily be expected, he refused to fulfil the engagements into which he had entered with the English. It would lead us into details by far too complicated for the nature of this work, were we to describe the plots and counterplots that ensued on this proceeding. We must be content, therefore, to state, that the behaviour of the nabob convinced the English authorities that a cordial reconciliation with him was impracticable; and that they engaged in a series of intrigues, of which it was the object to wrest from him his authority, and to transfer it to some other functionary more friendly to their views and expectations.

In conducting the delicate negotiations arising out of

this project, Ormichund took for a time a leading part; the individual for whom he acted being Yar Khan Lally, an officer high in the service of the nabob, and far from destitute of resources. The treaty with this person had not, however, assumed a definite form, when Meer Jaffier made a tender of his alliance; and the one being possessed of a degree of authority to which the other could not lay claim, Yar Khan Lally was, to use a familiar phrase, thrown overboard without ceremony. In accomplishing this end, however, it was absolutely necessary either to hoodwink Ormichund, or to gain him over. The first course was attempted, but it did not succeed; for Ormichund already knew too much to be with impunity neglected: the second was then tried, though under the palpable disadvantage of dealing with a man whose suspicions had been violently awakened. Still, as the ordinary restraints of honour (for we cannot use a milder term) were with great indifference set aside, the affair went on, apparently at least, with the utmost felicity. Ormichund became the medium of communication between Meer Jaffier and the English, as he had been between them and Yar Khan Lally; and the conspiracy gained strength from day to day, both at Moorshedabad and elsewhere.

When the English first began to move towards Chandernagore, Surajah Dowlah had marched a numerous army to Plassey, in the island of Cossimbuzar, where, under the orders of Roydulub, it lay encamped. Among other demands made by Clive subsequently to the reduction of Chandernagore, there was one which required that Roydulub should withdraw this force, and that the English should be left to deal with the French factory in Cossimbuzar, according to their own pleasure. The nabob refused to listen to this proposal, alleging that the French were entitled to his protection: indeed, he, in his turn, demanded that the English would break up the encampment which they had formed to the north of the Hoogly, and return, as became them, within the limits of their own territory. In this

emergency Clive thought it best to dissemble. He, therefore, broke up his camp, sent back half of his people to Calcutta, and kept the other half, ready against any emergency, at Chandernagore. Still the nabob withdrew not a man; nay, on the unfounded assertion of one of his officers, that the English had secreted a force in the island, he ordered Meer Jaffier to proceed with 15,000 men to reinforce the army of Roydulub, and to take the supreme command. Meer Jaffier could not refuse obedience; nevertheless, he left at Moorshedabad confidential agents, by whose means the intrigue continued still to be carried on.

It was now that Ormichund, made aware per force of the critical circumstances by which, not Meer Jaffier only, but Mr. Watts, and the rest of the English residents at Moorshedabad were surrounded, thought fit to throw additional obstacles in the way of a happy conclusion to the affair, by demanding an enormous sum of money as the reward of his co-operation. Let it be borne in mind, that, up to the present moment, he had stipulated for nothing further than a compensation for his losses sustained at the sack of Calcutta, and a restitution to all the privileges which he had enjoyed prior to that event. Now he required, that, over and above the gratuities granted to the British army, navy, merchants, council, and company, Meer Jaffier and the English should hold themselves bound to pay to him a commission of not less than five per cent. on all the monies found in Surajah Dowlah's treasury. Never was conduct more gross or less justifiable, unless, indeed, we except that of the men by whom the expectations of this usurer were defeated. Finding it useless to reason, and worse than useless to protest, it was determined, on the suggestion of colonel Clive, to draw up and engross two separate treaties: one (and it was to be considered as the real deed) in which Ormichund's outrageous claims were omitted; the other, a fictitious document, in which these claims were recognised. We abstain from offering a word of comment on this remarkable transaction.

Nevertheless, it is but just towards the memory of admiral Watson to state, that, when called upon to sign the latter deed, he peremptorily refused; and that, as a climax to the whole affair, his signature was forged, and appended to the document.

Time passed: the intrigues of Meer Jaffier, Mr. Watts, and Ormichund became known; and, while the two latter narrowly escaped from Moorshedabad, the former, who had been recalled on suspicion, was besieged in his own palace. His fears, however, getting the better of his judgment, Surajah Dowlah, instead of crushing his general on the instant, proposed to him terms of reconciliation; and their differences were, in consequence, ostensibly composed, after oaths of mutual forgiveness and fidelity had been exchanged.

Meanwhile the English army had again concentrated at Chandernagore, where it was joined by Mr. Watts, who gave an account of the state of affairs at Moorshedabad. Clive saw that to dissemble longer was impossible; and, aware that Surajah Dowlah would shortly join the division of his army at Plassey with the whole force of the soubahdary, he determined to anticipate the movement by opening the campaign. He accordingly issued a manifesto, in which, as is the custom in such documents, he threw the undivided responsibility of the approaching contest on the enemy; after which he assembled a flotilla of 200 boats, for the accommodation of the Europeans, the stores, and the guns; and began, under convoy of two sloops of war, to ascend the river. The sepoys marched in a parallel column along its bank.

On the 16th of June the English army reached Pattee, a fortified post on the Cossimbuzar river, which is situated about two leagues above the junction of that stream with the Jellengeer. This they promptly reduced, as well as Cutwah, a town with a castle, twelve miles higher up; when, the rains setting in with excessive violence, Clive was glad to strike his tents, and to quarter his men, as conveniently as circumstances would allow, in the huts and houses around. For six

days he halted here, looking with intense anxiety for the communications from Meer Jaffier which he had a right to expect; but the few letters which reached him only told of the reconciliation with Surajah Dowlah, and promised nothing more than a neutrality, scarcely to be relied upon. Clive's position was now as perilous as the general of a small army ever occupied; and he was too clear-sighted not to perceive that it was so. He, therefore, summoned a council of war, and proposed to its members to determine whether the troops should cross the Cossimbuzar at once, and put their very existence on the hazard of a battle, or, halting where they were during the rainy season, call in the Mahrattas to their aid, and renew the war at its close.

It is a curious fact, that Clive, instead of requiring, as is customary, the opinion of the junior members of the council first, took the lead by giving his own, and gave it in favour of a suspension of hostilities. Majors Kilpatrick and Grant, the next in point of seniority, followed in the same course; while Coote, afterwards so distinguished in the wars of the Carnatic, protested against the adoption of a policy so unwise. He represented, that they could gain nothing by delay; that the confidence of the men, now wound up to the highest pitch, would evaporate; and that the junction of M. Bussey's corps, an event by no means improbable, would give to the nabob a superiority not to be resisted. The arguments of major Coote made a deep impression on Clive's mind. Though the council determined, by a majority of thirteen to seven, that it would be unwise, under existing circumstances, to proceed, Clive saw that the decision was erroneous; and, after some hours spent in solitary deliberation, amid the recesses of a neighbouring grove, he issued orders that the troops should be in readiness to march the following morning.

The sun was rising, on the 22d of June, when the troops began to pass the river; and, by four in the afternoon, all were established on the opposite bank. Here a messenger from Meer Jaffier met them with

intelligence that the nabob had halted at a village six miles on the other side of Cossimbuzar; where Clive was advised, if practicable, to fall upon him by surprise. Clive returned for answer, that he should bivouac that night at Plassey, and advance next day as far as Daudpoor, where, if Meer Jaffier failed to join him, he would "make peace with the nabob." The troops accordingly resumed their march a little before sunset; and having, by dint of extraordinary exertions, dragged the boats, and conveyed the stores a distance of fifteen miles, reached the grove of Plassey at one o'clock in the morning. Here they lay upon their arms, being startled by the unexpected sound of gongs, drums, clarions, and cymbals, which, as they mark the vicinity of Indian watches, convinced them that they were within a mile of the nabob's camp. It was an anxious night for the leaders, and especially for Clive, on whose shoulders the undivided responsibility lay; though the men, after the guards were set, and the sentinels duly planted, slept as soundly as soldiers are apt to do even on the eve of a battle.

The grove of Plassey, in which the English army lay, measured about 800 yards in length, by 300 in breadth, and consisted of mango trees planted in regular rows. It was surrounded by a slight embankment, a ditch choked up with weeds, and approached, at its north-western angle, within fifty yards of the river. A hunting-seat belonging to the nabob, which stood upon the bank of the stream, afforded, with its walled garden and inclosures, an excellent point of defence for one of Clive's flanks, as well as a convenient station for his hospital. In the mean time, the enemy occupied an entrenched camp about a mile or a mile and a half in his front, which, commencing at the neck of a peninsula, formed by a curvature of the stream, ran directly inland for 200 yards, after which it formed an obtuse angle, and bore away, nearly three miles, to the north-east. At this angle stood a redoubt, in which cannon were mounted; there was also a woody eminence conve-

niently situated about 300 yards beyond; while a couple of tanks, begirt, as these reservoirs always are in India, with mounds of earth, offered great advantages, either in advance or retreat, to the force which should seize them. All these matters became visible to Clive as soon as the return of dawn enabled him to reconnoitre, though the space of time allowed for that purpose was not very extended.

Clive had mounted to the roof of the hunting-seat, and, with his telescope, swept the line of the nabob's works, when his attention was suddenly attracted by a general stir within the camp. By and by the heads of columns began to emerge into the plain, and in a few moments the whole of the enemy's army was seen in slow but imposing advance. Fifty thousand infantry, armed with matchlocks, spears, rockets, and bows; 18,000 cavalry well mounted, and, for the most part, sufficiently accoutred, formed, with fifty pieces of cannon, this formidable array, which came on in semicircular order, as if for the purpose of hemming in on all sides the handful of veterans in the grove. Nor was the mode in which he moved his cannon the feature in this warlike show which excited the least degree of interest in the mind of the spectator. The guns (most of them 24's and 32's) were, by means of huge wooden stages, raised six feet above the level of the plain, and the cumbrous machines supporting guns, gunners, ammunition, and all things necessary, were dragged each by forty or fifty bullocks, assisted in the rear by an elephant. One brigade of field-pieces, however, four in number, acted apart from the rest, under a body of forty French deserters, who placed themselves in one of the tanks, not far from the edge of the wood.

The force with which Clive made ready to sustain the shock, consisted of 3000 men of all arms, including 900 English, of whom 100 were artillerymen, and fifty sailors. His train comprised eight 6-pounders and two howitzers; and he arranged the whole in one line, with his Europeans in the centre, just beyond the skirts

of the wood. This he did, under the impression that, if he kept his men under cover, the nabob, mistaking prudence for fear, would acquire additional confidence; besides which, he felt that at any moment a corps so pliable might be thrown back, long ere the unwieldy masses that threatened could interfere to derange the evolution. Finally, he posted his cannon three on each flank of the battalion, and the remaining two, with the howitzers, under cover of a couple of brick-kilns, so as to protect his left; and, having cautioned his men to keep steady, and neither to advance nor retire without orders, he returned to his station on the roof of the house.

It might be about eight o'clock, when a shot from the enemy's tank gave the signal for a general discharge of their artillery. The fire was promptly answered by the English guns; and for some time a cannonade was kept up, which made sad havoc in the nabob's ranks, and proved not absolutely harmless to the other party. It had lasted about an hour, when Clive, finding that several of his men fell, directed the whole line to withdraw within the grove; upon which the enemy, mistaking the change of ground for a flight, pushed their artillery more to the front, and fired with increased vivacity. As the English, however, sat down behind the trees, no damage was sustained; while their pieces, plunging full into the dense columns of horse and foot exposed upon the plain, produced a great deal of slaughter.

Things continued thus till noon, Clive having determined, after consulting his officers, to act on the defensive throughout the day; when, a heavy shower of rain falling, the enemy's ammunition became damaged, and their fire began to slacken. They still, however, kept their ground; but, about two hours later, the bullocks were observed to take their stations beside the platforms; and the whole, covered by the infantry and cavalry, moved slowly to the rear. The truth, indeed, is, that the nabob, intimidated by the fall of one of his

most trusted chiefs, had issued orders for a general retreat, and was himself hastening to escape to Moorshedabad, under the escort of a select body of horse. He had sent for Meer Jaffier to his tent, had thrown his turban on the ground before him, and adjured him, in the most affecting manner, to defend it; a trust which the traitor freely undertook, without entertaining the most remote idea of fulfilling it. But of all this Clive remained unavoidably ignorant, inasmuch as the fears of the messenger despatched to inform him of it, hindered him from passing the line of fire; and he was in consequence left to form his own conjectures, and to act upon their suggestion.

While the rest of the army fell back, the French company, under Sinfray, kept its ground at the tank from which it galled the English with an incessant fire both of cannon and musketry. Clive was at this time sound asleep, fatigue having fairly overmastered him; upon which major Kilpatrick, placing himself at the head of two companies of Europeans and a couple of field-pieces, made ready to dislodge the party in the tank, and to occupy it as a post from which to annoy the enemy's columns in their retreat. But a correct sense of military discipline having induced him to inform Clive of his intention, the latter was no sooner awakened than he ran to the spot, and sharply reproved Kilpatrick for presuming to take a step so important on his own responsibility. Nevertheless, he did not condemn the movement proposed; on the contrary, while he sent Kilpatrick to the rear, with instructions to bring up the rest of the army, he himself took the command of the storming party, and, pushing forward, gained possession of Sinfray's embankment, without the loss of a man.

In the meanwhile, the line put in motion by Kilpatrick quitted the grove, and advanced. It was observed now that a considerable column, extending itself from the enemy's right, faced about, and began to move towards the north-east angle of the grove. This was

Meer Jaffier's corps; which, however, being unknown to the English leaders, was immediately fired upon with great effect by one of the field-pieces. The column stood irresolute for a moment, and then followed the crowd; upon which the English detachment, rejoining their comrades, pushed for the redoubt. That, as well as the woody eminence being stormed and taken, the guns were run up, and a fresh and more destructive fire opened upon the camp, where a scene of confusion prevailed, of which we should in vain endeavour to convey to the mind of the reader any adequate conception. One body of the nabob's troops alone held together, though withdrawn from the line of the English fire, and separated entirely from the rest; and as now the standards of Jaffier were recognised, the fact of his adherence to the original agreement became manifest both to Clive and his brother officers. Instantly the word was given to push on. The camp was entered, without any other opposition than arose from the impediments occasioned by guns abandoned, tents half thrown down, baggage, horses, and bullocks, spread over the plain; while the broken and discomfited host, which ought even now to have annihilated the assailants, fled in dismay, without striking a blow in its defence.

Animated by the promise of a liberal donation in money, the troops steadily preserved their ranks, though surrounded by heaps of plunder; and, after a brief halt, which enabled the commissaries to collect as many bullocks and other animals as were requisite for the transport of the guns, pursued their march, in high spirits, as far as Daudpoor. Thither a strong advanced guard had been pushed, for the purpose of observing (for they could scarcely harass) the enemy's rear; and here an estimate was taken of the loss sustained throughout a long and toilsome day. It proved to be altogether trifling. Not more than sixteen sepoys and eight Europeans lost their lives; while the wounded amounted to forty-eight in all, of whom twelve only were English.

The battle of Plassey belongs to that class of events which defy all calculation previous to their occurrence, and silence all criticism after they have taken place. That an army of nearly 70,000 men, supported by fifty pieces of cannon, should have fled before 3000 soldiers, however superior in the qualifications both of discipline and arms, constitutes a fact in history on which it is useless to argue. While, therefore, we do full justice to the courage of the English leader, and to the steadiness and good conduct of the men whom he committed in a contest so unequal, we feel that to speak of the victory as the result of any wisdom in the combinations of Clive would justly subject us to the ridicule of every military reader. The defeat of Surajah Dowlah is only one out of numerous proofs that mere numbers are worthless, so long as the spirit of daring is not present to direct and animate them in battle.

The results of this great victory were not less remarkable than the victory itself. The nabob, distrustful of all around him, after fleeing to Moorshedabad, endeavoured to escape in disguise, with the design of placing himself and his fortunes under the protection of M. Law; but, being discovered by a man whose ears he had formerly caused to be cut off, he was betrayed to his enemies, and carried back a prisoner. Meanwhile Meer Jaffier had been saluted as nabob by Clive, and was in possession of the capital, which, as well as the leading men in the provinces, submitted quietly to the change of masters; whilst the murder of Surajah Dowlah, which, as a matter of course, followed his arrest, confirmed the wavering fidelity of the few that still held out. Then followed a recognition of the treaties originally entered into with the English, the whole of which the new nabob promised faithfully to fulfil, with the exception, indeed, of the fictitious agreement, by means of which the merchant Ormichund had been deceived. We willingly pass over this transaction, without entering much into particulars. Poor Ormichund, being abruptly informed by Clive and Mr. Scrafton,

that "the paper was a trick, and that he was to have nothing," fell back in a swoon; and recovered only to spend a year and a half in a state of pitiable idiotcy.

It is not necessary, in a military memoir of lord Clive, to detail at full length the many complicated occurrences which ensued upon this change of dynasty in Bengal. Of the expedition led by major Coote, for example, in pursuit of M. Law's corps, which had advanced as far as Baglipore for the purpose of supporting Surajah Dowlah, ere a rumour of his capture led to a retrogression, we need say nothing further than that, after penetrating to Chuprah, a town situated on the Ganges, at the distance of forty-four miles beyond Patna, it returned without effecting any thing. Meanwhile the provinces generally gave in their submission to Meer Jaffier. The promised treasures were sent to Calcutta under a strong escort; the facilities for trade formerly granted to the English merchants were renewed, and other and unexpected privileges, which the latter began immediately to demand, were, though with extreme reluctance, granted. Clive, therefore, returned to the seat of government in the middle of September; leaving behind him, amid the most perfect apparent tranquillity, the seeds of new quarrels, not less rancorous than those which he had just composed.

While events flowed throughout the north of India in a channel so favourable, the interests of the Company were brought into great jeopardy through the successes accomplished both by M. Bussey, and, for a time at least, by the government of Pondicherry. The former, though excluded from the confidence of the nizam, and compelled to defend himself against the troops of the faction which had undermined his influence, neither ceased to retain his hold upon the personal affection of Sulabat Jung, nor withdrew, as he had been required to do, from the province of Hyderabad. He kept, on the contrary, his ground in a position whence, on the first appearance of a change of

policy, he might be able to hedge round the wavering prince with French bayonets; and the accident, on the occurrence of which he ceased not to calculate, very soon befell. Sulabat Jung found the yoke which his brothers endeavoured to cast upon his neck too heavy to be borne. He recalled Bussey, who with the utmost alacrity obeyed the summons; and, delivering the nizam from the tyranny of his relatives, rendered him more and more the debtor of the French nation. The consequence was a grant of all that line of coast, which, commencing at Moolchelly on the south, and extending to the lake of Chilca on the north, a distance of not less than 470 miles, is known under the general appellation of the Northern Circars. Of the chief stations there Bussey took immediate possession; while the rest were held by the native zemindars, or chiefs, subject to the burdens hitherto imposed upon them by the nizam.

Meanwhile intelligence of the rupture between England and France, which had so long been anticipated, arrived in the Carnatic, and both sides made preparations to enter upon a contest on the issue of which the very existence of their respective establishments in India was felt to depend. It had been expressly stipulated, when the expedition for the recovery of Calcutta sailed, that Clive should not detain the troops beyond such a period as would permit their return to Madras by the month of April at the latest; and, in the communication which he made of his first successes, Clive not only referred to this arrangement, but expressed his readiness to adhere to it. In proportion, however, as his views in the northern provinces became more and more gigantic, his regard to the wishes of the authorities in the south died away. He ceased, indeed, ere long to allude to a measure of which he soon saw the impolicy, and carried on his schemes of conquest unmindful of the remonstrances and apprehensions of the Madras government.

These schemes were already to a great degree realised by the proceedings which have been detailed above, when

on the 17th of September, 1757, an announcement of the arrival of a French fleet off Fort St. David reached Calcutta. It was followed by renewed entreaties for the return of at least part of the Madras army; but Clive felt that, to weaken his force, in the existing state of things, would be to incur not only the loss of advantages already gained, but to run the hazard, in the event of an attack from the French, of total destruction. He therefore took no other notice of the requisition than he had done of others to the same effect.

In acting thus, it cannot be denied that Clive took upon himself no common weight of responsibility, yet the events fully bore him out in all his calculations; for the causes of dissension to which we alluded a short time ago were already beginning to develope themselves. The nabob, whose pecuniary resources fell far short of the obligations which he had incurred, endeavoured to evade their fulfilment by procrastination, by equivocation, and, finally, by the offer of bribes, not only to the subordinate agents of the Company, but to Clive himself. When he found that none of these measures availed, he became highly exasperated; and began to look around for means by which to deliver himself from the state of thraldom into which he had fallen. As, however, it would have been extremely perilous to break at once with the English, he directed his first efforts against certain Hindoo functionaries, towards whom, though he stood mainly indebted to them for success in the late rebellion, he looked with a jealous eye, in consequence of their supposed connection with Clive.

The persons chiefly obnoxious to Jaffier were Doolub Ram, the dewan, or chief officer of finance, under Alverdy Khan, a member of the family of Seets,—the most wealthy bankers and merchants at Moorshedabad,—and Ramnarain, the governor of the important province of Berar. These he endeavoured to circumvent by a series of intrigues, the detail of which belongs rather to the historian of India than to the biographer of

Clive; and he managed matters for a time with such address, that the victims, though aware of their danger, found themselves incapable of eluding it. But, when hostilities impended from Midnapoor, — when an insurrection broke forth at Dacca, and the nabob's army, mutinous, in consequence of their pay being far in arrear, refused to march, — Clive seized the happy moment for interference; and brought about, in appearance at least, a reconciliation with Doolub Ram. This was followed by a demand on his own part that the arrears due on the treaty of Moorshedabad should be paid up; and Jaffier, however little disposed to accede to the request, was compelled to give way.

All this occurred towards the middle of November, at the capital of the soubahdary, whither, with a large portion of the English army, Clive had repaired; and now the nabob proposed, in his turn, that the combined forces should march without delay upon Berar. Clive offered no objection to the movement, though he ceased not to urge the sound policy of an accommodation, now reminding Jaffier of the extent of Ramnarain's resources, now warning him that the appearance of a French force in the Hoogly must of necessity recall the English to the defence of their own settlements. Nor were his exertions in favour of the denounced governor limited to this: by holding a steady and impartial course amid the duplicity of the opposing parties, he made the nabob aware that neither flattery nor menaces would induce him to betray the interests of his country or of the individuals with whom these interests were connected. The result was, that Ramnarain was admitted to the royal presence, under a pledge of protection from the English, and conducted the nabob's troops into Patna. There a rumour of invasion by the soubahdar of Oude, in conjunction with the French party, under M. Law, caused Jaffier to stifle the remains of his anger. Ramnarain was reinstated in his dignities; and Clive, after extorting from the nabob a grant to the English of those districts along the banks of the

Ganges where saltpetre is produced, saw the native army break up, and retired with his own division, by way of Moorshedabad, to Calcutta.

This bloodless but important campaign came to a close on the 24th of May, 1758; and on the 20th of June there arrived from London a commission for new-modelling the government. The strange infatuation in which that device originated, as well as the evils which it was expected to remedy, it were useless in this place to explain; our purpose is sufficiently served by stating that, in the room of the old council of four, a council of ten was nominated, and that the single governor was required to give place to four, who should preside, not collectively, but separately, each assuming the reins for a space of three months, and then relinquishing them to one of his colleagues. The scheme was condemned as impracticable. The persons selected as chiefs met, and, with one consent, declared the arrangement void; after which they proceeded to make choice of a governor on the old plan. There could be but one opinion as to the individual on whom that honour should be conferred. Clive, who had achieved so much for the Company, was invited to defend his own conquests; and, as an undue horror of responsibility threw not its baneful shadow over his talents, he accepted the trust, however irregularly conveyed, without scruple.

In the meanwhile, Jaffier, impatient under the burdens which the treaty with the English imposed upon him, began to act with great severity towards his own subjects. Doolub Ram and his friends, in particular, became daily more and more distasteful, in consequence of the tenacity with which they adhered to Clive as their protector. He even renewed his attempts upon the life of the dewan, who was compelled to take refuge in Calcutta, whither he proceeded at last only after repeated remonstrances on the part of Clive and the English government. His next attempt was to excite, by means of forged letters, a jealousy in Clive's mind

towards this faithful functionary; but here also he failed. Clive knew enough both of the cautious habits of Doolub Ram, and of the unscrupulous character of the nabob not to suspect the fraud in a moment, though the latter took care that there should be no living witness to his duplicity, by ordering the individual with whom the correspondence was assumed to have taken place to be assassinated. Then followed tumults and seditions excited by Meeram, the son of Jaffier, for the purpose of rendering the English name odious at Moorshedabad; while Jaffier himself went, at last, so far as to avow that he would join any French force that might show itself in the province."

Things were in this unsatisfactory state, when intelligence of the capture of Fort St. David came in, as well as of the combined movements of Lally and Bussey's corps on Madras itself. The same letters which conveyed this unpleasant information contained renewed entreaties for the return of a part at least of the army to the Carnatic, without which, it was asserted, Madras could not resist the overwhelming force about to be directed against it. To these entreaties, however, Clive paid no more attention than he had done to similar applications already made. He knew that Madras, if resolutely defended, was capable, with the garrison already under arms, of holding out till the fleet expected from Europe should arrive; and he knew also that any material diminution of his own numbers, while it encouraged the nabob in his hostile views, would place the safety of Calcutta itself in some jeopardy. He determined, therefore, not to comply with the request; but, being really desirous of operating a diversion in favour of the Carnatic, he proposed to his council that an attempt should be made to expel the French from the Northern Circars. Strange to say, even this was objected to, as perilous and uncalled-for: nevertheless Clive persisted; and, in the end, a corps of 500 Europeans and 2000 sepoys, with a train of six battering cannon, and as many field guns, was sent,

under the orders of lieutenant-colonel Forde, to carry his designs into execution.

While the English force was thus divided, events occurred which, at one moment, threatened to be productive of very serious results. The soubahdar of Allahabad, the rajahs Sunder Sing and Bulwant Sing, and the nabob of Oude, attracted by the apparent weakness of Jaffier's government, entered into an alliance; and, placing at their head the son of the emperor Allimgeer II., prepared to invade the provinces with an overwhelming army. The better to conceal their real views, they obtained from the emperor the appointment of soubahdar of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa for the prince; and, towards the end of the year 1758, crossed the Carunnassa, and advanced upon Patna. It was not in the hour of danger that Meer Jaffier's hostility towards the English displayed itself. He wrote urgent letters to Clive, imploring that he would march to his assistance, and representing in the most abject terms his own helplessness, at the head of an army disorganised and mutinous, and surrounded by officers whom he could not trust. Clive was never less prepared to enter upon a perilous enterprise: but the moment was critical; and though the force which he found it practicable to assemble fell far short of his necessities, he hesitated not to march with all speed upon Moorshedabad.

By this time the confederates, after devastating the open country, were set down before Patna, where they pressed forward the siege with all the ardour of which an Indian army is capable. It was defended with considerable obstinacy by Ramnarain; not because he had become reconciled to the government of Jaffier, or valued at more than its worth his faith plighted to the English; but because a visit to the camp sufficed to convince him that there existed there neither unanimity of design nor vigour of execution. The attack, however, went on, and a practicable breach was effected, when the very event on the anticipation of which Ram-

narain had calculated befell. The soubahdar of Oude, instead of joining his allies under the walls of Patna, made himself master by treachery of Allahabad; and now the soubahdar of Allahabad insisted that the siege should be raised, in order that his capital might be recovered. It was to no purpose that M. Law, who met the army in its retrogression, implored the chiefs to delay but a few days, when Patna must submit: they rejected his counsels with indignation; and hence Meer Jaffier and Clive, though late in the field, found Patna still safe, and the enemy powerless, by reason of the dissensions which prevailed among them. Nor did Clive's good fortune end here: while lingering on the frontier, whither he judged it prudent to proceed, Clive received a letter from the unfortunate prince, containing a humble request for such a sum as might suffice to defray his personal expenses, and offering in return to relinquish all claim upon the soubahdary. It is scarcely necessary to add, that the proposition was acceded to, Jaffier expressing the greatest satisfaction at the event: indeed, so profound was his sense of the obligations conferred upon him by his ally, that he displayed an almost profuse liberality in rewarding it. He obtained for Clive the rank of an omrah, and conferred upon him, in jaghire, the whole of the land-tax which the Company was bound to pay into the exchequer of the nabob, in the capacity of zemindar, for the territory dependent on Calcutta; a grant which was estimated at the moment, and probably without exaggeration, as amounting to not less than 30,000*l.* per annum.

Nothing could occur more opportunely for the interests of the English than the happy termination of this war, succeeded as it was by the triumphant return of Forde from the Circars; for reports were already in circulation that an expedition was prepared at Batavia, with a view to assist the nabob in ridding himself of his troublesome allies. Whether or not the opinions which connected Meer Jaffier with this unjustifiable

attempt were well or ill-founded has never been satisfactorily explained; but it is certain that Clive had resumed his usual functions at Calcutta but a few days, when a squadron of seven Dutch ships entered the Hoogly, and immediately put on shore a body of 700 European and 800 Malay troops. As there was peace at this time between England and Holland, Clive appears to have hesitated a little as to the course which it behoved him to pursue; for the invaders gave out that they designed only to reinforce the garrison of Chinsura, and affected to regard the English as their allies. Still, the whole proceeding was, to say the least of it, at variance with the customary law of nations; and Clive had rendered the position of the Dutch still more critical, by procuring from the nabob a positive order that they would quit the coast. When he found, however, that no attention was paid to this mandate, but that both the ships and the army held their ground, he determined to treat them as enemies; and the rapidity with which he carried the resolution into effect was worthy of the moral courage required in framing it.

A body of 300 Europeans and 800 sepoys, with 150 native horse, was placed under the orders of colonel Forde, with directions to oppose, if necessary, even by force of arms, the threatened passage of the Dutch army across the country. Three vessels were, at the same time, manned, and sent down to the anchorage, avowedly with the design of seeing the nabob's commands carried into execution; in reality to attack the Dutch squadron, should its commander prove refractory. The most perfect success attended both operations: the Dutch squadron, refusing to quit the river, was attacked with great fury, and, after a warm engagement, which lasted two hours, defeated and taken. A similar result befell in the meeting of the land forces; though Forde appears to have experienced a not unnatural reluctance to bring matters to the issue of a battle. He had manœuvred with great skill to throw himself upon the line of the enemy's march: he had

succeeded in attaining his end; and he wrote to solicit from Clive explicit instructions how it behoved him to act. The whole affair is highly characteristic of the firmness and decision which belonged to Clive's temperament. He was playing at whist when Forde's despatch reached him; and, without quitting the table, he wrote with a pencil, on a slip of paper, these words: — "Dear Forde, — Fight 'em immediately; and I will send you an order of council to-morrow." Forde acted upon the instructions thus laconically conveyed. He charged the Dutch, overthrew them with great slaughter, and followed up the success with such alacrity, that, out of 1500 men who landed, only fourteen ever reached their place of destination.

From so bold, but necessary, an act of decision no mischievous consequences ensued, either to Clive individually, or to the nation whose interests he defended. The Dutch government, conscious that their designs were the reverse of honourable, neither confiscated the money which Clive* had intrusted to their care, nor complained of the treatment which their subjects had received from a power with which they were at peace; but consented to defray the expenses incurred by the armament, on condition that their captured vessels should be restored. To this Clive did not object; and hence, on the 5th of December, 1759, articles of agreement were drawn up, and ratified by the representatives of the two companies. The affixing of his signature to that deed was the last act of authority which Clive performed; for his health having again given way to the ravages of the climate, he resigned the government, and set sail, early in February, for England.

We are not aware that the homeward voyage of this remarkable man was productive of any adventure deserving of record, or that his landing drew forth any public expression of the respect to which his eminent services entitled him. No sooner, however, was it

* Clive had remitted, through the Dutch company, two thirds of his well-earned fortune to Europe.

known that he had revisited his native country, than all classes of men hastened to assure him of the sense which they entertained of his valour and conduct. By the rich and the titled his acquaintance was sought with an avidity highly honourable to both parties; from the Company he received the strongest marks of attention and regard; while the sovereign gave proof of his approbation by raising him, on the 1st of December, 1761, to the dignity of a baron in the kingdom of Ireland. Nevertheless, lord Clive, for so he must now be termed, derived but little gratification from all the honours and applause that overtook him. Neither rank nor the possession of an ample fortune, nor yet the esteem and admiration of society, were sufficient to compensate for the total loss of health, of which the recovery was as yet extremely uncertain, when a call was made upon his patriotism which he knew not how to resist.

Clive had resided in England something less than five years, when the disastrous state of affairs abroad induced the court of directors to solicit his renewed acceptance of the office of governor of Bengal. There had occurred, during the interval between 1760 and 1765, numerous events in that province, out of which extreme peril to the Company's interest arose; and the evils consequent upon them became at last too gigantic to be controlled by any other hand than that of a master. As the character of Clive, considered in the light of a statesman, is intimately connected with the turn which affairs took during his temporary absence from the helm, it will be necessary to give here a brief and general account of them.

There is good reason to believe that, long before he made public his design of withdrawing from the cares of office, Clive had entered into a negotiation respecting the appointment of a successor, and obtained an order that the dignity of precedence, which had hitherto devolved upon the senior member of council in Calcutta, should be conferred on Mr. Vansittart, a member of

the supreme council at Madras. That such an arrangement should prove distasteful in Bengal was no more than might have been expected, because the promotion of every civilian in the province was affected by it; nevertheless, the feeling of jealousy would have led to no positive inconvenience, had not another of Clive's acts — one of the last, too, which, as governor, he performed — given excessive umbrage to the directors. He caused one of their official letters to be answered in a strain which they condemned as insulting and subversive of all authority; and though the principal delinquent was now beyond the reach of censure, they directed that three gentlemen, Messrs. Holwell, Sumner, and Macguire, who had added their signatures to his, should be dismissed the service. Of the consequences arising out of the execution of that order we shall have occasion to speak by and by.

Meanwhile, however, the duties of president were very efficiently discharged; first, by Mr. Holwell, who acted till Mr. Vansittart should arrive, eventually by Mr. Vansittart himself. Under the former, a war was carried on against certain refractory chiefs, whom the cruelties of Meer Jaffier had driven into rebellion. This was followed by a severe contest, in which the shazada, or prince, now elevated, by his father's demise, to the dignity of mogul, took part with the nabob of Oude against the nabob of Bengal, whom the English, though fully aware of the respect due to the supreme head of the empire, considered themselves bound to support against all his enemies. We are not called upon to detail the movements of the belligerents: let it suffice to state, that, on more than one occasion, the English and their allies were very hard pressed; that Sujah Dowlah displayed a great deal both of activity and courage; and that it was not till after heavy expenses had been incurred, and numerous privations endured by the army, that Patna was saved, and the provinces cleared of the invaders.

The difficulties occasioned by a pressure from abroad

were not, however, so trying as those to which the wretched misgovernment of Jaffier, and the exhausted state of their own finances, gave rise at home. When Mr. Vansittart arrived at Calcutta, Meerham, the son of the nabob — a man as relentless as he was devoid of truth, — had recently perished by lightning; and Jaffier, now deprived of all support, was with difficulty saved from a mutiny of his own troops. Vansittart saw — or was persuaded by those around him — that some great change in the mode of administering the affairs of the soubahdary had become necessary; and he determined, at last, to bring about another revolution, by placing the whole authority of the province in the hands of men capable of bearing the burden.

It were out of place to narrate the measures adopted for the purpose of accomplishing this design. Every reader of history is aware that Meer Caussim, the son-in-law of Jaffier, entered into engagements with the English government; and, in return for numerous concessions favourable to the trade of the Company, and ample promises of pecuniary donations to the Company's agents, was elevated, without a struggle, to the throne which Jaffier abdicated. Yet was the arrangement far from satisfactory to the colleagues with whom Mr. Vansittart acted. A powerful minority in council protested against the act, as impolitic and iniquitous; their real ground of dissent extending no farther than that the idea originated with the president, whom, for obvious reasons, they abhorred.

These matters were still in progress, when the reappearance of the emperor, not far from the frontiers of Bahar, called the English army again into the field. There was little difficulty in defeating the invader; but the expenses occasioned by these repeated and remote expeditions soon drained the treasury of the slender funds that remained in it. The consequence was, that Meer Caussim was urged to advance funds, which he found it impracticable to procure by any ordinary means of extortion; and hence he cast his eyes upon Ramnarain,

a chief, who, whatever his crimes might be, had at least proved faithful, throughout every turn of fortune, to the English. By some strange oversight—for we cannot believe that there was design in the case—Mr. Vansittart left that personage at the mercy of the nabob; and he experienced such treatment as the subjects of an Indian prince are accustomed to experience at the hands of a covetous master: his very house was plundered, and all that he possessed torn from him.

Ramnarain had suffered this wrong only a few weeks, and the confidence of the natives in English protection was but partially shaken, when there arrived from London the order to which we have already referred, as removing Messrs. Holwell, Sumners, and Macguire from the Company's service. The expulsion from the council board of these his steady partisans had the effect of destroying entirely that influence by means of which Mr. Vansittart had hitherto been enabled to carry on the government. He was now decidedly in a minority; and as, with the gentlemen opposed to him, private feelings operated to the total subversion of public principle, the effects of their unfortunate triumph soon began to manifest themselves. It will be borne in mind that, among other privileges enjoyed by the Company, there was one which exempted their commissioned agents from paying the transit duties on certain descriptions of goods, all of which, when transported from the interior to the coast by native merchants, were heavily taxed. By the faction which now controlled the decisions of the supreme council it was resolved, that, in the immunities enjoyed by the Company in its corporate capacity, the servants of the Company, considered as individuals, ought to be partakers; in other words, that they and their friends were severally entitled to trade on their own accounts, under circumstances which could not fail to drive the native merchants out of the market. Again, though a monopoly of the saltpetre trade had been assigned by Meer Jaffier to the English, prescriptive usage had always exempted from the operations of that mo-

nopoly the nabob, who was entitled to purchase from the owners of the soil whatever quantity might be required for his own use and that of his household. The majority in council decreed that his claims, resting on mere prescriptive right, were inadmissible; and that the nabob, like other customers, should be required to buy only at the Company's sales. Finally, the right heretofore exercised by the nabob's officers and magistrates, of protecting their master's interests, was denounced, while a system of the grossest and most flagrant injustice, affecting every department of commerce and revenue, began.

It were a tedious tale to tell how Meer Caussim remonstrated against the wrongs thus put upon him, and bore, for a while, with exemplary patience, the insults that were offered to his dignity. Even the forcible entrance of an English detachment into one of his castles, under the pretext that a deserter lay concealed there, was endured, and a fresh engagement entered into, by which many important points were conceded to the cupidity of the English. But all availed not: the ruling party refused to abate one jot of their pretensions, and the nabob was driven, in the end, to the adoption of a measure which he had long threatened: he issued a proclamation repealing all transit duties whatever; and thus, at the expense of his own revenue, placed the native and English traders on a level.

"The conduct of the Company's servants on this occasion," says Mr. Mill, "furnishes one of the most remarkable instances on record of the power of interest to extinguish all sense of justice, and even of shame." They exclaimed against the remission, as a violation of their undoubted rights, and insisted that their rivals should be again burdened with heavy duties. The nabob peremptorily refused to ruin his own subjects in order that the fortunes of a few strangers might be advanced; and the coldness which had, during so many months, prevailed, ripened at once into irreconcilable animosity.

It was now evident, on all hands, that matters could not long remain stationary; and both parties made ready for the last appeal—the appeal to arms. Even here, however, the English were confessedly the aggressors; for the first blow was struck by Mr. Ellis, the chief of the factory at Patna, under whose guidance the town was assaulted and taken, while as yet no declaration of war had been issued. Meer Caussim, however, was not slow in retaliating the injury. He entered into a close alliance with Sujah Dowlah, the nabob of Oude; took the field at the head of all his forces; reduced the factory at Patna, making the garrison prisoners; and avowed that he would not lay down the sword while an Englishman remained in Bengal.

During the contest which ensued, the English were, on more than one occasion, severely tried; while the enormous expenses to which they were subjected increased fourfold the difficulties of their already perilous situation. It is true, that they succeeded in breaking the power of their enemy, who was compelled, at last, to seek safety by flight into the country of the Rohillas; but the pay of their own troops fell so far in arrear, that it became a matter of serious consideration how they were to be kept together. Whole regiments were already in a state of mutiny, which the most terrible examples scarcely sufficed to repress. In other departments, too, the utmost confusion prevailed; for the treasury was exhausted, and though the investments for England were stopped, and bills drawn upon the court of directors, the funds necessary to meet the current expenses of the government were wanting. It was under these circumstances that the nabobship was a second time offered to Meer Jaffier, in whom the lust of power still prevailed, even over the love of wealth. He accepted the dignity, under conditions which it was impossible that he should ever fulfil: and he died at last of vexation and chagrin, occasioned by the incessant demands made upon his resources, and the flagrant injuries inflicted upon his people.

Such was the state of British India, when the directory, alarmed at the dangers which menaced their power, came to the determination of intrusting to Clive the important duty of introducing into Bengal a new and a better order of things. With this view, the dignity of governor was, in May, 1764, conferred upon him; and, on the 4th of June, armed with full powers, and an ample code of instructions, he quitted England. On the 10th of April, 1765, he reached Madras, where a narrative of the events alluded to in a preceding paragraph was communicated to him. He learned by this, that the most imminent of the dangers which had called him from his retirement were removed; that the mutiny among the troops was suppressed; that Meer Caussim was expelled; that the chiefs who supported him were subdued; that the emperor himself was dependent on the bounty of the English; and that the nabob, Meer Jaffier, was dead. How all this affected him, and to what views of empire his attention became directed, may be gathered from the following extract from a letter, written at the time, to his friend Mr. Rous:—

"We have at last," says Clive, "arrived at that critical period which I have long foreseen; I mean that period which renders it necessary for us to determine, whether we can or shall take the whole to ourselves. Jaffier Ali Khan is dead, and his natural son is a minor; but I know not yet whether he is declared successor. Sujah Dowlah is beat from his dominion; we are in possession of it; and it is scarcely hyperbole to say, to-morrow the whole Mogul empire is in our power. The inhabitants of the country we know, by long experience, have no attachment to any obligation. Their forces are neither disciplined, commanded, nor paid as ours are. Can it then be doubted, that a large army of Europeans will preserve us sovereigns, not only holding in awe the attempts of any country prince, but, by rendering us so truly formidable, that no French, Dutch, nor other enemy, will presume to mo-

lest us? You will, I am sure, imagine with me, that, after the length we have ran, the princes of Indostan must conclude our views to be boundless; they have seen such instances of our ambition, that they cannot suppose us capable of moderation. The very nabob whom we might support would be either covetous of our possessions, or jealous of our power. Ambition, fear, avarice, would be daily watching to destroy us; a victory would be but a temporary relief to us; for the dethroning of the first nabob would be followed by the setting up another, who, from the same principles, would, when his treasure admitted of keeping up an army, pursue the very path of his predecessor. We must, indeed, become nabobs ourselves, in fact, if not in name; perhaps totally so without disguise: but on this subject I cannot be certain till my arrival in Bengal."

These were the sentiments of Lord Clive, ere his foot rested on the soil of his province. How long they might have been entertained prior to this open declaration of them we possess no means of learning; but that they were full of statesmanlike views, evincing profound sagacity and political wisdom in the writer, no one who compares the prediction with its accomplishment can deny. From the moment that our countrymen first began to interfere in the general politics of the Indian people and princes, the road to empire was thrown open to them, and they were ultimately compelled to follow it, — not, as is generally the case, in obedience to the dictates of ambition, but by the strongest of all impulses — the instinct of self-preservation.

About a month after the preceding letter was written, Clive, accompanied by Mr. Sumner and Mr. Sykes, two out of the four coadjutors nominated to assist him in the task of reform, arrived at Calcutta. He found that a new nabob had been recently appointed, namely, Nujeem ad Dowla, the son of Meer Jaffier, but that the English government had placed the whole management of his affairs under the control of an agent appointed by them-

selves. He ascertained, likewise, that a deed which had been sent out some time previously, for the purpose of putting a stop to the mischievous system of gifts, not only remained unexecuted, but was denounced as tyrannical and flagitious. In like manner the inland trade was still carried on with as much avidity as ever; while the most flagitious chicanery, as well as the most flagrant corruption of morals, abounded among all classes of the Company's servants. Clive felt that though the circumstances of the colony were in some respects different from those which were understood to prevail at the period when his commission was made out, there remained ample scope for exertion; and hence he proclaimed, without hesitation, that the authority of the president and council was at an end, and that all power now vested in the select committee, of which he was at the head.

It were foreign to the object of this work, did we enter into a minute detail of the many and striking changes introduced by the select committee into the civil administration of Bengal. To describe these at length, and to explain the nature of the causes which led to them, belongs rather to the historian of British India than to the military biographer of lord Clive; nevertheless, as the fame of that great man may be said to rest almost as much upon his proceedings in the council-chamber as in the field, we may be pardoned if we give a general view of the results of this his second administration.

There were two subjects of deep interest presented to the consideration of Clive, by the situation into which he found that the affairs of the province had been thrown; first, the relation which the English government then bore and ought in future to bear towards the native powers; secondly, the condition of the trading and mercantile classes as well as of the officers and servants, both civil and military, who, scattered through the soubahdary, were dependent, in a greater or less degree, on the Company. With reference to the former

of these points, he found that, by adhering to the ancient system of government, by setting up a nabob as the ostensible head of the state, and leaving to him the charge of collecting the revenues and administering the police of the country, the Company had not only embarrassed itself in its corporate proceedings, but that temptations were thrown in the way of its immediate servants, such as human nature could scarcely be expected to resist. He resolved, therefore, to place the matter on an entirely new footing, by obtaining from the emperor a grant of the dewanny, — in other words, authority to collect and appropriate the revenues of the three provinces of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa. Two means of attaining this end were before him. Either he might guarantee to the emperor the absolute possession of Oude, which the defeat of Sujah Dowlah had placed at the disposal of the Company; or, he might purchase the coveted distinction by the payment of an annual tribute, such as the fallen fortunes of the Mogul might require. Though the majority of the council gave their opinion in favour of the former course, Clive decided that the latter would best serve the interests of his employers.

Having prevailed upon the nabob, therefore, to resign into his hands the management of the fiscal affairs of the soubahdary, he proceeded to negotiate both with Sheik Alim and Sujah Dowlah — the first of whom he compelled to accept an annuity of 325,000*l.* per annum, while to the latter he restored the whole of his dominions, except one portion, estimated to produce a revenue of 250,000*l.*, which was conferred on the emperor. In return for this donation, the emperor awarded to the English that grant, which raised them at once to the dignity of princes in India, while the nabob, still retaining his title, retired from the actual cares of office, on an annual pension of 662,000*l.*

Having thus adjusted the Company's differences with the country powers, Clive turned his attention to the correction of those vices which too much disfigured the

conduct of affairs, both in the commercial and war departments of the colony. To the practice of accepting — in many instances, of extorting — presents from the native princes he succeeded in putting a total stop. The contract, which had been as yet but partially ratified, he carried fully into force himself, setting the example by affixing his signature to the deed; nor does it appear that his conduct in this respect gave the smallest umbrage to his colleagues. In like manner, the course which he esteemed it prudent to adopt, in reference to the inland trade, of which the directors had pronounced the condemnation, met with little opposition, either in the council or elsewhere. Clive saw, or pretended to see, that an absolute extinction of the privileges hitherto enjoyed by the European residents, was incompatible with the welfare of the colony. He accordingly modified, where he could not venture to abolish, by establishing a monopoly of the trade in salt, betel, and tobacco; and arranging that it should be carried on for the exclusive benefit of the superior servants of the Company. The following is the substance of the rules adopted in committee for conducting the trade in question.

It was agreed, that the sum of 100,000*l.* should be annually paid to the Company, under the denomination of duty; and that the profits arising after the duty was provided for, should be divided among three classes of proprietors. That in the first class should be included the governor, receiving five shares; the second in council receiving three shares; the commander in chief three shares; ten members of council, each two shares; two colonels, each two shares;—in all, five and thirty shares, divided among fifteen individuals. That the second class should comprise one chaplain, fourteen senior merchants, and three lieutenant-colonels, in all, eighteen persons; to whom twelve shares were granted, at the rate of two thirds of a share to each. That the third class should comprehend twenty-seven persons; namely, thirteen factors, four majors, four first surgeons at the presidency, two first surgeons at the army, one secretary to the council,

one sub-accountant, one Persian translator, and one sub-export warehouse keeper; among whom nine shares should be distributed in equal proportions. That a committee of four, empowered to make by-laws, borrow money, and determine the amount of capital, should be appointed for the entire management of the concern. That the purchases should be made by contract; that the goods should be conveyed by the agents of the association to certain fixed places, and there sold to the native merchants and retailers, at established and invariable prices. That the exclusive power of making those purchases should be insured to the association for one year; and that European agents should be allowed to conduct the business of the society in different parts of the country.

Strong doubts may be entertained both as to the policy and the justice of this arrangement, which at once violated an order long ago received from home, and perpetuated a system pregnant with ruin, immediately to the natives, more remotely to the English themselves; but with respect to other innovations, made into established usages, however unpopular at the moment, there can now, we conceive, be but one opinion. It had been hitherto usual for the senior members of council to withdraw from their duties at the presidency, and to establish themselves as chiefs at the remote factories, wherever the means of acquiring wealth appeared to be most abundant. Clive objected to that custom, as tending to leave the administration of the government in the hands of the least experienced of its members, as well as on the ground that abuses would be tolerated in persons possessed of acknowledged influence; against which, if perpetrated by junior servants, complaints would be immediately made. He therefore succeeded in obtaining an order, by which the routine of factory appointments was reversed; while, by increasing the salaries of the gentlemen appointed to these charges, he did all that human foresight could do, to place them above the reach of temptation to wrong.

Again, as it appeared, on investigation, that among the civil servants of the Company then resident at Calcutta, there were "not more than three or four whom the select committee could possibly recommend to higher stations," Clive, with characteristic decision, determined that the vacant seats in council should be filled up from Madras; and four gentlemen were in consequence invited from that presidency to assist at the deliberations of the supreme government. It would have been contrary to nature had this step, however prudent in itself, failed to call forth the indignant remonstrances of the individuals whose ambition suffered a temporary blight; but Clive treated such opposition with perfect contempt; and, suspending the secretary to the council, who unwisely made himself a party to it, went forward without faltering in his course of improvement.

So far the task of reform, invidious and irksome at the best, was completed with comparatively little trouble or hazard. The case was different when Clive began to apply the principle of retrenchment to the allowances claimed and enjoyed by the military. When the British troops, after the battle of Plassey, took the field in support of Meer Jaffier, that nabob, the better to insure their fidelity, conferred upon the officers a gratuity equal in amount to the batta, or tent allowance granted by the Company to its officers, while employed in active operations. Neither Meer Jaffier nor Meer Caussim ever found it convenient to reduce this perquisite, against which, as it in no degree affected their treasury, the English government considered it useless to protest; and hence, what had originally been received as a boon, came to be regarded as a right, of which the army considered themselves justified in exacting the fulfilment, no matter from what quarter the disbursement might directly come. The consequence was, that when, by the grant of the dewanny, the duty of providing for the military defence of the provinces devolved upon the Company, it was found that the revenues were burdened with a charge, among other things, of double batta:

in other words, that the pay of its military officers was considerably greater than had been calculated upon or admitted. Frequent orders were issued, requiring the correction of this evil; but as yet the situation of the colony had not been such as to render it safe to enforce obedience. It remained for Clive to apply the indomitable vigour of his mind to an undertaking from which all his predecessors had shrunk.

One of the first proceedings of the new governor, after his arrival in the country, had been, to reorganise the army of Bengal, by telling off the corps of which it was composed, into three divisions, or brigades. These, which consisted, respectively, of one European regiment of infantry, one company of artillery, six battalions of Sepoys, and one squadron of native cavalry, were stationed,—the first brigade at Monghier, distant 300 miles from Calcutta; the second, at Bankpore, near Patna, 100 miles beyond Monghier; and the third, at Allahabad, 200 miles beyond Patna, whence it observed the Mahrattas. Notwithstanding such an arrangement, there prevailed a perfect understanding among the officers attached to the several brigades, almost the whole of whom regarded the threatened diminution of their allowances with disgust. It was even agreed, so early as the month of December, 1765, that the meditated act should be resisted, and that the publication of any edict, requiring them to dispense with their obnoxious perquisite, should serve as a signal for a general resignation, by the malecontents, of their commissions. We are somewhat at a loss to account for the extraordinary deficiency of intelligence which kept Clive in ignorance of this conspiracy up to the very moment of its completion; yet, that the case was so, the event abundantly proved. An order appeared, to the effect that, on the 1st of January, 1766, the double batta should cease; and that the troops in Bengal should, with a few exceptions, be placed on the same footing with those on the Coromandel coast; that is to say, that the officers should have single batta when in the

field, when in garrison or cantonments no batta at all. In a moment, the spirit of discontent spread throughout a very large proportion of the inferior officers in the army. Oaths were administered, subscriptions entered into, and pledges given; while upwards of 200 commissions were collected for the purpose of resignation, whenever the fitting moment should arrive.

Things were in this state, when the sudden appearance of 60,000 Mahrattas on the frontiers of Cozah, about 150 miles from Allahabad, recalled Clive from the civil duties of his office. He reached Moorshedabad early in April, where a congress of native chiefs and princes was held, when a letter from sir Robert Fletcher, the officer commanding at Monghier, made him, for the first time, aware that the army was in a state of mutiny. Notwithstanding the strong terms in which Fletcher wrote, Clive could not at first persuade himself that the conspiracy was indeed so formidable as the apprehensions of his informant represented it to be. A brief enquiry, however, served to assure him that the affairs of the Company had arrived at a crisis; and never, perhaps, did there live the man better adapted to grapple with the dangers attendant on it.

Having ascertained from colonel Smith, commanding at Allahabad, that his officers, like those under Fletcher, were in mutiny; that the Mahrattas were in motion; that they were collecting boats, and that no reliance was to be placed on the fidelity of the European soldiers, — Clive instructed him to maintain, to the last, a bold front, and to yield only when there should be no alternative between concession to the mutineers, and disgrace in the presence of an enemy. Meanwhile, he himself hastened towards Monghier, giving, by letter, directions to the council of Calcutta, that no exertion should be spared in procuring a supply of officers; and pointing out that, even among the merchants, many might be found to whom commissions would prove not unacceptable. This done, and relying partly upon

the few who were known to be devoted to himself partly upon the steadiness of the sepoys, as yet, uncontaminated, Clive hurried to the chief seat of the conspiracy, where all his proceedings were guided by a degree of firmness and decision, which have been rarely equalled, and never, perhaps, surpassed. Without a moment's hesitation he placed in arrest the ringleaders in the movement, accepting the resignations of all, and sending the more faulty as prisoners to Calcutta. This was followed by a series of courts martial, by the sentence of which not a few were cashiered; while, of the remainder, some were permitted to retire, and others, on their professions of penitence, reinstated. Even sir Robert Fletcher escaped not the vengeance of those laws which he had, as but too plainly appeared, very inefficiently supported. He was tried on the charge of concealment of mutiny, and, being found guilty, was dismissed the service.

The tale of Clive's military life is told; for, with the suppression of this mutiny, ended that professional career, which alone we have undertaken to describe. His proceedings become henceforth a portion of the history of his times, and, as such, can be delineated, in a work like the present, only in outline. With respect to the concluding acts of his government, they were directed entirely to the consolidation of a system, which it had been his pride and his glory to originate, and which, though far from faultless, undeniably rendered the English name respected as well as feared throughout India. It is true that many abuses continued to prevail; and that, from all participation in the profits arising out of them, it is not very easy to exculpate Clive himself. It is equally true that, to the instructions received from home, Clive persisted to the last in paying only so much attention as suited his own purposes: nevertheless, he who compares the state of British India in 1756, when that great man first arrived in Calcutta, with what it was when he finally quitted it, will not

fail to place him in the foremost rank of benefactors to his country.

Having introduced a few changes into the laws which regulated the inland trade, given his sanction to a regulation which restricted the governor from all share in its management; appointed Mr. Verelst to succeed him as chairman to the select committee, and recommended a steady adherence to the principles of government then established, lord Clive embarked on board the Britannia, on the 16th of February 1767, and set sail for England. Here he was again welcomed both by his sovereign and the court of directors, as a man who deserved well at their hands; for the former conferred upon him the honour of the Bath, while the latter insured to him the continued possession, throughout a period of ten years, of the revenues arising from the jaghire round Calcutta. These were not, however, the only nor the most lasting monuments which were erected on this occasion to his fame. Clive had accepted from the nabob Nujeem ad Dowla, during his late residence at Calcutta, the amount of a legacy left to him by Meer Jaffier. This might and probably would have been regarded as a violation of the covenant into which he as well as his colleagues had entered, touching presents, had he appropriated the sum, five lacs of rupees, to his own use. But Clive never entertained an idea of the kind. He devoted it to a purpose at once politic and humane, to the establishment of a fund, out of which soldiers and sailors, invalided from the Company's service, might derive a maintenance; thus disarming, as far as it is possible so to do, party rancour itself, and compelling the reluctant approbation of men who are not usually disposed to applaud such as pass them in the race of fame or fortune.

In the year 1760, Lord Clive had been elected to serve in parliament as one of the representatives of the borough of Shrewsbury. He resumed his senatorial labours on his return to England, and continued them until towards the close of his life, without, however,

except on one memorable occasion, taking any very prominent part in the discussion of public affairs. The occasion to which we particularly allude, occurred in the session of 1773, when "A Bill for regulating the Affairs of the East India Company, as well in India as in Europe," was brought forward, after a long and patient enquiry, before a select committee, especially appointed to investigate the subject. While collecting evidence on which to ground the proposed measure, the committee subjected lord Clive, as well as several other civil and military officers, to the strictest examination, which affected not the proceedings of the Company alone, but their own individual conduct as agents and servants of that body. Out of this, again, sprang a report, which was, in due time, brought up by the chairman, and contained charges of rapacity, treachery, and cruelty, against all who were concerned in the celebrated revolution of 1756. As a matter of course, Clive became, in a remarkable degree, the object of this attack, which was pressed forward with all the rancour of personal hostility and party bias.

Had the proceedings of his enemies been tempered by the slightest regard to magnanimity, or even justice, it is highly probable that Clive would have added one more to the long list of great men, whose services have been repaid by the shameless ingratitude of the very generation whom they served. After a lengthened debate, it was carried in the affirmative, "That all acquisitions made under the influence of a military force, or by treaty with foreign powers, do of right belong to the state;"—while an additional clause, importing, "that in the acquisition of his wealth, lord Clive had abused the powers with which he was intrusted," failed only by a slender majority. Clive was not an orator, in the ordinary acceptation of the term, and rarely spoke in the house, but on the present occasion he delivered himself with becoming force and dignity.—"If the resolution proposed should receive the assent of this house," said he, "I shall have nothing left that I can call my own,

except my paternal fortune of five hundred a year, and which has been in the family for ages past. But upon this I am content to live; and, perhaps, I shall find more real content of mind and happiness than in the trembling affluence of an unsettled fortune. But, to be called, after sixteen years have elapsed, to account for my conduct in this manner, and after an uninterrupted enjoyment of my property, to be questioned and considered as obtaining it unwarrantably, is hard indeed, and a treatment of which I should not consider the British senate capable. Yet, if this should be the case, I have a conscious innocence within me that tells me my conduct is irreproachable. *Frangas, non flectes.* They may take from me what I have; they may, as they think, make me poor; but I will be happy. Before I sit down, I have one request to make to the house, that when they come to decide on my honour, they will not forget their own."

A warm debate ensued upon this, when, as we have just said, the insulting clause was negatived; and it was declared by the suffrages of a small majority, that lord Clive did (though abusing the powers with which he was intrusted) render great and meritorious services to his country.

It will be borne in mind, that Great Britain was involved, at the period of which we are now writing, in those unfortunate disputes which ended in the emancipation of the most important of her transatlantic colonies. As yet, indeed, the sword had not been drawn; though the rapid approximation of that crisis was foreseen; and hence the minister was already beginning to look abroad for a person competent to undertake the management of a war, of which, however, he understood neither the nature nor the extent. The military reputation of Clive at once pointed him out as eminently qualified for that charge; and a tender was made to him of the chief command of the forces about to be employed in North America. But Clive's constitution had not recovered from the shock which a service of many years

in the climate of India had given; and the faculties of his mind, as well as the powers of his body, were materially impaired. He therefore declined a trust, which, under different circumstances, it cannot be doubted that he would have undertaken; and, withdrawing even from his attendance on parliament, spent his time chiefly in absolute seclusion in the country. Here the depression of spirits, to which he had long been subject, gained ground upon him every day. He became melancholy and desponding, and died at last in a state of pitiable imbecility, on the 24th of November, 1776, not long after he had entered into the fiftieth year of his age.

The character of lord Clive, whether we regard him as a soldier, a politician, or a man, is marked by features so bold and so prominent, that the most careless observer of his busy and eventful career can scarcely fail to acquire of it at least a tolerably correct conception. Prompt, decisive, fearless, energetic, unbending, perhaps austere, and little oppressed with scruples, he seemed formed by nature to play a part on the very stage which Providence had ordained that he should tread; a stage where daring courage was at least as much needed as any faculty of calculation, and a perfect self-command in the midst of difficulties, more valuable than the most profound or sagacious foresight. In expressing ourselves thus, we desire not to be understood as questioning the claims of the subject of this memoir to be regarded as a man of extensive powers of mind, as well as of sober and restrained judgment. The latter quality was not, indeed, called much into play, because the circumstances both of the times and of the country demanded action rather than deliberation: nevertheless, his plans, both of military operations and civil government, were not the offspring of impulse, but originated, as often as they can be said to have matured themselves at all, in discreet consideration. His views, for example, of the posture which it behoved the Company to assume, so soon as the real weakness of the native powers became manifest, exhibit him in the light of a

wise as well as a bold speculatist; while the preliminary steps which he judged it proper to take, are all distinguished as much by prudence as by decision.

So far there can, we conceive, be but one opinion relative to the merits or demerits of lord Clive, whose faults as well as his excellences are palpable to all the world. Considered as a military commander, again, we must confess that we feel exceedingly at a loss by what standard to try him. It can scarcely be said that he exhibited at any period of his career the qualities which belong to the great general; because the nature of the operations which he was called upon to conduct afforded scarcely any room for their display. His enemies were, with few exceptions, undisciplined barbarians, deficient alike in the knowledge and the arms requisite towards the prosecution of modern warfare; while the force which he himself commanded never exceeded in numbers the strength of an ordinary division. From the perplexity of conducting an extended series of movements he was, therefore, entirely freed, and of the labours arising out of the management of the commissariat department — a department on which more than on any other the efficiency of an army depends, he knew nothing. Any comparison, therefore, between him and the illustrious commanders either of ancient or modern Europe would be ridiculous, inasmuch as the grounds on which such comparison might alone be formed are wanting. In like manner, his was not a system of partisan warfare, requiring celerity of movement and promptitude of action, in which a small body of men is made to harass and disturb a force against which it were the height of folly to present an open front. Clive, on the contrary, sought his adversary, no matter how superior in point of numbers, in order that he might bring on a battle at all hazards, and under almost any seeming disadvantages; and he conquered, even at Plassey, rather because he knew the enemy's moral weakness than through any skilful management of his

handful of followers. In seeking, therefore, to arrive at a just estimate of the niche which he is entitled to fill among military leaders, we must abstain, as far as possible, from contrasting him with others; and judge of him rather by a reference to general principles, than to individual acts performed in other countries.

It is quite certain that lord Clive possessed, to a remarkable degree, the quality of moral courage, without which all other talents are useless in the commander of an army. He stood in no dread of the bugbear of responsibility; and hence his faculties were always clear, unclouded, and in a condition to be applied with full force to the object before him. Again, the attribute of self-command was never enjoyed to a greater degree by any soldier of any nation. Errors he, doubtless, committed, as at Coverepawk and Buz-Buzia, where he permitted himself to be surprised, — and in front of Calcutta, where he executed his eccentric movement through the heart of Surajah Dowlah's camp. Yet the perfect coolness with which he adopted the necessary measures to remedy evils somewhat needlessly committed, abundantly testifies to the extent of his personal bravery, and to the versatility and readiness of his conduct. With a second quality, therefore, essential to the composition of the really able commander, he was unquestionably gifted: he possessed the power of handling his troops, as it is called; in other words, he was a perfect master of the field of battle.

In addition to these excellences, available to an equal degree in all quarters of the globe, Clive was endowed with a quickness of perception which enabled him to grasp, as it were, at a single glance, both the devices of the enemy and his means of carrying them into effect. To Lawrence, perhaps, belongs the merit of having first broken the spell which so long kept the English in awe of the native powers; yet it was Clive who taught them that these powers might not only be resisted but overcome, even when their strength appeared conso-

lidated, and their spirits flushed by recent successes. Now, although all this may be regarded as trivial after the event is known,—the case was widely different while the chances hung in the balance,—when it was necessary to overbear, not his own scruples only, but the opinions and prejudices of those around him. We conceive, therefore, that with a third of those faculties, which are necessary towards the formation of a great military mind, Clive was fully endowed; he could calculate on the moral qualities as well as on the physical, both of his own people and of his adversaries.

We have said that Clive was never called upon to arrange a series of operations on an extended scale; and hence that any comparison between him and a Marlborough, or a Wellington, were absurd: nevertheless it is beyond dispute, that for the conduct of that particular species of warfare over which events required him to preside, he gave proof that he was eminently qualified. How far he might or might not have succeeded if called upon to direct one gigantic European army in the face of another, it is, of course, impossible to determine; but if the theory be correct (and we own that we believe that it is so), which holds that great talents invariably adapt themselves to the circumstances into which their possessor is thrown, then may we fairly enough presume, that on no field of active warfare would he have been found wanting.

It belongs not to the military biographer of lord Clive to pass sentence on his conduct, either as a statesman or a man. Possibly faults may be detected in both phases of his character, for which, however, great allowances ought to be made; inasmuch as in public and in private he was alike beset by temptations of no ordinary nature. But, however this may be, England ought never to forget that to him she is indebted for the erection and maintenance of an empire more extensive by far than any which has existed in the world since the downfall of the Roman supremacy.

Lord Clive was married in February, 1753, to Mar-

garet Maskelyne, daughter of Edward Maskelyne, esq. of Paston, in Wiltshire, by whom he had five children; namely, Edward, Rebecca, Charlotte, Margaret, and Robert; the whole of whom, as well as his widow, survived him. He was himself interred at Moreton Say, the parish in which he was born.

CHARLES MARQUIS CORNWALLIS.

1737—1805.

Charles Cornwallis, viscount Brome, first earl and afterwards marquis Cornwallis, the eldest son of Charles earl Cornwallis, by Elizabeth, the daughter of Charles viscount Townsend, was born on the 31st of December, 1737, at Brome, in the county of Suffolk. He received the rudiments of his education, first at a private school, and afterwards, as was customary with boys of his rank, at Eton; but, being designed for the military profession, his name was never entered, as far as we know, on the books of either of the universities. He removed, on the contrary, after the usual school course had been completed, to the military academy at Turin; where, in such studies as were pursued at that well known seminary, he spent several years of his life.

By a reference to the records preserved in the war-office, we find that lord Brome's commission, as ensign in the 1st regiment of foot guards, bears date the 8th of December, 1756. In that grade he continued up to the 5th of August, 1759; when, passing over the intermediate step of lieutenant, he was promoted, by purchase, to the rank of captain, in the 85th regiment of the line. In this capacity he served under the orders of lord Granby; the commander, at that time, of the British contingent in Germany. How far he found any opportunity of distinguishing himself, during the campaigns of 1759 and 1760, we have not been able to ascertain; but as the openings to fame, presented to a battalion officer, are for the most part rare, the chances are that he did his duty, without attracting any particular degree of notice. Nevertheless, that he displayed, at least, a fair proportion both of zeal and intelligence, is rendered manifest by the fact that, in the year 1761, he was again permitted to overleap an intermediate step in the ladder. He was promoted, on the

1st of May, to a lieutenant-colonelcy, by purchase, in the 12th regiment of foot.

From this date, up to the year 1775, lord Cornwallis (for he succeeded to the earldom in 1762) does not appear to have been any where actively employed in the field. He rose, indeed, with sufficient rapidity in his profession; being appointed, successively, aide-de-camp to the king, with the rank of colonel, 2d of August, 1765; colonel of the 33d foot, 21st of March, 1766; and major-general, 29th of September, 1775; while the honourable office of constable of the Tower was, by the special favour of his sovereign, conferred upon him so early as 1770. But his career, throughout an interval of fifteen years and upwards, was one rather of politics than of war; a course which, in a work like the present, we are not called upon closely to follow. A solitary occurrence may, indeed, be referred to, as marking a trivial variety in the customs of the service, as they guide men's proceedings now, and guided them seventy years ago. Lord Cornwallis, when appointed aide-de-camp to the king, retired from the 12th regiment, in order that his juniors in that corps might benefit by his elevation.

We have said, that during a period of fifteen years, lord Cornwallis devoted himself rather to the duties of a senator than to those of a soldier. He was twice elected member of parliament for the borough of Eye, in Suffolk, which place he continued to represent till the death of his father, when he took his seat in the House of Lords, and became a supporter of what would now be termed liberal or whig principles. Against the fatal measures which led to a rupture with the North American colonies, he stood all along opposed. He resisted them at the outset, on the ground of injustice, and counselled their abandonment, as an act of prudence; indeed, his name appears affixed to more than one protest, in which the probable consequences of ministerial obstinacy are set forth. Nevertheless, lord Cornwallis never forgot, while exercising the privileges

of a peer, that his country had likewise claims upon him as an officer. Unlike lord Effingham, he felt, so soon as the sword was unsheathed, that the merits of the question were entirely changed; and that, to withdraw from the service because he might be required to act against the insurgents, would be to violate the oath which he had taken to his sovereign. On this account, as well as because he considered it unwise to encourage, even indirectly, an armed resistance to the laws, lord Cornwallis avowed himself ready to assist in suppressing the rebellion; without, however, concealing his disapprobation of the acts which had produced it, or his determination, in the event of success, to move for their repeal.

With the events which distinguished the commencement of the struggle, as well as with the wretched system of delay and false economy which gave rise to them, we are very little concerned. The reader need scarcely be reminded, that after the Boston port bill was passed, and the embers of sedition blown into a flame; after the solemn league and covenant had been subscribed, and all commercial intercourse with Great Britain denounced; after the governor's cadets at Boston had disbanded themselves, and the representatives of Massachusetts Bay had met and transacted business, in defiance of a proclamation from general Gage, by which the assembly stood prorogued; after a general congress of delegates, from not less than twelve of the colonies, had been held at Philadelphia, by which the conduct of the province of Massachusetts Bay was approved of, and the violent resolutions passed by the county of Suffolk commended; after every thing had been done in America, short of open war, calculated to evince a spirit of determined opposition to the decrees of parliament, the minister persisted in believing that order would yet be restored without the application of any extraordinary power, or the incurrence of any extraordinary expense. Under this delusion the estimates of supply were formed, in November, 1774, on a peace establishment; and even when, in the February following, an increase to the land

and sea forces was deemed necessary, only 2000 seamen and 4383 soldiers were called for and granted. Nor, to say the truth, was much more of energy displayed abroad than distinguished the councils of the government at home. General Gage saw, from his head-quarters in Boston, the elements of a rebellion rapidly moulding themselves into form; his proclamations were derided, the course of justice was suspended, and meetings of armed men were held in every town and village; yet he contented himself with fortifying the neck of land which connects the town with the continent, and encouraging, by a display of unnecessary caution, the spirit of which he affected to be incredulous. One or two trivial expeditions were, indeed, undertaken; such as the march upon Salem, and the inroad to Lexington: but these, being mismanaged, tended only to increase the confidence, and to give a bitterness to the hostility, of the rebel militia. Finally, a corps of several thousand veteran troops permitted itself to be placed in a state of siege, by a swarm of undisciplined and half-armed peasants, commanded by officers destitute of experience, and indifferently supplied both with money and munitions.

The arrival, on the 25th of May, 1776, of the reinforcements under generals Howe, Burgoyne, and Clinton, was not productive of any material improvement in the position of the British army. Indecision and timidity still blinded the judgment of its chiefs, who persisted in maintaining the defensive: while the Americans, without formally renouncing their allegiance to the British crown, proceeded to organise a national government, to enrol troops, and to provide funds for the maintenance of a war. Fresh levies were thus permitted to come in from day to day, by whom the foraging parties from Boston were harassed, and all supplies, both of cattle and provender, cut off. Finally, the rebels, emboldened by success, took possession of Breed's Hill, an eminence which completely overlooks the land approaches to the town, where, with incredible labour and

diligence, of which no notice was taken by the royal leader, they entrenched themselves to the number of 1500 men.

The latter occurrence took place, as every reader of history is aware, in the night between the 16th and 17th of June; so determined had been the indolence, or so invincible the timidity, of the British commander. On the morning of the 17th, a heavy fire from the shipping in the harbour, made him aware that the enemy had assumed the offensive. He saw, and valued as it deserved, the movement which they had accomplished; and he now determined to recover an important position, which it was his business, long ago, to have secured. The battle of Bunker's Hill enabled him to effect this, though at an expense of life truly distressing; nevertheless the actual condition of the British army was in no degree ameliorated. Gage still avoided the course which it was his obvious duty to have followed, and clung to a place where his troops suffered the greatest privations, until he gave up his command, in the beginning of October, and returned to England.

In the meanwhile the flame of war, which began in Massachusetts, was not slow in extending itself throughout the whole of the continent. From South Carolina to the district of Maine the people were every where in arms; while the governors, thwarted by their assemblies and threatened by mobs, were glad to take refuge, either on board of ships, or in the forts and strong-holds of their respective provinces. Even Canada felt the effects of the general discontent, being invaded by a force under Arnold and Montgomery, which, though eventually repulsed in an attack upon Quebec itself, subdued the posts upon the Chabley, and retained them. Thus were the anticipations of the minister shown to be groundless and absurd; and the folly of holding in contempt the bravery and enterprise of an entire nation rendered manifest to the whole world.

Such was the condition of affairs on the other side of the Atlantic, when the British government, anxious

to make amends for past errors, proposed to employ against the rebels not less than 35,000 men, besides a large and formidable fleet. This was the more necessary, inasmuch as France had exhibited of late palpable signs of a disposition to take part in the quarrel; and, it was well known that agents from the revolted colonies were already on their way to Paris. It was soon found, however, in spite of the general popularity of the war, that recruits were but slowly obtained in England; one proof, among many others, that the English, though, when embodied, the best troops in the world, are, as a people, the reverse of military. Recourse was, in consequence, had to certain German princes, — the landgrave of Hesse Cassel, the duke of Brunswick, with others of lesser note; — from whom a body of 17,000 men were hired; on terms censured, by the opposition, as extravagant, but which were, probably, as advantageous as the nature of the service would warrant. This strong measure was followed up by the calling out of the militia, and the withdrawal of every disposable man both from Ireland and Scotland; while Gibraltar itself was garrisoned, in part, by Hanoverians, in order that a portion of the British troops hitherto cooped up there might be rendered available for general service.

In the winter of 1775, lord Cornwallis, now a major-general in the army, received orders to hold himself in readiness for active service in the colonies. It was stated some time ago, that, however averse he might be to the measures by which the war was precipitated, lord Cornwallis's views of his duty, both as a citizen and a soldier, were too just to permit any hesitation to arise in his mind as to the necessity of obeying this order. He, therefore, repaired to Portsmouth, where a portion of his brigade had been appointed to assemble; and, in the month of December, embarked in the Bristol, of fifty guns, commanded by commodore sir Peter Parker. But, as the commodore's instructions required that he should call for further reinforcements at Cork, and a succession of adverse winds set in immediately on his

arrival there, a full month elapsed, after the troops were all on board, ere the squadron could put to sea. Nor did their misfortunes end here. Several heavy gales occurred, which drove them considerably out of their course, insomuch that the low shores of America were not descried till the beginning of May, 1776.

Previous to the arrival of Cornwallis at the theatre of war, many important changes had occurred in various parts of America. Sir Guy Carleton, the governor of Canada, had obtained several successes; and, being joined, early in the spring, by a large force from Europe, was once more in quiet occupation of his province, as well as of the forts which Arnold and Montgomery had wrested from him. As if to counterbalance that success, New York was absolutely in possession of the insurgents; while general Howe, subdued as much by his own want of talent as by the masterly evolutions of Washington, was driven to evacuate Boston with disgrace. Meantime, lord Dunmore, after incurring an uncalled-for defeat at Great Bridge, on Elizabeth River, was forced to evacuate Norfolk, and leave Virginia to its fate; while, in North Carolina, the groundwork of an effective resistance was taken away by the precipitancy with which the well-affected, in that colony, were hurried into action. There chanced to be established there many families, emigrants from the highlands of Scotland, who carried with them, to their new homes, the spirit of loyalty which had animated them in their native country. On these it was well known that the British government might rely, so soon as a corps of regular troops appeared round which they might assemble; and hence, a resolution had been formed, of sending a division of the numerous army voted in the last session of parliament, to act from that district as a base of operations.

On opening their secret instructions, after they had well put to sea, commodore Parker and lord Cornwallis became aware that Cape Fear, in North Carolina, was specified as their point of destination. They were

directed to form a junction there with sir Henry Clinton, to whom the conduct of the war in the south was intrusted; and to co-operate generally with such forces as governor Martin, the head of the civil authorities, should have been able to collect. In the expectation which they were thus led to form as to the presence of general Clinton with the armament, the chiefs were not disappointed. That officer, after visiting New York, and vainly trying the temper of the people in Virginia, had pursued his course southward, and they found him, on their arrival, with a small force, at anchor in the roadstead; but of the anticipated succours to be derived from the royalists in the province all hope was passed away. These brave men having risen too soon were rashly led into the midst of difficulties, in the attempt to extricate themselves from which they suffered total annihilation.

Disconcerted by this untoward event, and apprised of the march of general Lee to oppose him, Clinton abandoned as impracticable the project of a landing in North Carolina; while, with his usual irresolution, he permitted several weeks to elapse ere he made up his mind to adopt any other plan of operations. It is true that the face of affairs was, in some degree, changed since he quitted Boston; for he had left general Howe in possession of that place, and now learned, through the medium of the American newspapers, that the town was abandoned. Nevertheless, having received no orders discordant with those which committed the defence of the southern provinces to his charge, it is impossible to attribute to any other cause than one, the hesitation which he experienced in entering upon that undertaking. At length, however, it was determined to effect something; and as Charlestown, in South Carolina, offered a convenient rendezvous for the shipping, and was understood to be but indifferently provided for defence, the squadron weighed anchor, and steered toward the mouth of Ashley River.

It were foreign from the design of this work were we

to describe, in detail, any series of operations, no matter how interesting in themselves, of which the chief conduct was not intrusted to the subject of our memoir. We will not, therefore, pause to give a lengthened account of the present abortive attempt upon Charlestown, in which the land forces never came into play, though the shipping were exposed to a long and murderous cannonade. Enough is done when we state, that Clinton again found the indefatigable Lee in his front; that, after forcing the bar and landing the troops on Long Island, he became an anxious spectator of the contest which the fleet sustained with the batteries in the place and a redoubt erected on Sullivan's Island; and that, at the close of a ten hours' engagement, during which one vessel was burnt to the water's edge, all hope of silencing the enemy's fire was abandoned. The squadron in consequence drew off, and, the troops being taken on board, the whole set sail, for the purpose of joining the main armament, under general Howe.

The plan of campaign, as drawn up at home, embraced three principal objects; namely, the deliverance of Canada, the conquest of New York, and the establishment of a firm footing in the colonies of North and South Carolina. Of these, the first had been fully accomplished by the spirited exertions of general Carleton; the last deferred, as we have just related, by the repulse at Charlestown. With respect, again, to the second, it was already in progress, though cruelly retarded and mismanaged; partly in consequence of the incapacity of those to whom it was committed, partly by accidents beyond the reach of human control. When he came to the resolution of evacuating Boston, general Howe directed his course to Halifax, whither he was given to understand that the promised reinforcements from England were instructed to repair. He thus put himself at the head of the particular corps by which New York was to be reduced; and, as the achievement of that enterprise implied consequences of the most vital im-

portance, he conceived that it ought not to be attempted, except by a force so great as to defy resistance. Under this persuasion, he recalled Clinton and his divisions from the south. Meanwhile he himself remained at the point of rendezvous two whole months, waiting the arrival of one or two regiments which had not yet made good their passage; nor did he sail at last, till a growing scarcity of provisions rendered a longer sojourn of the troops next to impossible.

Of the uses to which an active and intelligent enemy might apply the reduction of New York, general Washington was too well aware not to have turned the leisure thus unexpectedly afforded him to the best account. He knew that the English, in possession of that post, could, by communicating with Carleton along the Hudsons, cut off entirely the northern from the central provinces; while Connecticut, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania would alike lie open to insult, according as the aspect of affairs in one or the other might invite. At an early period, therefore, a strong body of troops had been thrown into the city, of which, as well as of the islands and promontories near, the fortifications were sedulously improved. It was the presence of this corps, indeed, which saved the place, when Clinton appeared first before it; and now that Boston was recovered, Washington marched, with the greater part of his own army, to assist in repelling the anticipated attack. An entrenched camp was formed in Long Island; the highlands were fortified; vessels were sunk in the entrance of the bay; and every point along shore, which presented a commanding position for cannon, was crowded with batteries. In a word, no precaution was omitted, which the means at the disposal of Washington enabled him to adopt, for the purpose of retarding, if he should fail ultimately to defeat, the threatened inroad.

Early in August, commodore Parker's squadron arrived off Staten Island, of which, about six months previously, general Howe had made himself master. The troops were immediately disembarked; and lord

Cornwallis found himself appointed to command the reserve, a body of excellent troops, in which the 33d, his own regiment, was included. Not many days afterwards, the first division of Hessians came in; and it was resolved, at a council of war, that hostilities ought to be commenced with as little delay as possible. It was suggested, moreover, that Long Island presented numerous advantages, both as to provisioning the troops, and securing the stores and hospital; and the question was, in consequence, carried that with the reduction of it, rather than of the city, the campaign should be opened. We are not called upon to offer any opinion respecting the wisdom of this decision. Doubtless, the arguments in favour of it were both numerous and cogent; more especially as the inhabitants were known to be universally well affected, and the place was capable, from its extreme fertility, of supplying the army with grain and forage. Nevertheless, there were other reasons which seemed to recommend the previous reduction of the city; and that the disposable force, both of men and ships, was inadequate to that undertaking, has never, as far as we know, been demonstrated.

The motives which induced us to withhold a detailed account of the attempt upon Charlestown, in South Carolina, operate with equal force in reference to the invasion of Long Island, and the attack upon the enemy's position at Brooklyn. We content ourselves, therefore, with stating, that, on the 22d of August, the British army crossed the Narrows; and, under cover of the guns from the fleet, made good its landing not far from Utrecht and Gravesend, on the south-western extremity of the island. The reserve under lord Cornwallis, forming on that occasion the advanced guard, pushed forward immediately, and drove in the outposts of general Putnam's division; but finding the enemy strongly posted, abstained from any attempt to penetrate beyond the village of Flatbush, at the gorge of a woody pass. Here they were joined in due time by general Howe, and the rest of the army; which passed the night in

bivouac, with its centre at Flatbush, and its flanks resting on either shore.

Several days being expended in landing guns, stores, and other necessaries, the 26th arrived ere the general was in a condition to move; but on that night, as soon as darkness set in, the van stood to its arms, for the purpose of seizing an important pass which the enemy had neglected to occupy. Cornwallis, with his brigade, was again employed, and accomplished his object with equal rapidity and judgment; for he turned the enemy's left, and threatened their rear, before so much as a suspicion arose that he had quitted his ground. The total rout of Putnam's troops ensued: they fled in great disorder within the lines at Brooklyn, leaving 1000 prisoners in the hands of the assailants, who were with difficulty held back from following up this brilliant success by an immediate assault on the entrenched camp. General Howe has left it upon record, that an express order from himself alone prevented this movement; of the success of which, if made, he entertained no doubt. Why that order was issued, has not been so satisfactorily explained.

In the complicated movements which succeeded this affair, including the reduction of York Island, the subsequent capture of New York, the march upon White Plains, the retrogression to Kingsbridge, and the attack upon the American lines at Fort Washington, lord Cornwallis took an active part. In the last of these operations he commanded the column which crossed the East River in boats, and completed the investment of the fort on its eastern flank. This done, and the garrison made prisoners to the amount of 3000 men, lord Cornwallis passed the Hudsons, for the purpose of reducing Fort Lee, a strong post in New Jersey, from which ships ascending the river were liable to be annoyed. The enemy, however, without awaiting his approach, abandoned the place; upon which he re-united his division with the main army, and accompanied it in the marches (for they can scarcely be alluded to in other

terms) which reduced the Jerseys, up to the banks of the Delaware, under British dominion.

It was now the month of December; and, by order of the commander-in-chief, the army took up a line of cantonments amid the detached towns and villages which lay between Brunswick on the Raritan, and Trenton and Bordentown on the Delaware. Availing himself of the season of repose, lord Cornwallis set out for New York, with the design of returning on private business to England: but he had not yet embarked, when intelligence reached him which caused an immediate change in his plans. Washington, apprehensive for the safety of Philadelphia, which the first severe frost would place at the mercy of the English, suddenly crossed the Delaware with 2500 infantry; and, coming by surprise on the first Hessian brigade at Trenton, defeated it with a loss of 1000 men. Satisfied, for the present, with this success, he withdrew as rapidly as he had approached; but being reinforced by fresh levies from Virginia and Maryland, he again took the field a few days afterwards, and threatened to cut off the scattered divisions of the British army in detail. Cornwallis felt that this was not a moment in which his services could be spared from the army: he hastened back into Jersey, drew together three brigades, with cannon; and, having heard that the enemy were posted at Trenton in considerable force, advanced, on the 2d of January, 1777, to meet them.

Though opposed by a detached corps at Maidenhead, and compelled to skirmish the greater part of the way, Cornwallis's movements were so rapid, that three battalions, the 17th, 40th, and 55th, which ought to have joined him from the rear, were compelled to halt that night at Princetown. The main body, however, entered Trenton about four o'clock in the afternoon, a single brigade having been left at Maidenhead to keep open the communication; and numerous attempts were made to bring on a general action, even at that late hour of the day. But Washington was too much master of his art to hazard a battle on which the fate of the war

might depend: he fell back across the Asumpinek, stationed strong guards at the fords, and replying to the English cannon only at intervals, lighted his fires, and appeared to lie down for the night.

After vainly trying the fords, under cover of a heavy fire from his guns, lord Cornwallis followed the example thus set, in the confident anticipation that the return of dawn would bring him into collision with his enemy; —but he was deceived. Washington no sooner saw that the hazard of a night attack was obviated, than he prepared to strike one of those bold strokes for which, not less than for prudence and caution, he stands conspicuous among the military commanders of his age. He caused his fires to be trimmed; left his pickets to follow as a rear-guard, so soon as the day should break; and, sacrificing his communications with Philadelphia, marched off, with the design of surprising Princetown, and, eventually, Brunswick itself.

To avoid the brigade posted at Maidenhead, it became necessary to pursue a route which carried him along the two sides of the triangle of which the road from Princetown to Trenton formed the base. A good deal of time was necessarily expended in making this detour; nevertheless, he gained the vicinity of Princetown soon after the sun had risen, where he found himself in presence of three British regiments, already on their march to join lord Cornwallis. Washington attacked them with great fury; and a fierce encounter took place, which ended without the loss of honour to either party. The English brigade suffered most, perhaps, in killed and wounded, and the regiments composing it were separated; one forcing its way onwards to Maidenhead, while the other two retreated into Princetown. Nevertheless Washington's object was but partially attained: the fugitives from the battle, not considering themselves safe at any post more in advance, continued their retreat to Brunswick; while the Americans took possession of Princetown, with the few stores which had been collected.

It was well for the interests of Great Britain that the chief command of her army was held at this time by an active and intelligent officer. Cornwallis was no sooner made aware of the departure of the enemy from his front, than he surmised the whole of their plan; to prevent the accomplishment of which would, he was aware, require on his part no ordinary exertions. Day had scarcely dawned, when the troops were in line of march, and a rapid movement began in the direction of Brunswick. It was conducted with admirable despatch; for the head of the English column came in sight of Princetown just as the rear of the Americans quitted it: and Washington was, in consequence, compelled to abandon a design pregnant with the most important consequences. After passing the Millstone Creek at a point half way between Princetown and Brunswick, he broke down the bridge, and, turning sharp to the left, led his overwrought followers into the strong country about Pluckemin. Nevertheless, though Brunswick, with the valuable stores and money collected there, was saved, the results of this campaign were the reverse of favourable to the English. Lord Cornwallis not being at the head of affairs, could only follow the instructions which he received, by retaining, throughout the winter, his hold upon Brunswick and Amboy; while Washington over-ran the whole of the open country, and cut off all supplies which were not brought in under strong military escort to the cantonments of the English, and to the city.

The campaign of 1777 was not only late in its commencement, but led, at least for a while, to no important results. Washington, securely posted amid the fastnesses which overhung Middlebrooke, beheld without alarm the petty war of detachments with which, during the months of March, April, and May, the English general contented himself; while, with inferior numbers, he restrained his opponents from attempting the recovery of that superiority which they ought never to have lost in the Jerseys. Once, indeed, and only once,

matters appeared to be approaching a crisis, when general Howe, by a feigned retreat, drew the enemy into the low country as far as Quibble Town; but the first movement in advance made Washington aware of his danger; and he fell back again with such celerity as to hinder any decisive blow from being struck. On this occasion, lord Cornwallis found an opportunity of displaying considerable vigour, as well as rapidity of movement. He marched with his column to turn the enemy's left, over a deep and difficult country; overthrew lord Stirling's corps of 3000 men, that endeavoured to stop him; and failed of attaining his object only through the exhaustion of his own men, whom the fatigue of a protracted action in a sultry day rendered incapable of further exertion.

The result of this affair, and the obstinacy with which Washington held to his plan of defensive warfare, led to a determination on the part of the English leaders, to which, in a great measure, may be traced back by far the most serious of all the reverses that befel the British arms during the struggle. Though the progress of Burgoyne from Canada was perfectly well known, and the necessity of co-operating with him from below sufficiently obvious, general Howe, in whose eyes the capture of Philadelphia appears to have possessed something more than its real value, came to the unfortunate resolution of transferring the seat of war to the south. With this view, about 16,000 men were embarked in the ships of war and transports, sir Henry Clinton being left with 8000 to maintain New-York; and the fleet, putting to sea, proceeded first to the mouth of the Delaware, and eventually to Elk River, in the bay of Chesapeake. Here, on the 25th of August, the troops were landed; and as they were all in a state of efficiency scarcely to have been expected at that season of the year, on the 3d of September they began their slow and cautious march towards Philadelphia.

Of the operations which occurred during this advance, as they were not conducted under the guidance

of lord Cornwallis, we are scarcely called upon to give any minute account. Washington, it is well known, soon became aware of the arrival of the fleet in the Chesapeake; and, with 15,000 men, passed through Philadelphia, in order to measure himself on new ground with his enemy. His first position was in rear of Red Clay Creek, with his left at Newport, on the Christine River. From this, however, as the English drew on, he fell back, skirmishing all the way, and eventually took post under cover of the Brandywine, along a range of heights that extended in a south-western direction from Chadsford. Here, on the 11th of September, general Howe attacked him with a fury that carried all before it. While one column amused the Americans by demonstrations in front of Chadsford, another, of which lord Cornwallis was at the head, pushed for the forks of the Brandywine; and, passing both branches without opposition, came down upon the enemy's right, and overthrew it. Once more was lord Cornwallis enabled to display to advantage the qualities of hardihood and celerity which particularly distinguished him. Though the detour which it was necessary to make measured not less than seventeen miles, the march was performed with the utmost regularity; while in the encounter which followed, both the men and their leader exhibited abundant proofs of courage, coolness, and decision. Washington's right, though skilfully disposed, was broken with great slaughter, and the position of the Brandywine rendered untenable.

We pass over the changes of ground which ensued upon this victory, by stating, in few words, that they were effected with as much caution and deliberation on the part of the English, as if no such victory had been achieved. The enemy, indeed, were not only not pursued, but, rallying their broken columns, and calling in detachments of militia, they once more assumed the offensive. No second battle, however, was fought; and only one or two lesser affairs, such as the surprise of

the American general Wayne by major-general Grey, with an occasional meeting of patrols, relieved the tedium of a tardy advance. Nevertheless, the way was now open before him; and general Howe, halting with the main body at German Town, sent forward lord Cornwallis with the reserve, by whom, on the 26th of September, Philadelphia, already abandoned by the congress, was occupied.

In the operations consequent upon the fall of Philadelphia, including the action at German Town, and the attack of the enemy's posts upon the Delaware, lord Cornwallis appears to have taken no part. He arrived, indeed, at German Town, with a squadron of cavalry in sufficient time to harass the rear of the Americans in retreat; but, both prior to that rencontre, and subsequently, — till the repulse of colonel Donop in the attempt on Redbank,—his duties, as commandant of Philadelphia, confined him entirely within the city. Then, however, he put himself at the head of a division of the army, and accomplished, by the skilfulness of his dispositions, what the impetuosity of Donop had failed to effect; for the enemy evacuated Redbank at his approach, leaving their artillery and stores behind. Yet was the navigation of the Delaware far from being cleared. Fort Mercer, with other strong places, still held out; while Washington, reinforced by 4000 men, was again in position at Whitmarsh, within fourteen miles of Philadelphia itself.

To meet this new danger general Howe called in his detachments, and drew up, first on the right, and afterwards on the centre and left, of the enemy's line. He then manœuvred to bring on a general action without success, and engaged in frequent skirmishes with the American light troops; but, finding that his cautious adversary was not to be cheated into a battle, he ceased, by degrees, to harass his own people by exposing them needlessly to the inclemency of the weather. About the middle of December he withdrew into winter quarters; and Washington retiring to a standing camp,

which he had formed at Valley-forge, both parties enjoyed for some weeks a respite from active warfare.

We find little occasion to trace, with minuteness, the fortunes of lord Cornwallis during the campaign of 1778. As he still acted in a subordinate capacity, neither the retirement of general Howe, nor the assumption of the supreme command by general Clinton, increased his responsibility, or gave a wider range to his talents, which were necessarily exercised as they had hitherto been, — rather in executing the wishes of another, than in devising original plans. When, therefore, we state, that he commanded the rear-guard on the evacuation of Philadelphia, and bore the brunt of the action at Monmouth court-house on the 28th of June; and that, during the alarm occasioned by the sudden arrival of admiral D'Estaing on the coast, he was ever at his post, cool, collected, and resolute; we have said all that the peculiarity of his situation seems to require at our hands. In like manner, his services during the autumn of this year, being confined entirely to the management of one or two predatory excursions, deserve but little notice in a work like the present. These were all conducted, it is true, in a masterly manner; and led, on one occasion, to the destruction of a regiment of American cavalry, which permitted itself to be surprised at Tapaapon on the Hudsons. But as the military reputation of lord Cornwallis depends in no degree on the success of such exploits, it were an act of something like injustice to his memory, were we to describe them at further length.

The season for active service being at an end, and his private affairs, which he had somewhat too long neglected, becoming urgent, lord Cornwallis returned, in the autumn of 1778, to England. He spent several months in London, where party spirit ran high, and gave his evidence in a manly and open manner touching the conduct of lord Howe; whom he defended with the zeal of private friendship, even in cases where it may be fairly questioned whether, on public grounds,

he considered the proceedings of his late chief to have been entirely free from censure. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that, in any instance, he sacrificed truth to a feeling of personal esteem ; for his testimony, though, on the whole, favourable to sir William Howe's good intentions, leaves the question of his ability as a military commander exactly where it would have been had no such testimony been given.

The business which had recalled him to England having been completed, and the investigation into the behaviour of general Howe brought to a close, lord Cornwallis prepared to return to the seat of war, which he reached early in the autumn of 1799. He found sir Henry Clinton awaiting, in a state of considerable anxiety, the attack with which he was threatened at New York, by Washington's army from the side of the highlands, and the fleet of D'Estaing by water. The repulse of the French admiral, however, at Savannah, of which intelligence reached him in due time, gave a turn both to the anticipations and designs of the British commanders. It was now determined that the defensive system, which had been adopted throughout the summer, should be abandoned ; that a powerful expedition should be conducted to the south ; and that the war should be carried on with vigour in North and South Carolina, as well as in Georgia and the districts beyond. There was the less difficulty in coming to this resolution, inasmuch as the crippled state of Washington's corps had been fully ascertained. Of his militia, multitudes were grown tired of active service; his provincials, who were in many instances entitled to their discharge, insisted upon returning to their homes ; and the business of recruiting went on with too little vigour to afford any immediate chance of supplying the deficiencies thus occasioned. Sir Henry Clinton, therefore, conceived that he would not subject New York to any imminent danger by withdrawing a large portion of his army from its defence, — more especially as the movement could scarcely fail to operate as a diversion, by com-

pelling the enemy to provide for the protection of his own settlements.

Though the plan of this enterprise was matured, and the troops actually embarked, so early as the beginning of October, the uncertainty which prevailed touching the position of the French fleet retarded its execution till within a few days of the close of the year. The 26th of December, indeed, arrived ere the convoy put to sea; and the storms which prevail on the shores of North America during the winter months, rendered the voyage at once tedious and full of danger. On the last day of January, however, the squadron reached the mouth of the Savannah, though in such disorder as to render a brief halt necessary; for the vessels came in singly, and not a few bore manifest tokens of the severity of the gales which they had ridden out. The consequence was, that they reached not their point of destination, the inlet of North Odesto, till the 11th of February; where the troops, amounting in all to somewhere about 8000 or 9000 men, made good their landing on James's Island, and established themselves on the right bank of the river Ashley, by which alone they were separated from Charlestown.

In the succeeding operations, which included the siege and capture of Charlestown, lord Cornwallis played the part of an able second, and of nothing more. Sir Henry Clinton, being personally present, may be presumed to have directed the various dispositions of the army, of which one portion under the immediate orders of Cornwallis was employed on the opposite side of Cooper's river, where it performed useful service by intercepting supplies, and cutting off all communication between the garrison and the open country. But of the measures adopted towards the attainment of that end it is the less necessary to give an account, inasmuch as they appear to have originated, for the most part, in the sagacity of colonel Tarleton. Besides, the period is at length arrived, when we shall be called upon to trace the career of lord Cornwallis, considered as the

leader of a separate and independent army; for, with the fall of Charlestown, ended that species of responsibility under which he had hitherto acted. General Clinton returned with a portion of the troops to New York, while the subject of this memoir remained to make good the conquest of the Carolinas.

Charlestown surrendered by capitulation on the 11th of May, 1780; and its garrison, consisting of nearly 6000 men, became prisoners of war. This was an important conquest in the existing state of affairs, inasmuch as it secured the command of both Georgia and South Carolina, where the mass of the people were understood to be peculiarly well affected to the dominion of the mother country; nor, to do him justice, was general Clinton negligent in taking the best precautions to ensure the full consequences of his successful essay in arms. He issued proclamations, inviting the inhabitants to return to their duty, and assuring such as were quiet, of protection and kind treatment; while at the same time he sent out three different corps, with instructions to clear the provinces of such insurgent bands as might yet endeavour to retain a hold upon the country. They were all eminently successful; indeed, the marches of the column which ascended the Savannah, as well as of that which crossed the Saluda to Ninety Six, partook of the nature of a triumphal progress rather than of a military movement. Nor were the proceedings of lord Cornwallis on the north-eastern bank of the Santee, though somewhat more adventurous, less fortunate in their issue. Colonel Tarleton, who led his advanced guard, overtook, at Wassaw, near the Catawba settlement, a force of 300 or 400 infantry and cavalry, which was retiring into Virginia with a valuable convoy of arms and ammunition. He attacked it with great vigour, obtained a complete victory, and rejoined Cornwallis at Camden, loaded with spoil.

It was now the month of June; and sir Henry Clinton, alarmed by certain reports which had reached him from New York, made ready to return for the defence

of the northern provinces. He had previously nominated lord Cornwallis to the command of all the troops that might be employed in the southern district, and he now formally resigned into his hands the civil as well as military authority over Georgia and South Carolina. Cornwallis devoted himself with great industry to the arrangement of matters which the progress of the war had rendered both complicated and insecure; and he succeeded in restoring something like order both to the commerce and police of the province. Nevertheless he failed in exciting that spirit of devoted loyalty on which he had been induced to rest no inconsiderable portion of his expectations. Men submitted to the king's government, it is true, and even enrolled themselves as members of the militia; but the readiness with which they violated their oaths as often as opportunity came in the way, proved how lightly the restraints either of order or honesty were esteemed.

In the mean while, such measures were adopted for the military defence of the district, as the circumstances of the times and the condition of the adjacent colonies appeared to demand. Charlestown was occupied by a numerous garrison; posts were established at Ninety Six, at Williams's on the Pacolet, at Rocky Mountain, Hanging Rock, and Rugely's Mills; while at Camden, the head-quarters of the field force were established, as well as a magazine of rum, biscuit, and other stores, laid up. At the same time a secret correspondence was opened with the loyalist inhabitants of North Carolina, among whom there existed a strong disposition to rise; and it was particularly urged upon them, that they should make no movement till the harvest should have been gathered in, and the royal army be in a condition to support them. But the impatience of men who live under a government that is odious to them, and are aware that help lies, as it were, within reach, is seldom to be restrained by considerations of prudence, no matter how strongly urged, or by what authority supported. The loyalists of North Carolina ran to arms long before

it was possible for lord Cornwallis to assist them; and, with the exception of one corps, which escaped to the amount of 800 men, they were totally destroyed.

From the 5th of June, the day on which sir Henry Clinton departed, up to the middle of July, the war in South Carolina was one merely of posts. The American colonel Sumpter, an active and intelligent officer, made two attempts to destroy the detachments at Rocky Mountain and Hanging Rock; and though repulsed on each occasion, with great loss, gave proof both of enterprise and courage. In like manner, the patrols which passed from station to station were occasionally surprised, and compelled to fight their way through obstacles which had not been anticipated. But the arrival, first of the baron de Kalb, and eventually of general Gates, to take the command of the troops assembled in North Carolina, gave, towards the beginning of August, a new aspect to the state of affairs. Gates brought with him a strong detachment from the main army in the Jerseys, to which were added several very efficient battalions of Maryland and Virginian troops; and the whole being reinforced by the militia of the province, as well as by the Delaware regiment, and colonel Armand's legion, made up an efficient corps of 5000 or 6000 fighting men.

During the compulsory residence of lord Cornwallis at Charlestown, the guidance of the field force devolved upon colonel lord Rawdon, who drew in his detachments, and concentrated his army about fourteen miles in front of Camden. Here, on the west bank of Lynch's Creek, he took up a position, strong perhaps in itself, but scarcely adequate to the protection of his magazines, which were saved through the respect in which his adversary held him, rather than by any judgment displayed by himself in the distribution of his corps. Of these proceedings, as well as of the advance of Gates, whose light troops engaged in constant skirmishes with Rawdon's pickets, lord Cornwallis was made regularly aware; and he hastened forward the business of settle-

ments and claims, in order that he might proceed to conduct the struggle which now impended. Meanwhile he omitted no means that lay within his reach to recruit the army under lord Rawdon, and render it capable of opposing the enemy with success. Every disposable man was sent to the front; colonel Tarleton was directed to patrol round the enemy's flanks, and to gain intelligence; while the greatest exertions were made to remount the cavalry, worn down with the severe duty heretofore imposed upon them. But before the details in which he was engaged would permit him to take the field, the army had changed its ground, and he joined it at last, on the 14th of August, in a new line, at a place called Logtown, in the immediate vicinity of Camden.

On mustering his force, lord Cornwallis found that, after deducting a sufficient guard for the protection of his hospital and magazines, he could carry into the field something more than 2000 men, inclusive of an irregular but very efficient corps of horse and foot called Tarleton's legion. The enemy, on the other hand, were estimated at 6000, of which 2000 were regulars; and the latest accounts represented them as having established their camp at Rugely's Mills. Lord Cornwallis determined to take the initiative, and issued orders that the troops should hold themselves in readiness to move; while he sent Tarleton forward, with instructions to intercept, if possible, some patrol, or to cut off an outpost, from which correct information might be obtained. Tarleton executed the charge with his accustomed ability. He secured three prisoners, brought them back to the general, and thus enabled him to discover that Gates was already in motion for the acknowledged purpose of forcing the English to fight, or else abandon their stores and sacrifice Camden.

The position which lord Rawdon had taken up, though well calculated to secure the safety of the depôt, was not in any remarkable degree defensible: lord Cornwallis, therefore, determined to change it.

With this view he ordered the troops to stand to their arms, and at 10 o'clock at night began a forward movement, under cover of a strong advanced guard and a body of vigilant cavalry in patrol. At 12 the column reached Sander's Creek, about five miles to the north of Camden, which it passed, though not without some confusion, and a rather vexatious delay. Order being restored, the line of march was resumed, and conducted for about an hour without adventure. The advanced guard, indeed, was already in progress through a defile, flanked on either side by a deep morass, and feathered with a straggling grove of timber, when the head of an enemy's column suddenly presented itself, and an immediate rencontre ensued. As usually happens in such cases, the leading files were driven in on both sides, and the firing kept up by the supporting parties was more incessant than destructive.

Made aware by the first discharge how matters stood, lord Cornwallis rode to the front, and exerted himself, for a while vainly, to put a stop to the firing. A similar proceeding having been adopted by general Gates, the musketry was at length silenced, and both sides drew back, as if by common consent, a space of thirty paces. But the enquiries which he immediately instituted among his guides and prisoners, making the British general aware of the peculiar nature of the ground, he was not slow in determining that it was well adapted for the developement of his strength. He therefore proceeded to arrange at leisure his troops into battle array, and made such dispositions as rendered him tolerably easy as to the result of an action, should the enemy remain to receive it.

The plateau, on which the hostile armies accidentally met, might measure, perhaps, three quarters of a mile across; being hemmed in, as we have just stated, on either flank, by an impassable morass. Across this neck of land Cornwallis arranged his troops, the infantry in two lines, the cavalry placed in column close to the reserve; while his artillery, which consisted of

only six pieces, commanded the road, and, in part, enfiladed the front of the first line. The dispositions of general Gates were not dissimilar, except that he crowded his guns considerably on his right, and placed a body of militia in rather an exposed situation, by intrusting to them the left of his position. Such was the aspect which each host presented to the other, when the dawn of day rendered objects visible; while a space of something less than 300 yards alone divided them.

It would appear that the disposition of the militia corps had either taken place without the knowledge of Gates, or that he himself, as soon as the return of light displayed it, became convinced that it was faulty. At all events, he made an effort to remedy the evil, by directing the brigade to shift its ground, and to make way for another; but he was not permitted to execute that evolution in peace. Cornwallis saw the movement; and, aware of the advantage which regular troops possess over irregulars, particularly when in the act of changing their formation, he gave the signal for an immediate attack. It was obeyed with the greatest alacrity and vigour. The militia, charged while bewildered with the conflicting orders which they received, scarcely stood to receive a single fire; and though the continentals on the right maintained themselves with considerable obstinacy, their valour proved unavailing. The right of the English, with excellent judgment, instead of following up the first success, wheeled round upon the flank of the enemy that still resisted, and, overlapping them with a fire, close, murderous, and well sustained, completely dispersed them. It was to no purpose that Gates brought up his reserve. A portion of these broke through the British skirmishers, and gained an eminence, where the guns stood, only to be cut down by a furious attack of the cavalry; which, falling in, sword in hand, upon the broken line, rode through it without the loss of a man. Never was rout more complete than now took place. The enemy fled in all directions, scarcely 100 men keeping together in any single

body; and the pursuit continued till fatigue, and the want of nutriment, rendered the horses incapable of sustaining it any longer. There fell in this action, on the side of the conquerors, 224 officers and men, including the wounded; whilst the loss of the enemy amounted, in all, to 70 officers, 2000 men, and eight pieces of cannon, besides wagons, standards, and the whole baggage of the army.

As soon as the stragglers could be called in, and the troops refreshed by a few hours of rest, Cornwallis pushed forward, with the cavalry and light infantry, to Rugely's Mills. From this point, he detached colonel Tarleton in pursuit of the American colonel Sumpter, who, with a body of 700 or 800 men, still infested South Carolina; and that indefatigable partisan again found an opportunity of exercising to advantage his talent for light warfare. Having followed Sumpter across the Wateree with 350 men and a single gun, he managed his approaches so judiciously, that he was enabled to come upon the enemy at a moment when the proximity of danger was not entertained. Fatigue had, by this time, diminished Tarleton's force to 100 horse and 60 foot; yet he charged the American corps without hesitation, and obtained a signal and almost bloodless victory. Upwards of 350 prisoners, besides 150 killed and wounded, bore testimony to the vigour of an action which cost the English the loss of only fifteen men and twenty horses. Tarleton now retraced his steps, and joined lord Cornwallis at Camden, where the whole army again reassembled.

Though thus victorious, both in a general action and in detail, lord Cornwallis soon became aware that, in spite of the protestations of loyalty which met him at every corner, he was, in reality, carrying on war in an enemy's country. His foraging parties were attacked; and the slender guards, under whose protection his prisoners were sent to the rear, suffered, on more than one occasion, from the hostility of the country people. It was his consciousness of the unsettled state of South

Carolina, added to the sickness which prevailed among the troops, that, according to his own statement, hindered him from following up his successes by an immediate inroad into the adjoining province. Yet was the delay deeply to be deplored. For when he did make up his mind to try the effect of a hostile demonstration, the moral influence of defeat was weakened; while the coming in of numerous levies not only enabled the enemy to present a bold countenance, but rendered them adequate to strike at the English posts, which, somewhat too loosely, and over too wide a surface, kept open the communications with Charlestown, and covered the frontier.

The middle of September was approaching, when Cornwallis, who had devoted several weeks to the adjustment of affairs connected with the sale of certain confiscated estates, put his columns in motion, and advanced along the northern bank of the Catawba, for the purpose of penetrating into North Carolina. He proceeded as far as Charlotte-town, a place of the advantages of which, in a military point of view, he had been induced to form an erroneous opinion; and there established himself, as in a central position between Camden and Salisbury. The movement was unfortunate; for it placed the commander-in-chief in the very centre of a district peculiarly hostile to the British interests, while it exposed several of his posts to imminent hazard from the attempts of the enemy's light parties. Even Camden itself was insulted, and Augusta furiously assailed; while an active partisan, major Ferguson, was forced to give battle at King's Mountain, and was defeated, with the loss of his own life and the total destruction of his corps. Cornwallis was now conscious that he had committed a grievous error, and that all his communications were liable to be interrupted. He accordingly began, on the 14th of October, a retrograde movement, and, crossing the Catawba, took up a new allignment at Wynnesborough, half way between Broad River and the Wateree. By this means, the important

station of Ninety Six was secured; and the safety of Camden, with the stores and hospital established there, placed beyond the reach of danger.

The projected winter campaign in North Carolina was scarcely abandoned, when intelligence reached Cornwallis, that major-general Leslie, with 3000 men, had been detached from New York for the purpose of effecting a diversion in his favour by conducting an expedition up the James River. Cornwallis knew, that from operations so desultory no important results could arise, and that the best chance of effecting any thing would be by uniting the two corps into one. Taking advantage, therefore, of a discretionary control, which had been awarded him by sir Henry Clinton, he lost no time in requiring that the inroad by the James should be suspended; and that Leslie should proceed with all his disposable force, first to Wilmington, and eventually to Charlestown. Meanwhile he exerted himself by detaching Tarleton, and other active officers, to subdue the refractory spirit that still prevailed; as well as to check the movements of more than one light corps, which the enemy contrived to throw, from time to time, into the province.

In prosecuting these petty enterprises, the winter months were spent, sometimes with greater, sometimes with less benefit to the cause. Wherever Tarleton commanded, success, for a time, crowned the efforts of the English; where the guidance of expeditions was intrusted to others, fortune was not always kind. Major Wemys, for example, with the 63d regiment, failed in an attempt to surprise general Sumpter at Fish Dam, near Ninety Six; and the enemy were, in consequence, emboldened to approach that station in considerable force. But Tarleton, moving rapidly to its support, compelled Sumpter to retire, and pursued him with singular tenacity as far as the banks of the Tiger. Here, though greatly inferior in point of numbers, he brought on an action which ended in the total defeat of Sumpter, who escaped with difficulty, having received a severe wound,

and leaving 150 men dead on the field. Thus were the months of November and December consumed, on the part of the English, in skirmishes of doubtful utility, and in strengthening the works at Charlestown, Ninety Six, and Camden, while, among the Americans, general Greene, who had recently assumed the command in North Carolina, was organising his resources, so as to act either on the offensive or defensive, as circumstances should appear to demand.

Towards the middle of December, Leslie's division arrived at Charlestown, where it underwent a new arrangement suitable to the necessities of the times. The most weakly of the men, with all the convalescents, being weeded out, were placed in garrison at Charlestown and Camden; while about 2000 active and able bodied veterans marched, under the guidance of their chief, to reinforce the main army at Wynnesborough. They had reached their destination but a few days, when intelligence came in that Greene was already in motion. His army, which was represented as not exceeding 1400 regular troops, had broken up into two columns, and was advancing; one brigade, under Morgan, across the Catawba upon Ninety Six; the other towards Haley's Ferry, on the Pedee, so as to threaten Camden. Both parties, it was stated, were likely to gather strength as they went on, for the militia flocked in by hundreds, and general Coswall, with a strong corps, was hastening towards the Pedee, in order to form such a junction with Greene as would give him a decided superiority. Lord Cornwallis determined to anticipate these attacks. Detaching Tarleton with about 700 light troops, of whom 200 were cavalry, across the Broad River, and instructing him to push Morgan to the uttermost, he himself set out to oppose Greene, with the intention, if possible, of cutting him off from Virginia, or, at all events, of compelling him to evacuate North Carolina.

The proceedings of Tarleton were on this, as on other occasions, distinguished by great activity, decision, and judgment. He marched rapidly upon Morgan, com-

pelled him to withdraw from the district of Ninety Six, and, following him up, step by step, overtook him at a place called Cow-Pens, near the springs of the Pacolet. Here a fierce action took place, which ended greatly to the disadvantage of Tarleton, whose legion behaved not with its accustomed spirit, and sustained a total defeat; indeed the corps was entirely annihilated, inasmuch as about 100 cavalry alone escaped from the field. It was a heavy blow to receive at the commencement of a campaign, and it exerted a fatal influence over every other movement both of the British and the American forces.

Though disconcerted by the defeat of his most active coadjutor, lord Cornwallis persisted in the plan of operations which he had sketched out for himself; and, delaying a few days only, for the purpose of receiving such stragglers as might have escaped from the action at Cow-Pens, advanced as far as Ramsour's Mills on the southern fork of the Catawba. Here he lightened himself of all superfluous baggage, collected flour and other necessary stores, and made every preparation for a campaign of rapid marches; after which he pushed upon the southern fork, along the southern bank of which numerous bodies of militia were known to be posted. This, though swollen by heavy rains, he passed at M'Cowan's ford, in spite of a sharp resistance from the enemy; when, ascertaining that Morgan was before him on the road to Salisbury, he commanded an immediate and rapid pursuit. But all his exertions failed to overtake that vigilant and active officer. When the advance reached the Yadkin, they found only a feeble rear-guard, which they immediately charged and destroyed; but the mass of the corps was safe, for the swollen waters of the river were already between them and the English.

A variety of movements, executed under all the disadvantages of defective intelligence and stormy weather, carried the British army, on the 12th of February, to the Dan, where, by securing Boyd's Ferry, lord Cornwallis hoped to throw himself between general Greene

and his communications with Virginia. He was led to entertain this expectation in consequence of reports which reached him, that Greene was concentrating at Guildford, and that Morgan, after passing the Yadkin, had been directed to turn his steps upon the same point; but the rumour proved absolutely groundless. Greene was not in a condition to hazard a battle, inasmuch as the militia corps from Virginia were yet far in the rear; and having a thousand spies abroad for one that served his enemy faithfully, he became aware of his danger in sufficient time to avert it. He retreated with precipitation upon the Dan, and crossing the stream on rafts and flying bridges, found a temporary shelter behind its waters. Upon this, lord Cornwallis fell back as far as Hillsborough, where, in the centre of a district supposed to be especially well affected, he caused the royal standard to be hoisted.

Contrary to the expectations which he had been led to form, lord Cornwallis found but a slender inclination among the inhabitants of Hillsborough and its vicinity, to enrol themselves under the banner of England. Very few volunteers presented themselves, and of those who might have come in, about 200 permitted themselves to be surprised by a patrol of American cavalry, which cut them to pieces. It was to no purpose that he detached largely into the surrounding districts for the purpose of encouraging the people to rise by a show of protection. There was a total indifference visible in all quarters; while Greene, reinforced to the amount of not less than 8000 men, repassed the Dan, and began to act once more on the offensive. Several affairs occurred as often as the scouting parties met, and a bold countenance was again assumed by the republicans, who returned to their old practice of deceiving the royalist leader, and affording every assistance to the enemy. Finally, provisions beginning to fail, and the troops suffering great privations, it was determined to evacuate Hillsborough, and to draw slowly towards Cape Fear

River, along the course of which a new line of communication might be established.

The first march of the royal troops carried them by the left towards the Dan, which they passed on the 26th of February, and on the 27th reached Allamanee. Greene became immediately aware of the movement, and, confident in his superior numbers, lessened the space between Cornwallis and himself, by taking up a position between Troublesome Creek and Reedy Fork. On the 2d of March an affair of foragers occurred, which ended favourably for the English, and on the 3d, Tarleton being despatched six miles to the front, held his ground only by dint of constant skirmishing. On the 5th, intelligence was received that the enemy's army lay in a loose and broken manner, the continentals only being with the general at head-quarters, while by far the greater proportion of the militia and eighteen months' men were still at a distance. Lord Cornwallis instantly put his army in motion. His advance soon fell in with a corps of continentals, which it attacked and defeated with considerable slaughter, though not till after a smart skirmish had been maintained, throughout which the enemy defended their strong ground with much resolution. Unfortunately, however, the operation thus happily begun, was not followed up to its legitimate extent. Lord Cornwallis was persuaded that his provisions would not suffice for a march beyond the Haw, and that there were multitudes of well-affected persons near Deep River, whom it was of importance to protect. He accordingly turned aside to the westward, leaving a path open for Greene, who had already begun his retrogression, and who found leisure, while the English amused themselves in the vicinity of New Garden, to call in his detachments. This was no sooner done than he executed a counter-march with 7000 men, and took post in a very favourable position near Reedy Fork, where he ventured with his cavalry and riflemen to harass the rear of the English while in the act of passing the north branch of the Deep River.

The hostile armies were now about twelve miles apart, equally eager to engage, and equally confident of success. On the part of the Americans, the consciousness of superior numbers, with a conviction that victory would ensure the total ruin of the English, while a defeat would but partially damage themselves, held out the strongest inducements to hazard a battle. On the part of the English, a high sense of honour urged the general to stake his very existence on a contest which he could scarcely decline, without an acknowledgment of marked inferiority. Under these circumstances, it became manifest to every soldier and officer, in either camp, that a decisive action was at hand; nor did any great while elapse ere the anticipations thus excited received their full accomplishment.

Having aseertained, on the evening of the 14th, that Greene was established at Guildford, lord Cornwallis moved from his ground at dawn on the 15th; and his advance, commanded by Tarleton, falling in soon afterwards with an American light corps under Lee, a sharp encounter took place. The enemy defended themselves for awhile with great obstinacy; retreating, indeed, by slow degrees, but fighting every inch of ground, till they rejoined their main army, drawn up in three formidable lines, about a mile and a half from the court-house. The ground which Greene had selected, as well as the disposition of his several corps, evinced great judgment and military skill. He formed his front line behind a high rail, where the men were enabled to command, by their fire, an open space of perhaps 300 yards in width; and he supported it with clouds of skirmishers on either flank, as well as by columns of horse and foot, who occupied the woods in the rear. Nor was his order of battle less judicious in reference to the quality of his troops, than to the manner in which they were distributed. The North Carolina militia, the worst troops in his army, stood in the front; the eighteen months'-men and Virginia militia-men made up a second line, about 250 paces behind; while

the reserve, composed entirely of continental or regular troops, took post without the reach of fire, and clear of all risk of confusion from the pressure of fugitives. Thus he was ready either to follow up whatever success the militia might obtain, or to cover the retreat, should such become necessary, with troops on whom he could rely, and who, being pliable and steady, could avail themselves of any confusion that might occur among the English during the excitement of a pursuit.

Lord Cornwallis, after bringing up a few guns, which answered those of the enemy as soon as they began to fire, proceeded to form his army into two columns of attack, both of which he covered with light infantry and yagers, as well on their flanks as in front. His reserve, again, consisted of one battalion of guards, one company of grenadiers, and the cavalry: indeed, his total force fell considerably short of 3000 fighting men. Nevertheless, the best possible spirit prevailed among them; they were in the highest state of discipline, and anticipated from the victory, to which they looked forward, greater benefits than could perhaps accrue from it. Under these circumstances, lord Cornwallis experienced no misgivings, and the event fully justified his confidence.

While these arrangements were in progress, the artillery kept up, on both sides, an incessant fire, from which some loss was sustained, especially on the part of the British. As soon, however, as the several regiments had taken their stations, the word was given to advance, and the whole pushed forward in profound silence and excellent order. The enemy, likewise, behaved with great steadiness, reserving their fire till scarce 150 yards divided the lines, when they gave it deliberately, coolly, and, as a necessary consequence, with considerable effect. Nevertheless, the assailants were not arrested for a moment. Raising a shout, the battalions, which moved across the open space, threw in one volley, and then sprang forward, in magnificent array, with the bayonet.

It was scarcely to be expected that a brigade of half-disciplined militia would abide the shock. The North Carolina-men did not pause to receive it, but broke and fled almost before the British troops had traversed half the space that intervened between them and their opponents. In like manner, the regiments which flanked this line, though in a great degree sheltered by the wood, gave ground, almost as soon as threatened; while the assailants, scattering in pursuit, soon became involved in an extensive and complicated skirmish. At this moment, Greene's second line advanced to support the first; and the English, having separated from the centre, the issue of the contest became for a moment doubtful. But a judicious movement of the infantry of the reserve, so as to fill up the gap disclosed, soon restored matters to their former situation. Again the enemy inclined by the right and left into the woods, and again was the contest of that broken and irregular nature, which gives to regular troops little superiority over the merest levies.

While an incessant tiraillade gave indication of the obstinacy with which the woods were contested, the second battalion of the guards, supported by the grenadiers, made a push upon two of the enemy's guns, which enfiladed the main road, and did considerable execution. The attack succeeded; but ere the guns could be removed, the simultaneous advance of a brigade of Marylanders, and of colonel Washington's cavalry, drove back the guards with some loss. Once more, therefore, the fate of the battle became doubtful; for though the guards found shelter among the thickets hard by, the centre of the British line was broken. But while the enemy as yet hesitated touching the purpose to which their success ought to be turned, a charge from Tarleton's dragoons preceded by a round of grape from a couple of 3-pounders, once more threw them into disorder. It was discovered, too, that colonel Webster, with the 33d regiment, the light company of the guards, and the yagers, had gained the right flank

of Greene's reserve, and the necessity of an immediate retreat, in order to avoid an attack from the rear, became apparent. Greene directed his continentals to cover that movement; and the front which they presented was at once so bold and so orderly, that no effort was made to molest them.

In this action, which began at half past one, and came to an end about half past two o'clock, the total loss sustained by the English amounted to 93 officers and men killed, 414 wounded, and 26 missing. That of the Americans was considerably greater; yet when the relative qualities of the troops are considered, as well as the facilities enjoyed by the two parties of making good their casualties, it may be questioned whether the indecisive victory of Guildford Court-house was not purchased at too dear a rate. One thing, at least, is certain, that lord Cornwallis, though successful in the field, not only found himself incapable of pursuit, but was laid under the painful necessity of abandoning a large portion of his wounded, and retiring on the 18th towards the Deep River. From that point he fell back towards Cross Creek, closely observed by general Greene, who, after a brief halt at Speedwell Furnace, as if courting a second battle, resumed the offensive, and manœuvred with great boldness to place himself in the rear of his late conqueror. It was the design of Cornwallis to have established himself at Cross Creek, provided the navigation of the Cape Fear River had been opened, an arrangement which he had directed major Craig, the officer in command at Wilmington, to accomplish by every means in his power. But the major, though a zealous and active officer, found the country so universally hostile, that any attempt with his slender force to command a narrow stream, hemmed in, to the extent of ninety miles, by steep and rocky banks, could have led only to the destruction of his people in detail, and the loss of Wilmington itself. Lord Cornwallis was, therefore, compelled to pursue his march towards the coast, which he

reached, without any serious molestation, on the 7th of April.

The army had reposed but a few days at Wilmington, when letters came in from Charlestown, which announced that general Greene was moving upon South Carolina, and that Camden, with the stores collected there, was in danger. The same despatches conveyed intelligence that three regiments were expected from England, and that general Philips had been detached from New York with a considerable body of troops, to effect a diversion in the Chesapeake. That Greene had some important object in view, was strongly suspected from the hour when he ceased to annoy lord Cornwallis on his march; and now the difficult question arose, whether it would be more judicious to return for the defence of Camden, or to force a junction with Philips, and thus recall Greene from his excursion. There were strong arguments to be urged on both sides; nevertheless, the barren state of the intervening country rendering a land journey impracticable, and a return to Charlestown by sea appearing disgraceful and uncertain, Lord Cornwallis finally determined on an inroad into the heart of Virginia.

Towards the end of April, the British army, diminished by casualties of various kinds to 1500 men, advanced from Wilmington in the direction of the Roanoke. The march, though harassing and uncomfortable, was not productive of any striking adventure, inasmuch as the enemy offered little opposition; indeed, the Roanoke was gained on the 6th of May by the advanced guard under Tarleton, after a trifling skirmish. A similar result attended their further progress, — though for a time it was productive of intense anxiety; for the reports of Philips's movements were vague and unsatisfactory, and the hazard of failure in the attempt to reach him was imminent. But no obstacles could arrest the progress of the indefatigable Tarleton. On the 14th of May he crossed the Meherren with 100 cavalry, and two companies of infantry mounted; and the

day following opened a communication with colone. Simcoe, the leader of Philips's flank corps. The two armies were thus brought into contact; and on the 20th of May a formal junction took place at Peterborough, on the Appomattox, or southern branch of the James River.

The force of the English, particularly in light troops, was now so superior to any which the enemy could bring against them, that the general felt himself in a condition to adopt almost any plan of operations, no matter how extended or multifarious. Under this impression, he commenced an active and galling system of annoyance, pushing his patrols upon every station where stores were collected, and harassing and cutting up in detail the debris on which bodies of militia were beginning to assemble. He even made a dash at Charlotteville, where the provincial assembly had met, and secured several of its members; but all his exertions failed to prevent a junction between the troops of baron Steuben and those of the marquis la Fayette. The latter gentleman, as we need scarcely observe, had early espoused the cause of the insurgents, and was now, though acting with the avowed approbation of the court of France, a major-general in the service of the United States.

While thus operating in detachments, which carried the war over a wide extent of country, lord Cornwallis was not forgetful that no permanent hold could be retained on the province, unless he should be able to establish some place of arms within reach of the fleet, from which, as from a base, his operations might be conducted. With this view, he gradually called in his parties, and moved slowly upon Williamsburgh; being followed, though at a respectful distance, by the united corps of Wayne, Steuben, and La Fayette. A variety of manœuvres marked the progress of the march, for the patroles repeatedly met, and frequent attempts were made on both sides to cut off detached parties. It was not, however, till the royal army had

reached Williamsburgh, that any serious fight occurred; and even then the affair, though smart for the moment, led to no important result. La Fayette, indeed, deserves credit for the address with which he seized a happy opportunity of forcing colonel Simcoe to action; and the perseverance of his troops, who sustained no ordinary fatigue in their efforts to come up with the English, is highly commendable. Nevertheless, the action was wholly indecisive. There fell on each side about thirty men, and some prisoners were taken; but the English rear being supported, drove back the assailants, and both parties withdrew, the king's troops into Williamsburgh, and the Americans to their head quarters at Tyse's Plantation, fifteen miles from the field of battle.

Amid the conflicting testimony which has come down to us touching the views adopted by the different actors in this campaign, it is not very easy to determine whether the project of establishing a permanent post in Virginia originated with sir Henry Clinton or with lord Cornwallis. We are equally at a loss to decide how far the right of absolute choice was or was not submitted to the latter, after the design had been seriously entertained; but, however this may be, it is certain that his lordship soon found reason to conclude that Williamsburgh at least offered no peculiar advantages. He had scarcely taken up his quarters there when he received advices from New York that the enemy were threatening an assault, and that the return of a portion of his corps was necessary for the maintenance of that important station. Now, his whole disposable force fell somewhat short, at that moment, of 6000 men; and the position at Williamsburgh, being open and exposed, required at least 6000 men to maintain it. Lord Cornwallis, therefore, made up his mind to try the military value of Portsmouth, though not unaware that the situation of that town was unhealthy; with which design he broke up on the 4th of July, and began his march towards the James River. But he did not move alone. In spite of the activity of the rear-guard, commanded, as usual,

by Tarleton, which pushed a reconnoissance into the very heart of the enemy's camp, La Fayette followed his steps with great activity, and on the 6th the foragers communicated information that the Americans were approaching with every appearance of confidence and good order.

The British army lay at this time in a strong position on the southern bank of the James River, having each flank covered by deep ponds, and a morass stretched out before the centre. Of the baggage almost all had been transferred to James Island, whither it was lord Cornwallis's design to remove next day; although he was not indisposed in the interval to receive an action, should the Americans evince any disposition to risk it. In order to bring about this result, a dragoon and a negro were bribed to pass over to the enemy, and to draw them on by stating that the infantry and guns had retreated, and that only a weak rear-guard of cavalry and the legion held the ground in their front. There is every reason to believe that La Fayette gave credence to this report, and that in reliance upon the deserters he hazarded an attack under circumstances peculiarly disadvantageous. Be this, however, as it may, he came on a little before sunset in two columns; and pushing by a narrow causeway across the swamp, stood committed, with about 2500 men, in presence of the whole British army.

The action which ensued, of the nature of which every military man will be able to form a tolerably distinct notion for himself, ended, as it was to be supposed that it would, in favour of the English. The infantry, which had been concealed behind certain undulations in the ground, while the cavalry slowly withdrew, advanced against the Americans, as soon as they had passed the swamp, and, taking them by surprise, bore down all opposition by the weight of a close and well-directed fire. The militia, indeed, which faced the left of the British line, offered scarcely any resistance, being broken and dispersed by a single volley; while the continentals, though they fought bravely, could

make no determined head against the orderly and cool assault of the right. Nevertheless, they devoted themselves with so much gallantry, as to secure the escape of their less disciplined comrades, by protracting the struggle till darkness began to set in: they then retired, having lost besides the whole of their cannon, about 300 men in killed and wounded; while the English abstained from pressing their retreat even with the cavalry.

It is not very easy to explain the motives which induced lord Cornwallis to act on this occasion as if he, and not the enemy, had sustained a reverse. The requisition of sir Henry Clinton was, perhaps, pressing, and his lordship may have concluded that the first duty required of him was to pay attention to the demands of his superior; or, he may have entertained the idea that the whole plan of campaign in the north ran the risk of becoming confused, should he disregard the command already specified. No doubt all or either of these considerations may have sufficed to direct him, and ought equally to be received as extenuating, if they could not wholly excuse, the error into which he fell. Yet was that error grievous in itself, and the parent of many and painful reflections to the individual who committed it. The enemy at this time were so thoroughly worn down by a long march and a hard and fatiguing contest, that they threw themselves on the ground destitute of order, within six miles of the British outposts; where Tarleton's cavalry alone, had it been let loose in good time, would have destroyed them without difficulty. Lord Cornwallis, however, was not aware of this circumstance, and would not commit his horse in a nocturnal movement, but spent the night in ferrying his troops to the island, whither, on the preceding day, the baggage had gone before.

Lord Cornwallis now pursued his progress towards Portsmouth, sending out, as usual, Tarleton's legion to scour the country, and halting at a place called Cobham, till the detachment should return with its spoil. No obstacle being opposed to him by the enemy, he

gained his destination in due time; when a survey of Old Point Comfort, a commanding station in Hampton Road, was effected, with a view to erect there the place of arms proposed. But though the order to send back a portion of his force was recalled, Cornwallis found, on examination, that Old Point Comfort was unsuitable to his purpose, both in consequence of its extent, and because the river was not there navigable for ships of the line. He determined, therefore, to occupy the double post of York and Gloucester, on each side of the York River, at a point where the stream narrows to the extent of perhaps a mile across, being both above and below not less than a league in width.

To reach this station, it was necessary that both men and horses should be embarked and conveyed with guns, stores, and other materiel, up the course of the river. Not the slightest confusion occurred during the expedition; and even the horses, though cast overboard into deep water, and made literally to swim ashore, reached the land without sustaining any damage. This occurred during the space between the 6th and 22d of August, by the latter of which days the whole army was assembled; and, on the morning of the 23d, extensive working parties began to fill up the line of entrenchments which the engineers had previously marked out. Meanwhile the cavalry, with a body of mounted infantry, traversed the open country, sweeping it of grain, flour, forage, and other necessaries; the whole of which were brought in and laid up for use, in the event of a blockade being attempted, or a depôt required. But the period was now at hand when the tide of fortune, which had never run strongly in favour of the English, was destined to turn; and lord Cornwallis, after long and vigorously prosecuting an offensive war, was doomed to combat, not for glory, but for existence.

It has been stated that the posts of York and Gloucester were situated on each bank of the York River, at a point where the stream, though deep and rapid, narrows considerably in its course. Of the capabilities of

both, natural as well as acquired, to sustain the attack of a superior army, the reader will be able to judge for himself, after he shall have perused the following description, which we borrow from the narrative of one who acted no mean part throughout the combat which he describes.

"Gloucester," says Colonel Tarleton, "is situated on a point of land on the north side of the York river, and consisted at that time of about a dozen houses. A marshy creek extends along part of the right flank. The ground is clear and level for a mile in front; at that distance stands a wood: the space which it occupies is narrowed by the river on the left, and a creek on the right. Beyond the gorge the country is open and cultivated." **** "Yorktown, again, before the war, was a place of considerable trade; great part of the houses form one street, on the edge of a cliff, which overlooks the river: the buildings stand within a small compass, and the environs of the town are intersected by creeks and ravines. Different roads from Williamsburgh enter York in several directions, and the main route to Hampton passes in front of it."

From this account it will be seen that the facilities for strengthening the former post were ample, and that the construction of a few redoubts, which commanded the open country, and secured the passages of the creeks and ravines, placed it beyond the hazard of assault. With respect to the latter, we must again have recourse to colonel Tarleton's pages, in order to assist us in coming to a right conclusion.

After informing us that several houses were levelled, and a chain of connected works drawn round the town, which leant both their flanks upon the river, the writer goes on to say that an outward position was seized, which, both for its natural advantages and the labour bestowed upon it, became "in every respect convenient for the king's troops. The right rested on the swamp which covered the right of the town; a large redoubt was constructed beyond it, close to the river road from

Williamsburgh, and completed with friesing and abatis. The Charon and Guadaloupe, two small frigates, were moored opposite the swamp, and the town batteries commanded all the roads and causeways which approached it. On the right, at the head of the morass, two redoubts were placed, one on each side of the main Williamsburgh road. The centre was protected by a thin wood, whose front was cut down with the branches facing outwards. A field-work, mounted with cannon, was erected on the left of the centre, to command the Hampton road. A deep ravine and a creek, which increased till it reached York River, covered the left. Trees were felled, flèches were thrown up, and batteries were constructed at the points which were deemed more vulnerable. The distance between the heads of the swamp and creek, which embraced the flanks of the town, did not exceed half a mile. The face of the country, in front of the line, was cut near the centre by a morass, and, excepting this break, the ground was plain and open for near 2000 yards. An excellent field artillery was placed to the greatest advantage by captain Rochefort, who commanded in that department."

While Lord Cornwallis was thus strengthening himself, as a measure of precaution, if not of safety, the marquis de la Fayette took up a position near the Chickahmany, a river which joins the James about six miles from Williamsburgh. There he awaited patiently the developement of a plot to which every successive day gave additional interest; nor was he condemned to endure long the agony of suspense. On the 3d of August a powerful French fleet, under the count de Grasse, entered the Chesapeake, a portion of which proceeded instantly to block up the channel of the York River, while the rest, after sending 3000 men to succour the American army, kept watch at the entrance of the bay. La Fayette felt himself no longer compelled to treat his adversary with undue respect. He broke up his camp as soon as the French division joined

him, and advanced in high spirits as far as Williamsburgh.

At this eventful crisis in his fate, when his water communications with New York were entirely cut off, and repeated rumours warned him of the approach of a still more formidable enemy by land, it was suggested to lord Cornwallis that the best hope of safety for himself and his gallant army lay in an immediate resumption of the offensive. As yet the American forces were as little superior in numbers, as they were inferior in point of discipline to his own; for the troops under La Fayette could not exceed 7000 men, of whom a considerable portion were militia. To have attacked him boldly in his position, and compelled him to give battle, might have been productive of the happiest results; for a decisive victory would have deranged the whole of Washington's plans, and even partial success must have considerably impeded them. Unfortunately, however, Lord Cornwallis was induced to reject the proposal, chiefly in consequence of the receipt of a communication from New York, in which sir Henry Clinton assured him of ample support, so soon as admiral Digby, who had long been expected, should arrive upon the coast. Instead, therefore, of striking at La Fayette, he contented himself with continuing his preparations for defence, which were carried on with all the zeal and diligence that a sense of impending danger is apt to create.

The arrival of a British fleet at the mouth of the Chesapeake, and an indecisive action between admiral Graves and the count de Grasse, served but to elevate for a brief space, and to no purpose, the hopes of lord Cornwallis and his army. Though scarcely defeated, the English failed in forcing the navigation of the bay, which the arrival soon afterwards of De Barras's squadron rendered impracticable; while every hour brought in fresh assurances that Washington was in rapid march towards the south by the Elk River and Baltimore.

Cornwallis became seriously alarmed. He wrote earnestly and often, entreating that an effort would be made, either by a diversion upon Philadelphia, or a direct attack on the French fleet to succour him from New York; and though cheered from time to time by promises of support, his apprehensions appear to have prevailed over the momentary satisfaction which their perusal created. Once more he began to meditate the adoption of a measure, bold perhaps, but under existing circumstances not unjustifiable; which, had he entered upon it at once, would have largely increased his personal reputation, even if it had failed in saving a valuable portion of his veteran army. The scheme in question involved the evacuation of Yorktown, and an overland retreat with the most active of his infantry and cavalry, either upon New York or South Carolina; a manœuvre difficult indeed, and not to be accomplished without great danger and privation, yet perfectly within the reach of human execution.

In the correspondence which he published soon after his return to England relative to the conduct of the campaign of 1781, lord Cornwallis states that he was withheld from carrying this project into effect solely by the repeated assurances of relief which he received from sir Henry Clinton. We are of course bound to give full credence to an assertion thus solemnly made, yet is it difficult to believe that the writer could have been so profoundly ignorant of the actual state of affairs at the moment when these assurances were received, as to have regarded them otherwise than with extreme hesitation if not distrust. Of the great superiority of the French by sea proof too decisive had been afforded, and the approach of an army through the Jerseys, and in the face of Washington's columns, was a contingency altogether too remote for calculation. It appears extraordinary, therefore, that an officer possessed of lord Cornwallis's bravery and decision should have fallen into the mistake of which weak minds alone are apt to be guilty, that of sitting still when beset with

dangers, and trusting to the chapter of accidents for deliverance.

But if we are compelled to speak thus harshly of the resolution to which lord Cornwallis came, much more does his conduct, after the storm burst upon him, deserve our unqualified censure. On the 14th of September general Washington arrived at Williamsburgh, whither his troops, both French and American, followed with all practicable speed; and on the 28th lord Cornwallis's pickets were driven in. Still the enemy had gained no important advantage, for the outer chain of works remained untouched, and Washington, though he closely reconnoitred, seemed but little disposed to assail it. By what infatuation swayed we cannot pretend to say, lord Cornwallis suddenly made up his mind to evacuate that line. He received another despatch from New York, became more and more anxious to husband his resources, and imagining that the defence of one position would prove less harassing to his people than the defence of two, he came to the ill-advised resolution of withdrawing within the town. This he accomplished the evening of the 29th, and on the following morning the ground, with all the redoubts and breastworks, upon the erection of which so much labour had been bestowed, was occupied, without the loss of a man, by the Americans.

It is not worth while to describe in detail the progress of a siege which exhibited very few traces of daring or enterprise on the one side, and little more than ordinary skill and resolution on the other. Enough is done when we state that Washington closing up the captured flêches in the rear converted them into redoubts and places of arms for his own troops, while Cornwallis continued to add to his defences, maintaining at the same time a somewhat loose and irregular cannonade upon such working parties from the enemy's army as exposed themselves. In like manner an attempt was made to injure or destroy the enemy's blockading squadron by sending out fire-ships; and once

and once only, a sortie took place. But the sortie, though it gave an opportunity for the display of much personal valour, neither led nor could possibly lead to any beneficial result, and the attempt upon the fleet wholly failed, through the imprudence or want of self-possession among those engaged in it. Every day, however, brought the conclusion of the drama nearer, and rendered its nature more and more inevitable. On the night of the 6th of October the first parallel was completed, and on the 9th the batteries opened their fire. Against these it was soon found that the unfinished works of Yorktown afforded very imperfect shelter, for the guns in the ramparts were one after another dismounted, and men perished behind the parapets of loose earth. On the side of Gloucester, too, the investment had been already completed, a body of 3500 men, under general Choisé, driving in the pickets, and cutting off all communication with the open country: but it was not till the 14th that any attempt was made to straiten Cornwallis by assaulting his outworks. That night, however, a couple of redoubts were stormed, which covered the left flank of the British entrenchments; and both being carried, in spite of a gallant resistance, all hope, even of a protracted defence, was abandoned. It was now, when driven to his last resource, that Cornwallis determined on that measure of retreat, which, if attempted at an earlier stage in the operation, might have been successfully accomplished. He made up his mind to force a passage through Choisé's lines, and with the élite of the garrison, 3000 men, cut his way to New York; and he made his calculations so accurately that the chances were at least equal, whether, even now, the attempt might not have succeeded. But, after half of the troops destined for this service had been ferried across, a violent storm arose, which, dispersing the boats, rendered it impossible to complete that night arrangements which could scarcely be deferred till the morrow. The consequence was, that matters were brought back, as nearly as possible,

to the state in which they had been previously to the commencement of the move, and men looked forward in sullen and silent despair to the future.

Thus circumstanced, lord Cornwallis came to the mortifying resolution of opening a communication with Washington, with a view to capitulate. On the 17th a flag was sent out, and terms, such as the British general imagined that he had a right to demand, were proposed; but they were accepted only in part. Washington would not consent to grant to the garrison of Yorktown other honours than those which the garrison of Charlestown had received; and to these, as his case had now become absolutely desperate, Cornwallis was compelled to submit. On the 18th of October, something less than 7000 British troops laid down their arms, in the presence of 16,000 French and Americans, while York, with its artillery and stores, as well as the shipping in the harbour passed, the former into the possession of the congress, the latter into that of the king of France.

Among other stipulations entered into at the surrender of Yorktown it was agreed, that while the British troops remained prisoners in Virginia, in charge of a certain number of their own officers, the remainder, including the commander-in-chief, should be at liberty to depart on parol, whithersoever business or inclination might draw them. Taking advantage of this privilege, lord Cornwallis, so soon as he saw the terms of the capitulation in progress of fulfilment, took ship for New York, where, in no very enviable state of mind, he passed the winter; and whence, early in the spring of 1782, he set sail for England, with the avowed intention of vindicating his own conduct during the campaign. There is little gratification — it may be questioned whether there is much of instruction — to be derived from the perusal of controversial pamphlets, composed under the influence of angry passions, and designed as much to inculpate others, as to defend the reputation of the writers. We abstain, therefore, from making any reference to those with which both the

generals and their adherents thought fit, at this time, to favour the public, as an appendix to the disclosures which a parliamentary enquiry into their proceedings unavoidably called forth. Our purpose is sufficiently answered, when we state, that, according to the showing of all parties, a good deal of blame attaches both to sir Henry Clinton and lord Cornwallis; between whom there does not appear to have existed that good feeling and personal amity, without which it is scarcely possible that men can act happily together, either in politics or in war. As to other matters, they took the turn here, which they will be found to take in almost all disputes of the kind. The friends and partisans of the general-in-chief asserted that his case was made out to their perfect satisfaction, the admirers of lord Cornwallis contended that his vindication was complete.

There occur no events in the personal history of lord Cornwallis between the years 1782 and 1786, of which his military biographer is required to take any especial notice. It was, at least to him, a period of profound peace, which he spent as he had done other and similar seasons; — partly by an attendance on his duties in parliament — partly in the enjoyment of his family and friends. But the favour of his sovereign, the partiality of the minister, and his own well-earned reputation as a soldier and a statesman, pointed him out as a man upon whose further exertions his country had strong claims. Nor did any great while elapse ere an appropriate field presented itself, on which his abilities might be exercised to the advantage of the commonwealth. The refusal of lord Macartney to act as governor-general of Bengal, except on terms which the minister deemed it inexpedient to grant, kept that high and responsible office vacant; and lord Cornwallis was, in the month of February, 1786, called upon, with the full sanction of all interested in the welfare of India, to fill it.

We have little concern in a work like the present with the many complicated and troublesome details,

in the adjustment of which the new governor-general found occupation during a space of not less than four years. Every reader of history must be aware, that immediately on his arrival at Calcutta, in September, 1786, lord Cornwallis found himself involved in negotiations with the nabob of Oude, the nizam, and other native powers; and that he brought them to a satisfactory issue only by the exercise of that decision which formed a prominent feature in his intellectual character. But the means by which he was enabled to avoid an open rupture with the nizam, led to a breach with another and a much more formidable potentate, — between whom and the English the seeds of discontent had been so long sown, that it needed very little provocation on either side to bring them to maturity. We allude now to Tippoo Sultan, the sovereign of Mysore, who inherited from his father Hyder Ally, an unconquerable detestation of the English nation.

The omission of Tippoo's name from the list of native powers, with whom the Company were publicly stated to be on terms of alliance, sufficed to rouse the jealousy of that irritable prince, who had long meditated the subjugation of the principality of Travancore, a petty state, towards which the government of Madras was bound by ties of the strictest amity. Believing that he stood absolved, by the omission just alluded to, from the obligations which had hitherto restrained him from asserting, by force of arms, his right to a disputed portion of territory, Tippoo, in the spring of 1790, burst into Travancore; and though at first repulsed, succeeded in carrying the lines of Cranganore by assault, in the presence of an English brigade, which offered no opposition to the movement. The inevitable consequence was, a declaration of war on the part of the supreme government, as well as of their allies, the Mahrattas and the nizam of Deccan.

It was the intention of lord Cornwallis, so soon as hostilities became inevitable, to proceed in person into Carnatic, for the purpose of placing himself at the head

of the army. The arrival of general Meadows, however, to succeed Mr. Holland as governor of Madras, induced him to abandon that determination; and he took, in consequence, no active part in the campaign of 1790: yet were his exertions incessant, from first to last, to supply the army with every thing requisite to its efficiency, as well as to distress the common enemy, by alarming him on all sides, while the promptitude with which he gave orders for the suspension even of the ordinary investments to England, deserves the highest praise. All, however, availed not. The campaign of 1790, though both harassing and expensive, produced no visible effect upon the aspect of the war; and hence Cornwallis, returning to his original determination, set sail for Calcutta, in order to assume in person the direction of the army.

On the 12th of December, 1790, the governor-general landed at Madras, and on the 27th of January joined the army, which he had instructed general Meadows to assemble at Velout. Here the troops were passed in review; the carriages and baggage animals inspected, and other steps taken preliminary to more active operations; after which, a plan of campaign essentially different from that on which his predecessor had acted, was considered and arranged. A few words will suffice to convey to the mind of the reader a sufficiently accurate idea of the new dispositions.

There were two lines, by one or other of which the British army might advance into Mysore; — namely, that through the southern passes, which, though remote, would lead directly upon Seringapatam; or the nearer and more difficult route, which conducts by way of Vellore and Amboor upon Bangalore. After giving to the subject the fullest consideration, lord Cornwallis determined on adopting the latter course, being instigated chiefly by his disinclination to separate too far from his depôts at Madras. He was not unaware that in choosing this line, he laid himself under the necessity of reducing Bangalore, a place second in point of strength,

as well as of importance to Seringapatam alone; and he knew that the obstacles opposed to such an enterprise, would derive great additional force from the remoteness of any point calculated to support a magazine, from which the wants of the besieging army might be supplied. Nevertheless, the evils attending a double siege, even under such circumstances, appeared less formidable than those arising from a total abandonment of his communications; and he accordingly, on the morning of February the 8th, put his army in motion, and advanced on the great road towards Vellore.

While the British general was thus adjusting his plans, Tippoo, encouraged, in part by the prospect of a French alliance, — in part, believing that the English would not venture to approach Mysore, so long as he held a footing in Carnatic, retained the position at Gingee, which, at the close of the preceding campaign, he had taken up. The direction of Cornwallis's march, however, dispelled the latter illusion; and he made haste, as far as might be, to retrieve his error, by ascending, with great celerity, the passes of Changama and Policode, and issuing orders that Bangalore should be put in a posture of defence. But no serious obstacles were opposed to the progress of the British army. A trifling skirmish or two alone made the advanced patrols aware that they were moving through an enemy's country, whose remissness in leaving unguarded a series of defensible posts was as much a subject of surprise as of congratulation. Except by these, however, and by the demonstration of an attack upon the baggage, Tippoo exhibited little trace of that vigour in opposing lord Cornwallis, which he had displayed in his contest with Meadows. On the 5th of March, an encampment was accordingly formed within 1000 yards of the pettah of Bangalore; and the outposts being driven in, arrangements were immediately made to press the siege with the greatest possible diligence.

Desirous as he had shown himself to avoid a rencontre with the English, Tippoo was fully sensible of the

importance of Bangalore; and gave proof that he would not abandon it, to maintain alone and unassisted, the chances of an obviously unequal struggle. He established his camp at a short distance from the town, amid ravines and other spots difficult of access, whence he kept up a constant communication with the garrison, so as to throw in frequent reliefs both of men and stores. The effect of this arrangement was to cast serious impediments in the way of the besiegers, who were compelled to cover even the first reconnoissance of their engineers with a powerful escort of cavalry. Nor was this all. An affair of horse, in which the English proved eminently successful, led to a more serious encounter between the covering party and the Mysoreans, in which the former sustained a heavy loss, chiefly through their own imprudence and over excitement. Nevertheless, the progress of the siege was not for a moment interrupted. On the 7th, the pettah was stormed, and, after an obstinate resistance, carried, when batteries being thrown up, so as to command and overpower the citadel, a heavy fire was opened upon its defences.

Tippoo made more than one effort to retard the advances of the assailants; by demonstrating with his whole army, and occasionally enfilading the camp from certain hollow ways, where his cannon could act in comparative safety. Lord Cornwallis was ever ready to meet and to repel these annoyances, without, however, for an instant suspending the labours of his artillery: by whose indefatigable exertions a breach on the 20th was effected. Orders were immediately issued to prepare for the assault, which an attempt on the part of Tippoo to recover the pettah scarcely interrupted, and on the night of the 21st that decisive blow was struck with perfect success, and comparatively little difficulty. The fort was carried at the very moment when a corps of 5000 men from Tippoo's camp were on the march to assist in repelling the expected storm.

Successful as he had hitherto been, the losses sustained

by lord Cornwallis, particularly in bullocks and other beasts of burden, was such as materially to cramp his operations, and interfere with his plans. He looked, moreover, to be joined, about this time, by a numerous body of the nizam's troops, who, penetrating by a different route, had agreed to meet him as near as possible to the walls of Bangalore. Nevertheless, though anxious to obtain some intelligence of his allies, and unwilling that Tippoo should find leisure to recover from his alarm, he found it impossible to advance, even though reinforced from the rear, earlier than the 28th of February. It so happened, that the Mysoreans, having struck their tents on the same day, began to move in a line diagonal to that pursued by the British; and the two armies meeting crossed one another, not without a smart and spirited skirmish: yet the enemy, as if aware of their weakness, manœuvred to avoid a general action. They defiled rapidly across Cornwallis's front, and turning into a road which ran parallel with that which he was pursuing, observed, without committing themselves, his future movements.

We have alluded to the promised junction of a body of the nizam's troops, and to the anxiety which lord Cornwallis experienced lest any accident should occur to prevent the accomplishment of an object, perhaps somewhat too highly esteemed. His present movement, indeed, had but the single object in view of clearing the approaches for his allies; and, though undertaken with a portion only of the army, it answered the purpose. On the 12th, 14,000 of the nizam's cavalry came in—but such cavalry! Instead of facilitating, they seriously impeded every subsequent operation, being perfectly useless, even as a means of obtaining intelligence; for the respect in which they held the Mysoreans was such, that they never accounted themselves safe, except in the midst of the British camp. As yet, however, lord Cornwallis knew nothing of their timidity, or lawlessness, so he returned, well pleased with the success of his demonstration, to Bangalore.

During this movement, and, indeed, for three weeks afterwards, strong detachments were constantly employed in bringing up from Amboor, and collecting in the districts round, bullocks and other animals, for the transport of stores. It was not, however, till the 4th of May that such a train was brought together as could, in any degree, authorise the commencement of a forward movement; and, even then, the commander in chief was laid under the painful necessity of appealing to the patriotism and good feeling of individuals. Happily it was not made in vain:—"almost every officer," says an eye-witness, "carried, at his own expense, two or three bullock loads of shot and shells; and the nizam's troops alone transported 5800 lbs. of shot."*

Prior to the commencement of his campaign in Mysore, lord Cornwallis had arranged with general Abercrombie, the commander of the forces at Bombay, that he should invade Tippoo's territories from the side of Malabar, so as to unite with him in his intended operations against Seringapatam. Abercrombie had faithfully obeyed his instructions; and was now, as his scouts gave notice, in position at Periapatam, where, besides being master of a considerable battering train, he had collected and laid up extensive magazines of rice. It was a main object of the present advance to open a communication with Abercrombie, to whom all departments now looked for the supply of their deeply-felt deficiencies; while, at the same time, the hope was entertained, that by the rapidity and happy choice of their marches, the country through which they were about to pass, might be made to support them from day to day. But in the latter of these anticipations both lord Cornwallis and his followers were deceived. Tippoo was too active even for their lightest patrols, and made a desert of the provinces, for miles, on either flank of the column as it moved forward.

The privations endured both by the British and native troops were very great, and the patience with which

* Sir Thomas Munro.

they bore them was exemplary; for the horses and bullocks died by hundreds on the road, and provisions became hourly more exhausted. At last, however, they reached Arkary, a place on the bank of the Cavery, whence the towers and battlements of Seringapatam could be seen, rearing themselves proudly above the rocks and hills, that give a character to the island on which the city stands. Cornwallis found that the Mysoreans, in anticipation of this move, had seized a strong position in advance of the river, where they evinced a determination of measuring themselves with him, should he endeavour to force a passage by the ford. He did not decline the offered engagement, but halting for the night, on the ground which he already occupied, issued orders for an attack three hours before dawn, on the following morning.

In the action, which followed, though evidently one of experiment alone, both Tippoo and his troops behaved with singular gallantry, maintaining their ground with a degree of steadiness which would have done no dishonour to Europeans, and bringing cavalry as well as infantry into play with the best effect. "Tippoo," says the same authority to whom we referred a short time ago, "had not more than 3000 horse in the field; he himself showed much judgment and decision in taking up his positions. This was to be expected from his character; but the conduct of his infantry excited much surprise:—they stood the fire of musketry often till our troops were within a few yards of them; they defended every post; they rallied wherever the ground was favourable; and when at last driven from the field they retreated without confusion." All their gallantry and devotion failed, however, to counteract the effects of superior discipline and intelligence. Their left being broken, after a severe contest, their whole position became exposed, and they were compelled to fall back with great precipitation behind the river.

Though gratifying to the feelings of those engaged, the victory of the 14th of May brought with it no per-

manent benefits to the army. The weather was, by this time, entirely broken; the roads, trampled into the consistency of mud, became all but impassable; and the bullocks and horses died by hundreds every day. To have commenced, under these circumstances, the siege of a large and populous town, garrisoned, not by a detachment, but by the whole military force of a kingdom, would have savoured of madness; more especially as the stock of provisions, scanty from the first, began rapidly to fail. Lord Cornwallis, therefore, though exceedingly distressed at the necessity, made up his mind to fall back, and sent orders to general Abercrombie that he, in like manner, should retire, expeditiously but without confusion, from his encampment at Periapatam. Meanwhile he himself made such preparations as the state of the case seemed to require. The battering train, which with infinite labour he had brought up, was destroyed; the spare powder was cast into wells, the shot buried, and the stores committed to the flames; after which the troops, encumbered only with a slender stock of necessaries, scarcely adequate to forty-eight hours' consumption, commenced their unwilling retreat.

If the men had suffered considerably during the advance upon Seringapatam, the privations which they endured, while prosecuting their retrogression, far surpassed any thing to which they had previously been subject. They were not compelled indeed to outmarch their physical powers—because it was necessary to cover the removal of the hospital, and the means of transporting even that were scanty; but of provisions the scarcity was awful; and, but for the opportune arrival of a supply, when all hope of a supply had been abandoned, consequences the most serious might have accrued. We have spoken of the alliance which lord Cornwallis had contracted with the chiefs of the Mahratta nation, and of the alacrity with which these freebooters engaged to co-operate in the invasion of Mysore. Until they heard of the successes of the English, however, they had, with their accustomed duplicity, kept

aloof, and they pushed forward at last only under the expectation of sharing in the spoils of Seringapatam. But though they arrived too late to render assistance in an enterprise undertaken with undue precipitancy, and thence impracticable, they came in excellent time to relieve the distresses of the half-famished soldiers, with whom they opened a communication on the second day after the retreat was begun, and the miseries of absolute destitution were beginning to stare them in the face. Happily, the Mahrattas brought with them both grain and bullocks, which, with characteristic activity, they had gleaned on every march; and the exorbitant prices which they required for both were afforded without a murmur by men, whose very existence may be said to have hung in the balance.

Notwithstanding the abortive issue of its closing scene, the results of this campaign were, upon the whole, exceedingly favourable to the interests of the English. The extreme severity of weather which had destroyed lord Cornwallis's cavalry and draught cattle, was experienced in an equal degree by Tippoo, whose immediate losses, perhaps, fell short of those of the invaders, but whose means of recruiting had become greatly less available. In former times the Mysorean was accustomed to draw his supplies of cavalry horses chiefly from the countries of the nizam, and the Mahrattas, both of which, by the progress of the war, were shut against him, while his brood mares, on which also he had to a certain degree depended, were fallen into the hands of the enemy. His infantry again, if less disorganised than the cavalry, was a good deal diminished in numbers, while it appeared next to impossible that he could be able to recruit. He no longer commanded the resources of the kingdom, of which all, except a narrow belt of territory, immediately surrounding the capital, was overrun, and even that belt had suffered more than the usual visitations of war, being swept of its very inhabitants. It is true that here and there a strong hold was still garrisoned in his name;

and that provinces, both fertile and populous, obeyed the edicts of his deputies; but almost all of these were so far removed from the seat of war as to contribute in no perceptible degree to his strength as a belligerent. The retreat of the English, therefore, left him powerless for offensive warfare, to prosecute which, both moral energy and physical force were wanting; while his chief hope for defence lay not more in the strength of Seringapatam than in the possible exhaustion and poverty of the army which threatened it.

Whatever confidence Tippoo might have been induced to repose in the latter of these contingencies, the progress of events soon served to dispel. There was no lack of energy nor any deficiency of power either in the British commander, or in the state whose resources he wielded. Lord Cornwallis strained every nerve to recruit the losses of the army, and to supply those deficiencies under which it had hitherto laboured, as well by calling forth the latent resources of the country, as by exercising an unusual but necessary control over the company's revenues. On the one hand he opened, through the agency of captain Read, a negotiation with the Brinjarries, a caste of travelling merchants, who derive a profitable trade by supplying the armies of the native princes with grain. On the other, he directed that the China ships should be stripped of their treasure, and elephants, cattle, and carriages bought, and forwarded from Madras. Nor was he totally regardless of military operations. Several forts, important on account of their situation as commanding the passes through the Ghauts, not previously opened, were reduced; while both the Mahrattas and the nizam were encouraged to straiten the enemy's limits by overrunning the districts, hitherto spared, and cutting off such garrisons as they found themselves competent to molest.

So passed the summer of 1791, during which Tippoo made an ineffectual attempt to negotiate a peace; and in the month of September his preliminary arrangements being complete, lord Cornwallis once more took

the field. He opened the campaign by laying siege in succession to various strong hill forts which stood in the line of his proposed march, and threatened to incommode his communications. These, including the formidable posts of Nundydroog and Penagra, Savandroog and Ostradroog, were one after another taken, some by capitulation, others by assault, and not a few by the treachery or cowardice of their commanders. Kestnaghery, however, a fortress inferior in point of importance to none, still owed allegiance to the government of Tippoo; nor could all the efforts of colonel Maxwell, who, with his brigade, marched against it, induce the garrison to submit. Nevertheless, enough was done to render secure and easy the progress of the Brinjarries from point to point, as well as to facilitate the approach of convoys from the coast, of which the last and greatest reached Bangalore in safety on the 2d of January, 1792.

Having thus removed every obstacle to the last grand push, lord Cornwallis reviewed his army at Ostradroog on the 31st, and on the 1st of February set forward in three parallel columns towards Seringapatam. The right which moved nearest to the enemy consisted entirely of infantry and field-pieces; the left was composed of light carts, officers' baggage, and camp followers; while the centre comprehended all the battering train, tumbrels, heavy waggons, bullocks, and elephants attached to the army. A space of little more than 100 yards separated each of these columns the one from the other, and the whole were preceded and covered on either flank by the cavalry and sharpshooters.

Simultaneous with the advance of the main body under Cornwallis were the movements of Abercromby's corps from Malabar, and of the hordes, for they scarcely deserve the appellation of armies, of the nizam and the Mahrattas. It augured badly of the strength or courage of the Mysoreans, that they offered to these complex manœuvres no serious opposition. In front of Cornwallis, indeed, they showed only an occasional squadron

of horse, which hovered along the line of march, and threatened the baggage, but which invariably disappeared as often as a disposition was made to intercept or force it to give battle. Thus, without being called upon to fire a shot, or to surmount any other obstacles than those arising out of the absolute devastation of the country, the British arrived, for the second time, on the banks of the Cavery, whence the battlements of Seringapatam were once more descried, bristling with cannon, and garrisoned by not less than 45,000 men.

Seringapatam, the capital of Mysore, is situated on an island in the Cavery, which measures about four miles in length from east to west, by one and a half in breadth from north to south. The Cavery itself is fordable at several points; but the fords were at this time covered by entrenchments, which Tippoo, under the direction of French engineers, had thrown up as an outer line of defence for the city. That line which extended about four miles from one flank to the other rested its right upon a hill called the Pagoda Hill. The left leaned upon the river; a broad deep nullah or tank, skirted along its inner edge with thorns and aloes, covered the front; for the lines ran parallel with the hedge, and embraced at convenient distances the one from the other eight field forts, each of which possessed a double ditch, a glacis, a covered way, and a winding sortie. These were respectively capable of containing from 500 to 600 men, and were armed with guns of a wide calibre, which varied in number from ten to twenty. Finally, the left of this formidable position, besides being supported by a redoubt, was rendered secure by the proximity of an impassable swamp: the rear was protected by the river; and the whole, with the exception of the extreme right, lay exposed to the fire of all the guns mounted in the citadel.

The columns were no sooner halted, and the enemy's dispositions examined, than lord Cornwallis despatched instructions to his more remote divisions to close in

upon the southern branch of the stream, while the nizam corps should take ground, so as to communicate both with them and the main body. In the mean while he himself determined to try the effect of a general attack upon Tippoo's lines, with the view of driving him back upon the island, gaining possession of the fords, and so completing, with as little delay as possible, the investment of the place. Orders were accordingly passed, with due caution from brigade to brigade, that the troops should assemble under arms, in three distinct columns, at nine o'clock on the evening of the 6th. Neither the tents nor the cannon were, however, to quit their ground, inasmuch as the latter would be useless in the dark, and the act of striking the former would inevitably excite suspicion; whereas it formed a main feature in the general's plan to take the sultan by surprise, and to gain, if possible, a footing within his works, ere a shot should have been fired. Never were orders more faithfully or regularly obeyed. The troops stood to their arms silently, yet in the highest spirits, and formed their columns of attack with a degree of calmness which augured well for the future proceedings of the night. To the first, under general Meadows, which consisted of his Majesty's 36th and 76th regiments, of the Bengal brigade, and a battalion of sepoys, it was given in charge to turn the enemy's left. The second, composed of the 52d, 71st, and 74th British regiments, of the 4th Bengal, and the 2d and 21st coast battalions, had it in charge, under the guidance of colonel Stuart, to force the enemy's centre, and to possess themselves of all his works as far as the Pagoda Hill on the extreme right; while the third, led on by colonel Maxwell, and made up of the 72d regiment, the fifth coast brigade, and one battalion of sepoys, were directed to carry, by assault, both the Pagoda Hill and the redoubt which covered it. Finally, a strong party of artillerymen and lascars, under the orders of major Montague, followed in rear of all for the purpose of turning the enemy's guns upon themselves so soon as

they should have been taken. Cornwallis himself took post beside the second column, though he left the management of details as much as possible to colonel Stuart.

Midnight was close at hand, and the moon full and cloudless, when the troops, arranged as has been just described, reached, almost at the same moment, their respective points of attack. The centre column passed the nullah, and penetrated within the lines undiscovered, when, finding no force drawn out to oppose them, they advanced into the enemy's camp, where all the tents were standing. They arrived, indeed, at the royal pavilion ere a single shot was fired, when, by direct orders from the general, they broke up into three corps, one of which rested on its arms, while the remaining two passed onwards. The first made a push for the river, which it crossed near a redoubt, and failed to enter along with the stream of fugitives only through the celerity with which the gate was closed. It then wheeled to the right, penetrated through a long bazar street, and, traversing the island, arrived at another ford, by means of which the communication with the southern country is kept up. That, too, was defended by a work on which a couple of guns were mounted, and the garrison found time to discharge one of them; but the assailing party sprang forward with fixed bayonets, and in a moment the redoubt was their own. There they halted, having fairly cut through the middle of the enemy's position, and established a communication from one branch of the Cavery to the other.

The success which attended the operations of the second party was not less signal nor less rapid. It, too, passed the river, and, turning to the left, swept the whole of the bank, till it formed a junction with colonel Maxwell's column, which had, in like manner, carried all before it. Nevertheless, Maxwell had not proceeded thus far without meeting serious opposition. Having taken the river at a point where the bottom was rocky, and the banks steep, he had lost some men by the

enemy's fire ere his landing was made good, and would have, doubtless, suffered more severely had not the approach of Stuart in their rear thrown the Mysoreans into confusion. But the enemy, alarmed for their communications, fled in great confusion, leaving, on the right as well as in the centre, the assailants masters of the camp.

While these things were passing in other quarters, general Meadows advanced upon the enemy's left, where he soon found himself in front of a strong redoubt, into which the flower of Tippoo's infantry seemed to have been thrown. The grenadiers of the 36th and 76th regiments carried the covered way with the bayonet; but, when attempting to enter the gorge, they were saluted by a volley of grape and musketry, which cut down the larger number, and compelled the survivors to recoil. Thrice they renewed the attack, and thrice were they driven back; but the enemy's ammunition beginning to fail, a fourth assault was hazarded with better effect. The troops rushed, like madmen, within the parapet, and 350 Mysoreans died upon their bayonets. General Meadows immediately turned the head of his column towards the centre, with the view of opening a communication with lord Cornwallis; but, as he kept too near to the front of the camp, he passed the general in the rear, and halted at last only at the Pagoda Hill, on the extreme right of the line.

The consequence of this mistake was to place, for a while, lord Cornwallis in a situation of imminent peril, of whose column, broken up as we have related, only four companies of Europeans, and as many of native infantry, remained with the general. He was furiously attacked by the whole of the enemy's left, which, rallying after the loss of the hill, discovered his weakness, and endeavoured to overwhelm him ere assistance could arrive. Happily, the 52d regiment, which had penetrated into the island, and became detached from all support, after gallantly capturing four pieces of cannon, and dispersing a very superior force, came up just as

the firing began. In re-crossing the stream, the men had missed the ford, by which accident their ammunition became totally damaged; but they soon supplied themselves from a spare cask belonging to one of the native corps, and now threw in a volley upon the enemy's flank, which completely disconcerted them. They broke and fled; upon which Cornwallis, occupying one of the captured redoubts with a few companies, filed off towards the Pagoda Hill, and united himself to Meadows.

So ended the business of the night; and on the morrow it was found that the field-forts covering both flanks of the enemy's position had fallen, and that the assailants were in possession of a line which stretched completely across the island. The redoubts in the centre of the Mysorean camp still, however, held out, whilst that into which Cornwallis had thrown a garrison lay so directly under the fire of the town, that to reinforce it was impracticable. Its defence, therefore, rested entirely with the brave men to whom it had been committed, and nobly they realised the expectations which the general had formed. Though exposed to a tremendous cannonade, which tore down their defences, 150 British soldiers maintained themselves all day in this place, repelling not less than five different assaults, each undertaken by a body of fresh troops. Nor were the other portions of that corps which held the new allignment in the island permitted to spend the day in peace. They were twice attacked with great fury between sunrise and sunset, besides being alarmed by the threat of a third effort during the night; but the night passed by in perfect quiet, and the morrow brought with it no symptoms of a renewal of the strife.

So far every thing had corresponded to lord Cornwallis's most ardent wishes. His loss in the late action amounted to something more than 535 men killed and wounded, while that of Tippoo, inclusive of deserters and prisoners, fell not short of 14,000. That the usual effect of success, moreover, had been, at least,

commensurate with its physical advantages, the arrival in camp of certain British officers, whom the sultan, in defiance of a capitulation, had long detained in captivity, abundantly proved. Nevertheless, the British general relaxed not in his exertions for a moment. General Abercromby, whom the tardy movements of the Hyderabad and Mahratta contingents, had prevented from taking up the ground originally marked out for him, was directed to pass over to the north of the Cavery, and there to establish himself in a common camp with lord Cornwallis's corps. It was to no purpose that Tippoo strove, first, by threatening the baggage, and, latterly, by menacing the column, to hinder the execution of this manœuvre: Abercromby made good his progress; and the united armies devoted themselves to the construction of fascines, and the adjustment of other matters preparatory to the commencement of a siege.

A few days being spent in this manner, and parties of horse sent out to hurry forward the tardy allies, lord Cornwallis pushed, on the 18th, a detachment across the southern bank of the Cavery, and made himself master of the island on both sides. The troops employed in this service displayed equal zeal and spirit; penetrating into the Mysorean camp, cutting about 100 men to pieces, and drawing towards themselves the undivided attention of Tippoo and his officers; indeed the movements of the garrison gave ample proof that from that quarter they apprehended that the final blow would come. But they were deceived. Cornwallis, taking advantage of the false attack, broke ground in the night, opposite to the northern front of the citadel, and completed, in a great measure, his first parallel ere day returned. A contemplation of that work, as well as of the rapid approach of Abercromby, who drove in his outposts and completed the investment, affected Tippoo with the deepest alarm. He saw that the siege was begun, and that the only alternative left was, either to abide the

issue, or else to avert it, by submission, while yet the means were in his power.

Tippoo was obstinate and brave; but neither his obstinacy nor his courage sufficed to blind his judgment, which assured him that further resistance would be fruitless. Emissaries were accordingly sent out, with whom lord Cornwallis readily agreed to treat, though he intermitted not for a single hour the labours of the siege, which was pushed with so much vigour that the second parallel soon became complete, while fifty pieces of cannon were mounted in the batteries. The scruples both of Tippoo and of his vakeels gave way before argument so convincing. A treaty was drawn up, which deprived Tippoo of half of his dominions; his sons became hostages in the hands of the English commander; and the troops were informed, in general orders, that hostilities were at an end. As Tippoo, however, still wavered, and exhibited a disposition to procrastinate, if not to evade the fulfilment of the treaty, the batteries were once more armed, and for the space of half a day the camp assumed all the bustle of renewed warlike preparation. Nevertheless, the cloud soon passed away. Tippoo affixed his name to the deed; and the army, after receiving the warmest thanks of its leader, as well as donations of six months' batta, broke up, and returned by detachments to the several points whence it had been drawn.

With the changes which lord Cornwallis introduced into the revenue and judicial systems of Bengal, as well as with the general tone of his policy, both foreign and domestic, we have, in this place, no concern. We shall not, therefore, pause to remark upon them, further than by observing, that they displayed, in all their parts, marks of a lofty and generous mind, eager to promote the welfare of the people of India, though wanting in the degree of knowledge requisite in order to carry into effect his own excellent intentions. In like manner, the dispositions which were made during the progress of the war with Tippoo to reduce the settlement of Pondi-

cherry, as they fell not within the immediate scope of lord Cornwallis's management, are subjects rather for the pen of the general historian than for that of his lordship's military biographer. Enough is done when we state, that the campaign of Mysore no sooner came to a close than lord Cornwallis hastened to Madras for the purpose of destroying, by one bold stroke, the remains of French influence in the Carnatic. He found, however, on his arrival, that the blow which he meditated had been already given with effect, and that throughout the vast continent of India Great Britain alone, of all the European nations, maintained an attitude of power. He therefore devoted a few months to the settlement of certain civil affairs, in which the nabob of the Carnatic and his creditors were concerned, after which he set sail, amid the regret of all ranks and classes of men, for England.

The reception which awaited him both at court and elsewhere corresponded to the value of the services which he had rendered to the East India Company in particular, and to his country at large. From the directors he received every mark of respect and gratitude, while, in addition to the thanks of both houses of parliament, he was elevated by his sovereign to the rank and style of a marquis of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. This last event befell soon after his arrival in London; for the letters patent by which the dignity was conferred bear date the 18th of August, 1793.

From this period up to the month of June, 1798, there occurred nothing in the public life of the marquis Cornwallis which demands from us any particular notice. Reposing, as it were, after the labours of his Indian warfare, he passed his time chiefly in London, where, being appointed master-general of the ordnance, he gave to the king's government the support of his high character and sober judgment. The condition of Ireland, however, a prey to anarchy and misrule, and threatened from day to day by an invasion from France, appeared to demand at the head of its affairs an officer of talent

and experience; and lord Cornwallis was, through no solicitation on his part, nominated to fill the office of lord lieutenant. He did not decline the arduous task; but setting out from London early in June, arrived on the 15th at the viceregal lodge in Dublin.

Lord Cornwallis found his province in that state of feverish disquiet which naturally succeeds to the perpetration of such atrocities as had recently been committed in many of the counties. The rebellion was, indeed, suppressed, and of its chief instigators many were secured: but there prevailed, from one end of the island to the other, a restless and excited temperament, which threatened every moment to bring about a fresh revolution. It was well known, moreover, that the French were preparing two secret expeditions, one at Rochefort, the other at Brest, which the reports of spies represented as destined for the invasion of Ireland, and the lighting up again of the flame which had so recently been extinguished. Lord Cornwallis adopted every precautionary measure for the preservation of the peace of the country which the means at his disposal would warrant, nor did any great while elapse ere the propriety of these measures became abundantly manifest.

The orders which he had issued for a fresh disposition of the troops were as yet but partially obeyed, when Lord Cornwallis received intelligence that a French force, consisting of 1260 rank and file, a large proportion of officers, and three pieces of cannon, had landed under the command of general Hombert, on the shores of Killala bay. This occurred on the 22d of August; and the same day the enemy, after a trifling skirmish with a few companies of yeomen, established their headquarters in the town of Killala. They lost no time in issuing proclamations, in which they called upon the Irish people to join them, assuring the rebels that they formed but the advanced guard of a much more powerful force. But the particular quarter of Ireland, whither accident or design had carried them, chanced to be but little affected with the revolutionary spirit; and hence

general Hombert's manifestoes failed in producing the effect which he had anticipated from them, the people continuing, for the most part, inactive, if not impartial observers of the event.

As soon as these occurrences became known at Dublin, the troops distributed over the various stations in Connaught were directed to concentrate; and lieutenant-general Lake was sent down to Galway with instructions to place himself at their head. At the same time lord Cornwallis drew together a strong corps from Leinster, which he directed to assemble at Athlone or Carrick upon Shannon; while Dublin, Wicklow, Wexford, Meath, Kildare, and Louth, were overawed by the establishment of numerous posts, communicating one with the other, and capable of affording mutual support. By these judicious arrangements, whatever the spirit of disaffection might be, it was effectually restrained in those counties, of which the strongest suspicions were entertained, while a field force, of not less than 7000 men, was rendered disposable, and brought to bear, by different routs, upon the enemy.

The first encounter which occurred between the French and English troops redounded very little to the credit of the latter. General Hutchinson's brigade, which general Lake had joined the evening before, threw itself, on the 27th, between the enemy and Castlebar, and though considerably superior in point of numbers, sustained a total defeat. The yeomanry companies, of which it was principally composed, fled, indeed, as soon as attacked; and not a few of the soldiers belonging to the Longford and Kilkenny militias, passed over to the republicans. Still the country people appeared diffident of committing themselves, about 1500 alone coming in; of whom a portion were immediately clothed, and armed with muskets, while to the rest were distributed those rude and inefficient, though common weapons in all rebellions, pikes. Nevertheless, general Hombert maintained a bold countenance, distributed proclamations, and established a provisional government; nor was it deemed prudent

to molest him till such a force should have been drawn together as would render all hope of successful resistance visionary.

The British army lay at this time in two grand divisions, one under general Lake at Tuam, the other, of which lord Cornwallis was at the head, in Athlone. Besides these, there were certain lesser detachments, such as a body of 2000 men under general Taylor at Boyles; another, about 500 strong, under sir Thomas Chapman, at French Park, and a battalion or a few companies, scattered over various points, wherever the apprehension of a popular movement demanded their presence. But the period had arrived when longer to abstain from bringing matters to an issue would have argued not only a lack of courage but of prudence. Rumours were afloat of the sailing of the Brest squadron, Dublin was stated to be on the eve of an insurrection; and it was confidently asserted that numerous bands of rebels were moving from Ballinarobe to Clare, and from the western and most mountainous parts of Mayo. It became an act of policy to strike at general Hombert ere he should be supported from one or all of these quarters, and his little corps swelled, as it would in that case be, into a really formidable army.

On the 30th of August, head-quarters were transferred to Ballinamore, patrols being pushed forward as far as Ballinarobe, about six miles from Hollymount. On the 1st of September a camp was formed at Knockhill; and on the 2d, lord Cornwallis arrived at Tuam, where he was joined by two additional regiments. From this point, general Lake was detached to French Park, where general Taylor was directed to join him; and dispositions were made at once to straighten the enemy's left, and to cover the roads leading towards the Shannon. The 3d having been devoted to the completion of these arrangements, Cornwallis advanced on the 4th as far as Hollymount, with the intention of attacking next day the fortified position which the enemy were said to have assumed at Castlebar. But

the information received that evening, confirmed as it was by the reports of his own patrols, led to a totally new disposition. Hombert had, it appeared, filed off to his left; and though the exact route which he had taken could not be immediately ascertained, the dawn of day found the British troops in rapid march towards Ballinhannis.

While moving on this line, an orderly from general Lake brought intelligence that the enemy were marching with great celerity towards Sligo, and that they had been slightly engaged with the yeomanry of Tubber Curry, while passing that place. Lake, who had been previously instructed to follow the French, foot by foot, was now reinforced with general Moore's brigade, while the commander-in-chief, passing by French Park to Carrick, crossed the Shannon, and ascended its eastern banks. The garrison of Sligo was at the same time directed to fall back, an order which colonel Vesiker obeyed with reluctance, after having sustained a sharp action for the space of an hour at a place called Colooney, two miles in advance of his post. But the game which general Hombert had hitherto played with singular audacity, if not with judgment, was now drawing fast to a close. Followed closely in the rear by Lake's division, and headed by that of lord Cornwallis, he endeavoured, by suddenly doubling back in the direction of Dumkern, to elude the toils; and he succeeded in reaching Ballinamuck, ere his pursuers were enabled to close in upon him. At that place, however, the campaign came to an end; for general Lake, overtaking and forcing him to give battle, the rebels immediately dispersed, and the French brigade, now reduced to little more than 800 men, laid down their arms.

With the exception of this trifling affair (for to speak of it as a campaign were to misapply the term), the period of lord Cornwallis's viceregal administration, which extended over a space of nearly three years, was not distinguished by any occurrence of which we are called upon to take notice. We express ourselves thus,

because the great and important measure of the union, though carried through under his auspices, lies beyond the scope of such a work as the present; and were the case otherwise, the merit of conducting that transaction to an issue belongs rather to the secretary for the time being than to the lord lieutenant. Enough, therefore, is done by stating, that his government was firm and equitable; that it corresponded with the general tone of his character, and was worthy of the reputation which he had acquired elsewhere; and that when on the change of administration, which occurred in 1801, he withdrew from the exercise of his high functions, he carried with him the respect and esteem of all the loyal people of Ireland. But he retired not even now into the shades of private life. Within a short time after his return to England he was selected to represent the interests of Great Britain at the congress appointed to adjust the terms of a permanent peace with France, of which the preliminaries had been signed by the ministers of both countries on the 1st of October, 1801. In this capacity he quitted London on the 1st of November, and, attended by a numerous suite, crossed over to Calais, whence he proceeded, after an interval of two days, to Paris.

It were foreign to the design of this work were we to give any minute account of the tedious and unsatisfactory negotiations which preceded the treaty of Amiens. We content ourselves with reminding the reader that, though personally flattered and caressed both in Paris and at Amiens, lord Cornwallis found that the negotiations which he had been appointed to conduct went on very heavily, and that a spirit of procrastination, of which the object was scarcely concealed, threw its baneful influence over the proceedings of his fellow-diplomatists. It was to no purpose that he strove to hurry forward the completion of a treaty, to delay and retard which excuses were continually invented. The French government, without deigning to notice his remonstrances, pursued its own objects with ceaseless dili-

gence; nor were matters brought to a crisis till England in her turn began again to assume the imposing attitude which she had somewhat too hastily laid aside. Then, indeed, the scruples of the first consul gave way; and a treaty, to discuss which the plenipotentiaries of the several powers had met so early as the beginning of December, was on the 29th of March, 1802, formally ratified.

Having effected this object, lord Cornwallis returned to England, with the firm intention of spending the remainder of his days in honourable retirement from public life. Disease, the effect rather of hard service than of age, had begun of late to undermine his constitution; and he felt that a respite from the cares and anxieties of official employment was essential to his comfort, if not to his existence. But the place which he held both in the estimation of his sovereign and of the minister was too elevated to permit the gratification of that desire. He had enjoyed the blessings of domestic life little more than two years, when he was again called upon to assume the chief direction of the East India Company's affairs; and the call was made under circumstances, which, in the opinion of a man possessed of his lofty and patriotic principles, forbade all attempt to elude obedience. Lord Wellesley's administration, not more brilliant than judicious, had given excessive umbrage to a majority in the court of directors, who reprobated as unnecessary wars waged for existence, and complained even of the amount of territory which their victorious armies had acquired. A cry was raised that the pacific policy, on the maintenance of which the prosperity of British India must ever depend, had been wantonly and grossly abandoned; and that the revenues of the country were brought into a state of depression, out of which it would be extremely difficult to raise them. When these things were stated to lord Cornwallis, and it was gravely added, that to him both the directors and the king's government looked as the single individual, competent by his influence

and talents to correct the evils, he felt that to refuse the office thus pressed upon him would be to sacrifice a great public duty at the shrine of private convenience. Such had never been his practice hitherto; and neither the weight of years nor a melancholy accumulation of infirmities prevailed to draw him into its adoption now.

On the 28th of June, 1805, the subject of this memoir landed at Calcutta, and, for the second time, undertook the responsible and arduous task of superintending the affairs of the Anglo-Indian empire. Neither the condition of his body nor the state of his mind, lighted up, as from time to time it was, by flashes of original vigour, were, however, at all competent to support a charge so laborious; nor, indeed, did he long survive the incessant and harassing toil to which his new situation rendered him subject. After spending the whole of the summer in conducting tedious and unprofitable negotiations, of which it was the object to bring about a peace between the Mahrattas and the Company, the governor-general found himself compelled to take the command of the army: on his way to join which his illness assumed a character which the skill of his medical attendants failed to relieve. After lying nine days in a state of insensibility, relieved by short and occasional intervals of consciousness, he expired on the 5th of October, 1805, at Gazeepore, near Benares, where a splendid monument, erected to his memory by the British inhabitants of Calcutta, still marks the place of his sepulture.

Thus died, in the 67th year of his age, one of the most upright and patriotic individuals whom England, fertile as she once was, and, perhaps, continues to be, in honest public men, has ever been so fortunate as to produce.

That his talents, either as a statesman or a soldier, belonged to the loftiest order, it were ridiculous in the extreme to assert; but of the purity of his intentions, even in cases where the results may have proved unfor-

tunate, his very enemies, supposing him to have had an enemy, could not entertain a doubt. The revenue and judicial system which he introduced into the Bengal provinces, for example, whatever its practical effects may have been, bears ample testimony to the disinterestedness and to the humanity of his views; while the most unsuccessful of his campaigns, that in the Carolinas and Virginia, leaves him still in possession of the character which attaches to a brave and active officer, to an honourable and upright man.

When we pass, however, from the broad ground of general remark, that we may examine into the details of lord Cornwallis's public life, it cannot be denied that while we discover much that deserves our commendation, we observe likewise many and striking errors, degenerating, in some instances, into positive faults. As a military officer, and it is in that capacity alone that we are called upon to discuss his merits, lord Cornwallis possessed indomitable courage, activity, coolness, perseverance, and circumspection. No man knew better how to conduct a movement through a hostile country; no man could be more at his ease while superintending the formation of his troops in an enemy's presence, or wielding them to good purpose after the battle began. But in the great and important business of arrangement,—in the art of establishing magazines, organising a commissariat, and otherwise providing against the probable effects of disaster,—it must be confessed that he was deplorably deficient. Of this, his mode of conducting the war, both in America and Mysore, affords ample proof. His marches, first into South Carolina, and eventually into Virginia, with the various changes of ground which he effected in both provinces, display a spirit of enterprise and gallantry not often surpassed; yet they led to nothing, because they were undertaken, we had almost said, at random, certainly without due attention to the unavoidable consequences both of rapid success and total failure. In like manner, the movement from Bangalore to Seringapatam, in the spring of

1792, fully bears us out in the conclusion which we have ventured to draw. Besides that the season of the year was then too far advanced to invite the precipitation of hostilities, the state of the magazines was such as to render success next to impossible; nor could the disastrous retreat that followed affect with one moment's surprise any one at all conversant with military operations. If it be urged that lord Cornwallis depended for supplies upon the Mahrattas, and that the tardiness of their arrival threw him out in all his calculations, we answer, that a prudent general will never permit the subsistence of his troops to turn upon any accident of time; and that to barbarian allies he will scarcely look for more than that secondary species of assistance which arises from straitening the enemy's resources, and cutting off their convoys.

Again, the conduct of lord Cornwallis during the last scene in his American warfare lies open to many and serious charges, to which we have already, while describing the siege of York-town, alluded in terms sufficiently explicit. The vigour of conduct which he had displayed on several less important occasions seems to have entirely abandoned him there. Had he adopted the bold but prudent measure of forcing a retreat while Washington was yet at a distance, he would have saved the flower of his army, though he lost the town, — and even later than this, the same resource was open to him, though, doubtless, at greater hazard, and beset with more urgent difficulties. Nor is this all: his precipitate abandonment of the outer position, that he might shut himself up in a place only half fortified, and inconveniently small, appears wholly inexplicable. On the lines a very considerable degree both of labour and science had been expended, they were perfectly defensible against all except regular approaches; and every day expended in maintaining them was so much time gained for the arrival of those succours which sir Henry Clinton had promised. The event, indeed, proved that had the investment of the place been deferred but a

single week, the disgrace which attached to the British arms by the surrender at York-town would have been avoided.

Having thus pointed out what we conceive to be the main defects of lord Cornwallis's military character, it is necessary that we should be equally careful in drawing the attention of the reader to those points in which he peculiarly excelled. We have alluded to the facility with which he handled troops under fire, and altered his dispositions either for attack or defence in the presence of an enemy. The battle of Camden affords an excellent illustration of that facility. In spite of a sudden meeting in the dark, he seized with happy promptitude a position every way adapted to the nature and extent of his army, and held the defensive till a rash endeavour on the part of general Gates to change his order of battle gave an opportunity to attack with advantage. It was not neglected; and a great and brilliant victory rewarded the decision of the English general.

In like manner the capture of Tippoo's lines, and the vigour with which the siege of Seringapatam was pressed, equally display, though under different circumstances, the power which lord Cornwallis possessed of wielding masses of men with accuracy and quickness. By the former he gave ample proof of capability both to plan and to execute a series of complicated and difficult manœuvres; by the latter his activity was rendered not less conspicuous than his knowledge of engineering in one of its most difficult branches. Now an officer, who is never more at home than on a field of battle, or in front of an enemy's town,—who is master of manœuvre, a skilful leader both in advance and retreat, and familiarly acquainted with the capabilities of all under his command,—cannot even, though wanting in other and not less essential points, be accounted a mean man in the list of military commanders. To Marlborough, to Peterborough, or even to Wolfe, we should certainly not compare him; but the marquis Cornwallis is a name of which the British army has no cause to be ashamed.

Lord Cornwallis married, July 14. 1768, Jemima Tullikens, daughter of James Jones, esquire, by whom he had one son and one daughter. The former, who was born October 19. 1774, succeeded to the marquisate, which became extinct by the failure of heirs male in the next generation.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR RALPH ABERCROMBY, K.B.

1733–4.—1801.

Ralph Abercromby was born at Menstrie, in the parish of Logie, in Scotland, on the 7th of October, 1733–4. He was the eldest son of George Abercromby, esq. of Tullibody, by Mary the daughter of —— Dundas, esq.,—a lady who, with great amiability of manners and numerous accomplishments, possessed much of the strong sound sense that characterised the race from which she sprang.

We have not been able to discover that the future hero of Aboukir was distinguished as a boy by any peculiarities either of taste or character. He is represented, indeed, in the traditions of his native village as having exhibited more than the customary gravity of youth; or, to use the homely but expressive language of our grey-headed informant, "as a douce solid lad, no muckle gien to daft like jinks, and liken weel to roam about by his lane." But of the authenticity of this tradition no proof has been afforded us, nor have any particular instances of singularity or unsociability been repeated. It is probable, therefore, that his "solidity," if exceeding that of strong-minded youths in general, displayed itself in no very unusual manner, though the renown acquired by the man caused, in this instance, as it is apt to do in others, the most ordinary acts of the boy to be remembered and commented upon.

The education of the subject of this memoir seems to have been conducted on a somewhat general plan, though with a greater degree of care than usually marked the proceedings of Scottish country gentlemen in the beginning and middle of the last century. We find him, for example, after passing through the customary school course at Rugby, a member, first of the university of

Edinburgh, and subsequently of that of Gottingen, where his studies were not restricted to any particular line, but ranged indifferently over the fields both of literature and science. It does not even appear that, though destined all along for the profession of arms, the subjects usually regarded as essential to the completion of a soldier's early training occupied more than a just proportion of his time. Nevertheless, the great end of all intellectual discipline was in his case fully attained. The mind accustomed to exercise itself, and to find pleasure in exercise, experienced neither difficulty nor labour in acquiring that species of knowledge which is called military; for it is certain that wherever talents exist they may, unless permitted to grow obtuse through idleness, be turned with equally good effect to almost any purpose either of peace or war.

It is somewhat remarkable that there should not have occurred in the early life of sir Ralph Abercromby a single event of which, in such a work as the present, it is necessary to give an account. Though his country was engaged in more than one serious war, Mr. Abercromby enjoyed no opportunity of turning his professional acquirements to account, till he had attained to the rank of major-general; at least we have been unable to ascertain either the date of any service performed by him, or the field on which it was accomplished, prior to the memorable era of 1793. When, therefore, we give, in few words, a statement of his upward progress on the professional ladder, and add to that account that he held the situation when very young of aide-de-camp to sir W. Pitt in Germany, we shall have done all that in this stage of our narrative can be expected at our hands.

Mr. Abercromby's first commission bears date March 23. 1756, when he was appointed to a cornetcy in the 3d dragoon guards. He became lieutenant in the same regiment February 19. 1760; captain, 3d horse April 24. 1762; major, June 6. 1770; and lieutenant-colonel, May 19. 1773. With this corps, otherwise called the Carabineers, he served chiefly in Ireland,

throughout the greater part of the American war, and was transferred towards it close with the rank of brevet colonel to the 103d foot. But of the 103d foot he retained the command only till 1783, when the regiment was disembodied, and himself placed upon half pay. In that situation he remained till September, 1787, when a promotion placed him on the list of major-generals; a position which, in 1790, was rendered, in a pecuniary point of view, more valuable by his appointment to the colonelcy of the 69th foot. The regiments which he successively obtained were the 6th foot, April 26. 1792; the 7th dragoon guards, November 5. 1795; and the 2d dragoons, or Scotch Greys, on November 2. 1796. To this meagre list of dates it is only necessary to add, that he represented in parliament, from 1774 to 1780, the county of Kinross; but that he made no attempt to render himself conspicuous either as a party-man or as a politician.

It augurs largely of the estimation in which his talents were held, that on the breaking out of hostilities in 1793 general Abercromby, though hitherto untried in the presence of an enemy, was selected to accompany the duke of York to Flanders, as a general of division. The better to assist him in discharging the duties of that office, the local rank of lieutenant-general was conferred upon him; and the manner in which he conducted himself on many trying occasions gave ample proof that the distinction had not been misplaced. It is not our intention to describe in detail the campaigns of 1794 and 1795, over the management of which general Abercromby exerted no control; nor yet to give any minute account of particular operations for which he, as a subordinate officer, was little responsible. Enough is done, when we state that in the affair of Cateau (April 26. 1794), where the guidance of the advanced guard was committed to him, he displayed both courage and conduct of a very high order; that at Turcoign (May 17. 1794) the division of which he was in command stormed the enemy's lines, and alone, of all the columns engaged,

effectually performed the service required of it; and that on the following day he covered the retreat across the Morgue, and saved, by his skilful dispositions, the army from total destruction. In like manner his behaviour at Tournay commanded the applause of all by whom it was witnessed, and contributed, in no trifling degree, to the success of the operation; while at the disastrous action of Dommel, — at the battle of the Waal, — at Nimeguen, — and, indeed, wherever an opportunity offered, — he fully established his claim to be regarded both as a gallant and a judicious officer. At Nimeguen he received a wound, of which he took no notice till the firing had ceased; and even then he could scarcely be persuaded to commit himself to the care of the surgeon, farther than by permitting a bandage to be wrapped round the hurt.

The return of the duke of York to England in December, 1794, left to general Abercromby the care of conducting one of the most trying and arduous retreats to which a British army had ever been compelled. Left in an exposed position along the banks of the frozen Waal, and threatened by a force which it would have been madness to oppose, Abercromby was driven to the painful necessity of spiking his heavy guns, destroying his stores, and falling back on the 4th of January towards the Leck. But he was not allowed to pursue that march unmolested. Pichegru, crossing the river on the ice, followed him with such rapidity that to avoid an action was no longer practicable. The rear-guard was accordingly halted; and a sharp affair ensued, which ended at last in the repulse of the assailants, though not till after almost every man in the British army had taken part in the struggle. Nevertheless, from the victory thus hardly won, no permanent advantage could be derived. The British troops fought for existence, not for conquest; and hence the retreat was renewed so soon as darkness set in, and continued without a halt as far as the defile of Gorb, in the province of Utrecht.

By this retrogression Abercromby brought his columns into contact with those of general Walmoden, the leader of the German auxiliaries; and now, in the absence of the duke of York, commander-in-chief of the allied armies. Educated in what has emphatically been described as the old school, Walmoden appears to have looked only to his front, while Pichegru, at the head of 70,000 men, was manœuvring on both his flanks. The consequence was a fierce attack, delivered at a moment when it was least expected, and a desperate action fought under every disadvantage of imperfect information as well as inferiority of numbers. The allies were driven from their ground, with the loss of their camp equipage, and reduced to the necessity of bivouacking in the open fields during the depth of an usually severe winter; nor did aught preserve them from utter annihilation except the determined bravery of the rear-guard, composed entirely of British troops, and acting under the orders of general Abercromby.

To trace from day to day the course of this overmatched army, and to describe the numerous skirmishes which occurred between the patrols in retreat and the enemy in advance, would occupy more space than the limits of our work can afford, without conveying either instruction or amusement to the reader. Let it suffice to state that to every imaginable hardship and inconvenience that gallant band was exposed, and that both officers and men bore up under their reverses with admirable perseverance and magnanimity. Followed closely by a numerous and determined enemy, they halted and faced about from time to time, receiving, with the utmost coolness, an attack wherever offered, and repulsing the assailants. In like manner, the patience and discipline of the troops, though sorely tried, as well through the increasing hostility of the inhabitants as by the rigours of the season, on no occasion gave way. Though convinced that the country was no longer tenable, and looking only to the sea for safety, they bore, with the most praiseworthy resignation, the privations

required at their hands; for the instances were rare, indeed, in which the neglect of the inhabitants was visited with violence, or the honour of the British name tarnished by acts of plunder or rapine. Their route led towards Deventer, which they reached on the 27th of January; and of the difficulties of that movement some idea may be formed by perusing the following extracts from the journal of one who himself took an humble part in the proceeding.

Robert Brown, a corporal in the Coldstream regiment of foot guards, writes thus, when describing the operations of the 16th, 17th, and 19th of January: —

"January 16th. — We marched at the appointed hour, and, after a very tedious journey, about three o'clock in the afternoon reached the verge of an immense desert called the Welaw, when, instead of having gained a resting-place for the night, as we expected, we were informed that we had fifteen miles further to go. Upon this information, many began to be much dejected, and not without reason; for several of us, besides suffering the severity of the weather and fatigue of the march, had neither ate nor drank any thing, except water, that day. For the first three or four miles, such a dismal prospect appeared as none of us was ever witness to before; a bare sandy desert, with a tuft of withered grass or solitary shrub here and there. The wind was excessively high, and drifted the snow and sand together so strong, that we could hardly wrestle against it; to which was added a severity of cold almost insufferable. The frost was so intense that the water which came from our eyes, freezing as it fell, hung in icicles to our eyelashes; and our breath, freezing as soon as emitted, lodged in heaps of ice about our faces, and on the blankets and coats that were wrapped round our heads.

"Night fast approaching, a great number, both of men and women, began to linger behind, their spirits being quite exhausted, and without hopes of reaching their destination; and if they once lost sight of the

column of march, though but a few minutes, it being dark, and no track to follow, there was no chance of finding it again. In this state, numbers were induced to sit down or creep under the shelter of bushes, where, weary, spiritless, and without hope, a few minutes consigned them to sleep; but, alas! whoever slept awakened no more, their blood almost instantly congealed in their veins, the spring of life soon dried up; and if ever they opened their eyes it was only to be sensible of the last moments of their existence. Others, sensible of the danger of sitting down, but having lost the column, wandered up and down the pathless waste, surrounded with darkness and despair; no sound to comfort their ears but the bleak whistling winds; no sight to bless their eyes but the wide, trackless desert and shapeless drift; far from human help, far from pity, down they sunk to rise no more.

"About half past ten o'clock at night we reached Brickborge, where, to add to our misfortunes, we could hardly find room to shelter ourselves from the weather, every house being already filled with Hessian infantry, who are in no respect friendly to the English. In several houses they positively refused us entrance, and in every one refused us admittance to the fire; at the same time they posted centries by the cellar doors to prevent the inhabitants from selling us any liquors; even their commanding officer pushed, with his own hands, a number of our men, neck and heels, out of his quarters. Thus we were situated, till, partly by force, partly by stealth, we crept in where we could, glad to obtain the shelter of a house at any rate.

"January 17th.—We halted this day, and in the morning waggons were sent out with a number of men to search for those that were left behind. A great number were found in the route of the column; but a greater number who had straggled farther off were never heard of more. In one place seven men, one woman, and a child were found dead; in another, a man, a woman, and two children; in another, a man,

a woman, and a child; and an unhappy woman being taken in labour, she, with her husband and infant, were all found lifeless. One or two men were found alive, but their hands and feet were frozen to such a degree as to be dropping off by the wrists and ankles.

"January 19th.—Perhaps never did a British army experience such distress as ours does at this time. Not a village, not a house, but what bears witness to our misery, in containing some dead, and others dying: some are daily found, who have crawled into houses singly; other houses contain five, six, or seven together, some dead or dying, or unable to walk; and as for those that are able, it is no easy matter for them to find their way; for the country is one continued desert without roads, and every track filled up with the falling and drifting snow. Add to all this, that the inhabitants are our most inveterate enemies, and, where opportunity offers, will rather murder a poor, lost, distressed Englishman than direct him in the right way — several instances of which we have already known."

In this condition, and after enduring such privations, the army reached Deventer, where a few days of rest had been anticipated, but no repose was granted to them. Pichegru trod in their footsteps; and on the 29th the retreat was resumed, after all that remained of stores, artillery, and spare equipments, had been destroyed. Nevertheless, the officers were alert, the men orderly, and the countenance presented to the enemy so bold, that every effort to stay their progress, or seriously molest the line of march, failed. Thus they arrived at Bremen in Lower Saxony, jaded, indeed, and destitute of supplies, but unbroken in spirit, and unimpaired in discipline; whence, on the 14th of April, they began to embark in the fleet sent round for their reception, and, before the end of the month, were safely landed in England.

The behaviour of general Abercromby throughout the campaigns of 1793, 1794, and 1795, and more especially during the retreat, of which an account has just

been given, fixed upon him the eyes of his country and the government, and excited the highest expectations of his future career. The consequence was, that when, in the autumn of 1795, it was found necessary to prepare an expedition for the West Indies, where the French had made of late unexpected efforts to establish a superiority, he was, to the great satisfaction of all employed, appointed to take command of the troops. The army assembled on the present occasion fell not short of 25,000 men, of which rather more than 3000 were cavalry; and its equipment, as to stores, appointments, medicines, and clothing, was, perhaps, the most complete that ever distinguished a field force sent out from the shores of Great Britain.

Had the same good sense been displayed in the management of that fine body of men, which was exhibited in the mode of preparing it for service in a tropical climate, many valuable lives might have been preserved, and a prodigious waste of money and material avoided. Unfortunately, however, this proved not to be the case. The fleet, instead of sailing in detachments as the vessels procured their respective complements of men, was detained till late in the autumn at St. Helens, in order that the whole, proceeding in a body, might create an impression on the minds of the enemy such as should render all idea of resistance illusory. The consequence of this device, with whom originating we know not, proved lamentably disastrous. On the 27th of October, the fleet being ready for sea, the weather, which had long threatened, became violently tempestuous; insomuch that several ships were driven from their anchors, and more than one stranded. Nor were the after fortunes of the expedition more prosperous, for a time, than this sad commencement. On the 11th of November 300 sail got under weigh, only that their progress might be arrested by an accident which befell the admiral; and when, on the 15th, a second attempt was made, the fury of the elements rendered it abortive. A severe storm headed the fleet soon after it had cleared the Isle of

Wight; and such vessels as escaped destruction were compelled to return to Portsmouth.

Admiral Christian, a brave and rugged seaman, bore with impatience these numerous reverses; and exerted himself strenuously, by gathering together the remnants of his command, to render them as little mischievous as possible. Again he weighed anchor on the 9th of December, and, on the 13th, was again overtaken by a tempest; which, besides destroying utterly several of the worst found among the transports, dispersed the remainder beyond the chances of immediate re-union. There was no bearing up against misfortunes so severe, and of such frequent occurrence: the idea of moving in a body was abandoned; and general Abercromby, in the Arethusa frigate, led out, on the 14th of February, as many troop-ships as could be conveniently assembled. These suffered but little delay during the passage; and on the 14th of March reached Barbadoes, the point of general rendezvous in the West Indies.

It chanced that, of the vessels dispersed during the gales above alluded to, several had accomplished, alone, or in petty squadrons, the outward voyage; general Abercromby, therefore, found himself at the head of a very respectable force, with which, after sufficient time had been allotted for refreshment, and the organisation of depôts, he proceeded to carry the design of the expedition into effect. His first attempt was on Dominica and Berbice, both of which submitted to a detached brigade under general Whyten; his second on St. Lucia, an island worthless in itself, but, from its local situation, affecting seriously the trade of the whole archipelago: before it the fleet, now joined by admiral Christian, cast anchor on the 26th of April, and the same day a landing took place at Longueville Bay, Pigeon Island, Churte Bay, and Ance-la-Raze. Next morning the army advanced for the purpose of closing in upon Morne Fortunée, the principal place in the island, and a post of some strength; and Morne Chabot, a position commanding the main approach to the capital, was gallantly car-

ried by generals Moore and Hope. Nevertheless, Morne Fortunée was not reduced till after considerable labour had been endured, and some loss sustained, both from sickness and the sword. The face of the country, indeed, presented obstacles of no common nature; for the hills were steep and rugged, and the means of transport available both for cannon and stores were supplied entirely by the zeal of the seamen. Yet on the 14th of May the batteries began to fire; and on the night of the 17th an outwork was stormed. From that period the siege went on regularly, but with great spirit; and on the 26th the place submitted on capitulation, the inhabitants passing once more under the dominion of Great Britain, and the garrison becoming prisoners of war.

As soon as he had reduced certain refractory bands, which, retiring into the interior, carried on, for a while, an extremely harassing warfare, general Abercromby set sail for St. Vincent's, where he made good his landing, without sustaining any opposition, on the 8th of June. On the 10th, an intrenched position, along the ridge of a mountain called the Virée, was attacked; and three out of four redoubts being carried, the enemy gladly accepted the terms which humanity prompted general Abercromby to offer. The island submitted as St. Lucia had done, and, strange to say, under circumstances in all respects similar. Though the governor, with the main body of the garrison, laid down their arms, bands of fugitives, uniting with the Caribs in the woods, gave to the British army a long and troublesome occupation; for it was not till the month of September that famine, rather than disasters in the field, compelled these savage warriors to capitulate. In addition to the French brigands, 5000 Caribs threw themselves, on this occasion, on the mercy of the conquerors, and were transported in a body, first to Isle Ratan, in the gulf of Mexico, and eventually to the continent of South America.

This war of skirmishers being ended, and the settle-

ments of Guiana and Esquibo reduced, general Abercromby set sail for England, whither business, partly of a private, partly of a public nature, carried him; but his sojourn there was brief: he returned, early in February, 1797, to his command; and proceeded without delay to complete the circle of his conquests by an attack, first upon Trinidad, and afterwards on Porto Rico. The former of these exploits was of easy attainment; for Trinidad hoisted the English ensign without striking a blow; but the latter proved not only disastrous, but unfortunate. Porto Rico held out; and its situation, on a narrow neck of land, separated from the main by an arm of the sea, placed it beyond the reach of insult from the force employed for its reduction. General Abercromby, therefore, after landing his troops, and trying to no purpose the effect of a fire across the Lagoon, abandoned the design as impracticable; and, with the loss of 220 men, of whom 121 deserted to the enemy, returned to Barbadoes. Not long after this he resigned his command and withdrew, carrying the esteem and respect of the soldiery along with him, to Europe.

At the period of which we are now treating, even trivial successes by land called forth the marked approbation of the British government; and general Abercromby's recent acquisitions being really of some importance, he found that his claims to distinction and reward were not disputed. He had, during his absence, been appointed to the colonelcy of the Scotch Greys, and nominated governor of the Isle of Wight: he was now advanced to the dignity of the Bath, created a lieutenant-general, and endowed with the lucrative governments of Fort George and Fort Augustus. Nor was this all; the troubled state of Ireland appearing to demand at the head of the troops an officer in whom they would repose implicit confidence, sir Ralph Abercromby was required, in November, 1797, to repair, in the capacity of general-in-chief, to Dublin. He held this important office throughout the winter, and exerted

himself successfully to restore to the army that strict discipline which the nature of the service in which it was employed had in some degree impaired. But he was not called upon in person to direct any military movement; for, in the spring of 1798, lord Cornwallis arrived to take upon himself the twofold duty of lord-lieutenant and commander of the forces. As a necessary consequence, sir Ralph Abercromby withdrew; and, transferring his head-quarters to Edinburgh, assumed, on the 31st of May, the guidance of that portion of the army which occupied Scotland.

He had exercised this pacific command something more than twelve months, when a field of operation unexpectedly opened out to him much more congenial to his inclination as well as to his talents. The suppression, in a great degree, of the Irish rebellion, and the situation of the French armies, with difficulty maintaining their ground in Italy, and hard pressed on the Upper Rhine, determined the English government to attempt once more the liberation of Holland and the re-establishment of the stadtholder in his ancient dignities. This scheme, desirable in itself, as calculated to deprive the enemy of one of his richest provinces, appeared the more practicable that the Dutch people, and especially the seamen belonging to the fleet, were represented as enduring with impatience the French yoke, and ready to muster about the Orange flag so soon as it should be hoisted. A large army, computed at 25,000 men, accordingly began to assemble along the coast of Kent; and sir Ralph Abercromby again selected to take rank, next under his former chief, the duke of York, received orders to place himself at the head of that particular corps with which it was resolved to effect a landing and secure a hold upon the country.

Early in June, 1799, Abercromby was at his post, facilitating, by every means in his power, the organisation and equipment of the force which he had been appointed to command. His exertions being ably seconded by both officers and men, and the seamen exhibiting

on this, as on all occasions, not less intelligence than zeal, a corps of 12,000 infantry, with artillery and a few troops of horse, was embarked and ready for sailing by the second week in August. Nor was time unnecessarily wasted after the men and stores were on board; for on the 13th the fleet quitted its anchorage, and, in spite of a succession of adverse and boisterous gales, the coast of Holland became visible on the 21st. Immediate preparations were made to effect a landing; and the troops were already under arms for that purpose, when the storm, which had subsided for a time, came on again with fresh violence, and the admiral was compelled to consult the safety of his fleet by putting out to sea. Thus baffled by events over which he had no control, the leader of the expedition reluctantly deferred the enterprise; for it was not till the evening of the 28th that the ships could take their stations, so as to afford the smallest prospect of a secure debarkation.

There were two distinct objects which the general and admiral were required to effect as preparations for the still more important business of the armament. There lay at this time in the Texel a Dutch fleet, consisting of eight sail of the line, three frigates, and a sloop, the whole under the command of admiral Storey. Of these vice-admiral Mitchell, the immediate coadjutor of sir Ralph Abercromby, had it in charge to take possession, — by treaty, provided he found the Dutch officers and men inclined to hoist the Orange flag, — by force of arms should his summons be neglected. On the part of the land forces, again, it was their business to effect a debarkation as near as possible to the Helder point; to intrench themselves there so soon as they should have reduced the forts and batteries in the vicinity, and to await, in a secure position, the arrival of reinforcements. These, however, were to consist, not only of the second division of the British army, under the duke of York, but of 17,000, or 18,000 Russians, for whom the means of transport had been

despatched so early as July to the Baltic, and who, after touching at Yarmouth, were to proceed direct to Holland. Thus, then, the fleet and army which now threatened the Dutch shores could be regarded only as the advanced guard of a force much more formidable,—whether judiciously thrown into action alone and, as it were, totally unsupported, it is not worth while very minutely to enquire.

When the British army first began to assemble, nothing more was known, respecting its destination, than that it was about to proceed, under sir Ralph Abercromby, on some secret but important expedition. It is more than probable that, even then, the French directory entertained tolerably correct suspicions touching its future scene of action; for Holland was felt to be at once the weakest and the most important portion of the republican territory exposed to an attack from the sea. But, however this may be, the British government soon deprived its general of any advantage which a state of doubt on the part of his enemies might have afforded, by avowing to the world the designs which it entertained, and the reasons on which its hopes of success were founded. The consequence was, that general Brune, the French commandant of Batavia, aware beforehand of the coming storm, made strenuous efforts to collect means by which its violence might be resisted. The Batavian national guard was every where called out; fresh levies of regular troops were ordered, and a body of 10,000 French soldiers being held in hand, it was estimated that upwards of 30,000 men might be brought, in the course of a few days, to bear upon any point which chanced to be threatened. Meanwhile, the coast was guarded by flying corps, of which one, amounting to 6000 or 7000 of all arms, observed the point of the Helder from a strong position at Keetem, about six miles from the shore.

Such was the state of preparation among the enemy, when, at two o'clock on the morning of the 29th, the British troops took their stations in the boats of the

fleet, and, covered by a heavy fire from the brigs, armed transports, and other lighter vessels, began to approach the Helder point. No attempt was made to oppose the landing, even by a fire of artillery, though numerous white tents, seen over the waving sand hills, gave indication that a hostile force was near; but scarcely had the leading division begun to move forward when it was assailed with great fury, in front, by infantry, on the right, by a body of chasseurs à cheval. Nothing could exceed the collected gallantry with which that charge was met. Though grievously hampered on the right by the nature of the plateau, and unable to bring more than one battalion into line in that quarter, general Abercromby received the enemy with a firmness which entirely disconcerted them; while he pushed forward his light troops from the left, and overlapped, with a volume of fire, that portion of the Batavian line which endeavoured to bear down his centre. Meanwhile fresh regiments came up, as the seamen, who spared no exertion, succeeded in rowing them ashore; and the enemy, already more than matched, gave way, at first reluctantly, but, in the end, with great confusion. General Dandaels, who commanded the Dutch, fell back upon his camp at Keetem, while Abercromby bivouacked that night among the sand hills, which his men had won with their bayonets.

An action fought as this was amid ground exceedingly broken, and under all the disadvantages attending a recent debarkation, could not fail to be both irregular and bloody. There fell, on the part of the English, not less than 400 of all ranks; of whom, however, scarce sixty were killed on the spot, while the loss of the enemy was estimated at more than double. But the mere account of casualties formed the least of the inconveniences which accrued to the Batavian army from its defeat. General Dandaels felt that the fortress of the Helder was no longer tenable, and sent orders, the same night, that it should be evacuated; so that when general Moore advanced, on the following morning, for

the purpose of investing it, he found the gates open, and the place abandoned. This was all that was needed to secure to Abercromby's corps such a position as should render safe and easy the arrival of its supports. The army, accordingly, drew up along the neck of the peninsula, where it was joined, the same day, by a fresh brigade, which landed under the guns of the batteries of the Helder, now occupied by a British battalion.

In this situation the army remained for some days, during which admiral Mitchell, and his gallant followers, penetrated through the intricate navigation of the Texel, and made themselves masters, by capitulation, of the Dutch fleet. The Texel itself was then occupied; and the troops reinforced by the whole of Don's division, amounting to 5000 men, made a forward movement of about a league in extent, and took up a new and formidable position in rear of the Zyper. Here Abercromby made haste to intrench himself; for his total strength fell short of 16,000 men, and he knew, from the reports of deserters, that Brune had concentrated at Alkmaer to the amount of not less than 25,000,—a superiority too great to be held at nought under any circumstances, but especially at a time when the arrival of formidable succours might from day to day be anticipated.

The same considerations which induced Abercromby to decline offensive operations prompted Brune to bring matters with as little delay as possible to the issue of a battle. As yet, he far surpassed the invaders in point of numbers; whereas the junction of the Russians and of the duke of York's corps would render him inferior, at least till the supplies, which he had ordered up from the further provinces, should come in. Seeing, therefore, that the English exhibited no inclination to move, he determined to attack them in their lines. With this view he advanced, at an early hour on the morning of the 9th, in three heavy columns, of which the left was composed entirely of French, the centre and right of Dutch troops. The first, passing through Groot and Kamp, drove in the British outposts, and penetrated as

far as the height of Houndsboys-duynen, on which the right of the English lines appuyed. The second, led on by general Dandaels, attacked the village of St. Martin's, with every demonstration of courage; while the third, under the guidance of general Monceau, pushed by way of Crabbendam, up to the very banks of the Zuyper Sluys. Not for one moment, however, was the fate of the battle doubtful: a volley of musketry and grape, thrown in with all the coolness which distinguishes the practice of the British artillery and infantry, staggered each column ere it could deploy, — and all the efforts of the leaders failed, throughout the remainder of the day, to restore the men to order and confidence. The attacks, though fierce and frequent, were thenceforth given without regularity; and by one o'clock in the day the whole army was in full and disorderly retreat.

There fell, in this action, on the side of the French, about 1500 men; — on the part of the English, less than 200 were rendered incapable of active service. General Brune left behind him, likewise, a field-piece, with several tumbrils and pontoons; but few, if any, prisoners were taken. Nevertheless, the moral effect of a victory obtained over odds so tremendous was keenly felt by all ranks of men; the utmost self-assurance, indeed, prevailed throughout the British camp, as well as the greatest anxiety to assume the offensive, while the confidence which they reposed in the skill and sound judgment of their chief knew no bounds. Yet it failed not to excite uneasy sensations in Abercromby's mind, that, in spite of the defection of the fleet, and the repulse, on two separate occasions, of the enemy's troops, no adherents to the cause of the house of Orange appeared any where in arms. He learned, on the contrary, from various quarters, that the republican ranks were enthusiastically filled up, and he began, from that moment, to entertain serious misgivings touching the result of the enterprise. Still his bearing was as bold, and his manner as cheerful, as it had been from the be-

ginning; nor, when his royal highness arrived on the 13th to relieve him from the cares and responsibility of command, did he render up his trust without regret.

There accompanied the duke of York, on the present occasion, a body of 5000 excellent troops, which swelled the amount of the British army alone to not less than 22,000 men. This was a formidable force, it must be admitted, on account both of its numbers and discipline: nevertheless, the duke was not compelled to hazard any thing even with it; for there arrived, between the evening of the 14th and noon of the 18th of September, not less than 13,000 Russians under the command of lieutenant-general de Hermann. Not an hour was now lost in arranging a forward movement, of which the sound policy could not fail to be admitted by all who considered the question, though it may, perhaps, be doubted whether sufficient time was afforded for the recovery of the Russians from the effects of a long and boisterous voyage.

In expressing ourselves thus, it is far from our intention to throw the slightest discredit on that turn of mind which prompts the leader of an invading army to bring on, as speedily as possible, a great and decisive battle. Under almost all circumstances, the assailing party will find that nothing is to be gained by delay, which, while it wastes his own resources, enables the enemy to mature his plans, and to consolidate, more and more effectually, his means of defence. Nor, in the present instance, were the reasons for an early attack less cogent than they are usually found to be. As yet M. Brune could bring into action little more than 25,000 men; and his position, though strong, was less formidable than it would become after he had devoted another week to its improvement. It was well known, moreover, that strong reinforcements were on the march both from Brussels and the north of France, while a second line was already marked out on which his columns might fall back, in the event of their suffering a

reverse. Still the Russians, unaccustomed to the effects of a sea voyage, were enfeebled through long confinement; — a state of body exceedingly unfavourable to military operations, which a single day of rest on shore would have ameliorated. Nor is this all. The Russians had never, till now, served with the English. The tactics of each nation were totally unknown to the other, and the very appearance and dress of the allied corps were mutually strange and distasteful. Had a day or two been devoted to the arrangement of a good understanding between them, no great advantages, in point of time, would have been afforded to the enemy; and it is just possible that the result of their first conjoint operation might have been different from what it was.

Whether the facts at which we have hinted presented themselves to the consideration of the duke of York, or whether, being considered, they were regarded as weighing little in the scale against the policy of an immediate advance, we are destitute of ground on which to hazard an opinion. We know only that the last division of Russians had scarcely taken its ground, when orders were issued of a warlike nature; and that the whole army being divided into four columns, one of these, on the left, commenced, at six o'clock the same evening, its cautious march towards the front. But it will be necessary to describe more in detail both the position occupied by the enemy and the arrangements made on the part of the English general, for the purpose of dislodging them.

After his unsuccessful attempt on the 10th, general Brune had posted his army along a line somewhat in advance of Alkmaer, which, extending from the heights of Camperdown on the left to the Zuyder Zea on the right, embraced Bergen, the villages of Walmenhuysen and Schorledam, the post of Oude Carspel, at the head of the Lange Dyke, and to a certain degree, at least, the town of Hoorne. He had intrenched himself here by placing a battis on all the great roads, by barricading the vil-

lages, and throwing up redoubts and breastworks; while a succession of canals and drains, from which the bridges were carefully removed, covered him as if with a series of wet ditches. A numerous and heavy artillery commanded all the plain, which was, for the most part, open and destitute of cover, except that in the vicinity of Bergen a thick grove spread out, and here and there a row of trees, overshadowing the banks of a canal, gave some character to a scene not otherwise allied to the picturesque.

The disposition of the enemy's army having been fully explained to him, the duke of York determined to make his attack in four columns, of which the right, composed chiefly of Russians, under Hermann, should move upon Bergen, the left, under Abercromby, gain possession of Hoorne, while the centre divisions, under Dundas and Pulteney, forced, the former, the villages of Walmenhuysen and Schorledam, the latter, Oude Carsdel, on the road to Alkmaer. As the point of action assigned to the left column lay considerably beyond the extent of the line, sir Ralph Abercromby was directed to quit his ground at eight o'clock on the evening of the 18th; and so well was the march conducted, that the slightest suspicion of the design appears not to have been entertained by the garrison of Hoorne. No patrols observed the approach of the English, nor were any extraordinary measures adopted, if not to retard the movement, at least to render it conspicuous; and hence, when the signal gun was fired, and the column rushed forward, Hoorne was carried without loss — we might have said without resistance. The consequence was, that general Brune's position became, in the highest degree, critical; for his right being turned, and the means of penetrating into his rear laid open, a defeat in other quarters must have led to the total destruction of the army.

Had the remaining divisions of the allied army performed the parts allotted to them with the same diligence and skill which characterised sir Ralph Aber-

cromby's advance, the 19th of September would have been memorable for one of the most signal victories obtained over the French troops during the war. Unfortunately, however, this was not the case. The Russians, impatient under delay, pushed forward to the attack two hours before the appointed time, and the whole plan of operations became, as might have been expected, broken and confused. Nor did the errors committed by general Hermann and his people end here. After charging, in gallant style, the enemy's advanced works, and penetrating into Bergen, the men, weary and faint, began to straggle; and the officers were soon found to be destitute of sufficient authority to restrain them from still more glaring irregularities. They halted in the town, piled their arms, and spread themselves through the place in search of plunder, as if all the danger were at an end, and the enemy entirely routed. The consequences were not different from what might have been anticipated. General Brune, rallying the fugitives, drew them cautiously through the wood until he had enveloped the town of Bergen on three sides, when he rushed forward at the head of the grenadiers, and drove out the astonished Russians with prodigious slaughter. Not a moment was granted them to recover their confidence. Though supported by an English brigade, they were forced through Schorl, after a fierce and sanguinary resistance; and they halted at last only on the ground which they had quitted six hours previously.

The defeat of this attack, on which the results of the battle mainly depended, rendered not only sir Ralph Abercromby's success, but the conquests achieved both by general Dundas and sir James Pulteney of no avail. The former, who had carried Walmenhuysen and Schorledam, found himself exposed, by the retreat of the Russians, to be taken in flank, and after bravely defending himself for some hours fell back; while the latter withdrew also, in consequence of positive orders to that effect, from a strong position which he had taken up

not far from Alkmaer. Finally, the left column was directed to evacuate Hoorne, and to retrace its steps so soon as darkness should set in, and the army once more resumed its allignment with diminished numbers behind the Zyper.

We are not called upon to offer any critical remarks upon the mode of conducting an operation, of which the responsibility rested not with the subject of this article; yet the principal cause of failure on the present occasion can scarcely fail to be observed by such as look at the whole arrangement with other than the most careless eye. The precipitancy of the Russian column was doubtless an error, which its subsequent abandonment of order rendered a thousand times more disastrous; yet these faults might have been redeemed, but for another and still more fatal mistake. Sir Ralph Abercromby's column, at once the most numerous and the best appointed in the army, was separated by an interval too wide from the rest of the line. No doubt his situation at Hoorne gave him a complete command over the line of the enemy's retreat, and assured to him, in the event of success elsewhere, the fullest fruits of victory; but for any purposes of action, or as an additional means of securing that victory, he was perfectly useless. By employing sir Ralph Abercromby in the reduction of Hoorne, the duke of York placed himself in the situation of a general, who, instead of keeping a reserve with which to support or follow up the exertions of his leading corps, pushes it in front of his light troops. He fought a great battle with two thirds of his disposable strength, and relied for success exclusively on the issues of one attack.

The consequence of this failure, alike distressing and unexpected, were not slow in developing themselves. Antwerp, which had begun to waver in political feeling, returned to its allegiance under the republican government, and recruiting became more and more easy throughout the provinces. Meanwhile general Brune employed the interval afforded in bringing up large

reinforcements, in strengthening his present position, and in filling up the sketch of his second line between Bererwyk and the Zuyder Zea. The better to secure himself from danger on the left, he caused the sluices to be cut, and inundated the whole face of the country between the Polder and the Bumster; thus narrowing the space on which his assailants could act to an extent of about two leagues, or at the most seven English miles. Nor, to do them justice, were the English absolutely idle, though their exertions, for a time, savoured more of a defensive than of an offensive campaign. They, too, threw up redoubts, and carried a series of works from the North Sea on one flank to the Zuyder Zea on the other; while their shipping threatened the whole extent of coast, and reduced several places of little importance.

Such was the state of affairs on both sides till the 2d of October, when the rear-guard of the Russians, about 3000 strong, having joined him, the duke of York moved again in four columns to the assault of the enemy's position. His dispositions were now so far different from what they had been, that the guidance of his right, or most important attack, was intrusted to general Abercromby; who moved along the sea-shore, leaving Bergen to his left, against which another column, under general Dundas, was immediately directed. The left, moreover, extended no further than to Schorledam and Oudescarpel; on the latter of which sir James Pulteney was instructed to make a demonstration, while a strong reserve, under general Burrard, at once secured a retreat, and offered the greatest facilities for turning success to advantage.

It is not our province to describe with minuteness the progress of this battle, which was maintained with great courage from six in the morning till the same hour at night. Enough is done when we state, that general Dundas first succeeded in making an impression by forcing the village of Schorledam, and that the blow was followed up vigorously, both on the right and left.

Sir Ralph Abercromby's column, for example, driving every thing before it, swept the Downs of their defenders, and broke the chain by overthrowing a strong corps of the army at Egmont-op-Zee, whence the general judiciously wheeled to his left, so as to place Bergen in a state of siege, and to take the corps of general Gouvion in reverse. Brune felt that his post was no longer tenable. He drew off, however, in good order, being favoured by the darkness of the night, and took up fresh ground within the works, on which he had now, for more than a fortnight, kept strong parties constantly employed.

The allied troops lay that night upon their arms; and at dawn on the following morning began, though with extreme caution, to press forward. A few of the enemy, that lingered in the woods about Bergen, were forced back, and Alkmaer was occupied the same evening. But the difficulties of the enterprise, so far from being overcome, were found continually to increase. In the first place, the weather was completely broken, and a succession of cold and heavy rains rendered the roads impracticable for carriages, and extremely difficult even for horse and foot passengers. In the next place, the enemy, though driven from one formidable position, presented a bolder front than ever, being secured on a line still more defensible than that which they had lost, and gathering strength from hour to hour. The allies, on the contrary, might fall off in point of numbers, but there was to them no hope of reinforcements; while their communications with the fleet, though little more than six leagues distant, had become difficult and uncertain. Under these circumstances it was evident that the only chance of success lay in precipitating hostilities, and gaining a second victory. The duke of York, therefore, directed his advanced posts to be pushed forward, with the design of bringing on a battle so soon as he should have reconnoitred the ground; and at an early hour on the morning of the 4th that movement began. But it proved to be neither an unimportant nor

an easy one. The Russian pickets were opposed in an attempt to gain possession of a height above Baccan: they were supported from the rear, first by their own reserves, latterly by a portion of sir Ralph Abercromby's division; and before long a general engagement took place, each army feeding its detachments, already engaged, with the utmost eagerness. Never was a less regular, or less satisfactory, battle fought. The loss on both sides was, moreover, great; and the allies found themselves, on the return of night, masters only of the ground for which the lives of nearly 2000 men had been thrown away.

Of the proceedings which ensued upon this unlucky affair it is not necessary that a lengthened account should be given. Baffled, to a certain extent, in the open field, and made aware, from his prisoners, of the growing resources of the enemy, the duke of York yielded to the distressing conviction, that conquest was beyond his reach; and, having consulted his general officers, fell back, on the 8th of October, to his original position at Alkmaer and Petten. Here a negotiation was opened with general Brune, which ended in a suspension of hostilities, and the ultimate evacuation of north Holland under the terms of a convention. The Batavian fleet, which had at first been demanded, was not, indeed, restored, nor were other conditions, humiliating to British honour, admitted; but the unmolested embarkation of the troops was purchased at a rate sufficiently high, by the dismissal, without exchange, of 8000 French prisoners. On that score, however, no greater degree of responsibility attaches to sir Ralph Abercromby than to any other member of the council of war; nor is it our intention to attribute the slightest blame either to him or to his coadjutors, by whom the condition was approved.

The army of the Helder was no sooner broken up than Abercromby returned to his command in Scotland, which he continued to exercise throughout the winter of 1799, and during some of the earlier months in 1800.

Early in June, however, his talents were again called into play, under circumstances, in many respects, more favourable than had yet attended him. He received orders to place himself at the head of an independent armament, of which the design, according to immemorial usage, was kept secret, and concerning which it is not easy to speak, even now, with the confidence that might be supposed attainable by the narrator of events gone by.

The army, committed on this occasion to the guidance of sir Ralph Abercromby, fell little, if at all, short of 20,000 men, and is supposed to have had for its object a diversion somewhere on the coast of Italy, in favour of the Austrians, then pressed to extremity in all quarters. We express ourselves thus guardedly, because the eccentric movements of the expedition afford considerable reason to doubt whether any definite or well arranged plan was ever chalked out for it, at least in London. Be this, however, as it may, sir Ralph Abercromby joined his troops in Minorca on the 22d of June; and the following morning they began, in all haste, to embark. The first port at which the squadron touched was Leghorn. They reached it on the 9th of July; but, finding that an armistice was already concluded between the French and the Austrians, no attempt was made to force a landing. The fleet, on the contrary, withdrew as it came, no act of hostility having been committed; and a part making sail for Malta, the remainder directed its course to Minorca, where the troops were again landed, and distributed into quarters. So matters rested till the beginning of September, when a second embarkation took place, and the armament, which amounted in all to 143 sail of vessels, bore away, under the command of admiral Keith, in the direction of Gibraltar. Arrived here, a scarcity of water caused fresh delays to occur, alike harassing to the British troops, and advantageous to the enemy. It was found necessary to rendezvous afresh in the bay of Teutar: by and by it was esteemed advisable to return to Gibraltar; and finally, on the 3d of October, whatever

of doubt might remain on men's minds was removed by the occupation of an anchorage ground off the mole of Cadiz. We will not pursue any further the detail of movements so absurd and so profitless. The reader is doubtless aware that the intended attempt came to nothing: that the first division of troops, after they had taken their places in the boats, were recalled; and that the idea of effecting, by violence, what was seen to be unattainable by surprise, was pronounced visionary and romantic. It is not for us to decide how far the leaders of the expedition were swayed by the intelligence which reached them touching the virulence of the plague in the city; but if this circumstance had not greater weight than the preparations for defence upon which the governor, with becoming ostentation, employed himself, it would not be easy to acquit them of having relinquished a very important object with a degree of precipitancy scarcely to be justified. Be this, however, as it may, Cadiz was suddenly relieved from all apprehensions of danger; and the troops found that they were destined, for some time longer, to beat about amid tempestuous weather, apparently, at least, without an object.

Than the state of suspense to which sir Ralph Abercromby was subjected, rendered doubly intolerable as it was by confinement on board of ship, there is nothing which tries more severely both the spirits and the health of men unaccustomed to the privations of a maritime life. Sickness began to spread through the fleet in an alarming degree; and, in the feeling of impatience to which it may, in part, be attributed, sir Ralph Abercromby partook not less than the meanest of his followers. More than one object, indeed, presented itself to his mind, as demanding, at least, an effort at attainment; and he looked now to Italy, now to Spanish America, with no common interest or anxiety. Unfortunately, however, the convention of Hohenlinden rendered the former country useless as a scene of active hostility, while of the latter too little was known to sanction the

transportation thither of one of the finest and most effective corps that ever quitted the shores of England. There was, however, a third point towards which curiosity began to be directed. The situation of the French in Egypt, deserted by their chief, and cut off from all hope of succour, partly in consequence of the victory of the Nile, partly through the surrender of Malta, led more than one speculatist to regard them as open to attack; indeed we have good reason to believe, that, long before he received instructions from home, sir Ralph Abercromby had begun to calculate on the possibility of destroying them. Fortune so ordered it, however, that the entire responsibility of the enterprise should not be thrown upon his shoulders. While he yet hesitated, orders arrived from home to undertake the expedition in question; and on the 3d of November, 1800, the fleet, after taking in fresh supplies of water, shaped its course, one division to Minorca, the other to Malta.

That portion of the army which followed the fortunes of the commander-in-chief reached Malta on the 30th, where the troops were immediately disembarked for the purpose of refreshment; while the transports and other vessels underwent a thorough cleansing and fumigation. The detached corps overtook the main body on the 14th of December, and on the 20th the whole were again at sea. Yet it must not be supposed that, necessary as the refreshment of a landing had become, the interval between the 30th of November and the 20th of December was devoted to that purpose exclusively. A negotiation, on the contrary, was opened with the authorities at Constantinople for the supply of horses to the cavalry and artillery embarked; while colonel Anstruther, the quarter-master-general, was sent forward to the next place of rendezvous, in order to prepare the Turks for the reception of their allies, and to ensure a ready market of vegetables and fresh provisions. All this was, indeed, advisable, in consequence of the anxiety professed by the Turks to co-operate in the recovery of Egypt from French

dominion, as well as their earnest entreaty that the fleet would hold its last rendezvous in Asia Minor, where a flotilla of gun-boats should be prepared to reinforce it.

It seems to have been the wish of admiral lord Keith, by whom the naval department of the expedition was commanded, either to meet these promised supplies in the bay of Macri, or, failing that arrangement (and the roadstead proved to be exceedingly unsafe), to establish an anchorage at Rhodes. But here, also, obstacles presented themselves, which it was found impossible to overcome; and the fleet was, in consequence, compelled to move onwards, almost at random. Happily, at this juncture, the bay of Marmorice was discovered, a natural harbour, inferior, both in extent and security, to none in the world; and into it the vessels, not slightly affected by the gales which they had ridden out, were directed to steer. The effect of a sudden transition from storm to calm, so soon as the narrow inlet had been gained, is thus forcibly delineated by an eye-witness:—"The surprise, the pleasure of the soldiers," says sir Robert Wilson, "can scarce be described when they found themselves, in a moment, embayed by mountains, which formed the grandest scenery imaginable, and sailing in smooth water, although the instant before the fleet was labouring in a heavy gale of wind, and rolling about in a tremendous sea. Even ships which could not carry outside a top-gallant sail were now suddenly becalmed, and obliged to be towed up the harbour by the boats of the fleet."

Along this delightful and salubrious shore a camp was immediately formed, whither the sick, with the necessary attendants, were transported. The infantry regiments likewise disembarked by turns, accustoming themselves to that manœuvre which they were so soon to exercise in the presence of an enemy; while the cavalry, of which there were two regiments, the 12th and 26th, besides a detachment of the 11th, remained constantly on shore in expectation of their long promised horses. These came at last; but how different, in all respects,

from the animals which their imagination had pictured! They were not only "bad in themselves," says colonel Wilson, "but in such wretched condition as to make the dragoons feel humiliation in being ordered to take charge of them;" indeed, out of "several hundreds brought in, only two hundred were kept for the cavalry, about fifty for the artillery, and the remainder shot or sold for a dollar apiece." Such was the result of an attempt made to supply horses to the army by contract, even though the parties which undertook the contract were "the honest worshippers of Mohammed."

From the 28th of December, 1800, up to the 23d of February, 1801, the fleet lay at anchor in Marmorice bay, the admiral waiting the arrival of the capitane pasha and his squadron, and the general endeavouring to arrange a plan of campaign with the grand vizier at Joppa. Both were disappointed in their views; for of the promised flotilla but a few gun-boats joined, while the plague was found to have broken out in the vizier's army, and, as a matter of course, it had become immovable. Nor was this the only matter in which the leaders of the armament found themselves grievously baffled and perplexed. There was not, throughout the fleet, a map of Egypt on which the smallest reliance could be placed: no man, whether European or Asiatic, knew any thing of the interior; indeed, Mr. Baldwin, late consul at Alexandria, and sir Sydney Smith, were the only individuals possessed of the slightest information touching the country about to be invaded. Nor was this all. Day after day brought intelligence which rendered the necessity of an early entrance on the enterprise more and more apparent. It was discovered that the remains of the army transported from Europe under Buonaparte was considerably more numerous than previous information had led the general to believe. Then, again, rumours came in of certain frigates and line-of-battle ships which had eluded the vigilance of the British cruisers, and landed both men and stores; while the statement, both of friends and foes, went to

prove that from the natives no efficient co-operation was to be expected. In a word, it became manifest that nothing could be gained; that a great deal was hazarded by delay; and hence general Abercromby determined, let the consequences be what they might, to throw himself, single-handed, into the breach.

On the 20th of February, the British army, consisting of 12,000 effective; 1000 sick; 500 Maltese; a numerous medical staff, attendants, commissaries, and camp-followers; in the whole, 15,330 men, quitted, for the last time, the shores of Marmorice. On the 23d the fleet, which numbered not less than 175 sail, cleared the bay within the space of a few hours, and the wide waste of waters lay all around them. For some days there occurred no event of importance, except that the infantry were distributed into six brigades and a reserve, at the head of which were placed the generals Ludlow, Coote, Craddock, Cavan Doyle, Stuart, and Moore; while the cavalry was intrusted to the guidance of brigadier-general French, and the artillery and pioneers to brigadier-general Lawson. On the 26th, however, a squadron of storeships from England overtook them, under convoy of La Pique, captain Young; and on the 1st of March, the leading frigate made signal that land was in sight. It proved to be the Egyptian coast, adjoining to Arabs' Tower; and by an early hour on the following morning the fleet lay at anchor in Aboukir bay.

The first piece of intelligence which met them here was not calculated to elevate the spirits of the troops; for they learned that two brave and skilful officers, whom the general had sent on for the purpose of reconnoitring the coast, had fallen, the one dead, the other alive, into the hands of the French.* This was abundantly vexatious, on public grounds, as well as a subject of deep regret in private; yet it threw no damp upon the ardour of men who longed for nothing so earnestly as to be

* These were major Mackarras, an officer of great promise, and captain Fletcher; the latter of whom fell in the trenches before St. Sebastians, after acquiring and deserving the proudest name as a British engineer.

brought, no matter at what hazard, into immediate collision with the enemy. But it was not the only misfortune of which they found reason to complain. The weather had become so broken and squally that no boat could venture to face it; and hence the landing, which every hour's delay rendered more and more hazardous, became, for a whole week, totally impracticable. In the mean while there occurred a circumstance which, from its singularity, rather than from any important results arising out of it, well deserves notice. A French frigate, which, by capturing some English vessels, had become acquainted with the signals in use throughout the fleet, boldly accompanied the expedition as if she had formed part of it, and now shot a-head with the utmost coolness, hoisted the tri-coloured flag, and, setting pursuit at defiance, entered the harbour of Alexandria. She carried a very valuable reinforcement to general Menou; for she was laden with military stores, and had a detachment of experienced gunners on board.

Matters continued thus, greatly to the chagrin both of the general and his followers, till the evening of the 7th; when, the gale moderating, sir Ralph Abercromby, sir Sydney Smith, and the chief officers of the staff, proceeded in three armed launches to reconnoitre. They found that the most formidable preparations were made to resist the debarkation; and that a strong corps, both of infantry and cavalry, occupied the sand hills, which stretched in a semicircular form to the extent of about a mile from the castle of Aboukir on the left. Along that ridge twelve pieces of artillery were planted, so as throw, with the cannon from Fort Aboukir, a cross-fire on almost every channel of approach; while several mortars, half-hidden by the inequalities of the ground, gave promise of some variety, at least, in the nature of the missiles about to be employed. Nevertheless, a landing must be forced; and that, too, at the very point where so many preparations had been made to repel it: so there remained nothing for the general to accomplish except the completion of arrangements which might

enable him to bring his troops into action with as little delay as possible.

While the fleet pursued its passage from Marmorice, — or, rather, while the army enjoyed, in that delightful bay, its season of refreshment,— the order of landing had been very fully explained to the officers in command of the several brigades and battalions. It had been arranged that the first division should consist of the 40th, flank companies, and the 23d, on the right; of the 28th, 42d, and 58th in the centre; of the brigade of guards, the Corsican rangers, the royals, and 54th on the left, amounting in all to 5230 men. These corps, therefore, led on by major-general Coote, under whom were generals Moore and Ludlow, began to take their places in the boats so early as two o'clock in the morning of the 8th; and at three the whole moved forward to the appointed place of rendezvous, a sloop of war, which had taken its station just beyond cannon shot from the shore. As the fleet lay, however, in very scattered order, and the distances to be traversed were in several instances great, the day had long dawned ere the concentration took place; nor was it till after eight o'clock that the boats were arranged in such a manner as might enable the several parts of each regiment and brigade to assume, on the instant of debarkation, their proper places in the line. All was now suspense and breathless expectation, when, about nine o'clock, the signal was made to advance, and the boats sprang forward. It would be difficult to conceive a situation of deeper or darker interest than that in which the advance of the British army was now placed. The men sat erect and motionless; not a sound was heard, except the splash of the oars in the water, while the long line of boats moved rapidly, but in admirable and exact array, towards the shore. Not long, however, was that stern silence permitted to continue unbroken. As if doubting the evidence of their own senses, the enemy gazed for awhile, without offering to the frail armada the slightest molestation; but their astonishment

soon gave place to other and more stirring sensations, and they stood to their arms. In a moment the whole of their artillery opened, and the sea hissed and boiled behind and before the boats, with round shot and shells, that fell in showers around them.

Nothing daunted by this reception, the seamen, under the orders of captain Alexander Cochrane, pulled on, and soon brought themselves and their burdens near a still more heavy and destructive fire. Grape and musketry came down upon them like hail, and many casualties were sustained; yet the confusion created proved so trifling as scarcely to deserve notice. And now the four regiments on the right, the 40th, 23d, 28th, and 42d, having gained a place of shelter under the elevated position of the batteries, were impelled onwards with increased ardour and security. In a few moments, the boats touched the sand, when the troops, leaping into the water, which came up in various instances to their middles, hastened, under volleys of musketry, to form upon the beach. The formation was completed in an instant; and then, with fixed bayonets and unloaded muskets, the whole charged gallantly, and with loud shouts, up the face of the steep.

Had the enemy, instead of persisting to the last in firing volleys of musketry from the summit of the height, advanced to the edge of the water, and given the charge, resolute as the assailants were, their disembarkation, if effected at all, must have cost them dear. This, however, they neglected to do; and now, the tables being turned, they found themselves incapable of sustaining the fierce and fiery assault with which the right wing bore them headlong from their position. Though wearied, and breathless with toiling through loose sand, the British troops no sooner gained the summit, than they brought their bayonets to the level, and sprang forward; upon which the enemy, without so much as pausing to reload, fled in the utmost confusion. Nor was a charge of cavalry, with which they endeavoured to dislodge the 42d, attended with the

slightest benefit. A heavy fire, thrown in with precision, beat the commander of the French dragoons to the earth, and caused the troopers to gallop back in disorder.

While the right thus carried all before it, and drove the enemy from the key of their position, the guards, and other regiments on the left, sustained a not less desperate contest both with cavalry and infantry. The beach being level at the point where they forced their landing, the guards found themselves charged by two squadrons of horse; from which, as yet being without order or consistency, some loss was sustained. With admirable coolness, however, the men threw themselves into line, and gave their fire, close, murderous, and rapid; while the 58th regiment, forming on their right, bore back a brigade of infantry, which endeavoured, but in vain, to sustain the broken horsemen. Just at this moment, the royals and 54th, who, being embarked in transport boats, failed to reach the shore so early as their comrades, leaped ashore. They came in time to receive and drive back 600 French infantry, which were advancing through a hollow road, with fixed bayonets, upon the flank of the guards, and who, after an exchange of volleys, delivered at an interval of twenty yards, broke and fled in confusion.

The debarkation was now complete, and the battle won; for the enemy had abandoned their position, and were in full retreat, covered by swarms of tirailleurs, on the road to Alexandria. No attempt was made to follow or molest them; indeed the mind of the general had ample occupation in bringing the remainder of his troops to land, while the men were employed partly in conveying stores from the beach to the bivouac, partly in digging wells in the sand, wherever the proximity of date trees gave assurance of water. By dint of extraordinary exertion the depôts were established, and the army brought into a condition to act on the 12th; and about noon the same day the whole pushed forward, about four miles, on the Alexandria

road. Here, after sustaining a trifling skirmish, in which the patrols alone took part, a regular encampment was formed, at a place called Mandora's Tower; and the troops rested for the night, with their arms piled beside them, in confident anticipation of more serious work on the morrow.

The immediate result of this forward movement was to make the general aware that the enemy were considerably increased in point of numbers; and that they occupied a strong position among some sand hills and palm trees, about a couple of miles in his front. He had already caused the lake of Aboukir, or Maadie, to be reconnoitred, and a squadron of gun boats and launches prepared to support the operations on shore, by keeping parallel with the left of the army, both in attack and defence. When, therefore, on the morning of the 13th, the army quitted its ground, a corresponding movement took place with the gun boats, which kept as close to the beach as a regard to their own safety would allow, and followed foot by foot the advance of the soldiery.

General Abercrombie divided his troops on this occasion into three principal columns, of which the reserve, under general Moore, composed the right. The centre and left were preceded, at a brief interval, by the 90th and 92d regiments, communicating, the one with the other, by means of skirmishers in chain; the right moved on under cover of the 40th flank companies. After a short march, which sufficed to carry them beyond the grove of palm trees, under which the bivouac had been formed, the leading corps found themselves in presence of the enemy, who were drawn up in gallant array along the ridge of a series of sand hills, that extended from the canal of Alexandria to the lake. 5000 infantry, 600 cavalry, and thirty-two pieces of cannon, constituted the force which occupied that formidable position; and the whole, as if anticipating the movement actually in progress, stood ready for battle. Nor did many minutes elapse ere the 90th

and 92d became warmly engaged with very superior numbers. The French quitting their vantage ground pushed forward to meet the English advance, which, with equal readiness and celerity, deployed into line; and in five minutes a heavy firing, both of musketry and cannon, warned those in rear that the battle was begun.

While the 92d bravely held its ground against infantry, and the 90th* received and repelled a charge of cavalry, sir Ralph Abercromby formed his main army into two lines, directing the reserve, however, to retain its order in column, and to act as circumstances should seem to require. He then advanced, though slowly, for there were no horses with which to drag the guns; and the utmost exertions of the seamen, even when aided by a portion of the soldiers, scarcely sufficed to move them through loose sand, which came up, at times, to the very axle-trees of the carriages. But the enemy did not pause to receive the attack. They retreated, on the contrary, in good order, abandoning the heights which they had previously held, and withdrew, within an intrenched position, which they had formed with great care in front of Alexandria.

The retrogression of the French had not only been without confusion, but the excellence of their horse artillery, as well as the skilfulness of their marksmen, caused some loss to the pursuers; nevertheless, sir Ralph Abercromby determined, if possible, to carry, by a coup-de-main, the line of works within which they had sought shelter. With that view he continued to press forward, the centre alone keeping its direction in the plain, while the right and the left wings diverged, so as to secure certain eminences, under cover of which their formations might take place. In this manner, the

* The 90th acting as light infantry wore helmets; and being taken for dismounted dragoons were charged with great ardour by the French. During the mêlée, colonel, now lord, Hill, who commanded the reserve, received a ball on his helmet which beat him to the ground, but being resisted by the brass, happily failed to penetrate. Sir Ralph Abercromby likewise had a very narrow escape. His horse being shot under him he became enveloped by the enemy's cavalry, and was rescued only by the devoted bravery of the 90th regiment.

advance was conducted till the line had approached within point-blank range of the enemy's batteries; where the aspect presented by their works, as well as by the country, both in front and flank, warned the general of the necessity of examining more closely into the nature of the obstacles opposed to him. A halt was accordingly ordered; and the men stood still, exposed to a murderous fire of cannon, while the general and his staff rode forward to reconnoitre.

The difficulties under which sir Ralph Abercromby laboured, through the absence of all information touching the plans and dispositions of the enemy, were, from first to last, very great. It was found impossible to make the Arabs comprehend the object of such questions as were put to them; while, from their own statements, voluntarily offered, no conclusions could be drawn on which the general considered that he ought to place the smallest reliance. The face of the country also was, in many respects, deceptive to the eye of a stranger; and on the present occasion led such as examined it into the commission of several glaring errors. There was a plain on the right of the enemy, covered with a species of nitrous salt, which dazzled the visual organs, and presented, in its smooth and shining surface, a striking resemblance to a sheet of water. No man in the army was aware at the time of the well-known effect of mirage; and hence the weakest point in the enemy's position, a flat, by traversing which they might have been taken in reverse, was regarded as impregnable. In like manner the fiery brightness of the atmosphere, acting upon a white and glittering sand, gave to the gentle undulations, along which the French had ranged their batteries, an overcharged semblance of height and strength. The consequence was, that after examining, with the closest attention, what he believed to be a position of extraordinary difficulty, sir Ralph Abercromby came to the determination of suspending his attack; and the

troops were directed to fall back upon the post from which they had that morning dislodged the enemy.

The loss sustained in the course of this day's proceeding, and particularly from the fire of the French batteries, while the reconnoissance went on, was not only severe in itself, but exceeded that which had occurred during the battle of the 8th, when a landing was forced in the presence of an opposing enemy. Not fewer than 156 men and officers were killed, and 1070 wounded; whereas, in the previous affair, the casualties amounted in all to 617. Now, without calling in question the wisdom of the reconnoissance, which was doubtless as necessary here as it is elsewhere, it cannot fail to strike the most careless observer, that the moment for conducting it was as ill chosen as it is possible to conceive. The troops having been led within point-blank range of nearly forty pieces of cannon were suddenly halted in line, and the enemy, left free to exhibit their skill as marksmen, mowed them down without interruption, during a space of several hours. It does not even appear that, except on the right, the common precaution of making the men lie down, was adopted; indeed we are told by an eye-witness, that "the line stood without betraying the slightest irresolution, under a fire that might have shaken the firmest troops in the world." There was great error in all this, inasmuch as a slight deviation to the right or left might have carried the men clear of the direction of the shot; and there is scarcely any sacrifice which a general ought not to make, in order to shelter his people from the effects of a cannonade. The best troops in the world grow unsteady and loose under a continued exposure to long shots, which work to the full as much mischief upon the morale of a corps as they produce havoc in its ranks.

The ground now occupied by the British army was, upon the whole, favourable for defence, comprising a front of rather more than a mile in extent, from the canal of Alexandria and Lake Maadie on the left, to the sea on the right. In the immediate vicinity of the

canal there was a dead level, which the engineers were directed to strengthen, by throwing up two batteries; the centre lay along a range of hills, from which the slope ran gradually downwards towards the enemy, while the right, after sweeping across another hollow, appuyed upon a second range, amid which, at about fifty yards distant from the shore, stood the ruins of an ancient palace. Not far from that ruin, which was occupied by the 58th regiment, a redoubt was erected, into which, being open in the rear, the 58th regiment was thrown; the 42d, 40th, and Corsican Rangers, next took up the line, and carried it on; the reserve of cavalry were in the hollow; the guards, composing the right of the centre, crowned the heights; the Royals, 92d, 2d battalion 54th, and 1st battalion 54th, formed in eschellon to the left; while the 8th, 18th, 90th, and 13th, extended also in eschellon, till they rested upon the battery and the canal. Such was the first line and its order. The second, consisting of the Minorca regiment, De Rolle's, Dillon's, the Queen's, the 44th, 89th, 130th, and the 22d and 26th dragoons, part of them dismounted, lay about 500 yards to the rear. The 27th, 56th, and 79th again faced the canal; and the whole were covered by a chain of pickets, which occupied the roots of the sand hills from the sea to the canal.

In this position, along which were mounted two 24-pounders and thirty-two field pieces, besides a 24-pounder in the redoubt of the 38th, the army remained inactive from the 13th in the evening up to the morning of the 21st. Not that the interval between these periods was absolutely wasted; for working parties were continually engaged in bringing up stores from the fleet, and tents and other conveniences, of which they stood greatly in need, were issued out to the men. The castle of Aboukir likewise, which had been invested immediately on landing, was pressed with great vigour; while one or two affairs of posts and an occasional cavalry skirmish sufficed to keep men in remembrance that

an enemy was in their front. But of any preparations for bringing matters to the issue of a battle not a hint was dropped; indeed it appeared as if the general, though not less eager on that score than his followers, had begun to act upon the common principle of men overmatched, — in other words, permitted day after day to elapse, in the hope that somehow or another a lucky accident might occur, of which it might be possible to take advantage. On the 20th, however, a report was made that several bodies of the enemy had been seen marching over the flat, which, as we have already stated, had been hitherto mistaken by the British officers for a lake. In an instant the delusion under which all ranks laboured was dispelled; and though not unaware that general Menou had arrived from the interior, and that the French army was largely reinforced, sir Ralph determined, so soon as a more accurate examination of the country should have been effected, to assault the enemy's lines by night.

Such was the situation and such the prospects of the army, which the coming up of the 20th regiment from the conquest of Fort Aboukir rendered more efficient than it had yet been, when intelligence was conveyed to the general that the enemy meditated offensive operations, and that he might, from day to day, anticipate an attack. The information was so acceptable, that sir Ralph hesitated as to the degree of credit which it deserved, and took no other measures than he had been accustomed to do for the purpose of providing against surprise. At three o'clock every morning the troops were under arms; and they adhered to the practice on the 21st; but for half an hour after the ranks were formed nothing occurred to interrupt the silence that prevailed around. By and by, however, a single musket shot was heard, which was followed by the firing of three pieces of cannon, and the men held their breaths in suspense; but that feeling was soon relieved by a volley of musketry on the left which gave notice that

the event so long and so ardently desired was on the eve of its accomplishment.

The firing which thus stirred up the energies of the British troops, though sharp and warm for the instant, soon ceased; and there was again a profound silence. The enemy had, it appeared, attacked a picket near the canal, and were repulsed; though whether so effectually as to deter them from renewing the attempt, or because it suited not the designs of their leader to press the British left too severely, no one could pretend to surmise. But the doubt, if such there was, which took momentary possession of men's minds was not permitted long to exert its supremacy. General Moore, who chanced to be general officer of the night, and who, on the first alarm, had galloped towards the left, was but a few moments returned to his brigade, when a wild and broken hurrah, rising from the plain beneath, warned him of the approach of the enemy; and a volley of musketry, thrown in with steady effect, proved that the great and final game of war was about to be played.

As soon as the first shot was fired, sir Ralph Abercromby sprang into the saddle, and rode with all haste to the redoubt. He found the right of his army fiercely engaged; for the enemy, after driving in the pickets, assaulted, with indescribable fury at the same instant, the redoubt, the ruins, and one wing of the 42d, which general Moore, with great judgment, had drawn up in continuation from the redoubt along an open space, whence a portion of the 28th had been removed. On all points they were successfully resisted. The 28th poured in a fire, against which no bravery could bear up; the 58th, scarcely manning the breaches in the ruined wall, received their assailants with equal gallantry, while the 42d repelled a very superior force, which endeavoured to overwhelm them with their weight of numbers. Nor were other regiments idle. The 40th, moving briskly to support the 58th, rendered more complete the victory which the

latter corps had already won; and by a well-directed fire cut down whole sections of the now broken and disorderly assailants.

It was still profoundly dark; and the smoke, curling over the heads of the combatants, rendered all objects at arm's length from the eye totally invisible. Favoured by the gloom, a fresh column of French infantry — a corps designated on account of its former exploits the Invincibles — silently penetrated through a hollow way between the right of the guards and the left of the 42d, and gaining unperceived the rear of the latter corps, took it in reverse. The enemy then wheeled to their left, and pushed upon the redoubt, in total ignorance that they had thrown themselves into a situation of the utmost peril. We have explained that the ground on the left of the redoubt was taken up by one wing only of the 42d regiment. The other wing had formed a second and a parallel line in the rear; and the route pursued by the invincibles carried them, at this moment, into the interval between these two bodies. For a short time their progress remained unobserved; but lieutenant-colonel Stewart, who commanded the right wing of the 42d, suddenly becoming aware of the state of the case, rushed forward with fixed bayonets, while the rear rank of the left wing facing about charged fiercely to its new front. Maddened by this twofold attack, the enemy rushed on, in the face of a murderous discharge from the 28th regiment; and, dashing at the ruins, made good their entrance, closely followed by the 42d. A desperate struggle with the bayonet and butend took place within these walls; for the 40th and 58th received the French in front, while the highlanders hung upon their rear; but it was not of long continuance. After three fourths of their comrades had fallen, the wreck of the French invincibles, to the number of 200, laid down their arms.

While this was going on, fresh columns of infantry endeavoured to force back the left wing of the 42d, which was now weakened by the departure of its rear-

rank in the pursuit of the Invincibles, general Moore made haste to support them by bringing up rapidly the remainder of the regiment; and sir Ralph Abercrombie being likewise on the spot, the enthusiasm of the men was wound up to the highest pitch. "My brave highlanders," exclaimed he, "remember your country, remember your fathers." A shout followed this brief address, a single volley, and then a rush with the bayonet, before which the enemy fled in great confusion. But another and a severer trial was at hand. Several squadrons of horse were seen, amid the glimmering of dawn, to be in motion; and, ere the 42d could recover their order, the cavalry passed through their ranks. Still the regiment, though broken, was far from defeated. The men fought bravely as individuals; and, though they suffered much, the charge was finally defeated. Nor did that gallant band of cavaliers escape the fate which, but a few minutes previously, had overtaken the Invincibles. Wheeling also to the left, and floundering amid a number of little holes which the troops had dug in the sand for the purpose of containing their camp kettles, they exposed themselves to a murderous fire from the redoubt, beneath which men and horses came to the ground in whole sections. Nevertheless, the attack in this quarter was renewed, again and again, with unceasing fury. First a column of infantry advanced to support the cavalry, then a second body of cavalry bore in as the infantry retired, till the whole space was strewed with the bodies of the slain; and the 42d died, almost to a man, where it stood.

Throughout this dreadful contest, sir Ralph Abercrombie, unattended even by an aide-de-camp, moved about cheering the men, and exerting himself to restore order. He was thus employed when two French dragoons rode furiously at him, and endeavoured to lead him away prisoner. The brave veteran would not yield, upon which one of the troopers made a longe at his breast, and passed his sword with great force under the

general's arm: though severely bruised by a blow from the sword guard, Abercrombie seized the Frenchman's weapon, and, after a brief struggle, wrested it from his hand; he then turned, with equal judgment and magnanimity, to oppose his remaining adversary, but that man was already harmless; a corporal of the 42d, observing the perilous situation of his chief, sprang forward, and applying the muzzle of his piece to the Frenchman's side, shot him dead.

During the continuance of the struggle on the right, the centre had not been without employment, though the left remained free from other molestation than a distant and not very fatal cannonade. The guards, the royals, and the 54th, were successively attacked, and with equal valour drove back the enemy, who gradually bore away so as to bring almost the whole of their weight upon the space between the left of the centre and the right of the left wing. Not for an instant, however, did they penetrate the line, which stood compact and firm, not only while the ammunition which the men carried in their pouches held out, but even after the last cartridge had been expended. For it constitutes a remarkable feature in this sanguinary action, that while the enemy still hung on their front, the British troops stood on the defensive with their bayonets alone,—an act of cool and manly courage, such as no soldiers belonging to any other nation have ever been known to perform.

It was now eight o'clock; and the French, repulsed in all quarters, sustained the combat with their cannon and skirmishers alone. Occasionally, indeed, a swarm of tirailleurs would approach the English line, which brought their muskets to the level, though they gave no fire, till a supply of ammunition at length coming up, the guns began to open. The French, who stood aloof as if confounded by the cessation of shot from their opponents, now retreated in all haste; and, as they were not pursued, effected their escape to Alexandria.

A great and important victory was obtained, though at a price which was accounted, by every man and officer in

the British army, as far too costly. The gallant veteran who had that day wielded their energies, was found to have received a desperate wound; under which, now that the excitement of a doubtful contest was over, his physical powers gave way. At what precise period during the battle the fatal bullet struck him, has not been accurately ascertained; though the weight of evidence appears to fix it as having taken effect during the first and most desperate charge of the French cavalry. Such, at least, seems to be the opinion of the late respected general David Stuart of Garth, who was himself present in the action, and who, in his history of the 42d regiment, gives the following graphic account of the last scene in that memorable drama: —

"Some time after," says the writer, who has just described sir Ralph Abercrombie's rencontre with the French dragoons, "the general attempted to alight from his horse; a soldier of the highlanders, seeing that he had some difficulty in dismounting, assisted him, and asked if he should follow him with the horse. He answered, that he would not require him any more that day. While all this was passing, no officer was near him. The first officer he met was sir Sidney Smith; and, observing that his sword was broken, the general presented him with the trophy he had gained. He betrayed no symptoms of personal pain, nor relaxed a moment the intense interest he took in the state of the field; nor was it perceived that he was wounded, till he was joined by some of the staff, who observed the blood trickling down his thigh. Even during the interval from the time of his being wounded, and the last charge of cavalry, he walked with a firm and steady step along the line of the highlanders and general Stuart's brigade, to the position of the guards in the centre of the line, where, from its elevated situation, he had a full view of the whole field of battle. Here he remained, regardless of the wound, giving his orders so much in his usual manner, that the officers who came to receive them perceived nothing that indicated either pain or anxiety.

These officers afterwards could not sufficiently express their astonishment, when they came to learn the state in which he was, and the pain which he must have suffered from the nature of his wound. A musket ball had entered his groin and lodged deep in the hip joint; the ball was even so firmly fixed in the hip joint, that it required considerable force to extract it after his death. My respectable friend, Dr. Alexander Robertson, the surgeon who attended him, assured me that nothing could exceed his surprise and admiration at the calmness of his heroic patient. With a wound in such a part, connected with and bearing on every part of his body, it is a matter of surprise how he could move at all; and nothing but the most intense interest in the fate of his army, the issue of the battle, and the honour of the British name, could have inspired and sustained such resolution. As soon as the impulse ceased in the assurance of victory, he yielded to exhausted nature, acknowledged that he required some rest, and lay down on a little sand hill close to the battery."

By this time the rumour had spread abroad that the commander-in-chief was wounded, and the place where he lay was soon surrounded by the general and other officers. At a respectful distance from that melancholy party, the soldiers stood in groups; the triumphant feelings attendant on victory having given place to the deepest sorrow, and the most intense anxiety; for Abercrombie was adored by the men. A strict disciplinarian, he nevertheless knew how to unite kindness with rigour; and his mode of address was at all times such as to win the affections of the very men whom he was compelled from time to time to punish. The consequence was, that among the rugged countenances that watched him on that eventful occasion, there was scarce one over which the "unaccustomed tear" did not flow; and when at last he was borne off for transportation on board the Foudroyant, he carried with him the blessings and the prayers of all ranks and degrees in the army.

Whatever science could suggest, or skill execute, to

preserve a life so valuable, was performed by the medical gentlemen both of the fleet and the army. Every possible effort was made to extract the ball; and he bore for a while with so much firmness the painful and irritating operation, that confident hopes were entertained almost to the last moment. It appeared, however, that the mind was on this, as it is on various occasions, too active for the body. Sir Ralph Abercrombie could not be persuaded to divert his thoughts from the condition and prospects of the army; over which he continued to watch, while a patient in the flag-ship, with the same intensity of interest which he had experienced while on shore. His son, lieutenant-colonel Abercrombie, attended him, indeed, from day to day, and took his instructions exactly as if no misfortune had befallen him. It would have been marvellous had nature withstood this twofold pressure, of bodily suffering and mental disquiet. Throughout the evening of the 27th he became more than usually restless, complaining of excessive languor and an increased degree of thirst; and, from an early hour on the morning of the 28th, his medical attendants entertained serious apprehensions. These were not misplaced; for after lingering a few hours, apparently in little pain, though labouring under a difficulty of respiration exceedingly distressing to behold, the lamp of life went out, and the soul of the chivalrous and kind-hearted veteran returned "to Him who gave it."

Thus died, in his 68th year, lieutenant-general sir Ralph Abercrombie, — a man "whose memory" (we quote the terms of the Gazette of the day) "will be recorded in the annals of his country, will be sacred to every British soldier, and be embalmed in the memory of a grateful posterity." We have nothing to do with the peculiar phraseology in which this laudatory sentence is wrapped up; but of the degree of commendation intended to be conveyed no doubt can exist, and a brief survey of the public life of the man will prove that he was not undeserving of it. Brave and adventurous, yet prudent, and always master of himself, no man

was better calculated to win both the respect and affections of the soldiers, whom he moulded to his own purposes, as well in action as at rest, without appearing at any moment to go beyond the natural bent of his ordinary humour. But this, though a circumstance well worthy of notice, is not the only, nor the most remarkable, trait in his military character. Sir Ralph Abercrombie stands forth an almost solitary instance of inexperience telling as nothing in comparison with the impulses of a natural genius for war. He had passed through all the inferior gradations in his profession, and attained to the 62d year of his age, before circumstances enabled him to look an enemy in the face; yet, at a period when most men are retiring from the bustle of active life, he exhibited all at once a thorough knowledge of his art, and rose to the rank of an able and active general of division. How far he possessed the comprehensive talents requisite for the maintenance of a protracted struggle, or the guidance of a large army under circumstances of difficulty and danger, it is of course impossible to determine; but the praise cannot be denied to him of having executed well whatever he undertook; and of a man who succeeds thus far, it is scarcely too much to conclude that, if placed upon another and a wider field, he would have succeeded there also.

The services which sir Ralph Abercrombie performed were all of such a nature as to debar his biographer, in a great degree, from the exercise of a very minute criticism. In the Netherlands and at the Helder, for example, his rank was merely that of a lieutenant; and hence his exploits, however meritorious can be regarded as those of a subordinate only. During the West India campaign, again, there was absolutely no ground for the display of more than moderate abilities; while, throughout the Mediterranean cruise, we are perhaps justified in concluding that he acted strictly in accordance with his instructions, and, therefore, did nothing. It is to his short campaign in Egypt, therefore, and to it alone,

that we can refer for the purpose of determining the rank which he is entitled to hold among the military commanders of Great Britain; and though it is easy to discover, there, faults, or at least errors, the result of a general survey will certainly not place him in the lowest niche. Of the landing on the 8th of March it is impossible to speak except in terms of the highest admiration. Sir Robert Wilson has, indeed, affirmed that the object would have been more effectually attained had a division of troops passed up lake Maadie so as to threaten the enemy's rear; and doubtless, had the exact numbers and dispositions of the enemy been ascertained, such a manœuvre would have proved advantageous. But where such information is wanting, a general is scarcely justified in exposing a small force to be opposed and cut off in detail, more especially when, as in the present instance, his means of transport are insufficient for the removal of less than one half of his troops from the ships to the shore. Sir Ralph Abercrombie, acting upon the knowledge which he possessed, adopted both the boldest and the wisest course, by assailing the enemy in front.

We are not prepared to deny that too much of delay occurred between the debarkation on the 8th, and the affair on the 13th of March. Circumstanced as both armies then were, every hour of relaxation from the active approaches of the English was so much time gained by the French; who, if briskly followed on the 10th, might have fallen an easy prey by the bloodless occupation of Alexandria. In like manner, the mode in which the reconnoisance was eventually executed, lies open to many and serious charges. Nevertheless, let it be borne in mind that aggressive warfare was then new to the British army, and that the particular stage on which the present campaign was carried on presented difficulties great in proportion to the want of experience among those by whom it was trodden. We must, indeed, confess our surprise that the effect of the mirage should have been such as to deter the individuals concerned from bringing

one sense to the assistance of another; because a sheet of water, even when real, is not often regarded as impassable, till an attempt, at least, has been made to sound its depth. Still the scene was new; it produced but one conviction among all who beheld it; and if the general yielded to that conviction, as it operated on others as well as on himself, he probably did no more than would have been done by 999 out of 1000 similarly circumstanced.

Having thus slightly glanced at such defects as appear to attach to his Egyptian campaign, it is an act of justice to state that for one of these a fair excuse is to be found in the conformation of the general's visual organs. Sir Ralph Abercrombie was exceedingly near-sighted; so much so, indeed, as to require the use of a glass in the ordinary affairs of life, — in reading, in writing, and in recognising his acquaintances. Yet, in spite of that defect, no man was more perfectly at home on the field of battle — both as to the management of his own troops, and his ready anticipation of the movements of his enemy. His vigilance, moreover, and activity would have been remarkable even in a youth, and in a veteran of 68 they were quite wonderful. Had he succeeded at an earlier period in obtaining the direction of an army, he would have probably earned a name second to few in the annals of his country; as it is, that name will never be mentioned without bringing back to the mind of the listener a recollection of the first substantial triumph obtained over the hitherto victorious arms of revolutionary France.

The body of sir Ralph Abercrombie was conveyed to Malta, where, agreeably to a wish expressed by himself, it was interred. Here the officers and men of his army raised a monument to his memory; while at home, a peerage conferred upon his widow, with reversion to her son, and the general lamentation of all classes, gave proof how deeply his loss was deplored both by his sovereign and his fellow-subjects.

[*Note.*]—We cannot conclude this article without making the following extract from general David Stuart's curious and valuable sketches of the character and manners of the highlanders: —

"There was something remarkable in this (sir Ralph Abercromby's) family. The father, who was born in 1704, lived to see his four sons honoured and respected, and at the head of their different professions. While his eldest son, sir Ralph, was commander-in-chief in the West Indies, his second, sir Robert, had the same station in the East; lord Abercromby (a lord of session) was an eminently learned and virtuous judge; and the fourth died in possession of an independent fortune acquired in the service of the East India company. Three of his daughters were married to gentlemen of family and fortune, who resided so near him, that he could dine with either any day he chose; and his fourth daughter, continuing unmarried, devoted her days to the declining years of her father. Latterly he lived with his son. I happened to be in Edinburgh, in May, 1800, and dined with lady Abercromby on the day sir Ralph left her to embark in that expedition from which he never returned. A king's messenger had arrived from London the day before, and sir Ralph, only waiting for a few necessary arrangements, set out the next morning. When at dinner with the family, after his departure, I was affected in a manner I can never forget, by the respectable old gentleman's anxiety about his son, and his observations and enquiries about his future intentions, and what service was intended for him. His particular destination was not known at that time, but it was suspected he would be immediately employed. 'They will wear him out,' said he, 'too soon' (the son was then in his 68th year), 'and make an old man of him before his time, with their expeditions to Holland the one year, and the West Indies the next; and if he would follow my advice, he would settle at home and take his rest.' And when lady Abercromby observed

that she was afraid that he must go abroad — 'Then,' said he, 'he will never see me more.' The verification of this melancholy prediction might be expected from his great age, being then in his 97th year. He died in the month of July following, eight months before his son, whose absence he regretted so much."

LIEUT.-GEN. SIR JOHN MOORE, K.B.

1761—1809.

John Moore was born in the year 1761, in a tall narrow-fronted house, which faces almost directly the Tron church in Trongate-street, Glasgow. He was the eldest son of Dr. John Moore, by a niece of Dr. Simpson, the celebrated mathematical professor, and translator of Euclid's Elements; and the grandson of Dr. Charles Moore, a native of Armagh, and one of the ministers of the established church in Stirling.

It rarely happens that the son of a provincial physician, however highly respected in his own neighbourhood, is enabled to enter into life under circumstances so favourable as those which attended the early career of sir John Moore. His father, the well-known author of "Zeluco," though established, at the period of his son's birth, as a medical practitioner in Glasgow, had spent many years of his life in what is called the great world; during the progress of which he contracted an intimacy with some of the most distinguished public characters of the day. Originally an assistant-surgeon in Loudon's regiment, while serving under lord Stair in Flanders, he obtained, through the favour of the commander of the forces, promotion into one of the battalions of the guards; and was eventually removed from the army, that he might accompany, as domestic surgeon, lord Albemarle, the English ambassador, to the court of France. Of the advantages which such a position was calculated to confer upon him, Dr. Moore failed not to make the most. The brilliancy of his talents, and the correctness of his general conduct, secured for him the esteem and respect of those with whom he associated; and he never, through any act of imprudence or indiscretion, threw the fabric of his own fortunes to the

ground. The consequence was, that when, on his return from Paris, he found it expedient to settle in Glasgow, the friends of his gayer hours did not forget him; and though circumstances rendered unnecessary any exertion of their interest on his own behalf, it was freely and willingly afforded in favour of his sons. Hence the early appointment of the subject of this memoir to an ensigncy, and the facility with which he was enabled, not only to advance himself in his profession, but to turn to good account other opportunities of improvement which came in his way.

Young Moore received the rudiments of his education at the grammar school of his native city, — a seminary which has had the good fortune to send out into the world as many distinguished men as any other other of which Scotland can boast. His stay there was, however, brief; for his father, anxious to make him master of the French and German languages, sent him abroad while yet very young, and placed him under the care of a respectable Swiss clergyman. In Switzerland he continued to reside till the year 1776, when he was recalled for the purpose of joining the 51st regiment, to which he had been appointed: but he had scarcely done so, when another event befel, calculated in no trivial degree to affect both his present purposes and future prospects. We allude to the selection, by the duchess of Hamilton, of Dr. Moore, as travelling tutor to her son, — a young nobleman of delicate constitution and quick parts; and, as a necessary consequence, requiring both a skilful physician, and gentleman of talent and experience in foreign manners, to watch over him while passing through the ordeal of a continental tour.

Mr. Moore being at that time a singularly elegant youth, surpassingly handsome, graceful in his manners, and possessed of numerous accomplishments and an excellent judgment, the duchess earnestly besought that he also might accompany her son, with whose years his own very nearly corresponded. No objection was offered to this arrangement, either by Dr. Moore or the com-

mander-in-chief, and the young ensign became, in consequence, the bosom friend of the duke. Under these very favourable auspices he visited France, Switzerland, Italy, and the German states, mixing freely, as well as his noble companion, in the best society; and attracting, wherever he went, the marked notice both of the aged and the young. At Vienna, in particular, he seems to have made a very deep impression, particularly upon the emperor Joseph II., by whom he was strongly urged to abandon the English service, and to enter into that of Austria. But Moore was not only a soldier, but a patriot: he loved his profession, but he loved his country still more; and, being about this time promoted to a lieutenancy in the 82d regiment of foot, he turned to these flattering proposals a deaf ear. A similar result attended the applications of the duke of Brunswick, who would have willingly allured him into the ranks of his own army. Moore returned home at the conclusion of his tour, and joined the 82d regiment as a lieutenant.

From this period up to the month of September, 1780, there occurs little in the history of sir John Moore, of which, in a sketch like the present, it is necessary to give an account. He had obtained his lieutenancy by purchase; his company was conferred upon him after a similar fashion; and to the duties of commanding his men was added, shortly afterwards, that of acting as paymaster to the regiment. It speaks volumes in commendation of the zeal and intelligence of captain Moore, that, finding himself somewhat defective in his knowledge of accounts, he should have adopted, at this juncture, the only effectual method of mastering the difficulties that beset him. Requesting and obtaining leave of absence from his corps, he retired to Glasgow, where he became an amateur clerk in the counting-house of Mr. George Macintosh, a merchant in that city. We are not aware that there is upon record a more curious example of the triumph of good sense over both prejudice and indolence.

We regret exceedingly that of the mode in which

captain Moore's time was spent, from 1780 up to 1784, our researches have not enabled us to acquire any accurate knowledge. We know, indeed, that the 82d regiment served during the greater part of that interval in America; and the character of Moore leads us to conclude, that he would not willingly keep aloof from the perils and hardships to which his comrades were exposed. It is stated, moreover, by Dr. Cleland, in his valuable "Statistics of Lanarkshire," that Moore did accompany his regiment across the Atlantic; and the inscription on the monument erected to his memory in St. Paul's cathedral enumerates "America" among the fields of his varied and meritorious services. It is fair, therefore, to conclude, that, as captain of grenadiers, he first became practically acquainted with the duties of his profession; and we need not doubt that, as far as his means and opportunities permitted, he "distinguished himself in the field:" but of any particular exploits which would justify this conclusion we are ignorant, and to record the general services of the 82d regiment comes not within the scope of this work. We must be content, therefore, to state, that he continued to act as a captain till January, 1784, when he was reduced upon half-pay; and that he resumed not his military employment till November, 1785, when he was appointed to a full-pay company in the 100th foot.

It was at this stage in his career that Moore began to embark in politics, being elected, in 1784, to represent the Lanark district of boroughs in parliament. He retained his seat for about six years, speaking from time to time with great propriety and elegance, and convincing all who heard him, that his feelings were honourable and upright, and his knowledge extensive. But Moore was not formed to thread the mazy and tortuous paths into which the mere statesman, as he is called, is but too apt to diverge. His heart and soul were in his profession, where his advancement continued to go on, till we find him, in 1790, gazetted, on the 30th of

March, to the lieutenant-colonelcy of the 51st regiment. He now resigned his place in the house of commons; proceeded to Ireland, where his battalion was quartered; and continued to command it, at various peaceful stations, till events called him forth into a more congenial field of active enterprise.

The island of Corsica, after frequently changing its masters, and sustaining many and arduous struggles for independence, was made over by the Genoese, in 1768, to France, and subdued, though at the expense of considerable bloodshed, in 1769. Under that monarchy it remained submissive till the French people threw off their allegiance to their sovereign, and anarchy and misrule succeeded to a government, full of faults no doubt, but at least regular and systematic. During the first successes of the revolutionists, and the triumph, as it was esteemed, of liberty, general Pascal Paoli, long an exile from his home, re-appeared upon the stage, and made haste to advocate the claims of his countrymen to that freedom which he had formerly striven to carve out for them. On visiting Paris, he was received with enthusiastic veneration—the national assembly and royal family vying in their endeavours to show him distinction; and being eventually created president of the department and commandant of the national guard of his native island, he was sent over to establish there a totally new order of society.

Paoli's views of liberty were, however, different from those which unhappily began to mislead the French people. He sought to establish that species of freedom, which is the protector, not the destroyer, of property; and which, while content to secure practical happiness among all orders in the community, treats theoretical perfection as a vision too bright ever to be realised. In plain language, Paoli endeavoured to keep Corsica free from the prevailing infection of Jacobinism; and received as his reward a summons to appear before the bar of the national assembly. The veteran could not for a moment mistake the object of

that decree. He refused to obey; and putting himself at the head of an influential party, which remembered his former services, and adhered to him in the present juncture, he carried on for some months an unequal contest with the French garrison and its adherents.

With the events which characterised the Corsican war of 1793 (and they afforded to Napoleon Bonaparte the means of acquiring his first military laurels) we have in this place no concern. General Paoli and his friends lost neither honour nor influence during the contest, though the progress which they made towards the total expulsion of the French was, to say the least of it, extremely languid. Under these circumstances, Paoli sent urgent entreaties to lord Hood that he would come to the assistance of the Corsican patriots; and represented the condition of the enemy as desperate in the extreme, in consequence of the difficulties which they experienced in procuring provisions. Lord Hood, who had recently witnessed the evacuation of Toulon, felt little disposition rashly to commit again a British force in an enterprise of doubtful issue. He determined, therefore, to despatch, as a step preliminary to all others, two officers on whose judgment he could rely, for the purpose of ascertaining exactly how the opposing parties stood, and giving in a report as to the eligibility of the proposed enterprise. One of the officers selected to discharge this important trust was lieutenant-colonel Moore. He had recently joined general Dundas's army as commandant of the 51st regiment, and he now, on the 18th of February, 1794, in company with major Koelher, quitted the anchorage in Hieres bay, to proceed on his perilous mission.

Colonel Moore effected a landing with some difficulty, for the coast was then entirely in possession of the enemy, and succeeded in uniting himself with one of the irregular bands that acted under the orders of Paoli. Under such guides he was conducted to the Corsican general, under whose protection, but not always in his camp, he spent several days. The result, however, of his en-

quiries led him to the conclusion, that a compliance with Paoli's request would probably lead to the reduction of Corsica. He sent in his report to lord Hood and general Dundas; and, retiring as he had come, took shelter in the island of Roussa, where he waited patiently till the fleet should arrive to relieve him.

The statements of colonel Moore were so clear, and so ably drawn up, that the admiral's scruples immediately vanished. He reported that the enemy were indeed pressed; but that a reinforcement of 8000 men, under convoy of two frigates and several smaller vessels, was daily expected from Nice; so that if strenuous exertions were not used to prevent and cut off that supply, Paoli must again abandon his country, and the people receive once more the yoke of France. It was on the morning of the 23d that the preceding intelligence reached lord Hood. The same evening he weighed anchor, and causing a frigate to stand in shore so as to receive colonel Moore on board, held his course with sixty sail of vessels towards Corsica. But a storm coming on, he was compelled to take refuge in the harbour of Porto Ferara, which he reached with extreme difficulty at a late hour on the 29th.

Having remained here till the 6th, that the damage sustained in the late gales might be repaired, and supplies of wine and bread taken on board from Leghorn, the fleet again set sail, and, on the 7th, all the transports, under convoy of the Fortitude and Juno frigates, came to an anchor in Martello Bay. Here the troops were immediately landed, and took possession of certain heights which overlooked and commanded the town, while the frigates expended their fire during a space of not less than two hours and a half in a vain effort to ruin the enemy's defences. They were eventually compelled to draw off, after sustaining a good deal of damage; and the care of reducing the forts which defended Martello Bay devolved upon the army.

There were three works which commanded the proposed anchorage ground; namely, the tower of Martello,

the redoubt and batteries of Convention, and the tower of Fornelli. We have just alluded to the attempt made from the sea to reduce the former of these works, and of its unexpected failure. While this was going on, colonel Moore, at the head of the royals and 61st regiment, supported by a small howitzer and a 6-pounder gun, was detached over a rugged and mountainous country for the purpose of attacking the tower of Fornelli, of which the inhabitants reported that it was incapable of sustaining the fire even of the lightest field artillery. Moore executed the service intrusted to him with all possible zeal and activity; but found, on gaining the heights whence he had been directed to batter the place, that his field-piece made no impression. The shot, indeed, scarcely reached across a ravine that interposed between him and the object of his attack; while the descent was so precipitous, that the goatherds themselves scarcely ventured to penetrate into the abyss. Under these circumstances, he at once, and with great judgment, relinquished his design, and returned next day to head-quarters, now established opposite to Fort Convention.

The difficulties which attended the siege of that place were of no ordinary nature. Built upon an isolated hill about 250 feet from the sea, Fort Convention could be battered only from the summit of a steep crag, 1000 yards distant from its outline; and to the top of that crag the breaching guns were carried by the seamen belonging to the fleet. From the 12th to the 15th of February, both men and officers laboured incessantly at this arduous task, which was at length accomplished by the establishment of two batteries, containing each three pieces of artillery. On the morning of the 16th, the guns opened their fire, which was kept up, without intermission, throughout that and the following day; at the close of which period the enemy's works were seen to be ruined, and their replies to the cannonade became faint and intermitted. General Dundas made ready to try the effect of an assault without further

delay; and the command of the force to be employed on that occasion, consisting of the royals, the 25th, the 50th, and 51st regiments, was intrusted to lieutenant-colonel Moore.

At eight o'clock in the evening of the 17th, the assailants quitted their ground, and advanced in three columns towards Fort Convention. They reached the base of the hill without interruption, just as the moon began to rise, and, springing forward with fixed bayonets, forced their way at three points within the works. Scarcely a shot, indeed, was fired on either side, after the first discharge from the ramparts had been given; and the combat which is maintained when steel does the work of shot is seldom, as every soldier knows, of long continuance. Within five minutes from the commencement of the assault, Fort Convention fell into the hands of the English; and the commandant, with a considerable proportion of the garrison, laid down their arms.

The fall of Fort Convention was followed, almost immediately, by the evacuation of Fornelli; nor did the governor of St. Fiorenzo consider it necessary to hazard a siege. Both places were in consequence occupied on the 20th of March, after which a movement was made by sea and land upon Bastia. Here considerable resistance was offered; but the fire from the shipping fell so heavily, and the batteries on shore were so well served, that on the 21st of May, Bastia likewise opened its gates on capitulation. There remained in the enemy's hands only the town of Calvi, — a place of prodigious strength, as well as of great commercial importance, — and thither the troops, now commanded by lieutenant-general sir Charles Stuart, prepared to move with as much celerity as might consist with the completion of the necessary preparations.

Between Bastia and Calvi a range of steep mountains intervenes, exceedingly difficult of passage even to horses, and quite impracticable for artillery. To avoid that obstacle, the admiral and general came to the

determination of transporting the army, with its stores, by sea; and, on the 19th of June, the whole disembarked at Port Agra, a little bay somewhat removed from Calvi. The same evening active operations were begun by the occupation of the Sierra del Capuccine; and the position being distant from the enemy's advanced works not more than three miles, a close reconnoissance was immediately executed. It served to convince general Stuart that the reduction of Calvi would prove a service of considerable hazard: nevertheless, dispositions were promptly made for the erection of batteries; and the mountain passes being seized, the seamen were again employed to drag up the face of an almost perpendicular cliff, cannon and mortars.

There were two principal redoubts, which, with batteries communicating, covered the approaches to the town, and rendered the harbour and roadstead impervious to a hostile squadron. Against these, called the Mollmochisco and Mozello Forts, the first attacks were directed, with a combination of skill and courage which could not fail of leading to the happiest results. The former, after sustaining an incessant cannonade, was threatened, on the 6th of July, with an assault; and the enemy, conscious of their inability to resist, abandoned the redoubt. Fresh exertions were then made to ruin the defences of Mozello, by opening a heavy fire from two points at once; and on the 18th a practical breach was effected. But one step now remained to be taken. Lieutenant-colonel Moore, at the head of the grenadiers, the light infantry, and the second battalion of the royals, was commanded to storm; while a second corps, under colonel Wemys, should support him, by threatening an entrenchment on the left.

Nothing could exceed the steadiness and gallantry with which this arduous duty was performed. The troops, advancing with unloaded arms, in the face of a murderous discharge of shot and shells, ascended the breach an hour before dawn; and, though bravely

opposed with pikes, chevaux de frise, and other impediments, made good their entrance. Calvi was no longer defensible. The governor withstood, indeed, a renewal of the cannonade, which continued throughout the next and part of the succeeding day; but, by noon on the 21st, further resistance became useless, and he beat the chamade. Very honourable terms were granted to him, in consideration of the valour displayed in his defence; and Calvi, with its dependencies, submitted to the English arms.

Corsica was now wrested from the gripe of France, and became, for a short time, a portion of the British empire, not without an earnest desire on the part of the king's government to render the people happy and the island prosperous. A strong body of troops was, moreover, left for its protection; to which, in the capacity of adjutant-general, colonel Moore remained attached: but the office, though both honourable and lucrative, was not such as this enthusiastic soldier desired to hold. As was well remarked in the order issued to the army, while it yet mourned the recent loss of him whom all ranks equally loved and respected, "in war, he courted service in every quarter of the globe;" nor was he long doomed to linger under what was to him a real source of uneasiness — his absence from a field of active enterprise. Unfortunately, too, he mixed himself up in questions with which, as a military officer, he had no concern; and, becoming peculiarly obnoxious to the governor, sir George Elliot, he was recalled. Nevertheless, his character as a man and a soldier suffered no eclipse: on the contrary, he received intimation, early in 1795, that his presence would be required with the force which was about to proceed, under the command of general Abercromby, to the West Indies. He hurried to his post; and having, by this time, attained to the rank of colonel by brevet, he was gratified to find that the local distinction of brigadier had been secured to him, as well as the guidance of a considerable body of troops in the field.

In our sketch of the military life of sir Ralph Abercromby, we have made repeated mention of the valour and skill displayed by brigadier-general Moore, during the progress of the West India campaign. We shall not, in this place, recapitulate what has been said there descriptive of the debarkation at St. Lucia, or the forcing of the enemy's positions at Morne Chabot and Morne Fortunée; but it is necessary to add, that, when the commander-in-chief withdrew to prosecute other enterprises, general Moore was left with the 31st, 44th, 48th, and 55th British regiments, the corps of rangers and German yagers, to maintain the conquests already achieved. Nor was that a service devoid of hazard, or agreeable, either in its prosecution or accomplishment. Bands of French troops, withdrawing into the interior, formed a junction with the Caribs and runaway slaves, and maintained, for some time, a war of inroads and plunder, to the extreme alarm of the planters and the annoyance of the king's troops. General Moore penetrated, in pursuit of the brigands, into the wildest recesses of the mountains. His troops suffered severely from sickness, and the unavoidable consequence of exposure to hardsbips in a climate so pernicious; yet he thoroughly extirpated these lawless bands, and forced them to unconditional surrender.

During the progress of these operations, and for some time after they had ceased, the mortality in the ranks of the English army was truly fearful: there died, in the course of one year, not less than two thirds of the force originally intrusted to general Moore: indeed, the 31st regiment alone dwindled away, from an effective strength of 915, to 74 men. This was a waste of life far more extravagant than the most active European campaign has ever been known to demand; while the unhappy victims of a pestilential climate were deprived of the consolatory reflection that, by the sacrifice of life, they did their country service. Not less forward to meet one species of danger than he was prompt in setting the example of devotedness under

another, general Moore shared, from first to last, all the hardships sustained by the meanest of his followers. Like them, he lived upon salt pork and biscuit; slept in the woods, destitute of other cover than his cloak; and was continually in progress from post to post, wherever his presence appeared to be peculiarly required. At length the deaths became so numerous, that officers sufficient to carry on the current duties were wanting. General Moore was, in consequence, laid under the painful necessity of issuing a peremptory order, that no man, except in the last extremity, should apply for leave to quit the island; and the restrictions which a sense of public duty compelled him to impose upon others, he was not the man, in his own person, to evade. He, too, became seriously indisposed; yet the entreaties of his medical attendants were disregarded till consciousness had deserted him: he was then removed on board of ship, where, after a severe struggle, he recovered.

The object of general Abercromby's expedition being fully accomplished, brigadier-general Moore returned to England, where he received the rank of major-general, and was, in September, 1798, appointed to the colonelcy of the 9th West India regiment.

General Moore reached his native country at a moment of imminent peril, when Great Britain was threatened by invasion from France, and Ireland groaned under the horrors of a desperate and well organised rebellion. He was directed to proceed to the latter country, and there, first under the orders of his old chief, and latterly under lord Cornwallis, he exerted himself to preserve order and to put an end to violence. Of the part which he played during the inroad of general Hombert's corps, a sufficiently detailed account has been given elsewhere. We are not, therefore, required to enlarge upon that era in his military career further than by stating, that his diligence, activity, and talent drew forth, on all occasions, the warmest praise of his superiors; and that his promptitude in opposing the enemy

could be equalled only by his steadiness and zeal in maintaining strict discipline among his own troops. There was not a brigade employed throughout the rebellion, which supported a higher character both for valour and good conduct than his.

Tranquillity being restored, and a force collected in Kent, for the avowed purpose of straitening the enemy's resources abroad, general Moore lost no time in making a tender of his services, which were at once cheerfully accepted. He took command of a brigade in the first, or sir Ralph Abercromby's, division of the army which was destined, under the late duke of York, to assist the Dutch in their expected revolt; and he landed on the 27th of August, 1799, at the Helder, where he became immediately and warmly engaged. Of the result of that action an account has already been given, as well as of the events which followed, including the occupation, at daybreak on the 28th, of the Helder point by general Moore's brigade. In like manner the battles of the 19th of September and the 2d of October have been detailed, in the latter of which general Moore received two severe wounds: one through the thigh, which he totally disregarded; the other in the face, which compelled him to quit the field. Enough, therefore, is done, when to these general descriptions we add, that from the beginning to the close of the affair, general Moore so eminently distinguished himself that his name occurs in every despatch as that of an officer whose services were invaluable: and that he returned home more and more an object of admiration to his country, and enthusiastic attachment to his fellow soldiers.

The injuries which he had sustained were of a serious nature, and his constitution stood in need of repose; yet, when, in the spring of 1800, a fresh expedition was prepared, he again stood forward as a candidate for employment. His wishes were immediately attended to; and the satisfaction thence arising was certainly not diminished by the assurance that he was about to serve

again under his beloved and venerated leader, sir Ralph Abercromby. We will not run the risk of unnecessary repetition, by giving here even the outlines of that service at its commencement. Let it suffice to say, that sir John Moore accompanied his chief, first to Minorca, Genoa, Gibraltar, Cadiz, and Malta; and eventually to Marmorice, the point of final rendezvous, and to Egypt. It is worthy of remark, however, that while the fleet lay at Marmorice, general Moore was despatched to open a communication with the grand vizier; and that the report which he brought back of the wretched condition of the Turkish army induced sir Ralph Abercromby to lay aside all thoughts of co-operation. Hence the direct movement to Alexandria, the vizier remaining inactive at Joppa; and the brilliant landing of which, in a preceding article, we have endeavoured to communicate the details.

In the subsequent proceedings of the army, including its advance on the 13th, and its repulse of the enemy on the evening of the 21st of March, general Moore gave fresh proof of that courage and military talent of which he was known to be possessed in no ordinary degree. We have already spoken of his great gallantry during the action of the 21st, when, as general officer of the day, no trivial share of responsibility devolved upon him. He received, early in the battle, a musket ball in the leg, which he persisted in treating with neglect; nor did he quit the field till the firing wholly ceased, and the victory, to which his personal exertions had largely contributed, was secured.

The effect of that wound was such as to deprive the army of general Moore's services throughout the course of those somewhat tardy and eccentric operations, which, after the reduction of Rosetta, carried it by Ramanach and Menouf to Grand Cairo. The investment of the latter place was, indeed, in progress, when he arrived to resume the command of his corps; and, doubtless, his presence would have contributed greatly to promote the vigour of a siege, had the enemy found it convenient to

bring matters to that extremity. This, however, proved not to be the case. On the 22d of June, general Belliard sent out a flag of truce, with a request that an English officer of rank would meet a commissioner from the French army, for the purpose of negotiating a capitulation; and general Hutcheson was too conscious of his own weakness not to accede to the demand. A treaty was accordingly entered into, by which the French agreed to surrender Cairo, and to withdraw, with their arms, baggage, and artillery, from Egypt, while the English undertook to grant them a free passage to Rosetta, where means should be provided for transporting them to France.

The state of general Hutcheson's health, materially injured by fatigue and exposure, as well as his great anxiety to re-establish the ancient government of Egypt, induced him to remain with a slender escort at Cairo; and the command of the army which accompanied the French on their route to Rosetta devolved on general Moore. It was an office of little danger, though involving a good deal of responsibility, and general Moore discharged it in a very masterly manner. At the head of little more than 6000 men, he marched in parallel columns with the French, whose effective force fell not short of 10,800 of all arms; and he encamped night after night regularly, and with the strictest discipline, within cannon-shot of these armed and not over scrupulous prisoners. We are not prepared to say, that the idea of violating his engagements ever entered into the mind of general Belliard,—far less, that the faintest symptom of disaffection displayed itself throughout the journey; yet to general Moore the credit ought not to be refused, of maintaining, from first to last, such a countenance as must have overawed that disposition, had it arisen either among the officers or the men. The French general himself, indeed, did his escort the justice to remark, that a more orderly and better regulated movement had never been performed by troops.

While the main body of the British army was ad-

vancing upon Grand Cairo, and carrying forward that series of attacks which ended in the surrender of the capital, a force of 4000 men, under general Coote, continued to occupy the lines in front of Alexandria, and to keep in check the remnant of Menou's corps, which had retreated thither subsequently to the defeat of the 21st of March. It is not our province to explain the measures which Coote deemed it expedient to adopt, in order at once to secure himself from molestation, and to support the blockade. It is sufficient if we remark, that they were all marked with great judgment and prudence; and that even the breaking down of the canal of Alexandria, though a subject of deep regret, was dictated by a stern and irresistible necessity. By this means his front became considerably narrowed, and the duties imposed upon his pickets rendered less harassing and irksome; while the power of effecting sorties was, in a great measure, taken away from the enemy, at least in quarters where to meet them would have been both difficult and hazardous. Still, though comparatively safe from the first, and rendered doubly so as the season advanced, in consequence of the arrival, early in July, of nine battalions from England and Malta, Coote could attempt nothing offensively till the total subjugation of Upper Egypt left general Hutcheson at liberty to devote his undivided attention to Alexandria. The middle of August had, therefore, arrived, ere the siege of that important city may be said to have begun; though the garrison were already suffering the utmost extremity of famine,—the necessary consequence of a lengthened and well sustained blockade.

In the operations which ensued upon the re-union of the army under the walls of Alexandria, general Moore took an active part. He commanded that column by which the Nole Hill was occupied, and conducted the diversion which saved from an unequal combat the troops which first took up their ground opposite to the western face. But as neither these, nor the other measures, which led to the capitulation of the 2d of Sep-

tember, emanated from him, it were contrary to the plan of this work did we enter into them more fully. We conclude, therefore, the account of his military services in Egypt, by stating that, on the 15th of September, lord William Bentinck arrived at head-quarters; and that he brought with him instructions for the future distribution of the army, in obedience to which general Moore immediately set sail for England.

During the short peace which ensued upon the treaty of Amiens, general Moore spent his time as a civilian, partly in the enjoyment of those social circles which he was eminently qualified to adorn, partly in seeking both instruction and amusement by foreign travel. Never for a moment, however, were his thoughts abstracted from that great science to which all the ardour of his youth, and the experience of his riper years, had been devoted. The mode of drilling the British infantry was, at the period of which we are now treating, if not essentially defective, at all events encumbered with pedantries which served every possible purpose except that of rendering the recruit pliable and easy under arms. General Moore saw where the error lay, and devoted his singularly active mind to correct it. He drew up a system of manœuvre designed avowedly for light infantry alone, though in reality applicable to all classes of troops. He solicited and obtained permission to try the effect of that system on the 52d regiment, of which he was the colonel; and the plan was found to answer so completely in all respects, that other corps were successively submitted to him for instruction. A light brigade, as it was called, was accordingly formed in Kent, of which he was put in command; and at Shorncliffe and Hithe, the 43d, the 52d, the 95th, the 51st, the 68th, the 85th, and for a short time the 2d battalion of the 78th*, were all trained to balance,

* We cannot pretend to describe the degree of attention which sir John Moore paid to the proper training of his brigade; far less to give, within our limits, any account of that system of tuition with which the army is now generally acquainted. It may be permitted us, however, to say in this note, that Moore's system went upon the broad and palpable principle of bringing every movement of the body as near as possible to that which

march, wheel, use their fire-arms, and manœuvre in battalion, and in skirmishing order, under his own eye, or under the eyes of officers trained with admirable care in his school. In the Introduction to this work, allusion has been made to the great improvements upon Dundas's system effected in the book of regulations compiled by order of the late adjutant-general. It is only necessary to add here, that to the school of sir John Moore, and to the results arising out of it, the British army is indebted for all that is really valuable in the volume of instructions to which we have alluded.

We will not pause to describe the manner in which general Moore passed his time while commanding in this the most important district of Great Britain. For the invasion which was threatened, and to which all men looked forward, he stood fully prepared; for there was not a foot of ground between the coast and the capital on which he had not made his observations, with a view to render the advance of the enemy as tedious and as difficult as possible. One anecdote, however, which has been communicated to us by a nobleman intimately connected both with the general and the minister, it may be worth while to repeat. When Mr. Pitt was lord warden of the Cinque Ports, he spent a good deal of his leisure time at Walmer Castle, where Moore, as general of the Kent district, frequently visited him. They were in the habit of riding out together, and their conversation, as might be expected, turned not unfrequently on the possibility of obstructing the French in their march to London. It chanced that on one occasion our informant met the general just after he had parted from the premier.

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nature dictates, and rendering the soldier as free and unrestrained in all his evolutions as a naked savage. There was no absurd pointing of the toe, no springing of the foot in marching, no stiffness of the neck, no pedantic protrusion of the chest or stomach; but an easy, and therefore a graceful posture, with a natural rise and fall of the step, such as men would adopt in walking. There were, moreover, but four drills in the day, each extending to one hour only. The men were thus hindered from becoming weary; and they learned as much, giving their undivided attention to the hour's task, as they would have done under other circumstances in three hours.

"What a pity," said Moore without waiting for any introduction to the subject, "that man had not been brought up to the army."—"Why so?" was the question naturally put. "Because nature has made him a general," answered Moore: "I never met with a civilian who so thoroughly understood how to make the most of his ground."

In this peaceful situation he remained till the summer of 1806, when he proceeded, with a reinforcement of troops, which included his own well-tried 52d regiment, to Sicily. He reached the island not long after the affair of Maida, and found general Fox in command, under whom he continued to serve for some time; for of the troops about to be employed in the second expedition into Egypt he declined to take the guidance. That he calculated correctly as to the inevitable result of that expedition, a short time sufficed to prove; nor does it appear, that his refusal to commit himself, with a force clearly inadequate to the purposes intended, ever seriously lowered him in the estimation of his military superiors.

In the month of August, 1807, general Fox was recalled, and the command of all the troops employed in the Mediterranean devolved upon sir John Moore. He found himself almost immediatly involved in disputes with the court at Palermo, concerning the causes and progress of which it were foreign from the design of this work were we minutely to enquire. Enough is done when we state, that, in spite of a bitter opposition on the part of the reigning family, he succeeded in introducing into the Sicilian army various important changes; and that the work of reformation might have been rendered complete, had not other and more pressing matters interfered. Sir John Moore's system was as yet but imperfectly understood, when he received sudden orders to remove to Gibraltar, where a large force, about to be employed on a particular service, was appointed to meet him.

It is not our province to unravel the mysteries in

which the foreign policy of Great Britain is wrapped up, as well prior to the occurrences of 1807, as during their progress. We are aware, indeed, that much odium has very unfairly attached to the government under whose directions the Copenhagen expedition was effected; and that a plan, formed on the most matured consideration, and embracing the most important results, has been treated as a mere outbreak of insolent naval superiority. In due time, perhaps, the truth will be disclosed in full; but, on the present occasion, we cannot attempt any thing further than to give a brief outline of what there is good reason to assert was the main object of British interference with the northern powers.

By the treaty of Tilsit, England was left without an ally on the continent of Europe, Gustavus Adolphus, the eccentric but high-spirited king of Sweden, alone excepted. Denmark was, indeed, neutral, as far as a nation can be said to be in a state of neutrality, which receives the law from one of two belligerent powers; whilst Norway, though an integral part of the Danish monarchy, stood ready to second any efforts which might be hazarded to keep open a commercial intercourse with Great Britain. Of the attempt made to bribe Gustavus into a forgetfulness of his honour, by holding out to him the offer of Norway, as an appendage to his realm, our readers are, doubtless, aware, as well as of the chivalrous manner in which the proposal was refused, and the treachery of Napoleon made apparent to the Danish government. Nevertheless, no progress was effected in detaching Denmark from her ill-placed partialities: it became, on the contrary, more and more apparent every day, that she looked to extend her authority over Sweden itself; and Gustavus was forced, in self-defence, to consider and propose a scheme, which met, from the British ministry, with a ready acquiescence.

Remote as Sweden and Norway were from what may be called the centre of European politics, they presented

at this time, and especially the former, the only source of open and honourable inlet into the continent, for British commerce and British communications. It was thus a matter of the greatest importance that they should not, like the nations around them, be rendered subject to the yoke of France. When, therefore, Gustavus made the British government aware that he was threatened with war, not from France only, but from Russia and Denmark, England experienced no reluctance to assist him in the struggle, by throwing an army into Zealand, and occupying Norway, where the dispositions of the people were understood to be peculiarly favourable. With this view, lord Cathcart's armament quitted the English shores; while the troops called in from Sicily, and from other states in the Mediterranean, received orders to proceed, under the guidance of sir John Moore, to Norway.

Lord Cathcart, as is well known, made himself master of Zealand; while sir John Moore waited at Gibraltar for the assembly of the force which was to act in Norway: but, ere the latter came together, counter-orders reached him, which indicated at once an improvement in the position of the continental powers, and a thorough change in the warlike arrangements of Great Britain.

Napoleon had, by this time, begun that series of aggressions in the peninsula, which, after seven long years of war and suffering, ended in his own deposition. Junot, indeed, was in full march towards Lisbon; and the royal family of Portugal, acting under the advice of lord Strangford, were prepared, on the first appearance of the enemy, to migrate to South America. Sir John Moore was, accordingly, directed to assist sir Sydney Smith in the removal of the house of Braganza; after which he was to effect a landing at Madeira, and occupy that island for the benefit of the exiled sovereign. But here, again, circumstances interfered to hinder — as the event proved, most providentially — the accomplishment of this enterprise. The Portuguese family escaped ere Moore

was in a condition to aid them, and, instead of sailing for the Tagus, he returned with his corps to England.

In the mean while the insane proceedings of Bonaparte with reference to the peninsular nations brought about a complete revolution in the designs and wishes of the British government touching the northern powers. To support Gustavus, as had been originally proposed, was now regarded as a misapplication of the national resources, which could be much more effectually used in nourishing that resistance which Spain and Portugal had already begun to offer. It was felt, at the same time, that to leave Denmark in her integrity, while Russia threatened Sweden on one flank, and France on another, would affect with indelible disgrace the English character. We are not prepared to say that the method actually adopted for the purpose of avoiding this stigma was either the wisest or the most generous. But we believe it to be a fact, that the capture of the Danish fleet was effected as much with a view to satisfy Sweden, as to cripple the naval resources of our own enemies.

With this miserable perversion of a plan, which, though approved in London, was, we have reason to assert, drawn up at Stockholm, Gustavus was highly displeased; and the English government, moved in part by his remonstrances, in part desirous of keeping open the harbours of the north, determined on sending a second army to his assistance. To the command of that force, which amounted in all to about 10,000 men, sir John Moore was appointed; but the expedition led to no fortunate result. Moore's orders explicitly restricted him to Norway; Gustavus required that he should march his army to Stockholm, and place himself entirely at the disposal of the power which he came to assist. It is, indeed, probable, that Gustavus intended to keep the English troops in the capital, where that spirit of disaffection, which eventually drove him from the throne, had begun to show itself; and had he succeeded, it is not easy to say that,

at this hour, that eccentric but not insane man might not have occupied the throne of his ancestors. But Moore could not discover in his instructions any scope for latitude of interpretation, and, of course, remained firm. The result is well known. Gustavus, deaf to argument, and smarting under the sense of wrongs not wholly imaginary, placed the British general under a species of arrest, by commanding that he should on no account whatever quit the capital; and Moore, who had travelled to Stockholm unattended, leaving his troops on board of ship, was glad to escape in disguise. As a matter of course, the purposes of the expedition could proceed no further; and Moore, judiciously concluding that to keep 10,000 men idle was not the purpose for which he had been placed in authority, gave orders that the fleet should direct its course homeward.

It was well for the honour and interests of England, that sir John Moore thus promptly withdrew his troops from a point where their services could be rendered so little available. By doing so he escaped the mortification of being employed in an undertaking which the presence of an army could have in no degree facilitated; we allude to the removal of Romana's corps from the Baltic, in which he had been directed to assist, while he rendered available for a far more important as well as honourable purpose, no trifling portion of the disposable army of England.

We have now arrived at a period in the military history of our country, when, abandoning the system of petty and defensive warfare in which she had so long and so ruinously indulged, England began again to assume an attitude worthy of her ancient renown, as well as strictly in accordance with the dictates of sound policy.

Spain and Portugal, exasperated by wrongs endured, rose against their oppressor, and the demand which they made upon the resources and sympathies of Great Britain was not made in vain. A body of 9000 men, which had assembled at Cork under the command of

sir Arthur Wellesley, proceeded, on the 12th of July, 1808, for Corunna; whence it passed, first to Oporto, and eventually to the mouth of the Mondego. But with the proceedings of that corps we are, on the present occasion, very little concerned; and the tale of its triumphs has been too often told to render any repetition on our part either necessary or desirable.

While sir Arthur Wellesley was laying at Roreiça and Vimiero the foundation of that renown which received its consummation on the plains of Waterloo, sir John Moore was prosecuting a tedious and unprofitable voyage towards the seat of war. Immediately on his return from Sweden he had been called upon to serve his country again, though in a capacity as little anticipated by himself as it was injudiciously marked out by the superior authorities. He who had twice executed the office of commander-in-chief, and whose reputation stood at least as high as that of any military officer in the British service, was required to act under the orders of sir Hew Dalrymple and sir Harry Burrard, — men of unquestionable courage, and not perhaps deficient in talent, but possessed neither of experience in the conduct of armies nor of the confidence of the troops. It has been well remarked by Mr. James Moore, in his narrative of the campaign of 1808–9, that "there are few generals in the British service who would not have resigned on such treatment." Sir John Moore, however, entertained loftier and purer principles than animate the breasts of most men, no matter in what profession trained. He had repeatedly declared, that "if the king commanded him to act again as an ensign he would obey;" and now, whatever his private feelings might be, he accepted the charge thrust upon him, and discharged it with alacrity and zeal.

On the 31st of July, the fleet sailed from Portsmouth, and became almost immediately opposed by baffling and adverse winds. The consequence was, that the 19th of August arrived ere the shores of Mondego Bay were telegraphed; while of the position of sir Arthur Wel-

lesley, and of the troops under his command, both the general and his followers were profoundly ignorant. No despatch vessel had met them during their voyage; nor was any such found waiting their arrival. Under these circumstances, sir John Moore, whom the departure of sir Harry Burrard had left in command, sent a staff officer, in a light frigate, towards St. Martinho, whither he learned, from the crews of certain fishing-smacks, and the reports of the country people, that the right of the British army was advanced.

The messenger was not long departed, when a courier arrived with instructions for the fleet to move on as far as Maceira roads. These orders sir John Moore hastened to obey; and he reached the anchorage in sufficient time to be made acquainted with the splendid victory of Vimiero, and the armistice which ensued upon it. Neither in that, nor in the management of the convention of Cintra, was he in a situation to take any prominent part. The latter, indeed, was arranged and adjusted before he found an opportunity of examining the grounds on which it rested; for though the signatures of the chiefs had not yet been affixed, the articles had undergone full revision previous to his landing. Yet there is good reason to believe, that, had the contrary been the case, sir John Moore would have offered to the measure no decided opposition. The opportunities of pressing the enemy to advantage were, as he well knew, greatly weakened by the rejection of the double line of operations from Mondego; and the measure had ceased, in some degree, to be practicable, so soon as the columns were arrested in the pursuit after the victory of the 21st. Sir John Moore, therefore, while he warmly commended both the actions performed, and the dispositions recommended by sir Arthur Wellesley, experienced no reluctance in sanctioning, by his approval, a treaty which freed Portugal at once from the presence of a French army, and put the allies in possession, without loss of life or time, of all the fortified places throughout the kingdom.

Of the events which ensued upon the ratification of this treaty, including the occupation of Lisbon, the disputes relative to the species of property claimed by the French, the evacuation of the fortresses, and the departure of Junot's army from the Tagus, we are not required to give any account. In like manner, the negotiations entered into for the purpose of establishing a regular government in Portugal, and suppressing the intrigues of the junta of Oporto, lie beyond the design of this memoir. Enough is done when we state, in few words, that these, with other important and interesting transactions, took place while sir Hew Dalrymple still exercised the supreme command; and that the same officer, acting in obedience to his original instructions, made some preparations for an advance into Spain. Long, however, before these were complete, a variety of circumstances befel, which gave to the hopes and prospects of the British army fresh energy. Sir Hew Dalrymple having returned to England, whither sir Arthur Wellesley and sir Harry Burrard,—the latter being formally superseded,—had gone before, the chief management of affairs devolved upon sir John Moore.

On the 6th of October, a despatch from lord Castlereagh reached Lisbon. It contained official information of sir John Moore's appointment to the command of an army which should contain 30,000 infantry and 5000 cavalry; and which "his majesty had determined to employ in the north of Spain, to co-operate with the Spanish armies in the expulsion of the French from that kingdom." Sir John Moore was at the same time instructed both as to the manner in which this force was to be made up, and as to its destined scene of action. Of the troops now in Portugal, 20,000 infantry, two regiments of hussars, and a due proportion of artillery, were to proceed into Spain; the cavalry by land, the infantry and guns either by land or sea according to the discretion of the general; while an additional corps of 10,000 infantry, with cavalry, should sail from Falmouth to Corunna, whence it would join the main

body either in Galicia or Leon. Finally, the general was directed to concert his plan of operations with such officers as he should find at the head of the Spanish armies. He was made aware of the preparation of extensive depôts of provisions and stores, both at home and on the coast of Galicia; and he was referred, in cases of difficulty, to Mr. Frere, the British minister at the seat of the central government, as well as to the other civil and military agents scattered through the country.

Gratifying as such an appointment could not fail to be to his feelings as a man and a soldier, sir John Moore was not slow in discerning, that the charge imposed upon him was attended with difficulties of the most gigantic nature. The army of which he was at the head contained the elements of all that is excellent. The officers were zealous, intelligent, and brave; the men well disciplined, fearless, and in the very prime of life; and there existed but one desire among all ranks and classes, namely, that they might be brought as soon as possible into contact with the enemy. But the pliability of an army is dependent on many other causes, additional to the zeal of its officers and the courage of its men. There are departments, without a due organisation of which, the bravest troops in the world become unwieldy; and in these, the absence of experience is not to be compensated by almost any other qualification. On the present occasion, sir John Moore found himself destitute of a commissariat capable, because accustomed, to manage the details submitted to it. "In none of the departments," says he, in a letter addressed to lord Castlereagh, "is there any want of zeal, but in some of the important ones there is much want of experience. This remark applies particularly to the commissariat, few of whose members have ever seen an army in the field. The short maritime expeditions in which they have been employed require but middling talent, and gives them little or no experience of the operations they are now called upon to perform." Nor was the want of skill among his own agents at all sup-

plied by the intelligence or activity of the Portuguese themselves. From the native authorities he received no assistance: the country, moreover, was exhausted, and the means of transport limited in the extreme. Yet, in the face of all these obstacles, the army was in a condition to commence its march on the 18th of October; that is to say, on the thirteenth day from the receipt of lord Castlereagh's letter, and the assumption of the command by sir John Moore.

Of the activity and talent required to effect this end, within a period of time so limited, it is impossible not to speak in the highest terms. It was the work of no ordinary mind: and the decision to which the general came, of moving his force wholly by land, displayed sound judgment and discretion. It is to be lamented, that the examination of the roads which lead from Lisbon to the Spanish frontier was not conducted with all the care that might have been bestowed upon it; had this been done, the general would have ascertained that the route by Almeida, though unquestionably difficult, is not impervious to wheel carriages; and hence, that no necessity existed for that division of his force which he determined to hazard. Unfortunately, however, he put out of view the fact that Junot, during the depth of winter, had traversed that route; that he had brought with him a large train of artillery, which he succeeded in carrying across the mountains in spite of incessant rains and the swelling of the torrents; and receiving, as worthy of implicit confidence, the reports of the people of Lisbon, and the statements of an individual attached to the quarter-master general's staff, he came to the conclusion that a double line of movement was indispensable. While, therefore, he directed the mass of the infantry, with a brigade of 6-pounders, to march by Abrantes and Coimbra upon Almeida, a corps of 6000 men, composed of the cavalry, four brigades of artillery, and four regiments of foot, received orders to proceed through the Alantejo, by way of Badajos, Mena, Truxillo, Talavera de la Reyna, and the Escurial. The

latter column, having under its escort the great park of the army and many hundred carriages, was intrusted to lieutenant-general sir John Hope, an officer of tried courage and rare intelligence; the two former were respectively intrusted to lieutenant-general Fraser and major-general Beresford.

While these arrangements were in progress, and the leading regiments of each column *en route*, a despatch from sir David Baird made the general aware that the promised reinforcements from home were already at Corunna. He learned, however, through the same channel, that the military chest was empty; and that the Spanish authorities, being without instructions from the central government, threw obstacles in the way of a debarkation. He lost no time in supplying, as far as his slender means would allow, the former of these deficiencies, by forwarding 8000*l.* to Galicia; and he requested Baird, so soon as the difficulties of a landing should be overcome, to march upon Astorga. This done, and the government having been warned that to Corunna he should thenceforth look as to the point of communication with England, sir John Moore, on the 27th of October, quitted Lisbon.

Before proceeding with the narrative, which alone we have undertaken to conduct, it will be necessary, for the sake of connection, that we take a hasty glance at the general state of that country into which the British troops were now about to penetrate. It is not, indeed, without reluctance, that we enter at all upon a field which has already been trodden by so many able historians; yet, as our estimate of the soundness of sir John Moore's dispositions — we had almost said, of his professional character itself — depends upon the understanding which we may possess of the situation and proceedings of his allies, it were vain to attempt any satisfactory description of his career as a British military commander, without adverting to the peculiar circumstances under which it was begun and carried forward. Happily, however, we are not called upon to attempt mor

than a very slight outline of events, with the details of which, few Englishmen, arrived at the years of discretion, can be ignorant.

It will be borne in mind, that immediately on the application of the Spanish patriots for assistance, a whole host of agents, both civil and military, were despatched by the British government into the different provinces, for the sake of distributing supplies and reporting on the temper of the people. Of these almost all, carried away by the enthusiasm of those around them, represented the cause of independence as triumphant;—the local juntas were guided by the purest patriotism and zeal; the generals were skilful; and the very peasants more than a match for their ruthless invaders. The defence of Zaragoza, the repulse of marshal Moncey from Valencia, and, above all, the great victory of Baylen, tended to ensure for these reports almost universal credit: indeed, the deliverance of the peninsula was represented as secured, so soon as the intrusive king evacuated Madrid, and retired behind the Ebro. The lapse of a few months sufficed, however, to prove that these opinions had been taken up somewhat hastily. No good use was made of the victories thus pompously proclaimed. The juntas began to quarrel among themselves; the generals became refractory and jealous; and the troops were neither disciplined, armed, nor equipped; while the enemy were permitted to retain, with less than 45,000 men, their hold throughout the autumn upon Biscay, Navarre, and part of Huesca. For the left of the French, commanded by Moncey, lay along the Ebro and the Aragon, with its head-quarters at Tafalla. Marshal Ney's corps was at Guardia; that of Bessières at Miranda; and the right, of which Le Febvre was at the head, occupied the heights of Durango and Murdragon.

Such was the situation of the invaders early in October, in possession of a line which they retained only through the absence of skill, unanimity, and conduct on the part of the patriots. The Spaniards, again, were thus distributed: — On the right, the army of Galicia, com-

manded by Blake, occupied a line from Bilboa to Burgos; here the conde de Belvidere, with the levies of Estremadura, had established himself, in expectation of the speedy arrival of the English, and prepared, so soon as the junction should be formed, to fall upon the enemy's centre. To the right, again, lay Castanos, with his head-quarters at Soria, and detachments in Taranzona, Borga, and Tudela; while beyond him were the Aragonese and Valencian armies, covering Zaragoza, and extending as far as Sanguessa. A glance at the map will suffice to show that, to occupy such a line in force, 200,000 men would scarcely suffice; and that even 200,000 men would fail to hold it in the presence of an opponent able and willing to act vigorously on the offensive. But this is not the only nor the most glaring error of which the Spaniards had been guilty. They were brought into their present order with the avowed design of destroying the French ere reinforcements should reach them; and the circumstance that they outflanked the intruder appears to have satisfied them of their power to do so. There was a strange delusion on the minds of the Spanish officers throughout the war, which led them constantly to aim at surrounding an enemy, no matter how incompetent they might be to sustain an attack while their grand manœuvre was in progress.

Not satisfied with the reports which reached him from other quarters, sir Hew Dalrymple had early despatched lord William Bentinck to Madrid; colonel Graham likewise (now lord Lynedoch) was at the head-quarters of the principal Spanish army; and on the communications which he kept up with these gentlemen, as well as with Mr. Stuart, sir John Moore mainly relied for intelligence of the real state both of the French and Spaniards. At what value he himself rated the services of the other agents, including colonel Doyle, major Cox, and general Sontag, the reader of his private letter to lord Castlereagh, contained in the Appendix to Mr. Moore's Narrative, will be able to judge. He had heard

little, while hastening his own preparations at Lisbon, calculated to impress him with respect for the political or military wisdom of the Spanish government. There was not even a commander-in-chief appointed to preside over the destinies of the armies; and all the remonstrances of lord William Bentinck failed to convince the junta that such an officer was needed—nay, the opportunity of rapid communication by the occasional employment of couriers was with difficulty obtained. Again, not only were no steps taken to expedite the advance of Baird's corps, but the most serious obstacles were thrown in his way. The junta of Corunna detained him on board of ship till despatches arrived from Aranjuez authorising a debarkation; and then, after the loss of fifteen days, they afforded neither cars nor any other means of transport. Nor was this all of which the British general had a right to complain. Baird arrived pennyless, and had his immediate necessities relieved by the advance of 8000*l.* out of 25,000*l.*, the total amount of Moore's disposable funds; yet millions of dollars were scattered with a profuse hand, wherever a cry of money wanted chanced to be raised in any other quarter of Spain. In a word, sir John Moore, independently of the gross and glaring errors committed by his allies, entered upon his Spanish campaign under the pressure of all those disadvantages which attend the first display of her military strength by a nation which has been accustomed during many years to defend her rights by an expenditure of money rather than of blood; and, as a necessary consequence, has looked more to the subsidising of foreign armies, than to the equipment and due application of her own.

The progress of the several columns into which sir John Moore had divided his army was as rapid and as orderly as a defective commissariat would allow. On the 5th of November, head-quarters were at Atalaia, where the general ascertained, beyond dispute, that the information on which he had relied relative to the difficulties of transporting artillery, was wholly groundless.

The roads, though rough, were sufficiently practicable for carriages, and they continued to improve rather than to deteriorate as he proceeded; indeed, he met with no natural obstruction to the progress of his army during the whole of the march from Lisbon to Almeida. At the latter place he arrived on the 8th, having received, by the way, despatches from lord William Bentinck, which could not fail to excite in his mind the most uneasy anticipations.

The letters in question gave a detail of those movements on the part of the Spanish armies in the advanced line, which led, in due time, to the disastrous conflicts at Burgos, Espinosa, and Tudela. Moore became seriously alarmed for the safety of his own columns,—more especially for his cannon, and the division under Hope,—yet he could take no step towards rendering their position less insecure, because they were beyond the reach of mutual co-operation. He therefore contented himself with forwarding, by express, to general Hope, an earnest request that he would trust nothing to the reports of the native authorities, but use every exertion to have the roads examined, and the enemy's movements observed by his own officers. At the same time he wrote to general Castanos, to whom he had been referred for the purpose of arranging with him some plan of operations; and communicating also with Mr. Frere, now arrived at the seat of government, he continued his anxious and uneasy march into Spain.

If a correct judgment is to be formed from the general tone of sir John Moore's correspondence, he scarcely entertained from the beginning any hope of bringing his Spanish campaign to a triumphant issue. As he penetrated more and more into the heart of the country, his anticipations of evil gathered strength; for the people, "though civil, were found to be the reverse of enthusiastic," and the authorities were more than supine. There was no general arming of the provinces,—no anxiety displayed to turn to account the resources which a dense population might have supplied,—but

an indifference to danger, founded in part on constitutional indolence, and in part on an extravagant belief in the invincibility of the troops already opposed to the invader. How wide the latter dotage lay from the line of truth, the lapse of a short time sufficed to demonstrate.

It was the 13th of November, when sir John Moore, passing the larger portion of his infantry on its march, arrived at Salamanca. Here the melancholy intelligence of the defeat of Belvidere's corps was communicated to him; while the apprehensions which such a rumour were well calculated to excite, received a serious accession in the course of the two succeeding days. On the second night after his arrival, he learned, by express, from general Pagnatelli, that the enemy were overrunning the plains of Old Castile, and that they occupied, with a corps of cavalry, Valladolid, a city distant scarcely three marches from Salamanca. It is difficult to imagine that the error into which he had fallen in detaching Hope with the artillery should not have affected him, at this moment, with sincere regret. Ignorant as he necessarily was both of the force and the intention of the corps which threatened him from Valladolid, a retreat, even to the frontiers of Portugal, came within the reach of contemplation; and it was certain that the movement could not now be executed, except at the imminent risk of having all his divisions cut off one from the other. While, therefore, he assembled the junta, and warned them of the possibility of such a measure, he resolved to adopt it only as a last resource; and fortune so ordered it that an alternative, grievous in the extreme, never presented itself to him for adoption.

When he first heard of the occupation of Valladolid, sir John Moore had but 4000 infantry assembled. The remainder, with the brigade of 6-pounders, arrived soon afterwards; and he found himself, by the 28th, at the head of 14,000 soldiers, inferior, in point of equipment, discipline, and courage, to none in Europe. By and by intelligence came in that the enemy had fallen

back upon Valencia, and that weak parties of ten or twelve alone traversed the open country. Under these circumstances, Moore determined to keep his head-quarters still at Salamanca, and sent instructions both to Hope and Baird to close upon that city, with all the celerity that might be compatible with a due attention to their own safety.

While the head-quarters of the British army were thus employed, the divisions of Hope and Baird were making such advances to the point of concentration as the difficulties which they had to encounter, and the talents and energies of their leaders, would allow. After having been detained on board of ship from the 13th to the 31st of October, Baird at last made good his landing, and applied to the junta for the means of transport for his baggage, and supplies and provisions for his people. His applications were every where met with the most revolting indifference. Not a car, nor a bullock, nor a mule, was by public authority furnished; and the few which he found it practicable to hire were procured at a rate shamefully exorbitant. Sir David Baird was a gallant and straightforward soldier, and had seen a good deal of service; but he was not made of the proper materials for struggling against such difficulties. His warfare had been waged chiefly in India, where troops move in the midst of luxuries; and it is possible that he may have somewhat over-rated the hindrances which beset him in the north of Spain. But however this may be, his progress was remarkably slow. He marched by half battalions; and on the 26th of November, the head of his column had reached only to Astorga, its journeys having been accomplished at the rate of five or six miles per day. Widely different were Hope's proceedings. In spite of the delays occasioned by a defective train of draught animals, and the total absence of all co-operation on the part of the inhabitants, he reached Naval Carnero, within twenty miles of Madrid, by the 18th, where he proceeded immediately to concert measures with the Spanish government

— or, to express ourselves more accurately, to ascertain, by personal observation, how far the spirit of national resistance prevailed in the capital. He found, however, that both the civil and military chiefs were "altogether without a plan, and that every branch both of the civil and military administration was affected by the disjointed and inefficient construction of the government." The report, therefore, which he made to sir John Moore tended in no degree to dispel the gloom under which that accomplished soldier had already, and with too much reason, begun to suffer.

We have alluded elsewhere to the arrival of Mr. Frere as the representative of the British government at the seat of the central junta. It constituted not the least distressing of the difficulties under which sir John Moore laboured, that, from the very commencement of Mr. Frere's diplomatic career, a misunderstanding, the result of an extensive contrariety of mental conformation, existed between him and the accredited agent of the British crown. Sanguine, eager, and inexperienced, though endowed with excellent talents, and possessed of much general knowledge, Mr. Frere gave himself up, almost without reserve, to the guidance of the Spanish authorities, believing their statements both of their own strength and of the enemy's weakness, and reasoning upon them as upon data worthy of implicit confidence. Sir John Moore, on the other hand, while he held the resources of Spain in contempt, was perhaps inclined to over-rate both the power and the genius of the enemy to whom he stood opposed. His thoughts accordingly turned from the very opening of the campaign with a sort of natural partiality to retreat, as if he felt that he had embarked in an affair not only difficult but hopeless. When a frequent and confidential correspondence is carried on between men thus circumstanced, it is very easy to conjecture in what it must end. The general and the minister soon ceased to entertain the smallest respect for one another's judgment; and hence an intercourse, which ought to have

given strength and consistency to the conduct of the war, served only to embarrass and perplex all who were concerned in it.

Such was the situation of sir John Moore, from the 13th of November, the day on which he arrived at Salamanca, up to the 26th. Separated by an almost equal space from both the wings of his own army, holding no communication with the Spanish generals, and learning nothing of their plans, without money, or without intelligence, except such as came to hand through unsafe or circuitous channels, and continually pressed by the British minister to take steps of which his judgment disapproved, it is not to be wondered at if he early began to regard both his position and prospects with a very desponding eye. It needed, indeed, but the arrival of a few distressing communications, to destroy the faint hopes which he might have hitherto encouraged; nor were these long held back. Of the approach of Napoleon at the head of a prodigious army he had already been made aware, but of the exact amount of reinforcements thus thrown into Spain no account could be received. He determined, therefore, in obedience to the repeated entreaties of Mr. Frere, to attempt a forward movement; and on the 27th communicated his design of ordering Baird's column to advance upon Benevento, Hope upon Tordesillas, while the head-quarter corps should push towards Zamora and Toro. Before the necessary orders were issued, however, or the preliminary arrangements made, official information of the defeat at Tudela reached him. His preparations were instantly suspended; and Baird being directed to fall back and to embark his troops at Vigo or Corunna, Hope was requested to join at once, in order that a combined and orderly retreat might be made good upon Portugal.

That sir John Moore took at this time a very gloomy view of the state of the war, his letter to sir David Baird affords the fullest testimony. After describing his own intentions, contingent, of course, upon the

exertions of the Spaniards themselves, and expressing his utter hopelessness of being able to accomplish any thing, he alludes to the necessity under which he lay of covering Lisbon as long as possible. He then continues,—"On your arrival at Corunna you will of course embark, and sail for the Tagus, where orders shall be waiting you. Write immediately to England, and give notice of what we are doing, and beg that transports may be sent to Lisbon; they will be wanted; for when the French have Spain, Portugal cannot be defended." How very inaccurate this decision was, the events of a few months abundantly demonstrated.

While the intentions of the commander-in-chief underwent these changes, the leaders of his detached columns were exercising their talents according to the opinions which they severally entertained of the steps necessary to be taken on the present emergency. Baird, misled by the reported occupation by the enemy of Rio Seco and Ampudia, had once already retired from Astorga, after destroying the scanty magazine which he had found it practicable to collect; and he now again, as if rejoicing in the prospect of an escape from Spain, withdrew in all haste as far as Villa Franca. Hope, on the other hand, manœuvred to effect a junction with the column under the immediate command of sir John Moore, and conducted the operation with the vigilance and activity which belonged to his character. Avoiding Madrid, he turned short towards the Escurial, where he halted for the purpose of closing up his rear; and, after receiving a supply of bullocks, crossed the Guadarama mountains, so as to reach Villa Castin with his infantry and guns. Meanwhile, his cavalry took post on the road to Arevola, occupying the town itself with a picket, which, during the night of the 29th, found itself attacked by a superior body of French horse. The men withdrew, skirmishing, to a cottage by the roadside, in rear of which they made another stand. But they were not followed; and hence, though the alarm was given, and Hope became aware that his communications were

far from secure, the information obtained scarcely sufficed to guide him in his arrangements for averting the threatened danger.

Under such circumstances, general Hope felt that every moment was of value; and that the slightest hesitation on his part would probably lead to results very deeply to be deplored. He, too, was by this time acquainted with the disaster at Tudela; and his scouts brought in reports of columns, both of horse and foot, appearing within twelve miles of the outposts. He had before him but a choice of difficulties; for either he must retreat upon Guadarama, leaving the army at Salamanca bare of artillery, or he must force the junction by a flank march of three days over a flat country, and in the presence of a very superior cavalry. Hope adopted the latter and the bolder course. Throwing out strong patrols cautiously towards the French, he put his infantry, his guns, and convoy in motion; and, as the whole moved on by night as well as by day, they reached Peneranda, by different routes, on the 2d of December. The cavalry were then drawn in so as to occupy Fonteneros; and, on the 5th of December, the long-looked for communication took place.

Up to the present moment sir John Moore's determination of retreating upon the frontiers of Portugal had undergone no change. In spite of the remonstrances of Mr. Frere, and the undisguised regrets not only of the army at large, but of the members of his own family, his preparations were all made with a view to this consummation; — nor, in the existing state of things, could the policy of providing for some such result be blamed. The Spanish armies, defeated and dispersed, left him exposed to the fury of Napoleon in person; who, at the head of 100,000 men, was advancing towards the capital. He beheld neither vigour in the government nor enthusiasm among the people; and it needed but a slender share of common sense to assure him, that 30,000 British troops, however excellent, were not sufficient to check the career of the

triumphant invader. It may, indeed, admit of a question, whether the line of retreat marked out was, under the circumstances of the times, the best that could have been chosen: but, to have remained with a portion of his force in an open town, liable from day to day to be attacked by numbers altogether overwhelming, would have convicted him, not of courage, but of absolute insanity. From the moment that he became fully aware of the overthrow of Blake, Belvidere, and Castaños, sir John Moore must have seen that a new field of operation had become necessary; and towards securing that, whether in the south, in the north, or in Portugal, his undivided attention ought to have been turned.

But while we express ourselves thus, let us not be understood as contending that the difficulties which beset sir John Moore, either now or at other times, were of an ordinary nature. Never, perhaps, was the leader of a great army exposed to the evils of false information so continually, we had almost said so systematically. Even when their wretched levies were scattered to the four winds, the Spanish government persisted in the use of language as mischievous as it was devoid of truth; and of the English agents employed to act as checks upon the natives, not a few deceived either him or themselves. The circumstances attending an interview which he granted to don Augustin Bueno and don Ventura Escalante, two Spanish generals whom the central junta had despatched for the purpose of pressing upon him an immediate march to Madrid, are well known; yet as they serve to illustrate the peculiarly harassing nature of the impositions to which he was continually exposed, we may perhaps be permitted to refer to them.

A day or two previous to the arrival of general Hope, the Spanish gentlemen just named presented themselves at the head-quarters of the British army. They had been preceded by a letter from Mr. Martin Garay, the secretary to the supreme government, in which he set forth to great advantage the resources of the country,

and strongly urged the wisdom of arranging a more definite plan of operations between them and sir John Moore. To all that the secretary asserted they gave the full weight of their testimony. They assured sir John Moore that the Spanish armies were numerous, "that they were undismayed, and augmenting every hour; and that general San Juan, with 20,000 men, had so fortified the pass of Somosierra as to render Madrid secure from any insult on that side." Moore heard them with ill-disguised contempt, and interrupted them at last by introducing colonel Graham, who, the night before, had left San Juan at Talavera, whither, with the remains of his defeated corps, he had fled. It is scarcely necessary to add, that having received such proofs of the ignorance and folly of his proposed coadjutors, Moore brought his conference with them to a speedy termination, and adhered to his own plans.

This extraordinary interview occurred on the 3d of December; and throughout the 4th and 5th, Moore's resolution seemed fixed. He had even called his generals together, explained to them the nature of his position, and warned them of the necessity of a zealous co-operation in the proposed movement, when there arrived, on the evening of the latter day, communications from Mr. Stuart, Mr. Frere, and don Thomas Morla, — the latter, as we need scarcely recall to the reader's recollection, one of the deputies from the supreme junta intrusted with the government of Madrid. All these united in representing the inhabitants of the capital as animated by the noblest sentiments. It was added, that 25,000 men under Castanos, and 10,000 from the Somosierra, were marching in all haste to support the 40,000 already in arms; that the streets were unpaved, the entrances to the town barricaded, and that the glory acquired by Zaragoza would be more than rivalled by that of Madrid. Finally, the retreat upon Portugal was deprecated in the strongest terms; and the English general was urged either to throw himself into the capital, or, uniting his army with that of

Blake, to operate a diversion by threatening the rear of the French. A ray of hope broke in upon the despondency which had hitherto darkened the general's mind. He wrote the same night, entreating that Baird would suspend his retrogression; and followed up the letter by a second order next day, in which he directed that officer to retrace his steps to Astorga, though still providing against the chances that a retreat might become necessary. All this was judicious and proper; and if the tone in which these instructions were communicated partook somewhat too much of distrust, the measures themselves, embracing the establishment of magazines at Villa Franca, and other places in the rear, were perfectly sound. It is to be regretted only that they stopped short where they did; and that arrangements were not made even now for the taking up of a strong position in that province, whither in the event of a reverse it would be necessary to withdraw.

While thus exerting himself to render his force available, and opening a communication with the marquis de la Romana, sir John Moore found himself placed in an exceedingly painful situation, through the over-zeal, to call it by no harsher term, of Mr. Frere, and the extreme folly and presumption of the emigrant colonel Charmilly. The latter, a person of doubtful character, had been intrusted by the British minister with two separate despatches for sir John Moore, one of which he was desired to deliver only in the event of the other failing to shake the general's determination to retreat. Of colonel Charmilly, sir John Moore entertained but an indifferent opinion; and though he entered into conversation with him, after perusing Mr. Frere's letter, he studiously avoided making any display either of his sentiments or views. Charmilly concluded from this, as well as from the unguarded conversation of the staff, that the arguments of his employer had been disregarded; and he delivered, in consequence, the second despatch, on the morning of the 6th of December. It contained a most unwarrantable request, that sir John

Moore would cause the bearer to be examined, touching the military state of Spain, before a council of war. Moore felt and resented the insult. He did not, indeed, tear the letter to pieces, as almost every writer on the subject asserts, for it exists at this hour in its integrity, but he commanded the emigrant to quit his presence, and to withdraw immediately from Salamanca. This done, and Mr. Frere having been mildly rebuked for a proceeding totally unauthorised by their relative situations, Moore turned his attention to the adjustment of the plan on which he had resolved to act.

We have now arrived at a stage in our narrative, concerning which we must confess that, in spite of all that has been said and written illustrative of this celebrated campaign, we feel ourselves like a man groping in the dark. To trace the progress of sir John Moore's marches, and to give the same account of his designs which he gave himself, is not indeed difficult; but when we come to enquire into the purposes which these designs, even if accomplished, could have effected, the means of arriving at a just and satisfactory conclusion are to our view of no easy attainment. We are not, indeed, at a loss to discover why the projected retrogression upon Portugal was suspended. The situation of Madrid, and the necessity thence imposed upon Napoleon of employing before that place a large portion of his force, furnished a strong ground of hazarding in its favour a forward movement. It is evident, likewise, that the safest and most effectual course by which such diversion could be effected, would carry the British troops towards the lines of the enemy's communications. This, again, was to be done only by a movement to the left; for the route across the Tagus, and so onwards to the south of Spain, became closed to the British army as soon as Madrid was invested. But that the consequences, inevitable from such a change of ground undertaken after Madrid had fallen, were seen and provided against by the British general, we are still, in the face of much ingenious reasoning,

compelled to disbelieve. On the contrary, though we have ample proof that the probable necessity of a retreat into Galicia did occur to him, there is no evidence that it produced any grave or matured consideration of the uses to which that retreat might be turned. At all events, the province was not examined with a view to the selection of positions, which the army, when driven thither, might maintain; nor were any preparations made, by marking bridges for destruction, to retard the enemy in pursuit. It is true that Moore spoke of advancing "bridle in hand;" and that the probability of "having a run for it as soon as the bubble burst," never for a moment was absent from his mind; yet that due preparations were not made for that anticipated run, or, in other words, that his movements were not executed as movements tending to a retreat, a simple detail of events as they occurred will, probably, convince all impartial observers.

We stated some time ago that sir John Moore came on the 6th of December to the determination of holding his ground a little longer in Spain. It was not, however, till the 9th, that he made up his mind to move forward; for strong misgivings still haunted him, and he felt no inclination to commit himself on the mere assurance of don Morla, or even of Mr. Frere. Colonel Graham was accordingly despatched for the purpose of gathering intelligence, by the nature of which it was understood that the general would be guided, and he returned at a late hour on the day just specified, having, with considerable personal risk, penetrated as far as Talavera. His report was of a very mixed nature. Madrid had capitulated, or rather was betrayed by its rulers; the Spanish troops had withdrawn from it, full of indignation, and in good order; the enemy were in possession of the Retiro, but the populace, wild with rage, threatened every moment to break forth into rebellion. Thirty thousand French soldiers were thus fully occupied in retaining the conquest which they had achieved; while, of the remainder, some were moving upon Zaragoza,

some towards Talavera, and a third body upon Toledo. Now, though far less encouraging than it had recently been when Morla represented Madrid as impregnable, the state of affairs appeared to the general at least not desperate, for he had just received assurances from the junta of Toledo that they were prepared to perish in defence of their town;—and of the fidelity of Zaragoza no doubt could exist. He therefore wrote to Romana, informing him of his design to push upon Valladolid, and, directing Baird to close in towards Benevente, he himself made ready to risk much "in obedience to the wishes of the people of England."

With the history of Romana, as far as he appeared as an actor on the stage of Spanish warfare, we take it for granted that our readers are generally acquainted. Removed from Denmark in the autumn of 1808, and landed at Corunna with 9000 veterans, he joined Blake's army in time to share in its defeat; after which he retired with a half famished infantry into the mountains of Leon, where he became a point around which fugitives from all quarters were enabled to assemble. Never, perhaps, was there brought together a more disorderly or worse organised corps than that of which Romana was at the head. Yet to him (for Castanos was by this time superseded) sir John Moore had been referred, not only as the officer with whom it would be most convenient to communicate, but as the commander-in-chief of the Spanish armies; and, to say the truth, he proved to the full as rational and as well disposed as any other Spanish leader with which the British general had been brought into correspondence.

The forward movement of the British army began on the 11th of December, at a moment when the enemy, though immeasurably superior to the allies, were very widely scattered. About 150,000 French troops were then in Spain, divided into six separate corps, of which one under Bessières was marching upon Valencia, another under Victor threatened Toledo, a third under Lefebvre pressed towards Badajos, a fourth under Mor-

tier invested Zaragoza, a fifth under Soult hung upon the frontier of Leon, and a sixth with Napoleon himself held Madrid. To oppose these, there were of British soldiers about 25,000 effectives, of which 2800 were cavalry, while Romana reported his strength at 20,000 men, destitute of arms, cartouch boxes, shoes, and even clothing. With respect, again, to the armies of the centre and the right, these had entirely wasted away, and their miserable remains appeared only in scattered bands among the fastnesses of the sierras, or behind impassable rivers. Nevertheless sir John Moore desired to afford to these bands an opportunity of reuniting into one; and hence he took the road to Valladolid, not without a perfect knowledge that he would be immediately followed and observed by every disposable Frenchman in the Peninsula.

So early as the 9th, the cavalry of Baird's corps, amounting in all to 1538 troopers, had arrived, under the command of lord Paget, at Zamora. On the 12th, this fine body of men removed to Toro, while the hussar brigade, under brigadier-general Stuart, advanced to Tordesillas, and the remaining divisions marching from Alba de Tormes, Salamanca, and Ludesma, headquarters were established on the 13th at Alaejos. At this juncture two events befell, each, after its own peculiar fashion, bearing upon the issue of the war. In the first place, a portion of the hussar brigade surprised and destroyed, in the town of Rueda, a French post consisting of fifty cavalry and thirty infantry. It was the first opportunity which the English had had of measuring themselves with the enemy, and the result of the affair, though trifling in itself, was not without a moral effect upon the feelings of the men. In the next place, an officer was intercepted and murdered by the peasantry, while carrying a despatch from marshal Berthier to marshal Soult; and the packet being conveyed to sir John Moore, the latter saw immediate cause to arrange his plans. Instead of pushing upon Valladolid, and awaiting there the arrival of Baird from the rear, he

resolved to defile to the left, and to complete his junction between Toro and Benevente. Of this due notice was immediately communicated to sir David Baird; and general Romana, in like manner, being requested to co-operate in the proposed undertaking, sir John Moore prepared himself to strike a blow, on the success of which he believed that there was good ground to calculate.

In the intercepted despatch, certain facts were disclosed of the highest importance to sir John Moore and the liberating army. The emperor, it appeared, entertained a firm conviction that the English were in full retreat towards Lisbon, with the view of hastening which he had detached a strong corps, by Talavera, towards Badajos. Under this persuasion he warned Soult, that from that enemy at least he had nothing to apprehend; and hence that the opportunity of reducing Leon, and of driving back the insurgents into Galicia by taking possession of Benevente and Zamora, lay immediately within his reach. Reference, moreover, was made to the amount of the force under Soult's command, from which it appeared that he occupied a position at Saldana with two divisions, while Junot was collecting a third at Burgos, and Mortier with a fourth was moving towards Zaragoza. The most accurate information which he had been hitherto able to collect induced Moore to believe that Soult, with less than 10,000 men, lay between Sahagun and Almanzer. To that corps he felt that, with the troops under his own immediate orders, he was more than a match; he did not, therefore, apprehend that any serious risk would be incurred by leaving it on his flank; and he trusted that both Baird and Romana would, by the exercise of a just vigilance, obviate all hazard of being attacked in detail. He now discovered that Soult's force fell little, if at all, short of the total amount of his own effectives after they should have been brought together. It became a matter of prudence, therefore, to complete his junction with Baird as a step preliminary to all others,

consequent upon which an attempt might be made to strike at Soult while yet unaware of the proximity of an English army.

On the 16th, Hope's division having passed the Douro at Tordesillas, and pushed on to Villepando, sir John Moore established his head-quarters at Toro. Here he was met by a member of the supreme junta, with whom Mr. Stuart travelled in company, and who was the bearer of two letters: one from Mr. Frere, full, as usual, of remonstrances and adjurations; the other, somewhat in the same style, from the Spanish government. Both had been written in ignorance of his change of plan, and, as a necessary consequence, inveighed against a retreat; but both contained solemn assurances of the increasing enthusiasm of the Spanish people, and the growing strength of the Spanish arms. It has been asserted, too, though on what authority we pretend not to say, that don Francisco Coro, the representative of the junta, made a tender to sir John Moore of the chief command of the native forces. This may be true, or it may be false. All that we know on the subject is, that the offer, if made, was declined; probably because the general knew that there were then no armies in existence of whose services he could avail himself.

It does not appear that these letters, however ill-timed or injudiciously expressed, gave any serious disturbance to Moore's equanimity, which was much more powerfully affected by hearing that Romana, instead of moving forward to join him, had actually commenced his retreat into Galicia. He thus threw himself on the single line by which the English could obtain supplies, or, in the event of a disaster, make good their retreat; for the communications with Portugal were, to all intents and purposes, broken, and Corunna was now the great base of their operations. A strong remonstrance was immediately sent off, accompanied by an earnest request that Romana, if he found it inconvenient to act elsewhere, would penetrate into the Asturias; by which

means he would at once leave clear the road through Astorga to Villa Franca, and secure the left flank of the communication with the coast. But no pause was made for the purpose of ascertaining how the remonstrance might be received. Head-quarters, on the contrary, were removed on the 18th to Castro Nuevo; Hope's division occupying Villepando; while the cavalry scoured the open country, as far as the suburbs of Valladolid, and made some prisoners in various successful skirmishes. Meanwhile Baird was moving in the opposite direction; and on the 20th, the two corps became united with the cavalry at Melgar Abaxo, and the infantry at Mayorga.

The encounters which had hitherto taken place between the English and the French troops were all on a scale so diminutive, as to produce no very decided effect on the *morale* of either army. The occasional surprise of a picket, or the destruction of a patrol, was all of which the former could boast; while the latter, usually outnumbered, attached no importance to reverses in themselves so trivial. While the head-quarters of the British army occupied Mayorga, an opportunity offered of bringing the relative value of the two bodies more decidedly into comparison. It was not permitted to pass unimproved; and the result of the experiment brought with it just ground of congratulation both to general Moore and his followers.

Lord Paget, to whom the chief command of the cavalry had been intrusted, received information, about noon on the 20th, that a body of French horse, believed to be 700 or 800 in number, occupied Sahagun, a large village on the Cea. He determined to surprise them; and with this view caused the 10th and 15th hussars to mount and push forward a little after midnight. The point from which he set out, the Monastero Melgar Abaxo, was about three leagues from Sahagun; and the weather being intensely cold, the ground was covered with snow; nevertheless, the horses were fresh, the men in excellent spirits, and full of confidence

both in themselves and their leaders. The total number of the brigade might amount to 800 or 850 men.

When they had ridden about two thirds of the way, lord Paget divided his force; and directing the 10th to push slowly forward under general Slade, he himself, at the head of the 15th, made a considerable detour, so as to cut off the enemy's retreat. In effecting this movement, the 15th fell in with a patrol, which was instantly charged and overthrown; but, one man escaping, the French dragoons were warned of their danger, and made ready to meet it as became them. The consequence was, that when lord Paget reached the rear of the village (and the day had dawned ere this was accomplished), he found the enemy drawn up in line and ready to receive him. As yet the 10th were far in the rear, for Slade had not anticipated the celerity with which lord Paget moved; and the French, as was sufficiently apparent by the extent of their line, outnumbered the 15th by nearly two to one; yet there was no hesitation exhibited or experienced as to the course which it might be necessary to pursue. The 15th wheeled up, trotted forward to give the charge, and were arrested only by the intervention of a wide ditch or ravine, in rear of which the enemy had formed. A little manœuvring now ensued, which ended in the passage of the ditch, and a re-formation on the opposite side; after which, both parties shifted their ground once or twice, for the purpose of gaining the flank each of the other. In this the English were successful, when, coming down with great fury, they overthrew in a moment the enemy, who stood still to receive them. Many of the French were killed, and 150 prisoners, including two colonels, were taken. The rest escaped by a disorderly flight, leaving the 15th masters of the field.

Meanwhile the rest of the army was put in motion, and advanced on the 21st to Sahagun, where head-quarters were established, and continued throughout the two following days. The troops had, it appeared, outmarched their supplies, and there were yet various

matters to be arranged preliminary to the decisive operation on which the general had determined. While resting here, sir John Moore received communications from Romana, replete, as the communications of Spanish officers uniformly were, with proofs of extraordinary assurance and incapacity. It was asserted, for example, that Madrid still held out; that Soult's force fell short of rather than exceeded 10,000 men; and it proposed that a meeting should take place at Benevente, between the writer and sir John Moore, where a plan for surrounding the enemy might be arranged. Of such a proposition no notice could of course be taken; nevertheless some satisfaction was derived from an assurance which the Spaniard gave, that he had already withdrawn from Galicia, and that he was preparing to advance in two columns by Almanzer and Guarda.

The letter, of which we have thus given the outlines, reached sir John Moore while on the road to Sahagun, and bore date December the 19th; on the 23d a second despatch came in, written a day later. From this, amid much false information, sir John Moore received a confirmation of rumours which had already reached him, and on the authenticity of which he placed full reliance. It appeared that Soult, made aware of the approach of the English, had hastened the march of reinforcements from Burgos, and that other corps were in progress to strengthen him both from Palencia and elsewhere. Moore was not diverted from his original intention by these reports; but, being assured of the support of 7000 Spanish infantry, he made his dispositions to bring on — what his troops earnestly desired — a general action.

It was the design of sir John Moore to quit his ground about eight o'clock in the evening of the 23d, so as to reach Carrion soon after daylight on the 24th. Having forced the bridge, which he understood to be occupied by 5000 men, he should then ascend the river, and fall upon the main body of the French in their position at Soldana, at the moment when the Spaniards

threatened them from the rear. With this view, the convents in Sahagun were fitted up as hospitals, while the troops, eager for the fray, stood to their arms at the time appointed. But the march was scarcely begun, when a third despatch arrived from Romana, which, confirmed as its contents were by the reports of the spies, caused an immediate suspension of the movement. Sir John Moore found, not only that Soult was concentrated at Carrion, to the amount of 18,000 or 19,000 men; but that the whole of the French army, intermitting the enterprises in which its several parts were embarked, was marching to surround him. The corps originally moved upon Badajos had suddenly wheeled, and rations for many thousand men were ordered at Palencia, while Napoleon himself, at the head of 50,000 men, was across the Guadarama, and in rapid advance towards Benevente. To have persevered in his proposed attack could have led only to the loss of the whole army, no matter whether victorious or defeated in the battle. The regiments were, therefore, commanded to return to their quarters, and immediate steps were taken to commence a retreat into Galicia.

While the baggage was moving to the rear, and other impediments to the rapid progress of the troops averted, Moore despatched an officer to Romana, that he might arrange with him such an order of retreat as should at once obviate the risk of unnecessary crowding, and more effectually retard the enemy in pursuit. The Spaniards being already at Mansilla, that route across the Esla was left to them,—they undertaking to defend the bridge till the whole of the British troops should have passed, and then to retire, not into Galicia, but into Leon. Meanwhile the roads by Valencia de San Juan, and Castro Gonsalo, were allotted to the two columns into which the British infantry were distributed; the former being followed by sir David Baird's corps, the latter by the division of general Hope. The cavalry, however, were to hold their ground, making demonstrations towards the enemy's outposts; indeed, they

were not to quit the position till nightfall on the 25th, some hours after the reserve and light infantry should have withdrawn.

No movement could be conducted with greater order and regularity than the commencement of this memorable retreat. At a late hour on the evening of the 24th, the British corps set forward, and reached their respective points of destination at Valencia and Castro Gonsalo without sustaining either accident or hinderance. The cavalry, in like manner, played their part to admiration; for they kept the enemy's outposts confined to their own stations, and withdrew at last totally unperceived: and high time it was that the Esla should be made to interpose between this handful of British soldiers and the overwhelming masses that threatened them. Napoleon in person was approaching Tordesillas, and his patrols were already in sight, for some of them reached Castro Gonsalo ere the passage of the river could be effected, and insulted the rear of the column by destroying a slight portion of the baggage. Soult, likewise, now increased to more than the amount of his late assailant, had begun to move forward: Junot, with the army liberated at Cintra, was threatening their flank from Palencia: while Lefebvre, in possession of Salamanca, effectually interposed himself between them and the Portuguese frontiers. Thus were they threatened, on all hands, by a force against which resistance was clearly hopeless, and left with one narrow outlet alone through which to escape.

We have said that the cavalry, acting strictly in accordance with their instructions, saw the reserve clear of the position at Sahagun, and followed, at an interval of some hours, during the night of the 25th. On the 26th, an opportunity presented itself to a portion of the 10th hussars, of which that fine regiment gladly took advantage. Not far from Mayorga a considerable body of French dragoons were observed on the summit of a rising ground, making ready, as it appeared, to cut off any stragglers who might fall out from the column

while in march. Lord Paget immediately gave orders that they should be dislodged; and colonel Leigh, putting himself at the head of two squadrons, performed the service effectually. Though outnumbering the English greatly, and therefore prompt to receive the charge, the enemy, in spite of the advantages of position, were overthrown. About 100 prisoners remained with the victors.

Having thus freed themselves from the presence of a body of men, which, though too weak to molest the line of march, was still capable of producing uneasiness, the cavalry pursued its route, and reached the left bank of the Esla, now occupied by the light troops and a few guns, under brigadier-general Craufurd. It was crossed the following day; and after a toilsome march, performed under the pressure of an incessant and cold rain, the column arrived, on the 27th, at Benevente. Meanwhile Romana, leaving 3000 men to defend the bridge at Mansilla, fell back upon Leon; while Baird, surmounting all the obstacles opposed by a rising river, and a lamentable dearth of boats, gained the right of the Esla, and closed up his rear. But the dangers by which the retreating army had been threatened were scarcely diminished by these events. Soult, leaving the English to continue their progress unmolested, turned fiercely upon the Spaniards, and drove them, by a charge of cavalry, from the bridge at Mansilla. He thus opened out a road to Astorga, considerably shorter than those by which the British columns were moving; and it needed but the reduction of Leon, a town scarcely protected by a ruinous wall, to render him completely master of it.

Distrustful of the degree of obstinacy with which Romana's rear-guard would maintain their post, Moore had written to the Spanish general himself, pointing out how necessary to the safety of both armies was a protracted resistance at Leon, and urging him to keep it to extremity. Romana readily promised to do so; but he represented, at the same time, that the roads into As-

turias were impracticable; and that he must, when at last compelled to fall back, retire upon Astorga. Against this latter determination Moore strongly protested, but the event proved that his reasoning went for nothing. In the mean while, however, he found occupation enough in and around Benevente. The men, smarting under the sense of imaginary disgrace, suffering severely from the weather, and totally neglected by the Spanish authorities, had begun of late to exhibit symptoms of considerable disorganisation, and something more than discontent. They took by force the supplies which the inhabitants refused to furnish, and were, in several instances, guilty of great excesses. Moore felt this very deeply. He issued an order, strongly reprimanding the troops, and accusing the officers of neglect of duty, while he threatened to inflict summary punishment on the first person, no matter what his rank, who should be detected in the repetition of such offences. Moore incurred at the moment, as most men in his situation do, the censure of those to whom he addressed himself; but the reproof was not thrown away, and it is now universally acknowledged to have been richly merited.

Though head-quarters were established in Benevente so early as noon of the 27th, colonel Craufurd, with his light infantry and a couple of guns, continued to maintain themselves on the left bank of the Esla till midnight on the 28th. It was considered necessary that the bridge should be broken down; and the commanding nature of the left bank, which overlooked the level country on the opposite side, would have rendered it easy for the enemy, once in possession of the ridge, to defeat the best efforts of the English workmen to accomplish that object. But as the labour of breaking up a piece of solid and well-seasoned masonry was far from trifling, it went on very slowly; and the French, by repeated demonstrations on foot, as well as on horseback, strove gallantly to interrupt it. At last, however, two of the arches were severed, and the buttresses connecting them blown up; after which, amid the horrors of a tempes-

tuous night, the troops withdrew across the chasm on planks, which they cast down into the foaming torrent so soon as the last of their rear-guard was safe. They reached Benevente about three o'clock in the morning of the 29th, and at seven were once more in full retreat.

It is not very easy to determine to what precise point, if to any, the calculations of sir John Moore tended at the commencement of his retrogression. If it were fair to judge, from the tenor of his own correspondence, he certainly entertained the idea of defending Galicia; indeed, he alluded to that matter as all but fixed, in a letter which he despatched to Romana on the 27th of December from Benevente. According to that despatch, a stand would certainly be made at Astorga; and failing decisive success there, he was prepared to take up other and defensible positions among the mountains. "I shall continue my movement on Astorga," says he. "It is there, or behind it, we should fight a battle, if at all. If the enemy follow so far, he will leave himself more open to the efforts of the south. My opinion is, that a battle is the game of Bonaparte, not ours. We should, if followed, take defensive positions in the mountains, where his cavalry can be of no use to him; and there either engage him in an unequal contest with us, oblige him to employ a considerable corps to watch us, or to retire upon Madrid; in which last case we should again come forth into the plain. In this manner we give time for the arrival of reinforcements from England, your army to be equipped and formed, and that of the south of Spain to come forth." Such was the tenor of his reasoning as addressed to general Romana; yet we find him, in a letter to lord Castlereagh which bears date only one day later, using the following expressions indicative alike of his own want of self-confidence, and of his belief of the positive invincibility of the force which pursued him. "The country about Astorga offers no advantage to an inferior army; I shall, therefore, not stop longer there than to secure the stores, and shall retreat to Villa Franca,

where I understand there is a position. But if the French pursue I must hasten to the coast, for there is a road to Orense which leads more direct to Vigo, and which, of course, renders the position of Villa Franca of no avail. * * * I shall be guided by circumstances, and shall not, you may rest assured, retreat an inch beyond what I am compelled to do. But I fear, if once I am forced into the mountains, that the want of the means of subsistence will render it necessary to proceed down to the coast, to be provisioned from the ships. I need hardly add, the necessity of sending immediately the means of transport to re-embark the army at Vigo and Corunna."

From these extracts alone a strong presumption may be formed, that though the idea of maintaining himself in Galicia did occur, as it were, loosely and vaguely to the mind of the general, he never took the plan into his deliberate consideration, or adopted any steps with a view to carry it into effect. Officers were, indeed, sent out to examine the nature of the country in his rear; but their examination had reference only to the condition of the roads, and to the practicability of passing with more or less facility to some point on the coast where the troops might be embarked. We are not aware that so much as one survey was made of any district alluded to by common report as affording a defensible position. The general says, it is true, that Villa Franca was described to him as exceedingly defensible; and he even talks of making there the stand which was to embarrass all the schemes of Bonaparte; but it is manifest, from his own expressions, that of that position he had been very imperfectly informed, and it is certain that no officer commissioned by him ever reconnoitred it. We apprehend, therefore, that we do sir John Moore no injustice, when we say, that as yet he had not come to any fixed determination — that he saw things in the gloomiest light — entertained little hope of ultimate success — and found his attention continually, and perhaps involuntarily, turned towards the coast; but that from

time to time the possibility of showing a front passed before the eye of his mind, and occasioned, if not a feeling of hardihood bordering upon rashness, at all events extreme uneasiness and intense anxiety. A high sense of personal honour, a full knowledge of what was expected from him at home, and a consciousness that the means at his disposal were not, perhaps, unequal to realise, at least temporarily, his country's expectations, all these considerations urged him to fight;—though a rooted conviction that even victory could tend in no degree to preserve Spain, hindered him from digesting any plan, by adhering to which he might expect to fight successfully.

We have said, that on the 27th of December, headquarters were established at Benevente. The project of marching upon Vigo was at this time cherished by sir John Moore, and he caused enquiries to be made as to the practicability of the road which conducts by way of Orense to that place. He found that it was altogether impassable by cannon; and he therefore directed that the retreat should be continued to Astorga, where Baird was instructed to join. On the 28th, the divisions of Hope and Fraser marched to La Banessa; on the 29th, they pushed on for Astorga, Moore quitting Benevente the same day with the reserve, and the cavalry being left to bring up the rear. Of these not a few had slept during the night of the 28th in an extensive convent close to the river, where they were preserved by the great moral courage of one man from perishing most miserably.* Of that, however, they knew nothing;

* We extract the following account of that affair from the first volume of colonel Napier's History of the Peninsular War:—

"Several thousand infantry slept in the long galleries of an immense convent built round a square; the lower corridors were filled with the horses of the cavalry and artillery, so thickly stowed, that it was scarcely possible for a single man to pass them, and there was but one entrance. Two officers returning from the bridge, being desirous to find shelter for their men, entered the convent, and with horror perceived that a large window shutter being on fire, and the flame spreading to the rafters above, in a few moments the straw under the horses would ignite, and 6000 men and animals would inevitably perish in the flames. One of the officers, captain Lloyd, of the 43d, a man of great activity, strength, and presence of mind, made a sign to his companions to keep silence, and springing on to the nearest horse, ran along the backs of the others till he reached the

and in the occurrences of the day following, all desire of referring to other and less interesting events was absorbed.

The dawn had set in but a short while when a strong body of French cavalry were seen to try for a ford at no great distance from the ruins of the bridge. They discovered it and passed; while the patrols, falling back, made haste to form, so as to be able to check, if not to restrain, them. The corps which had thus thrown itself across the Esla consisted of about 600 of the cavalry of the guard, and was led on by their commandant, M. Lefebvre Desnouettes, a general of division. They were immediately charged by colonel Otway, at the head of 200 light horse; and the leading squadrons were more than once compelled to falter: but the odds were tremendous, and, of course, the enemy gained ground. While this was going on, lord Paget and brigadier-general Stewart arrived at the spot. The former hastened to bring back the 10th hussars; while the latter took command of the pickets, and continued the skirmish, which became, at last, so warm, that the squadrons were repeatedly intermixed. By and by the 10th, having completed their formation, rode forward to support, and, in five minutes, the affair was decided. The enemy, broken at a rush, fled in the utmost confusion, leaving Lefebvre, with seventy other prisoners, behind, and rallied at the opposite side of the stream, only to be dispersed again by a few rounds from the horse artillery.

In the mean time, general Moore was pursuing his march to Labanessa, which he reached without any disaster. He was followed, at nightfall, by the cavalry, which had held its ground all day, under an occasional cannonade; and, on the 30th, at a late hour, Baird's corps having already come in, the whole army assembled

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flaming window shutter, which he tore off its hinges and cast out of the window; then returning quietly, awakened some of the soldiers and cleared the passage without creating any alarm, which in such a case would have been as destructive as the flames." — (Page 467.)

at Astorga. But the scene which met them there was at once harrowing and vexatious in no ordinary degree. Romana's miserable followers, driven first from Mansilla, and afterwards from Leon, now crowded Astorga; and the line, which Moore had so anxiously striven to keep clear, was choked up. We cannot pretend to describe the confusion and riot which marked the progress of that night. The English, already disposed to regard the Spaniards as enemies, laid no restraint upon their fury when they found every house and stable occupied by Spanish soldiers; nor could the squalid and unearthly appearance of these diseased and naked men inspire them with the smallest pity. It was with some difficulty that many of them could be restrained from sacrificing their unhappy allies upon the spot.

Astorga was at this time full of stores, which sir David Baird, at the general's desire, had painfully accumulated. By far the greater portion of these were destroyed; for Moore entertained no idea of halting here longer than might be necessary for purposes of repose, and he was without the means of transporting any additional baggage. So soon, therefore, as Romana's people were furnished with as many muskets and cartridges as they could carry, and the immediate wants of the British troops were partly made good, the work of destruction began, and ammunition, intrenching tools, shoes, rum, provisions, and clothing, were, with melancholy indiscrimination, committed to the flames.

We have spoken harshly of the conduct of Romana in evacuating Leon, and falling, in despite of a pledge given to the contrary, on the line of the English retreat. It is an act of mère justice to add, that, enfeebled as the Spaniards were, and suffering under the ravages of typhus fever, they expressed themselves even now inimical to a further retrogression. Romana, in particular, insisted on the policy of making at least a temporary stand on the strong ground about Astorga, whence, in case of reverse, a retreat could, at any moment, be secured, through the almost impregnable passes of Mon-

zanal and Foncebadan. We are not prepared to say that the advice thus given ought to have been adopted. Doubtless, the position of Astorga was capable of being maintained till part at least of the stores collected there was removed; while the road to Villa Franca lay secure against all flank movements, except such as might be extended far beyond the limits compatible with a brisk affair. But to speak of Astorga as the point where the British army might pretend to make a determined stand against the masses that now threatened it, were ridiculous. At all events, sir John Moore was convinced that even a temporary check could not here be offered to the enemy; and Romana was warned that he must needs choose a line of march apart from that by which the English were about to move. Without a murmur, the high-minded Spaniard turned his starving and sickly men towards Orense, little dreaming that there also his allies were before him, and the resources of the country swallowed up.

When the troops received orders to evacuate Benevente, an impression was created in their minds that the sole object of the retrograde movement was to discover some more favourable position on which to deliver a battle. It is possible enough that Moore, in sanctioning this rumour, went in nothing beyond the straight line of integrity — in other words, that he really did intend to show front to his pursuers as soon as he should discover a spot of ground adapted for the display of his strength. But, however this may be, it is very certain, that, from the hour when the men turned their backs upon Astorga, all hope of retaining even a temporary hold in Galicia was abandoned. In proof of this, we need only state, that the light brigade, the very *élite* of the army, were here separated from their comrades. As if uncertain how most speedily to reach the coast, Moore caused Craufurd and his corps to pass, by cross roads, through Orense towards Vigo; while the rest of the troops followed the great causeway which conducts to Villa Franca. We would willingly draw a veil over

the results of this movement, as they showed themselves in the temper and discipline of the men, were we permitted so to do by a sense of what is due to the public. "The army," says lord Londonderry, "had hitherto fallen back, under the persuasion that it would not be required to retreat beyond its present position at Astorga, but that here, or hereabouts, matters would be brought to the issue of a battle. Though their conduct, in many respects, cannot, certainly, be spoken of in high terms, it is probable that this prospect, and this alone, had hitherto kept the men in something like a state of subordination. They had committed various excesses, it is true; many had individually robbed and plundered, and got drunk by the way; and some had thus fallen into the hands of the enemy, or had perished from the inclemency of the weather: yet the army, considered as a body, was still efficient; and required nothing more than a few hours of rest, and a moderate supply of provisions, to restore it to the state of high order in which it was at Salamanca. From the moment when preparations began to be made for a continued retreat from Astorga, all this may be said to have been at an end. In Astorga, the blowing up of ammunition wagons, the destruction of intrenching tools, and the committal to the flames of field equipments for a whole division, gave the signal, as it were, for all the bad passions of those who witnessed the scene to be let loose; and, mortifying as it is to confess it, the fact cannot be denied, that, from that hour, we no longer resembled a British army."

When sir John Moore first made up his mind to move forward from Salamanca, he wrote to sir John Craddock, requesting that he would send round to Vigo every disposable ton of shipping, for the purpose of enabling him, if hard pressed, to withdraw from Galicia. This was done in utter ignorance of the nature of the country through which he proposed to pass; for Vigo is at once less accessible and more hampered, as a point of embarkation, than any other harbour along the coast.

Nevertheless, though the requisition was attended to, and the general knew that the case was so, he wavered, even after Astorga had been evacuated, between marching upon that point, and falling back across the mountains to Corunna. We want no other proof than this, that his project of maintaining the passes which lead into Galicia was, by this time, wholly abandoned. He looked, indeed, to the sea, and to it alone, as affording a chance of salvation to his army; and, in spite of numerous assurances to the contrary, the troops appear to have felt that they were at length in full flight.

The road from Astorga to Villa Franca passes through the villages of Torre, Benevebre, and Ponferrada, and leads over a country as wild and as romantic as it is possible for the imagination to conceive. Even now, in the depth of a severe winter, when the mountain tops were covered with snow, and the sleet falling thick and fast obscured the vision, and rendered the path all but impervious, it was impossible to look around without experiencing sensations of no ordinary kind; at least, this was the effect produced upon the minds of a few among the officers, whose official situations exempted them from a portion of that misery under which their less favoured comrades groaned. To the army at large, however, the march brought with it only sufferings of the most deplorable kind. Men and horses foundered at every step; and of the unfortunate women, who, by some strange oversight, had been permitted in unusual numbers to accompany their husbands, a large proportion lay down and died amid the snow wreaths. The most admirable system of discipline which the world has ever seen will not preserve order in the ranks of an army circumstanced as was that of sir John Moore. Straggling could no longer be prevented; and of the acts of plunder and marauding committed by the men upon the inhabitants, we gladly turn away from giving so much as a single specimen.

The rear of the column halted on the 31st of December at Benevebre, Hope and Fraser's division hav-

ing pushed the same day on to Villa Franca. No affair of consequence occurred during the march; for the enemy's cavalry, though they pressed the rear-guard continually, took warning by the issue of the skirmish on the Esla, and held aloof from coming to blows. But the scenes of confusion and drunkenness which presented themselves in the town beggar all description. It was no longer the act of an occasional marauding party. Whole regiments, setting the orders of their officers at defiance, burst into the cellars, and seized the liquors, which, with the recklessness of men who have given up all for lost, they drank till both minds and bodies became powerless. Meanwhile, a ceaseless rattle of carbines gave warning that the French hung upon their steps. It was to no purpose that appeals were made to the sense of honour which still, to a certain degree, adhered to them. The men answered, that they wished to face the enemy; that they were disgraced by being made to flee before them; that the Spaniards were traitors, and that they and their chief were sold. They then broke out into long and unmeaning ebullitions of blasphemy, and summed up all by quaffing more deeply from the wine casks.

Such was the manner in which the night of the 1st passed over; and its effects were not different from what might have been anticipated. At an early hour on the 2d, the column again set forward, but the multitude of stragglers left behind was such as to render necessary some extraordinary effort to bring them off. For this purpose the 20th regiment, under colonel Ross, was directed, with a strong rear-guard of cavalry, to see every wine cellar and provision store emptied, and to drive the miserable rabble before them even at the point of the bayonet. To a certain extent the rear-guard had executed this toilsome task, when an alarm was given that the enemy was approaching. All was now confusion among the stragglers, while the attention of the troops was directed to stay the approach of the pursuers as long as possible. They succeeded only in part;

for the enemy, breaking through the covering squadrons, rode furiously into the heart of the crowd, and with merciless activity cut down, without discrimination, all that came in their way. Neither sex nor age was respected, insomuch that the road presented in a few minutes one of the most harrowing spectacles on which the human eye has ever rested. Sir John Moore did not fail to make the most of this barbarous massacre. Of the mangled wretches that escaped, several were led, bleeding as they were, from the rear to the front of the column, while the officers pointed to them as living proofs that insubordination in the presence of an enemy never fails to bring destruction upon those who are guilty of it.

Meanwhile the army continued its retreat. On the 3d, the reserve halted at Calcabellos, a town distant about six miles from Villa Franca, whither the head-quarters had gone on. Since the affair of the 28th of December, there had been no serious fighting between any portions of the hostile armies: fortune so ordered it that they should again try their hardihood in a sharp skirmish on the 3d. It is to be observed, that Calcabellos lies in a hollow between two ranges of hills, and is divided in the middle by a stream, across which a bridge of stone is thrown. While the reserve occupied in force the slope of the further range, about 400 of the rifle corps, with the pickets of cavalry, had been left during the night between the 2d and 3d on the summit of the opposite height; the riflemen being directed, as soon as the enemy made his appearance, to fall back, while the cavalry endeavoured by repeated demonstrations to retard his march. At the dawn of day, a corps of French cavalry, led on by general Colbert, was seen to advance, and the rifles, as they were required to do, marched leisurely towards the bridge. The enemy hesitated for a time; Colbert, as the event proved, having demanded further reinforcements so soon as he saw how the English were disposed on the face of the opposite range. But Soult, to whom the

chase was now intrusted, not only disregarded the requisition, but sent peremptory orders that a charge should be hazarded at once. Colbert's military pride was wounded. He placed himself at the head of the dragoons, and dashed forward with reckless impetuosity.

The cavalry pickets, either misunderstanding their duty, or deceived as to the number of those by whom they were threatened, gave way without striking a blow. Down they came at speed towards the bridge, and, driving through the riflemen, exposed them to be assailed without the means of effectual resistance. About thirty men were thus lost; but the remainder, rushing through the town, soon spread themselves, in skirmishing order, among the vineyards, and opened, at the distance of thirty yards, a murderous fire upon the enemy. Many gallant horsemen fell, and among others Colbert himself; yet was the danger far from being over. A body of voltigeurs, treading rapidly on the heels of the cavalry, now came in, and the sharp report of the rifles was briskly answered by a heavy roll of musketry. By and by the 52d descended to support the rifles; then came Merle's division covering the face of the hill just abandoned, and threatening every moment to cross the stream, and to bear down by weight of numbers the English infantry. But there was support at hand for these brave men. A few pieces of horse artillery suddenly arrived, and opened their fire with effect, upon which the enemy drew back beyond range, leaving the rear-guard to pursue its march in peace. The skirmishers came in to Villa Franca late in the evening, having lost about 150 men during the day.

While the rear-guard was thus employed, the leading divisions had been guilty of a repetition of almost all those excesses which had brought with them consequences so disastrous at Benevebre. Wine cellars abounded in Villa Franca; and the temptation which these held out to a wearied and dispirited soldiery, not

even the remembrance of the scenes which had passed before their eyes in the morning sufficed to render feeble. In Villa Franca, moreover, magazines had been collected equal to a fortnight's consumption for the whole army; in a word, the men, who for some days past had endured the most appalling privations, found themselves suddenly thrown, as it were, into the midst of plenty. Plunder and excesses of every kind ensued, to which the general succeeded in putting a stop only after the utmost exertions had been used, and some of the most active of the marauders were executed. Yet were the stores, thus preserved from the lawless hands of the robber, given over in the course of that night to indiscriminate destruction. Bread, spirits, ammunition, shoes, all were committed to the flames; and at early dawn, the last hope of retaining a hold upon the country was extinguished, by a renewal of the precipitate and disastrous retreat.

It is scarcely necessary to remind the reader, that throughout the whole of their retrograde movement the British troops had been exposed to a succession of cold and tempestuous weather. The rain fell in torrents, mixed from time to time with sleet, which heavy gusts of wind blew into their faces; and the roads, deep, muddy, and rugged, proved impracticable to all whose constitutions were not more than ordinarily robust. To add to their miseries, the men's shoes wore out, and there was neither time, nor, indeed, resolution enough among themselves to make good the deficiency. Foot-sore and broken hearted, not a few had already lain down to die; while horses, foundered and worn out, covered the line of road by hundreds. But the distresses against which they had hitherto struggled appeared light, even to the sufferers themselves, when compared with this terrible march from Villa Franca to Castro. The route lay entirely, for about fifteen miles, up the face of an ascent, across which the pathway wound like the zig-zag in front of a beleaguered city: and though it led through the heart of scenery of the wildest and most romantic

character, that circumstance tended but little to reconcile the overwrought soldier to his task. We abstain from drawing any minute picture of the horrors which accompanied that day's march. Enough is done when we state, that they were altogether such as to draw from one who beheld them a confession that, "the most harrowing accounts which have yet been laid before the public fall short of the reality."*

The troops were now traversing a district of country, in comparison with which it would be difficult to point out in any quarter of the globe one more defensible. Absolutely secure from any direct attack in front, and exposed to danger on the left flank only by a road which two battalions might have maintained against an army, if ever there was a position capable of being successfully defended, it was that along the base of which winds the valley of the Syl. It possessed, moreover, the advantage, inestimable in the existing state of the British columns, that it gave to the troops which held it command over the most extensive and valuable iron-works in Spain. From these ample stores might have been drawn means for reshoeing all the animals in the army, and the cavalry and artillery would have thus become efficient; both of which had of late ceased to be available through the foundering of the horses. No attempt, however, was made to make here even a temporary stand. Every thing, on the contrary, which threatened to retard the retreat, whether baggage, cars, sick, or stragglers, was left behind; and as such hindrances became more and more numerous at every step, the losses sustained were enormous.

As the nature of the country no longer admitted of the operations of cavalry, that force was sent on by itself to Lugo. The reserve, on the other hand, continued to march in rear of the infantry column at an interval of several leagues; indeed, it quitted Villa Franca only at ten o'clock at night, and reached Herrerias at twelve. Here the general became at length convinced that a con-

* Lord Londonderry, in his Narrative of the Peninsular War.

tinuance of his present rate of marching would, within the space of a few days, prove as destructive as a total defeat. He determined, therefore, to give a few days rest to his troops, even at the hazard of receiving a battle; and having learned that there was at Lugo an exceedingly favourable position, he despatched orders for the leading divisions to halt there. Unfortunately, however, sir David Baird, less provident than his commander-in-chief, sent forward this important communication by an orderly dragoon, who, getting drunk by the way, lost his despatches, and deranged the whole plan of operations. It had been one main object of Moore's letter to stop the progress of general Fraser's division, which, in accordance with the original plan of retreat, was directed to move by St. Jago de Compostello upon Vigo. The misfortune alluded to above rendered abortive this design, for Fraser, receiving no orders to the contrary, pursued his march; and when at last an aide-de-camp overtook him, he was already far advanced on his way to the coast. He wheeled about on the instant; and at the expense of severe suffering to the men, and the loss of much valuable time, regained, weary, faint, and fasting, the position at Lugo.

In the mean while the reserve continued its retreat from Herrerias, closely followed, and almost continually engaged with the enemy's advanced guard. For a time, indeed — that is to say, throughout the 4th — no skirmishing ensued; for the reserve quitted its ground after a few hours of rest, and by dint of great exertions, and a forced march of six and thirty miles, left the French far behind. But at Nogales, which the troops reached at a late hour in the evening, the enemy again overtook them; and when the march was resumed, the ceaseless tirallade of the sharpshooters recommenced also. While this was going on in rear of all, the regiments more forward were met by a string of country cars, upon which were piled up supplies of clothing, arms, ammunition, and shoes for Romana's army. Why these had not been forwarded at an earlier period, no explanation was given;

but their arrival now afforded proof that the junta of Corunna contemplated any thing rather than a retreat. The soldiers were in no humour to deal kindly with the Spaniards by whom these cars were escorted. They poured upon them volleys of abuse, till the men, alarmed for their lives, fled, and the stores were all immediately destroyed, except the small quantity which it was found practicable to serve out to the column as it passed. Nor were two bullock cars, loaded with dollars to the amount of 25,000*l.* sterling, treated with greater ceremony. Instead of distributing the money to the men (a measure recommended both by humanity and policy) the heads of the casks were knocked in, and the treasure rolled over the cliffs, tempted not a few who witnessed the deed to straggle from their ranks. Many valuable lives were thus lost, which might have been otherwise preserved to their country.

The village of Constantino stands upon the margin of a stream, which, running along a deep and rocky channel, forms the bottom of a ravine hemmed in on either hand by hills of considerable altitude. The reserve were approaching it towards evening on the 5th, when the enemy overtook them; and the dangers of attempting a passage in the face of pursuers, who, at pistol-shot distance, could command the bridge, were too apparent to be neglected. Moore halted the rifle corps with a brigade of horse artillery on the brow of the southern range, while the rest of the division pushed on as rapidly as could consist with good order. The manœuvre was not lost upon the French. Unacquainted with the nature of the country beyond, and suspecting that a general action would be offered, they too stood still on the face of an opposite height, till a large force closing up from the rear had accumulated. By this time, however, the English column was safe, and in possession of the high ground to the north of Constantino, where, with admirable skill, sir John Moore formed them; and it now only remained to bring off, with as little risk as possible, the rifles and artillery. All was effected with

the order and precision that mark the progress of a review. The artillery limbering up, descended the hill at a trot; the riflemen followed in double quick time; and though the French instantly rushed in pursuit, not a casualty was sustained. Guns and men passed the bridge in safety, and took their respective places in the line of which we have spoken as occupying the acclivity beyond. It was to no purpose that the enemy made repeated efforts to dislodge them. They repelled every attack, and withdrew at last only because to keep possession of that post had not entered into the calculations of the general.

Eleven o'clock arrived ere the rear-guard quitted Constantino, yet they performed their fatiguing march well, and came in a little before sunrise to the position at Lugo. They found it occupied by 15,000 infantry, 1800 cavalry, and 40 pieces of cannon,—the whole disposable strength that remained out of the force with which the campaign had opened. It is true that a couple of brigades were missing; for generals Alten and Craufurd had persevered in their march to Vigo, and were now with the flower of the infantry safe on board of ship; but there met the general here three fresh battalions, which Baird had left to keep open the communications; and hence, in point of numbers, he was not, perhaps, less efficient than he had ever been. The ground which he occupied was, moreover, exceedingly favourable for the management of his limited means. His right, which held a space of country comparatively flat, was protected by a bend of the river Minho; his centre took post among vineyards, intersected by frequent low stone walls; and his left, which was somewhat withdrawn, rested on the mountains, and was supported and covered by the cavalry. Colonel Napier tells us, "it was the intention of the general to engage deeply with his right and centre before he closed with his left wing, in which he had posted the flower of his troops, hoping thus to bring on a decisive battle, and trusting to the valour of the men to handle

the enemy in such a sort as he should be glad to let the army continue its retreat unmolested." If such were his views, he adopted a somewhat unusual method of realising them, inasmuch as his dispositions were entirely defensive, and of course liable to be tried on any point which the enemy acting offensively might select.

It will be borne in mind that Napoleon, though he suspended every other operation for the purpose of overwhelming the British army by weight of numbers, continued the pursuit in person no further than Astorga. The intelligence which reached him there, touching the situation and designs of Austria, caused an immediate change in his plans; and he withdrew, followed by 10,000 of his guards, by way of Valladolid, into France. To marshal Soult, duke of Dalmatia, was, thenceforth, intrusted the task of driving the English into the sea; and there were placed at his immediate disposal for that purpose, 20,000 men, of whom 5200 were cavalry. Soult was, however, supported by the divisions of Loison and Heudelet in the rear, as well as by the 6th corps, mustering about 16,000 men, under Ney, who, though in a great measure independent, received orders to act in furtherance of any scheme which the duke of Dalmatia might advise. General Laborde, likewise, was placed under his orders; and hence the total numbers employed to rid Spain of the presence of the English fell little short of 60,000 men. Yet it were absurd to assert that the retreating army ever was, or ever could be, threatened by odds so tremendous. Laborde never overtook his chief, nor possessed the power of doing so; while Ney entertained of his brother marshal a jealousy too violent to permit his contributing, by any extraordinary exertion, to increase his renown. About 25,000 men, therefore, at the utmost hung, upon Moore's rear; and it was to check these that he assumed, as we have just described, the position in front of Lugo.

Noon was approaching on the 6th, when the head of

the French column appeared, and began to crown the summit of a range of steep hills about three miles distant from the English position. The enemy came up but slowly, for they too had suffered from the rapidity of their advance, and during several hours occupied themselves in forming a line parallel to that of Moore. It was evident that great doubt existed in the mind of Soult relative to the strength of the array to which he stood opposed. The English, concealed in some degree by the inequalities of their ground, showed no more of their force than was necessary; and the French general was, in consequence, kept in a state of suspense, which he resolved if possible to remove by a demonstration. With this view, four pieces of cannon were, on the following morning, advanced towards the centre of the English, and opened their fire: they were replied to and silenced by the discharge of fifteen pieces, the first round from which dismounted a French gun, and caused the rest to be withdrawn. Soult gathered from this that something more than a rear-guard fronted him, and he determined to unmask his adversary still more by threatening him on the right and left. Two heavy columns accordingly descended into the plain by roads which led toward the flanks of the English, and in a short time the outposts were engaged in all directions. But on the right nothing further ensued. The French voltigeurs, after dislodging the sentries, and causing the pickets to turn out and extend, held aloof; and after a brief interval of distant and useless firing, hostilities ceased.

It was not so upon the left. The infantry column which threatened that point carried with it a battery of five guns, which played with considerable effect upon a portion of the 76th regiment, in occupation of a gentle eminence. This was followed by a sharp attack on the pickets, which were driven in with loss; and the line itself, after giving one or two volleys, slowly withdrew. Moore heard the sound of firing, and galloped to the spot. He found both the 76th and 51st

regiments hotly engaged, and apparently at a disadvantage; for the skirmishers were overmatched, and a heavy column bore fiercely upon them. Moore had served in the 51st as an ensign. He reminded the men of that fact, told them how much he expected at their hands, and placed himself in their front. There needed no further efforts to restore the battle. The line cheered, threw in a volley, and rushed on with the bayonet, before which the enemy's column immediately gave way. The French were severely galled in retiring, and lost by the reconnoissance about 400 men.

We have not concealed the shameless and glaring irregularities, of which, during the progress of the retreat, the British army had been guilty. It is an act of justice to add, that the prospect of meeting the enemy in fair and open fight restored, as if by magic, order to the ranks. There was no more wandering from the colours, no marauding or plunder, nor any inordinate use of the wine or spirits that lay within reach; but an eager yet dogged anxiety to bring matters to the issue of a battle, in the result of which all ranks believed that their personal honour was involved. We express ourselves thus, because it is certain that never, from the commencement of the retrogression till the day of embarkation, was any feeling of insecurity prevalent among the men. They believed themselves, throughout, quite competent to provide for their own safety; and, as a matter of course, capable of defeating the enemy: it were an error, therefore, to attribute to the workings of desperation, the calm courage which now pervaded them. In like manner, their crimes along the road may in a great measure be traced back to the chafing of minds galled by a sense of degradation, which in their own opinion they had not merited. From that they fondly trusted that the hour was approaching when they should be able to free themselves, and for the rest they left it all to Providence and their general.

In the hopes entertained by his followers, as far at

least as the fighting of a general action bounded them, sir John Moore fully participated. He expected, indeed, to derive, even from victory, nothing more than the power of embarking unmolested, for he no longer dreamed of retaining his hold upon Galicia, nor looked for any co-operation from its inhabitants. All accounts, moreover, not even excepting the letters of Mr. Frere, united in representing the Spaniards as every where confounded; for of the armies which had promised to support him, either directly, or by diversions elsewhere, not one was in existence. When, therefore, he anticipated a struggle, and desired it with the utmost anxiety, it was with the single view of crippling an adversary whom he could not hope to destroy, and of whose talents he had formed too just an estimate, not to feel that even this would be to achieve no common honour. For Moore knew that Ney was at Villa Franca. He knew, also, that from such a position as that occupied by Soult, a retreat, and comparatively a safe one, was at any moment attainable; and he could not flatter himself with being able to beat, in succession, two armies, each as numerous and experienced as his own.

Besides, the conviction was firmly rooted in his mind, that no success, nor any series of successes, would serve materially to forward the great cause which he was employed to support. "What if, beating first Soult and then Ney," says his zealous and able advocate, colonel Napier, "the British army had arrived once more above Astorga, with perhaps 10,000 infantry and half as many hundred cavalry. From the mountains of Galicia their general might have cast his eyes as far as the Sierra Morena, without being cheered by the sight of a single Spanish army; none were in existence to aid him, none to whom he might give aid." Though, therefore, he desired, as eagerly as the troops whom he commanded, to measure himself with the army of France, his eyes were still turned, with the same anxiety as before, to the sea coast and the shipping.

As if satisfied with the results of this reconnoissance,

the French general withdrew his guns, and retired to his position on the heights which he had originally occupied. Here he remained inactive till night closed in; upon which the British troops composed themselves to sleep,—some beside their fires, others in the town of Lugo, and amid the homesteads and hamlets around it. Both men and officers lay down, however, in the confident expectation that to-morrow's sun would light them to the combat; and all resumed their places in the line, silently, but resolutely, an hour before dawn. The morning broke, however, and displayed the enemy at rest where they had been the day before. No squadrons moved; no guns nor battalions quitted their ground; and, as hour after hour stole on, a painful conviction took possession of all minds, that Soult would not hazard a battle, at least aggressively. We are not authorised to say, that the possibility of attacking him where he stood was ever suggested to sir John Moore. If it were, the project was pronounced romantic, and the day accordingly passed over without the occurrence of any hostile demonstration from either party.

As night approached, sir John Moore felt more and more acutely the anxieties and distresses of the situation which he filled. There was nothing of which he was so desirous as that a battle might be brought on; yet the obstacles opposed to offensive operations on his part appeared so serious, that he turned away from the project with horror. He reasoned, as we have already shown that the historian of the peninsular war reasons, and he came to the conclusion that not even victory would compensate for the loss inseparable from the assault of such a position as that occupied by Soult. But if he shrank with natural reluctance from committing himself in a forward movement, much more unsatisfactory appeared to him the idea of lingering another day where he then stood.

Ney might, for aught he knew to the contrary, be in full march to join Soult; or, possibly, he might be endeavouring to turn the position of Lugo, by marching to

St. Jago or Betanzos. These were cogent reasons against a needless delay where it was manifest that Soult would not molest him: yet there was another, not less weighty, and far more pressing. His provisions began to fail: there had been collected at Lugo only a slender depôt, sufficient for the immediate supply of a corps, but quite inadequate to the consumption of an army; and a two days' halt of 21,000 or 22,000 men, had completely exhausted it. Moore, therefore, determined to retreat: and well aware of the advantage to be gained by forestalling the enemy, he made all his arrangements to fall back leisurely and in order that night.

There were several roads leading through the fields and vineyards in front of Lugo, which, after traversing a certain space, united again at the main road beyond the town. In order to avert confusion and to save time, Moore resolved to draw off his people in separate columns, each of which should follow one or other of these tracts, according as its situation in the line afforded greater or less facilities. The tracks, however, were somewhat vaguely marked; and it was judged prudent to establish beacons, by means of which the guides, not necessarily the most intelligent persons in existence, might be able to regulate their movements. Bundles of straw were accordingly reared at fixed intervals along each road; and the guides, warned of these land marks, undertook the task of directing the columns in their march without hesitation. But Moore was doomed to struggle against other obstacles than the vigilance of the enemy, and the occasional absence of regularity among his own people: the very elements warred against him; and never, perhaps, was their fury more fatal in its effects than it proved to be this night.

In obedience to orders duly received, the troops trimmed their fires, and displayed the usual symptoms, as soon as darkness closed in, of men reposing on the ground which they occupied. This was scarcely done, when the word passed quietly from rank to rank that the men should stand to their arms; and the several

brigades and regiments suddenly found themselves in march towards the rear. They moved, however, amid the raging of a tempest, than which none more violent had yet assailed them since the campaign began. The sleet fell thick and fast; a boisterous wind swept it round them; and the faculty of sight became confused and bewildered amid the increasing gloom of the storm. To sum up all, the bundles of straw, to which now the guides mainly trusted, were overthrown, or carried away by the fury of the blast, and the heads of the columns were conducted at random along such lanes and avenues as were first encountered. The consequences may be imagined. Bewildered amid a labyrinth of narrow outlets, the men floundered here and there at random; and long before the day broke, a mass of weary wanderers was found to have collected in and about the town of Lugo.

From the confusion incident upon this untoward commencement of the march, the army did not recover throughout the day. The storm still raged with prodigious violence; and the men, drenched, worn down, and dispirited, knew not how to struggle through its violence, especially in retreat. At every mile the stragglers became more and more numerous, till the whole road was at last choked up with them, and the ranks became all but deserted. Under these circumstances, a general officer, swayed by feelings of mistaken pity, directed his division to halt, and to find shelter among certain cottages and detached buildings that stood a little way apart from the road. This, be it observed, occurred while it was yet dark; and its effects were most calamitous. Discipline could no longer be preserved in that division. Neither threats nor entreaties could bring the men back to their stations, and a scene of plunder and rapine began, which, being imitated by other divisions as these in succession came up, beggars all our powers of description.

While this was going on in front, the commander-in-chief, putting himself at the head of the reserve, kept

possession of his ground till he conceived that all was safe; and then, retaining over that fine body of men the most complete control, drew off leisurely and with perfect order. There was no confusion here, nor yet any missing of the way; but the herds of stragglers which the reserve overtook unavoidably delayed their progress, by compelling them to halt from time to time, in order that these unhappy men might be pushed onward. It was a fortunate circumstance that the enemy not only made no movement in pursuit during the night; but that, when the return of day displayed to them the position of Lugo evacuated, they held back long and anxiously, as if fearing some deceit.

Had the contrary been the case, the loss of the English during this march must have been appalling. As it was, the French cavalry overtook the rear-guard late in the evening of the 8th, and compelled them, after a sharp resistance, to retire, when a dense body of marauders was immediately uncovered, and left to its fate. Nevertheless, these men, being for the most part sober, defended themselves with great gallantry. Though destitute of leaders, they formed an irregular column, and received with perfect steadiness the attack of the enemy; and having repelled it with considerable slaughter, they moved on cautiously, slowly, and therefore unmolested.

On the 10th of January the main body entered Betanzos, general Paget with the reserve bivouacking on some commanding heights a few miles from the town.

Here sir John Moore issued a strong but necessary order, in which he reproached the men for their want of steadiness, the officers for the little zeal which they displayed in preserving order, and threatened with condign punishment any individual who should thenceforth be found straying unnecessarily from his colours. This was not the first reproachful address which Moore had found it necessary to promulgate. On his arrival at Lugo, he had appealed powerfully to the feelings of his officers, whom he did not scruple to charge with the chief blame attaching to the irregularities of the troops;

and as the reproof then bestowed was not thrown away, so his present admonition produced considerable effect. All ranks were ashamed that their conduct should have merited such statements; and those in authority resolved that no exertions should be wanting among them to hinder the necessity of a repetition.

At an early hour on the 11th the march was resumed, the care of destroying the bridge at Betanzos being committed to the rear-guard. This they effected only in part; for though the bridge was constructed of wood, the enemy's cavalry came on so fast that the 28th regiment scarcely succeeded in checking them, while the working parties continued their labours. Besides, there were now no entrenching tools with the army; and of powder, the quantity was too limited to permit its application except in cases of the utmost emergency. At all events, the bridge was only partially destroyed, insomuch that the damage done by the English pioneers was, within half an hour after the arrival of the first infantry brigade in Soult's army, sufficiently repaired. Meanwhile Moore collected his people into one continuous column. He had suffered so much during the march from Lugo to Betanzos, that he would not again intrust the guidance of corps to his inferiors, while the situation in which he stood rendered it necessary that the whole should be capable of concentration at a moment's warning. The army was now approaching the coast, and it could not be doubted that sooner or later a battle would be forced upon them, no matter how imperfect the preparations of the enemy might be to bring matters to that issue. Of the degree of anxiety with which the general watched over the conduct of his army throughout this day, the following extract from Mr. Moore's Narrative will serve to show:—

"He" (sir John Moore), says the writer, "passed every regiment, and addressed the commanding officer of each, observing to them that there was no particular post for a commanding officer, who ought to range on the front, flank, and rear of his regiment; that his eye

should be every where; and that all straggling should be prevented by the activity of the officers. This march was conducted with much more regularity than on former occasions; yet eight or nine stragglers were detected who had preceded the column, and had taken possession of a house and the wine contained in it. They were seized and brought prisoners to the general: on which he halted the army; and the commanding officers of the regiments, and the captains of the companies to which the prisoners belonged, were sent for. Their haversacks were searched, to discover if they contained any plunder; and he enquired how long the men had been absent from their regiments. An officer replied to sir John, that one of the prisoners, not being able to march with the column, had been sent on before according to the general's order. Sir John answered, that when he gave out orders, he considered that he addressed them to military men; for were he to write every detail, no orderly book could contain them; that the manner of obeying such an order was to form up such men as were unable to march with the regiment, and place them under the charge of an officer or a non-commissioned officer; but, undoubtedly, they should not have been sent by themselves, to follow their own discretion. 'Sir,' continued he, 'had I found plunder in the possession of this man, he must have been condemned to death, and you would have been the cause of his guilt.'"

The circumstances detailed in the preceding extract occurred while sir John Moore was pushing forward for the purpose of reconnoitring the country about Corunna, and selecting a position whence the embarkation might be protected. The general rode on, hoping that the fleet, which he had directed to be sent round from Vigo, might be waiting his arrival in the bay, and calculating, as in such an event he was justified to do, on a safe and prompt embarkation. The first view which he obtained of the roadstead of Corunna sufficed to dispel that fondly cherished illusion. Not a transport nor a

ship of war was there; indeed, but for the presence of a few coasting vessels and fishing smacks, the bay would have been empty. Moore was disappointed and grieved. He observed that the elements themselves were in league to thwart him; and he examined the ground with the feelings of one who is conscious that gigantic exertions have been made to no purpose.

While the chief was thus employed, the troops continued their march, and began soon after noon to approach the place. Dispositions were immediately made to provide for their accommodation; and three divisions found shelter either in the town, or in the suburbs and scattered villages by which it is surrounded.

The reserve, however, halted, with the left at El Burgo, and the right on the St. Jago de Compostella road, protecting to the last, as they had done throughout the retreat, the lives and liberties of their comrades. "For twelve days," says Napier, "these hardy soldiers had covered the retreat; during which time they had traversed eighty miles in two marches, passed several nights under arms, in the snow of the mountains, were several times engaged with the enemy; and they now assembled at the outposts, having fewer men missing from their ranks (including those who had fallen in battle) than any other division in the army." This is high praise, doubtless, and may well be shared between the men and their brave and skilful leader, general Paget; but we cannot say, with the author, that it affords us a manifest proof of the malignant injustice with which sir John Moore has been accused of precipitating his retreat beyond the measure of human strength. One corps may accomplish its marches at the rate of forty miles per day; but to dream of moving an entire army at that pace were ridiculous.

Having caused the bridge of El Burgo to be destroyed, as well as another at a place called Cambria, higher up the Mero, sir John Moore turned his attention to the state of the town, and its capabilities of resisting an attack during a period such as might be required to

effect the embarkation of the British army. He found it weakly fortified towards the land, and commanded by heights, which, on its southern face, approached close to the wall; while, towards the sea, there were formidable batteries, as well as a citadel of some strength. He caused the water batteries to be dismantled without delay; and, while he employed the inhabitants, who cheerfully volunteered their services, in strengthening the defences inland, he, with the perfect concurrence of the local authorities, placed an English garrison in the castle. Amid the numerous instances of Spanish sloth and Spanish folly which marked the progress of the peninsular war, the noble patriotism and self-devotion of the inhabitants of Corunna ought not to pass unnoticed.

These matters being arranged, Moore turned his attention to others, neither less pressing nor less important. There were two magazines of gunpowder collected in the vicinity of the town, as well as a large depôt of arms, which, strange to say, had never been issued. Thousands and tens of thousands of Spanish peasants had, for months, been looking in vain for the supplies which the junta of Corunna received from England early in the spring; and now these supplies lay beyond the reach of removal or defence, so soon as the enemy, who trod fast upon the heels of the English, should approach.

To destroy them was a dire necessity; yet was there no alternative. The magazines were fired: they exploded with terrible violence, and shivered into countless fragments arms enough to equip half the levies which wandered naked and weaponless through the province.

That tremendous crash was succeeded by other sounds, scarcely less harrowing to the feelings of those who heard them: an incessant fire of musketry rung the knell of the noblest animals that ever served man in peace or war; for of the cavalry horses, which had with difficulty reached the coast, almost all were shot, to hinder them from falling into the enemy's hands.

Important as, doubtless, was the adjustment of these points, there yet remained one to be considered, in comparison with which all others shrank into insignificance: a position must be marked out, where the army might receive that attack to which, now that the transports had failed to meet them, it was certain that they would shortly be exposed. This was the more necessary, as the French already began to collect along the Mero, and it was ascertained that a body of horse, under Franceshi, had passed that river about seven miles above the village of El Burgo. Had his force been somewhat greater than it was, sir John Moore would have been at no loss in selecting a battle-ground scarcely less favourable than that which he occupied at Lugo. There was a chain of rocky eminences, which, commencing at the sea, north-west of Corunna, ended on the Mero, just beyond El Burgo; and which, being covered by a branch of the river, would have compelled the enemy, if he approached at all, to come by the Compostella road alone. That ridge, however, was too extensive for the British army; and, if occupied only in part, lay exposed to be turned on the right, where a pathway led over a succession of eminences up to the gate of Corunna. Moore, therefore, abstained from seizing it, and contented himself with another, though a far less defensible allignment, enclosed, as it were, within the greater range. Over this he carefully led his staff officers and generals; and, having pointed out to them the stations which they would severally be required to occupy, he felt himself, comparatively speaking, at his ease.

While the English were thus employed, the French, worn out by the rapidity of the last march, came up but slowly towards the site of the approaching battle. On the 12th, they were assembled in force along the Mero; the infantry being posted opposite to El Burgo, the cavalry in part at Celas, in part extending towards the sea. During the 13th, working parties were employed in repairing the bridges at El Burgo; and these being complete, the troops began to cross on the 14th. Some

firing took place on this occasion; the enemy endeavouring to dislodge the British post from the villages without effect; but it did not continue long, for the French turned aside from the village, and spread themselves gradually over the face of that position which sir John Moore would have occupied had his numbers sufficed to secure it. Here Soult was joined, on the 15th, by the division of general Laborde; a reinforcement which increased his effective force to something more than 20,000 men.

In the mean time, the spirits of the British troops were cheered by the arrival of the fleet from Vigo, which entered the harbour of Corunna at an early hour on the 14th. Not a moment was lost in preparing the vessels to receive their loads, and in sending off the sick, the wounded, the dismounted cavalry, such horses as it was judged worth while to remove, and all except eight pieces of artillery. All these were embarked, partly during the night of the 14th, partly in the course of the following day; so that, by midnight on the 15th, a large portion of the boats was disengaged. Nevertheless, this interval passed not wholly unmarked by the occurrence of active operations. On the 15th, in the evening, the French cavalry, supported by light infantry, took ground towards the left, so as to sweep across a valley, and wind round in the direction of St. Christopher's, on the St. Jago road; during the progress of which manœuvre they sustained a sharp skirmish with the 95th rifle corps. On the right of their line, likewise, the pickets got engaged; and a couple of field pieces were run forward to support them: in an attempt to surprise which colonel Mackenzie, of the 5th regiment, unfortunately perished. Still the indications afforded of an approaching battle were not very pressing; and there were some in Corunna who indulged in a vague hope that so critical an operation might be avoided.

In this manner the hostile armies spent the 15th of January, their labours being continued during a large

portion of the night as well as of the day. How the British employed themselves after darkness set in, has, in part, been explained; nor were the French less busy. With infinite difficulty Soult established, on the summit of the rocks which formed the left of his line of battle, a battery of eleven guns, the fire from which would unavoidably enfilade, though at long range, the right of the English position; and supported it by placing there Mermet's division of infantry, Laborde he had already stationed on the right; half of his corps, occupying the high ground, the other half being on the descent towards the river; while Merle, with his division, held the centre. Meanwhile a discussion, involving questions of no common interest, was going on at the head-quarters of the British army. The enemy's fires girdling their own, excited, in the minds of many, uneasy anticipations of the future; and it was seriously submitted to sir John Moore's consideration, whether he ought not to negotiate for leave to retire to the ships unmolested. Moore's lofty and chivalrous spirit disdained a counsel, which there were not wanting soldiers both brave and experienced to advocate. He pointed out that such a proposal, if made, would probably be rejected by the enemy; that the condition of the army was not such as to call for it; and that the bare suggestion implied an insult to men, who, amid all their sufferings, had never sustained a defeat. The project was, in consequence, laid aside, and the generals withdrew to their respective stations, either in the line or at the outposts.

The dawn of the 16th found both armies under arms, but stationary, as they had been when the sun last set. About 14,500 British troops occupied at this moment the range of inferior heights, to which we have already alluded as being enclosed on three sides by the enemy's position. On the right was Baird's division, advanced in a sort of *échellon* formation towards the French left. It was supported in the rear by one brigade, and communicated by the left with Hope's

corps, which prolonged the line across the main road to a piece of strong ground abutting upon the muddy bank of the river. Here also a species of second line was formed, by distributing a brigade upon several commanding points; while the reserve, under Paget, took post near Acris, a village on the high road, and about half a mile behind the centre. It was the object of this formation to command a valley, which separated the right of Baird's division from the French cavalry; whom a battalion pushed forward, and a body of skirmishers in chain, more immediately held at bay. Finally, general Frazer's division, remaining on the heights that overlook Corunna from the east, at once observed the Compostella road, and was prepared to advance to any point where its presence might seem to be required.

Having visited the outposts, and passed along the line, where all remained profoundly quiet, Moore returned to Corunna, and renewed the arrangements, which had for a brief space been interrupted, for the embarkation of the troops. He issued instructions to the commanding officers of regiments touching the course to be pursued by them, in the event of their being separated, during the bustle of the moment, from portions of their corps; and directed that all the boats of the fleet should be in readiness to receive the men by four o'clock at the latest. This done, and the most perfect order prevailing, he called for his horse, and prepared once more to ride out, — a design which he carried into execution a little after one o'clock. "Remember," said he to colonel Anderson, of the adjutant-general's department, "I depend upon your paying particular attention to every thing that concerns the embarkation; and let there be as little confusion as possible." He was already in the saddle when he spoke these words; and, without waiting for a reply, he rode forward.

The general had not proceeded far, ere an orderly met him with a report from general Hope, that "the enemy's line was getting under arms." Moore expressed

to those about him great satisfaction at the intelligence, which was almost immediately confirmed by the statements of a deserter; and, putting spurs to his horse, galloped towards the front. But he had not yet reached the crest of the position, when firing was heard. The enemy had begun to move soon after Hope's messenger was despatched; and now, pouring down the face of the hill, their skirmishers were fiercely engaged with the British pickets.

In the bottom of the valley which separated Baird's division from that of Mermet, stands the village of Elvina, the ground about which was a good deal intersected with stone walls and hollow roads. Here a British outpost was stationed; and, upon it, after a general salvo from his artillery, Soult caused the first rush to be made. A heavy column, covered by clouds of tirailleurs, accordingly drew on, before which the English picket fell back in disorder; and the village being occupied, a fresh disposition took place under shelter of a furious cannonade from the works. The column separated into two lesser bodies; of which one bore upon Baird's front, while the other defiled to the left, so as to gain the base of a hill, when, making a half wheel to the right, it began to penetrate along the glen, round the right of the British line. Moore saw and instantly provided against this manœuvre. Ordering Paget to carry the whole of the reserve to the spot where his detached battalion stood, and to turn from thence the left of the French attack by threatening the battery, he threw back one wing of the 4th regiment, *en potence,* and causing it to open its fire upon the flank of the French column, now entangled in the defile, produced a great slaughter. At the same moment the 42d and 50th regiments were directed to advance against the column now issuing from Elvina. This they did with great courage and loud cheers, and in five minutes were warmly and closely engaged, amid the uneven ground by which the village is encompassed.

Against the determined rush of these two distin-

guished regiments, the French were unable to make any head. For about half an hour they maintained a close and warm discharge of volleys; but the British troops, overleaping the fences, and closing upon them with the bayonet, the enemy gave way. The 50th, wound up to the highest pitch of excitement, and nobly led on by major Napier, followed them into Elvina, through which, in spite of an obstinate resistance, they bore them. But it so chanced, that ere they could turn their success to good account, a sudden relaxation in the vigour of the 42d permitted the French to rally, and renew the fight with increased numbers. Sir John Moore had brought a battalion of guards from the second line to fill up the blank space in the first, occasioned by the advance of the 50th and 42d. The latter regiment, misunderstanding the object of this evolution, suddenly halted, and began, though with unfeigned reluctance, to fall back. Immediately the French took advantage of the circumstance. They sprang forward, overwhelmed the more advanced parties of the 50th, made major Napier prisoner, and would have recovered Elvina, had not Moore ridden up, and explained to the 42d that they were in error. This was all of which the highlanders stood in need. Their line was reformed in a moment; one wild shout rose to heaven; and again, with muskets levelled, they sprang onwards, carrying all before them.

Sir John Moore beheld all this with the enthusiasm which belonged to his character. He had seen, that though the battle raged elsewhere, the enemy made no progress; and knowing that the right was the weak point in his line, he there took his station. Though the 50th were too far advanced to hear his address, he shouted loudly, "Well done the 50th! Well done my majors!" alluding to majors Napier and Stanhope, both of whom owed their promotion to his recommendation. To the 42d, too, his address was equally brief and spirit-stirring. "Highlanders," said he, "remember Egypt!" and when they began to fall back, he

rode close to the rear, and exclaimed, "My brave 42d! join your comrades; ammunition is coming, and you have your bayonets." It is impossible to conceive that soldiers, directed by such a chief, could behave otherwise than heroically. The 42d did join their comrades; and the charge which they made under the eye of their beloved general proved absolutely resistless.

Moore was watching the advance of this portion of his army when a cannon ball struck him on the left shoulder, and he fell to the ground. Not a muscle in his countenance quivered; but raising himself instantly to a sitting posture, he directed his gaze intently towards the objects which but the instant before had engrossed all his attention. Captain (now sir Henry) Hardinge, a staff officer, who was near, threw himself from the saddle, and seizing the general's hand, anxiously enquired whether he were much hurt; but Moore made no answer. His eye continued fixed, though apparently without power, upon the battle which raged before him, while an expression of deep anxiety pervaded his face, as if doubtful how the tide of victory might roll. Hardinge saw this, and made haste to relieve it. He said that the 42d were advancing; and he received his reward in the bright expression which Moore's dark and speaking eye turned upon him.

By this time colonel Graham had likewise dismounted; and both he and captain Hardinge, cheered by the calmness of their chief, began to encourage the hope that his wound might not be mortal. When they looked, however, to the condition of the dying warrior, they saw at once that his hours were numbered. The shot had smashed his shoulder to atoms; the arm was hanging by a piece of skin; and the ribs over the heart, besides being broken, were literally stripped of flesh. Yet he sat upon the field collected and unrepining, as if no ball had struck him, and that he were placed where he was for the mere purpose of reposing for a brief space from the fatigue of hard riding.

By this time a party of the 42d was collected, and a blanket being spread out, the general was laid upon it with the utmost possible tenderness and lifted from the ground. In the act of removing him, it was observed that his sword came distressingly in the way; for the hilt struck against his wounded shoulder, and the blade got entangled between his legs. Captain Hardinge endeavoured to unbuckle the belt. "No, Hardinge," said he, with the chivalrous feeling worthy of an earlier age, "it is as well as it is. I had rather it should go out of the field with me." Captain Hardinge, of course desisted from his well-intentioned attempt; and with the sword girdled round him, which he had never disgraced, sir John Moore was borne from the field.

We have reached a stage in our memoir, when to employ any other language than that of the brave men who witnessed the last moments of their chief, would, in our opinion, savour as much of impiety as of presumption. It is necessary, indeed, to premise, that previous to the fatal catastrophe which deprived the British army of a leader not more respected than beloved, sir David Baird had received a wound from a grape-shot, which caused the amputation, on the field, of his arm. He received information of the catastrophe while the surgeons were dressing his hurt; and commanded them instantly to desist, and run and attend on sir John Moore. But the latter would not permit them to waste their time upon him. "You can be of no service to me," he said; "go to the soldiers, to whom you may be useful: I am beyond the reach of your skill." Who can wonder that the rugged veterans that carried him towards the rear should have "shed tears as they went."

The distance from the field of battle to the town was considerable, and the motion of his bearers necessarily slow, yet sir John Moore frequently arrested them in their progress. From time to time he caused them to halt and turn round, that he might listen to

the firing, and as the sound became more and more faint, he expressed himself well pleased with the circumstance. By and by a spring wagon rolled near him from the field, in which a wounded officer was laid. It was colonel Wrench, who, on hearing that sir John Moore lay in the blanket, proposed that he should be placed beside him in the wagon. "The general," says Mr. Moore, "asked one of the highlanders whether he thought the wagon or the blanket best, who answered, that the blanket would not shake him so much, as he and the other soldiers would keep the step and carry him easy. Sir John said, "I think so too." So they proceeded with him to his lodgings in Corunna, the soldiers shedding tears as they went.

In the passage of the house he was met by his valet, a man who had served him faithfully for many years. Poor François was stunned by the spectacle; but his master, more considerate, as he always was, of the feelings of others than of his own, strove to speak gaily, for the purpose of cheering him. "This is nothing, my friend, nothing," said he, and smiled through his agony as he spoke.

It would little gratify the taste of a discerning public to be told how the medical gentlemen acted when the horrid laceration of their chief was fully exposed to them. Better is it to give, in the simple, yet touching language of colonel Anderson, a general account of his dying moments; an account drawn up on the spot, and transmitted to the relatives of the deceased, by one who had for twenty years been his friend and companion in arms. "I met the general," says the writer, 'in the evening of the 16th, bringing in a blanket and sashes. He knew me immediately, though it was almost dark, squeezed me by the hand, and said, 'Anderson, don't leave me.'

"He spoke to the surgeons on their examining his wound, but was in such pain he could say little.

"After some time he seemed very anxious to speak to me, and at intervals got out as follows: —'An-

derson, you know that I have always wished to die this way.' He then asked, 'Are the French beaten?' and which he repeated to every one he knew as they came in. 'I hope the people of England will be satisfied; I hope my country will do me justice! Anderson, you will see my friends as soon as you can. Tell them every thing. Say to my mother ——' Here his voice quite failed, and he was excessively agitated. 'Hope — Hope — I have much to say to him — but — cannot get it out. — And colonel Graham — Are all my aides-de-camp well? (A private sign was made by colonel Anderson not to inform him that captain Burrard was wounded.) I have made my will, and have remembered my servants. Colborne has my will, and all my papers.'

"Major Colborne then came into the room. He spoke most kindly to him, and then said to me, 'Anderson, remember you go to ——, and tell him it is my request, and that I expect he will give major Colborne a lieutenant-colonelcy. He has long been with me — and I know him most worthy of it.' He then asked major Colborne if the French were beaten? and on being told they were, on every point, he said, 'It's a great satisfaction to me to know that we have beat the French. Is Paget in the room?' On my telling him no, he said, 'Remember me to him — It's general Paget I mean,—he is a fine fellow. — I feel myself so strong — I fear I shall be long dying. — It is great uneasiness — It is great pain — Every thing François says is right — I have the greatest confidence in him."

"He thanked the surgeons for their trouble. Captains Percy and Stanhope, two of his aides-de-camp, then came into the room. He spoke kindly to both, and asked Percy if all his aides-de-camp were well.

"After some interval, he said, 'Stanhope, remember me to your sister.' He pressed my hand close to his body, and in a few minutes died without a struggle."

To a narrative so touching as this, because so strongly marked with the features of reality, it were idle in us to attempt any supplement. We turn, therefore, at once, from a contemplation of the last moments of our hero, to consider, with as much impartiality as the circumstances of the case will allow, his character as a man and an officer. Nor, in truth, is the task thus voluntarily assumed either a difficult or a painful one. We find so much in the career of sir John Moore to commend; so many marks, at every stage, of all that is noble and attractive in human nature; that the business of scrutiny merges, as it were, by its own weight, into that of an almost unconditional eulogist. Were we to keep our eyes fixed, indeed, upon the private character of Moore, it might well set even malice itself at defiance; for if ever there lived a high-minded and honourable man, sir John Moore was that individual. But it is as the leader of a British army, as a soldier brought up from his childhood amidst the din of arms, that we are alone called upon to regard him; and there, too, not less than as a son, a friend, and a brother, his claims upon our respect and admiration are boundless.

Perhaps there never lived a more enthusiastic, and, as a necessary consequence, a more thorough soldier, than sir John Moore. "In the school of regimental duty," says the general order issued to the army on the 1st of February, 1809, "he obtained that correct knowledge of his profession which is essential to the proper direction of the gallant spirit of the soldier; and he was enabled to establish a characteristic order and regularity of conduct, because the troops found in their leader a striking example of the discipline which he enforced in others. In a military character, obtained amidst the dangers of climate, the privations incident to service, and the sufferings of repeated wounds, it is difficult to select any point as a preferable subject for praise. The life of sir John Moore was spent among his troops. During the season of repose, his time was

devoted to the care and instruction of the officer and soldier; in war he courted service in every quarter of the globe. Regardless of personal considerations, he esteemed that, to which his country called him, the post of honour; and by his undaunted spirit and unconquerable perseverance he pointed the way to victory." There is not a sentiment conveyed in this laudatory but well-merited encomium, to which we are indisposed cheerfully to subscribe. Nevertheless, it is necessary that we should look beyond general praise, as well as general censure, while we endeavour, under all the disadvantages attending the discussion of a subject which has been too much regarded as a party question in politics, to ascertain how far sir John Moore displayed, at the head of an independent force, the rare talents requisite for such a situation.

In the course of this memoir, enough has been said to make manifest the opinion which we entertain of sir John Moore in every situation, subordinate to the highest. As the commanding officer of a regiment, as the general of brigade and of division, as a master of military tactics, from the drilling of a squad to the manœuvring of a line, the British army has produced few that have been equal, none that have surpassed him. Wherever fortune led him, while acting a subordinate part, he displayed at all moments, and under all circumstances, the most perfect self-command; and he succeeded, in consequence, in securing from the troops who served under him unlimited confidence and admiration. In Corsica, at the Helder, and in Egypt, the presence of Moore with the army was felt, among all ranks, to be worth an additional brigade; and the example which he set of unflinching bravery, united with prudence and subordination to command, gave to his services a value, of which it were vain to calculate the amount. It is to his campaign in Spain, however, and to it alone, that we must turn for the proper standard by which to try his fitness for separate command; inasmuch as there, for the first and last time, the undivided responsibility

rested upon him, of wielding to the best advantage a British army in active warfare.

The bitterest enemy of sir John Moore's reputation (if, indeed, there exist at this time a single individual deserving to be so styled) will not deny that he entered upon his task, and conducted it throughout, under circumstances of great and palpable disadvantage. He was called upon to lead an army into Spain, at a moment when the grossest delusion prevailed, not with the English government only, but among all classes of the English people; when it was fondly believed that if he failed to move rapidly, he would arrive too late to participate in the triumphs which the patriots were about, single-handed, to achieve. The reports, too, which reached him from the seat of war were all calculated to mislead and to perplex. He heard of armies which mustered 40,000, 50,000, and 60,000 men apiece, threatening the feeble remains of Joseph's legions on the further side of the Ebro, while recruits were represented as coming in from all the interior provinces with a degree of celerity which rendered the means of supplying them with arms inadequate. Repeated assurances were, moreover, made to him, that with the guidance of his own troops on their march all his cares would end, because Spain abounded with resources which would be placed freely at his disposal, and there were ample means with which to protect from the remotest hazard of annoyance the concentration of his columns. In a word, his advance was determined upon under the confident expectation that he should act merely as second in the struggle, which would be maintained chiefly by hosts of devoted patriots, liable, indeed, to annihilation, but incapable of defeat.

How far all this deviated from the truth, it is not necessary that we should explain. At the very moment when his march began, the Spanish armies in the front line were overthrown; and he became, all at once, not an auxiliary, but a principal in the gigantic struggle. Yet it was not from the Spaniards alone that he met

with shamefully insufficient support. When he opened the campaign, there were but 25,000*l.* in the military chest, and he was required to spare out of that not less than 8000*l.* in order that sir David Baird might make good his landing at Corunna. Now, if it be borne in mind that every department attached to the army was, at this time grievously defective; that the commissariat was scanty both in talent and experience; that no regular system of raising supplies, or collecting forage, was established; that the people of the country, unacquainted with the nature of bills of exchange, looked upon promissory notes, no matter in whose name tendered, as waste paper; and, not unnaturally, viewed a foreign soldiery with distrust,—some idea may be formed of the inconveniences to which the mere absence of an adequate stock of gold and silver must have subjected the commander-in-chief. If, therefore, the prevalence of exaggerated expectations at home; if false intelligence received from all quarters abroad; if the want of money, and the necessity of counteracting that deficiency through the agency of men totally unaccustomed to the details of their duty;—if all these things operate as drags and crosses upon a general about to open a campaign, never, surely, was the commander of an army more awkwardly or unfortunately situated than sir John Moore. All the ordinary appliances of modern warfare were wanting, and he had but his own genius, and the well known valour of his troops, to carry him forward.

So far the commencement of sir John Moore's career was undeniably beset by difficulties, for which he was not accountable. That he did not add to these by the unfortunate distribution of his army in advance, it is the merest prejudice to affirm. We are not unaware that a high authority has asserted that the sending round of Hope's corps, the whole of the artillery of the army, by Badajoz, Talavera, and the Escurial, was, in every point of view, a judicious manœuvre. Never, surely, was a judgment, naturally acute, more

completely blinded by the impulses of generous feeling; for colonel Napier is too well versed in the theory of his profession, to be ignorant, that the sternest necessity alone could palliate such a proceeding. One of the most vital, yet most obvious rules in war, is that which requires an officer to keep his troops constantly in hand,—or, in other words, to separate his strength as little as circumstances will permit; and, when compelled to do so, to detach with judgment. Again, if a movement must be made on a double line (and a single line it at all times preferable), care should be taken that each separate corps is complete within itself; that is to say, that the detachments be, as it were, armies in miniature, and hence competent to act effectively whenever threatened. Sir John Moore was inattentive to these two great military axioms; and the consequence was, that he remained powerless either for offensive or defensive warfare, till the cause which he came to support had suffered total annihilation.

But it will be said that Moore was deceived touching the condition of the roads through Portugal; and it has been triumphantly demanded, what benefit would have accrued had a different course been adopted? — "Suppose the artillery, under Hope, had moved with sir John Moore, and had been at Salamanca on the 25th of November, the junction with Baird was still to be effected, and the separation of that general was not the work of Moore. Would any one have had the latter advance with 14,000 or 15,000 men to Burgos, or to Aranda de Duero, or to Madrid? If to the last, Baird must have been abandoned; because the 4th corps, which was at Rio Seco on the 24th of November, would have anticipated his line of march. Burgos? He was still too late, because Blake's and Belvidere's armies had been dispersed on the 10th and 11th. But say they had not been dispersed; then the arrangement of sending Hope by Madrid was better than marching by one column to Salamanca, inasmuch as the latter, by being enlarged, and troubled with a great train of car-

riages and guns, could not have reached that town so soon as the 25th; whereas, by moving as they did on separate roads, all marched more rapidly, and Hope could have united at Burgos with a difference only of twelve leagues, and at Aranda with a difference only of one league, in the distance traversed."

In reply to the first question, we have only to observe, that for his plan of advance, circumstanced as Moore was, previous to his march through Portugal, no apology, depending on the absence of due information, ought to be offered or accepted. It was well known that by the very line of road reported as impracticable, Junot, at a less favourable season of the year, had marched; and that, though some of his artillery received damage, he brought up the remainder fit for service to Lisbon. Whatever the natives themselves, therefore, might affirm concerning that road, a careful survey ought to have been effected by British officers; and that this was not done the event distinctly proved. We are aware that one gentleman, attached to the quarter-master-general's department, did confirm the rumours circulated by the Portuguese, and that sir John Moore acted upon his statement; but it were too much to contend that, in doing so, he displayed sufficient caution. At all events, he blamed himself severely for having been thus led astray. "If any thing happen," says he in a letter to general Hope, "I have not the excuse of necessity to plead, for the roads are practicable for artillery." It is clear, therefore, that, according to his own judgment, sir John Moore committed a grave offence against his art, by the separation of his artillery and cavalry from his infantry.

Again, it is useless to enquire what good end would have been served had no such separation taken place? Granting that events would have fallen out precisely as they did, we are not, therefore, justified in applauding a measure which, besides being faulty in itself, when regarded as an isolated transaction, could not possibly affect advantageously any future proceeding either of the

British or Spanish army. But this is not all. Though we are not prepared to say that the junction of Moore's and Hope's columns at Salamanca on the 25th of November, had they been reinforced, as, perhaps, they might have been, by Baird's corps, would have enabled the English general to make successful head against the overwhelming numbers opposed to him; it were ridiculous to contend that the circumstance would not have placed him more perfectly at his ease, and, as a necessary consequence, enabled him to choose, while the power of choice remained, his own field of operations. On the 25th of November the passes of the Somosierra and Guadarama were both in the hands of the allies. They might have been reinforced, and an attempt made to hold them; or, supposing this device too perilous — and there is no denying that it would have been perilous in the extreme — Madrid might have been covered till a larger force than that before which it fell had been collected against it. At this time, moreover, there lay open to sir John Moore the road into the south of Spain; a part of the country towards which he appears to have looked, from first to last, with a partial eye; while, in case of the worst, a retreat into Portugal was perfectly within his reach. But it will be said that, on the 25th of November, Baird's corps was still at Astorga, and that the presence of the 4th French corps at Rio Seco kept it from advancing beyond that point. This is true; though we have yet to learn why sir David Baird should have lingered so long by the way as to reach Astorga only on the 19th of November. When retiring, which he did on the 20th, in consequence of a communication received from Salamanca, his means of transport were found sufficiently ample to carry him on at a rapid rate; why they should have proved less effective in advance than in retreat, we know not. But, granting that he could not have moved beyond Astorga, what follows? The embarrassment occasioned by the position which sir John Moore held midway, as it were, between his detached corps, would have been entirely

averted, had Hope's division remained from the first attached to head-quarters. In that case the army from Portugal might have taken ground to its left, and made "a wipe" in passing at the 4th corps; or, failing that, its junction with Baird must have been effected in sufficient time to render the march of Napoleon by Burgos exceedingly hazardous. There are, therefore, many and valid reasons, apart from that which has been already assigned, why the separation of the army in advance ought to be lamented; and it is manifest from the whole line of his correspondence that the general himself saw them as we do now.

When we pass again from a consideration of what might have been, to review what actually did occur, we discover much of which it is impossible to speak in terms of unqualified commendation. Sir John Moore began to act offensively, after all, to attain which an offensive movement on his part could have availed, was lost. Madrid capitulated on the 3d of December. On the 10th, Moore became aware of the circumstance; and on the 12th, the British army moved from Salamanca in the direction of Valladolid. Do we blame the general for this? Far from it: it was his object to create a diversion in favour of the southern provinces, and he attained that object; but whether all the use was made of the diversion that might have been made, we are not prepared to say. From the hour that Madrid fell, sir John Moore's attention ought to have been exclusively devoted to the securing of his own retreat; including under that head the selection of some position which might have enabled him to retain, throughout the winter, a hold upon the country. His first march in the direction of Valladolid, however, cut him off, in a great measure, from Portugal; and the northern provinces became, as a matter of course, the basis of his future operations. It was now that vigorous steps ought to have been taken, in order to ascertain how far Galicia was defensible, as well as the facilities which it afforded for the establishment of magazines, to be sup-

plied, as opportunities offered, from the coast. Had this been done, who will contend that the progress of the British army to its ships would have been what it actually was? The establishment of one or two strong posts at the head of the valley of the Syl would have rendered the position of Villa Franca perfectly secure on the left; while on the right, the mountains of Asturias, scarcely penetrated by two wretched roads — which, though traversed by Ney in the month of *May*, were in *December* and *January* impassable — could have been maintained even by Romana's levies against almost any superiority of numbers. Be it observed, that we allude now only to the possibility of holding Galicia for a time. To render that province a permanent base from which the British army was to act, might or might not have been advisable; but we confess that we have not yet been able to discover any solid argument for its precipitate abandonment in the depth of winter.

Sir John Moore, however, went on, "bridle in hand," as he himself expresses it, because "apprehensive every moment that the bubble would burst." On the 14th he learned, by an intercepted letter at Alœjos, that the enemy believed him to be in full retreat towards Portugal, and that marshal Soult, with an inferior force, occupied Saldanha. His plans were immediately changed, and instead of pushing for Valladolid, he determined, after forming a junction with Baird at Benevente, to strike at the position of the enemy. It would have been a bold, but not an unwise manœuvre, had it been regarded 'as a movement in retreat;" because the obvious consequence of it was to bring down upon himself, at once, every corps which Napoleon could draw together. The necessity, therefore, of arranging beforehand every step which he might be compelled to take — in other words, of "sending officers to the rear, who might mark and prepare the halting places for each brigade," and so conduct them in good order to their fighting ground — became more urgent and obvious than ever. But these precautions Moore failed to take. Is not the proceeding

liable, under such circumstances, to be regarded as a sort of random stroke delivered by a man who avows, in one of his letters, "that it was necessary to risk the army, to convince the people of England, as well as the rest of Europe, that the Spaniards had neither the power nor the inclination to make any efforts for themselves?" For what was to be gained, even by victory? Not even the opportunity of retreating at a diminished hazard, or by a pace less accelerated, inasmuch as 90,000 men were already closing round him, with Napoleon at their head.

Again, it is ridiculous to talk of the retreat to Corunna, as of a movement conducted otherwise than with extreme haste and headlong precipitation. Till the strong ground about Astorga was won, the army could not, indeed, move too rapidly; for it was beset with multitudes which set resistance in the plain at defiance; but from that point to the coast, almost every foot of country was at least as capable of defence as the position ultimately chosen, from which to cover the embarkation. Let it not be supposed that we entertain the monstrous opinion that Astorga might have been permanently defended. Our argument goes only to this; that the nature of the country through which it passed gave such advantages to the retreating army, that the rate of marching was, from that point, at the option of the English general. Soult could not pursue more rapidly than Moore chose to retire. When, therefore, we find that eighty miles of mountain passes were compassed in two days, that more than one night-march was effected, and that many stragglers were cut off in consequence of their inability to keep up with the column, we cannot but believe that the march was pressed with a degree of hurry for which the circumstances of the case made no demand.

The truth, however, is, that an impartial examination of sir John Moore's letters furnishes strong evidence of the fact, that with a thorough knowledge of the theory of his profession, and many points of character necessary to its practice, he was wanting in one quality, for the

absence of which all other accomplishments fail to make amends. Moore under-rated his own capabilities, and entertained an exaggerated opinion of the talents of his enemies. Responsibility, likewise, was a burden too heavy to be borne, increased as it was by the anomalous position which he held in reference to the British ministers; whose powers, being undefined, were very apt to be mistaken both by the commander of the forces and himself. It is true that the circumstances into which the former was thrown were at once novel and vexatious. Buoyed up by promises which were never fulfilled, misled by those whose business it was to convey to him accurate information, harassed by the blunders of a feeble government, and left to his own resources when he had expected to act merely as an auxiliary, great allowances must be made for the despondency under which he laboured. Yet, with all these palliatives, it is impossible to deny that Moore's natural temperament was the opposite of sanguine. Now, to bear up under all imaginable disappointments, and to meet and overcome the difficulties arising out of them, is required of no man so completely or so uniformly as of the leader of an army; nor is the moral courage requisite for such a trust inherent in that mind which, at the outset of any enterprise, anticipates defeat as inevitable. Such, however, were the sentiments with which Moore began his campaign in Spain; and its issues were scarcely different from the results which might have been expected to flow out of a commencement so little auspicious.

We are not among the number of those who see, in the protracted halt at Salamanca, proofs of indecision and weakness in the English general. That halt was the unavoidable consequence of the order assumed in his march, of which the mischievous effects were certainly not diminished by the absurd transportation of sir David Baird's troops to Corunna. It was impossible for Moore to act otherwise than as he did, with one wing of his army at Madrid, the other at Astorga, and his centre midway between both. But in the

contradictory orders which he from time to time issued, now checking, now hurrying forward the column from the north, ample proof is afforded that, even to the last, his plans of action remained vague and indeterminate. Nor is the cause of this hard to be discovered. Moore entered Spain under an expectation that he should co-operate with some native leader, if not as an inferior, at all events as nothing more than the commander of auxiliary force. All his arrangements were made upon this basis; and when they proved to be illusory, he found himself unequal to the task of effecting others. In plain language, Moore was quite prepared and perfectly competent to divide with another the responsibility attached to his situation; but from the prospect of bearing it entire, he turned away with horror. To sum up all in few words, a candid survey of the history of sir John Moore's active life leads to the conclusion, that, with almost every accomplishment that is necessary towards the formation of a military mind, he was not at home in the guidance of an independent army. Brave, sagacious, active, cool and collected in danger, and well versed in the minor details of his profession, no man has ever excited more lofty expectations while ascending to a station of command. Yet the conduct of his army in Spain did not justify these expectations, nor place him in the foremost rank of British generals. Whence did this arise? We answer, without hesitation, that his failure—for a failure it was—must be attributed partly to a diffidence of his own powers, for which there was no just cause, and partly to the absence of those powers of calculation, on the exercise of which the events of war mainly depend. Experience in command might have removed these defects; in which case his career would have probably rivalled in brilliancy that of any commander, either of ancient or modern times; but, as it is, we are left to think of him with respect, perhaps with admiration, though strongly tinctured with pity. Moore was a high-minded and gallant soldier, an able and zealous second in command;

but there is nothing in his history which authorises us to place him among the most illustrious military commanders of his age.

Sir John Moore was tall and well formed, with a noble and soldier-like carriage, which a slight stoop — the consequence of repeated wounds — scarcely served to affect. His countenance was decidedly handsome; his eye full of expression; and his voice clear, deep, and musical; while his manners in society were a perfect model of those befitting the gallant soldier and the accomplished gentleman. Full of vivacity, and gifted with a playful wit, he knew as well when to assume reserve, as when to lay it aside; and if ever he spoke warmly, it was in defence of what he believed to be the truth, or in condemnation of acts or sentiments which he regarded as despicable. Moore was not merely beloved, but adored by his friends, and he included in the number almost every man that served under him. By the common soldiers he was revered as a being of a superior order; and never has an officer in high command more richly merited the devotion of his followers. Yet Moore was no sickly sentimentalist — no violator of necessary discipline under the cloak of a false generosity. While he praised, and, where it was possible so to do, rewarded the orderly and the upright, he never screened the plunderer or the disobedient from punishment; and he found, as all men who act on the same principle invariably do, that even the culprits esteemed him the more for his firmness.

With the peculiar circumstances which attended the funeral of this gallant and upright warrior, the readers of this memoir must have been long familiar. It was proposed at first to remove his honoured remains to England, that his countrymen might have an opportunity of paying to them the tribute of respect; but on the suggestion of colonel Anderson, who had frequently heard him declare, that "if he were killed in battle, he wished to be buried where he fell," the idea was abandoned. The rampart of the citadel of Corunna

was then selected as offering a fit resting-place for his body; and midnight, when the sound of war might be expected to cease, was set apart as the hour of interment. All was done with perfect regularity and order. A grave was dug in one of the bastions by a party of the 9th regiment, towards which, at the appointed time, the body of the general was conveyed. "No useless coffin shrouded his clay;" for none such could be procured; but wrapped in his cloak, and dressed as he had fallen, the hero was committed to the dust. By torch-light the chaplain-general read the funeral service, amid a group of sincere though rugged mourners, and, the earth being heaped over him, he "was left alone with his glory."

It is scarcely necessary to add, that the general and staff officers, who assisted at this melancholy ceremony, were called away at its conclusion to their posts. A random fire was heard in the front, which became gradually more serious, and led to the expectation that a second attack impended; but nothing of the kind took place. Sir John Hope, on whom the command had devolved, conducted the embarkation with admirable celerity and address, and the transports were almost all at sea ere the enemy brought a gun to bear upon them.

THE END.



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
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